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Coming into force in 2009, the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage has grown in reputation as the leading international 
instrument for the global protection of underwater cultural heritage (UCH).  While the 
Convention introduced a number of positive developments in the international system 
protecting UCH, there has been a lack of research evaluating the legal framework from a 
more critical and macro perspective.  This study therefore seeks to examine the possible 
weaknesses which may lie in the sole reliance upon an international treaty, as an 
instrument developed and enforced through the legal system of public international law.  
It argues that the multiple-value and global public good nature of UCH makes agreements 
between states to ‘cooperate’ in its protection prone to underproduction and poor 
compliance, when operating within such a consent-based system of law.  It then argues 
that numerous features of Westphalian sovereignty – including sovereign absolutism, 
equality and territoriality – can each be found at the heart of a struggling system for 
governing the oceans, which has relied too heavily upon the positivist paradigm of nation 
state authority and its manifestations through state-led public international law and 
private international law. 
 
Utilising an in-depth literature review across numerous law and governance research 
fields, as well as interviews with 11 expert respondents in the field of marine and UCH 
policy, the study examines: (1) what are the challenges relating to cooperation, 
compliance, and collective action in the protection of UCH if relying on “inter-national” 
governance, as is envisioned by the use of the UNESCO Convention; and, (2), assuming 
that new solutions are needed, whether “transnational” governance approaches – 
operating vertically at multiple policy scales (global-regional-national-local) and utilising 
private, public and hybrid actors in the provision and enforcement of regulation – might 
enhance the protection of UCH further.  In particular, it seeks to examine whether global 
governance, regional-level regimes, and community-centred collaborative governance 
could each provide additional protections for UCH, beyond the horizontal Westphalian 
paradigm.  The findings provide evidence of the weaknesses which would be inherent in 
the exclusive reliance on the UNESCO Convention and conclude that, in parallel, further 
efforts must be made to achieve new global, regional, and community policy regimes for 
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The Need for the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage 
 
Chapter Abstract: 
This chapter introduces the aims and objectives of this study.  First, it maps out the study’s 
intended objectives and the methodological approach, which will combine secondary 
source research across numerous literature fields, as well as empirical research in the 
form of interviews with experts in the fields of UCH law and marine governance.  It then 
defines underwater cultural heritage (UCH) and examines some of its key values, before 
exploring the various direct and indirect threats which render its protection and 
management an important international objective. It also produces a brief timeline to 
explain international and regional efforts at ensuring its protection over the past half 
century, eventually culminating in the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of 
the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO Convention).  The core features and 
principal achievements of the UNESCO Convention are explored and then it sets the 
context for the analysis in Chapters 2 to 5 on the difficulties that arise from enforcing the 
Convention through the paradigm of Westphalian law. 
 
1. Introduction: Improving the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage by 
Transnational Governance  
The UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 
(UNESCO Convention) has been gradually growing global momentum and membership 
since coming into force in 2009.1  Previous legal research appraising the UNESCO 
Convention has been predominantly focused upon its general ambiguity or its treatment 
of now well-trodden legal debates such as the laws of salvage, the irreconcilability of 
commerce with archaeological practices, or the sovereign immune status of sunken 
warships.2  While such literature has adequately critiqued the UNESCO Convention from 
a superficially positivist perspective, there is a lack of literature evaluating the treaty’s 
effectiveness in practice.  In particular, little attention has been paid to the fact that the 
overarching objective of the treaty was to add substance to the existing duty among States 
 
1 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 2001, 
in force 2 January 2009), 2562 UNTS 1 (UNESCO Convention).   
2 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Parties of the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) to 
“cooperate” in the protection of underwater cultural heritage (UCH).3  Looked upon 
critically, however, the Convention has merely repeated this ambiguous commitment 
between states. 
 
This thesis takes a new approach by critiquing UCH law from a broader and more critical 
perspective, questioning its real efficacy in practice and examining issues with its 
implementation globally.  Therefore, instead of criticising the substantive legal rules 
within the UNESCO Convention or the LOSC, as has been the preoccupation of much 
research up to this point, it focuses its aim more directly at the legal system within which 
those rules are developed and enforced, i.e., public international law.   The overall aim of 
the study is to explore whether the weaknesses of the UNESCO Convention, qua 
multilateral and inter-state treaty, could be better addressed by the addition of rules, 
norms, regimes and actors operating at transnational scales ranging from the global, 
regional, national, and local levels.  The focus of the chapters can therefore be broken 
into three main sections: 
 
• Chapters 1 and 2: The International Legal Rules Protecting Underwater 
Cultural Heritage 
The aims of Chapters 1 and 2 are to introduce the issues surrounding the international 
protection of UCH and the traditional legal rules which have been used in its protection, 
i.e., national law, private international law, and public international law.  
 
Chapter 1 explains and justifies the chosen methodology for addressing study’s aim, 
which is focused particularly upon the synthesis of previously disjunct fields of secondary 
source literature, such as UCH law and policy, transnational law, legal pluralism, legal 
realism, integrated ocean management, global governance, collaborative governance, 
meta-regulation, and global public goods; as well as the undertaking of 11 interviews with 
expert respondents across UCH and marine governance fields in North-Western Europe 
as empirical evidence.  It then introduces the definition of UCH and its various threats 
and values, before providing an introduction to the efforts to negotiate effective 
international rules in its protection. 
 
 
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 397 (LOSC), Art. 303(1). 
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Chapter 2 then explores the UNESCO Convention in a bit more detail, highlighting how 
it may have done a suitable job of dealing with the main concerns at the time of it drafting, 
particularly relating to the sanction of treasure hunting through laws of salvage.  However, 
it also highlights how the Convention failed to focus on the more indirect, incidental or 
illicit threats which are becoming an increasingly severe and frequent problem, such as 
looting, dredging, trawling, fishing, cable and pipe-laying, mining, energy generation and 
extraction, and offshore construction.  Ultimately, by using a ‘multiple-value’ lens 
through which to view heritage, the chapter resolves the debate between seeing UCH as 
being subject to opportunism (as it has been viewed by treasure hunters) or 
preservationism (as viewed by archaeologists), arguing in favour of better long-term 
preservation, often preferably in situ.   
 
• Chapters 3 to 5: The Weaknesses of the International Legal System 
Taking this forward, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will more directly critique the international 
system for protecting UCH by going beyond a positivist and black-and-white analysis of 
the legal rules and, alternatively, appraising their development through inter-state 
bargaining and their cross-border enforceability. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the fact that the very aim of the UNESCO 2001 Convention was to 
provide substance and meaning to an international agreement to ‘cooperate’ in the 
international protection of UCH, as widely subscribed to by most states through the 
LOSC.  It argues that the political contest for power and jurisdictional authority between 
sovereign states in the context of UCH has boiled down to such a hortatory and ad hoc 
duty to cooperate.   However, under the rubric of international law, such an equivocal 
commitment only requires an inefficient and passive type of cooperation, instead of an 
active form of cooperation requiring states to proactively pre-empt threats to UCH and to 
curtail certain excesses at the expense of their own economic advancement. 
 
Chapter 4 then takes this forward and focuses on the consent-based nature of the 
international legal system and how, by the interoperation of the game theoretical concepts 
of free riding and Prisoner’s Dilemma, public international law has proven itself to be 
weak at addressing state compliance with collective action goals which are for the global 
good, rather than for the national good.  It argues that certain characteristics of UCH 
protection, as a multiple-value good, render its production prone to positive externalities, 
thus making it an undesirable investment of political energy, time, and resources by 
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national governments.  It evidences this by pointing to numerous examples of poor state 
compliance with international commitments to protect UCH, as discovered through 
interviews and secondary research. 
 
Chapter 5 then introduces the concepts of ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ and ‘transnational 
law’, before engaging in a critical assessment of the international law of the sea as a 
system for governing the ocean.  Focusing on three particular characteristics of 
Westphalian sovereignty – absolutism, equality, and territoriality – it hopes to show that 
one of the key factors behind the poor enforcement and lack of effective governance 
regimes in the ocean is a result of a positivist approach to international law that considers 
nation states as only bound by the rules they agree to enforce against themselves and by 
which they agree to be bound.  It then demonstrates that the rules devised for protecting 
UCH in the UNESCO Convention and the LOSC are characteristic examples of such 
vague and ambiguous inter-state laws, which will propagate the persistent challenges of 
compliance, normative, knowledge, geographical and  regulatory ‘gaps’ in ocean 
management, especially in relation to protecting the marine historic environment as a 
global public good. 
 
• Chapters 6 to 10: A Transnational Approach to the Protection of Underwater 
Cultural Heritage 
Chapters 6 to 10 then explore the solution to the strained system of inter-state law, as was 
evidenced in Chapters 3 to 5, in the form of a more transnational (multi-actor, multi-level 
and public-private hybrid) approach.  This seeks to expand on the available norms and 
systems available for protecting UCH across the global framework ‘beyond the state’.  In 
particular, Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 each proceed by introducing theories and arguments in 
favour of increasing the governance role of private and public actors and norms at the 
global, regional, national, and community levels, respectively.   
 
Chapter 6 explains how the chapters that follow will break up the proposed transnational 
governance approach into a multi-level (global-regional-national-community) frame.  In 
doing so, it makes the connection between the increasingly coveted ‘integrated’ approach 
to governing the oceans and the study of transnational law and governance, before 
clarifying why it is beneficial to represent transnational governance through a multi-level 
governance frame.  It then goes on to examine the potential value of promoting the 
influence of regimes, actors and institutions at the broader ‘global’ level, particularly 
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focusing on the increasing capacity and important function of public-private networks, 
NGOs, epistemic communities, pressure groups and stakeholders in steering or impacting 
regulation protecting UCH at the global level. 
 
Chapter 7 then examines the ‘regional-level’ of transnational governance, first exploring 
the three main types of regionalisation: multilateral, supranational, and transnational.  
While the chapter discovers a surprising and unfortunate lack of existing research 
explicating the various benefits of regional-level integration in protecting collective 
interests, it does collate a summary of many key arguments and proposals towards this 
end.  It shows how regionalism is particularly effective at addressing the collective action 
‘critical mass’ and lowest common denominator issues experienced at the broader 
international level, highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5.  It then looks at UCH protection more 
specifically, examining the future role of regional-level regimes and the political 
challenges to their achievement. 
 
Chapter 8 provides a brief counter-perspective to the findings in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 10, 
by providing various defences of the traditional system of national-level governance.  It 
shows that national law has various democratic, legitimacy and familiarity advantages, 
which will make it both essential and indispensable to effective global governance.  It 
therefore sets up the various strands for future research in this area, by considering the 
democracy, accountability and legitimacy challenges inherent in transnational 
governance. 
 
Chapter 9 then looks more broadly, particularly at the local and subnational scales, at the 
private governance role of communities and stakeholders themselves.  Introducing 
research which shows the capacities of communities to self-govern and to be co-governed 
in a manner which is more effective than traditional top-down regulation, it provides 
evidence that meta-regulation should be more frequently utilised to facilitate the power 
of communities themselves in the protection of global heritage.  It demonstrates that, 
particularly through the provision of legislation, public-oriented property law and 
facilitated collaborative space, it is possible to create sufficient buy in, incentivisation or 
motivation for communities – including local and transnational networks of stakeholders 
– to craft more effective systems for protecting heritage than would otherwise be possible 
by command-and-control regulation.  This leads to recommendations that future global, 
regional, national and local policy facing collective action issues in the marine 
28 
 
environment should include co-governance elements, which delegate some power and 
responsibility back to communities themselves. 
 
Finally, Chapter 10 concludes by summarising all the arguments raised throughout 
Chapters 1 to 9, while also providing a residual defence for the ongoing role for traditional 
national-level governance (i.e., domestic law, private international law, and public 
international law) in the protection of UCH.  It intends to argue – again with reference to 
primary and secondary research in the field of UCH law and management – that both 
national-level and transnational governance are in fact positively inter-related and that 
the promotion of one mechanism will assist in strengthening the quality of the other.  It 
thus promotes the widespread ratification, implementation and promotion of multilateral 
frameworks, such as the UNESCO Convention; in parallel to more committed efforts to 
expand the role of NGOs, institutions, epistemic actors, corporations, individuals, and 
communities at the global, regional, and local level.  Considering that national-level 
regulation has been the predominant focus in the past, it therefore argues that the 
expansion of regional regimes (whether by multilateralism, supranationalism, or 
pluralism), as well as the empowerment of private and public-private communities by co-
management and collaborative governance, should therefore now be given greater 
priority and significance in the global agenda for UCH protection. 
 
2. Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage by Transnational Governance: A 
Methodology 
(a) Methodology: Combined Literature Review and Expert Interviews 
The research questions introduced in Section 1 – relating to the weaknesses of 
international law in protecting UCH and the potential advantages of adopting a more 
multiple-level approach – can be addressed with the use of evidence and research utilising 
a relatively simple methodology.  Specifically, the fact that these questions have yet to be 
explored at all with regard to UCH, neither theoretically or practically, means that this 
study can provide an initial scoping on the research theme and introduce the theories in 
the form of an extended review, analysis and appraisal of existing secondary literature.  
For example, this study provides originality and new thinking in the field of international 
UCH policy by being the first to introduce and thoroughly examine theories and concepts 
such as global public goods, multiple-value heritage management, transnational law, legal 
pluralism, rational choice theory, global governance, transboundary marine spatial 
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planning, and collaborative governance into the context of submerged archaeology.  
Given that each one of these fields consists of a large body of existing primary and 
secondary research sources which have yet to be cross-matched with the body of research 
into UCH law and policy, there is more than sufficient material and new analyses which 
can be drawn from these existing resources and no need to go beyond this in order to 
answer the specific enquiry of the study. 
 
Nevertheless, while a review of existing literature would have been sufficient to address 
the enquiries of this study (as set out above in Section 1), there are numerous advantages 
to also adopting a combined empirical approach to the study.  This empirical element – 
in the form of expert interviews – supports and expands the originality and veracity of the 
argumentation, as well as more critically addressing any gaps in the existing bodies of 
literature.  Furthermore, while the study opens new research pathways by being the first 
to apply these existing bodies of theoretical literature to UCH protection, the use of expert 
interviews can concept-test the findings and ensure that the conclusions drawn from the 
theory do match up with the practical reality.  The empirical element therefore consists 
of a series of in-depth and semi-structured interviews with leading experts on either UCH 
policy or marine governance; where the former could confirm the accuracy of conclusions 
relating to effective UCH protection and its likely interaction with marine governance; 
and the latter could confirm the accuracy of conclusions relating to effective marine 
governance, informing the protection of UCH.   
 
As the experts were intended to concept-test conclusions drawn from the analysis and 
synthesis of existing literature, it was decided that no more than 4 experts from each field 
– i.e., 4 experts in UCH policy and 4 experts in marine governance – would be needed to 
provide indorsement of the plausibility of theories raised and to adjudge whether 
hypotheses are in line with emerging policy.  In the end, this target was exceeded, with 
the final study consisting of 4 experts in marine governance and 7 leading experts in UCH 
policy.  It was also decided that, seeing as one of the core research questions is the 
potential role for regional-level governance and the enhanced transnationalisation of 
governance across subregional contexts, it would be prudent to avoid any potential bias 
by limiting the study to experts within one country and, rather, selecting experts with 
experience around a broader geographical region.  The region chosen for an emphasis in 
the study was the Northern European ocean region and, principally, the experts with 




There are a number of reasons for this choice of region.  Not only is Europe often regarded 
as a global leader in terms of effective and well-developed marine policy, but it is also a 
leading region for transboundary solutions crafted through detailed multilateral rules or 
supranational legislation.4  As Jentoft and Knol recently said, if effective transboundary 
governance ‘cannot be realized [in the North Sea], one would be hard-pressed to envision 
a situation in which it could.’5  These seas are also home to many nations with a strong 
economic interest in offshore activities and who have already begun exploring or creating 
various multilateral, supranational and transnational systems of governance across 
regional seas.6  Indeed, the BalticRIM project in the Baltic might be one of the world’s 
foremost efforts to date in utilising transboundary marine spatial planning tools to protect 
submerged cultural heritage.7  On top of this, research and expertise in marine 
archaeology and ocean governance in the North Sea and Baltic Sea is among the world’s 
leading and the seas themselves are particularly rich in terms of globally significant 
UCH.8  Yet, these same seas are regarded as increasingly crowded spaces, with an ever-
growing list of competing and overlapping sectoral demands in an ever-shrinking space.9  
 
4 Soma, K., van Tatenhove, J. and van Leeuwen, J., (2015), ‘Marine Governance in a European Context: 
Regionalization, Integration and cooperation for Ecosystem-Based Management’, 117 Ocean & Coastal 
Management 4-13; van Hoof, L., van Leeuwen, J. and van Tatenhove, J., (2012), ‘All at Sea; 
Regionalisation and Integration of Marine Policy in Europe’, 11 Maritime Studies 9-22; Freire-Gibb, L.C., 
Koss, R., Margonski, P., and Papadopoulou, N., (2014), ‘Governance Strengths and Weaknesses to 
Implement the Marine Strategy Framework Directive in European Waters’, 44 Marine Policy 172-178; 
Qiu, W. and Jones, P.J., (2013), ‘The Emerging Policy Landscape for Marine Spatial Planning in Europe’, 
39 Marine Policy 182-190. 
5 Jentoft, S. and Knol, M., (2014), ‘Marine Spatial Planning: Risk or Opportunity for Fisheries in the North 
Sea?’, 12 Maritime Studies 13-28, at p. 13; Gilek, M., Hassler, M. and Jentoft, S., (2015), ‘Marine 
Environmental Governance in Europe: Problems and Opportunities’, in Governing Europe's Marine 
Environment: Europeanization of Regional Seas or Regionalization of EU Policies?, M. Gilek and K. Kern 
(Eds.), 249-264, Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 258. 
6 Jay, S., Alves, F.L., O’Mahony, C., Gomez, M., Rooney, A., Almodovar, M., Gee, K., de Vivero, J.L.S., 
Gonçalves, J.M., da Luz Fernandes, M. and Tello, O., (2016), ‘Transboundary Dimensions of Marine 
Spatial Planning: Fostering Inter-Jurisdictional Relations and Governance’, 65 Marine Policy 85-96, at pp. 
85-86; Blæsbjerg, M., Pawlak, J.F., Sørensen, T.K. and Vestergaard, O., (2009), Marine Spatial Planning 
in the Nordic Region - Principles, Perspectives and Opportunities, Nordic Council of Ministers 
(Copenhagen), at p. 15. 
7 BalticRIM, ‘Integration of Maritime Heritage in the Maritime Spatial Planning of the Baltic Sea’, (at: 
http://www.submariner-network.eu/projects/balticrim; accessed 1 May 2019). 
8 Peeters, H., Murphy, P. and Flemming. N., (Eds.), (2009), North Sea Prehistory Research and 
Management Framework (NSPRMF) 2009, Rijksdienst voor het Cultureel Erfgoed (Amersfoort), at p. 7; 
Aznar, M.J., (2016), Protecting UCH in EU Waters: A Legal Approach (2016-17), Report Outline for Grant 
from HFF, Honor Frost Foundation (at: http://honorfrostfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
Mariano-Aznar-Protecting-underwater-cultural-heritage-in-EU-waters-a-legal-approach-2016-2017.pdf; 
accessed 1 May 2019). 
9 Flatman, J., (2012), ‘What the Walrus and the Carpenter Did Not Talk About: Maritime Archaeology and 
the Near Future of Energy’, in Archaeology in Society: Its Relevance in the Modern World, M. Rockman 
and J. Flatman (Eds.), 167-192, Springer (New York), at p. 176; House of Lords, (2015), The North Sea 
Under Pressure: Is Regional Marine Co-Operation the Answer?, 10th Report of Session 2014‒15, HL Paper 
137, Authority of the House of Lords. 
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The focus on the Northern European seas thus resulted in opinions being drawn from 
experts with a suitable mix of principal nationalities across this region (5 Dutch, 2 
German, 2 British, 1 Belgian, 1 Spanish), with many of the interviewees also having 
experience of working across national borders in this region. 
 
The qualitative interviews were primarily conducted at a distance by teleconferencing 
technology, with the exception of two responses which were conducted by a detailed 
written response and follow-up queries by asynchronous email exchange.  The content-
rich nature of the interviews meant that visual and physical cues and responses of the 
interviewees were not important, and the most important information would be the spoken 
(or written) responses of the experts, which were transcribed into a written manuscript.  
The interviews were conducted in compliance with the University of Exeter’s ethical 
rules, including the design of the questionnaire, the ancillary information provided to the 
interviewees, the rights of interviewees throughout the process, and the use of data.   
 
Before the interview, all interviewees were given the same information and set of 
questions which would form the basis of discussions.  This included questions about the 
effectiveness of the UNESCO Convention, the potential strengths and weaknesses of 
regional-level and local-level governance in protecting UCH, and the potential role and 
challenges of various governance approaches such as marine spatial planning, 
environmental impact assessments, policy networks, and public-private partnering.  The 
interviews were therefore semi-structured, with these various questions forming the 
overall basis of discussion, with the interviewees being encouraged to raise and discuss 
any and all matters they felt were of relevance with regard to the study’s area of focus 
and the overall aims of the research.  The author of the study, who was the sole interviewer 
in all cases, also asked reflexive and reactive questions based on the feedback of the 
interviewees.  This combined structure and flexibility allowed the interviewees to all 
address the same issues, while still being flexible to providing greater feedback in those 
areas of the research which were closer to their specific knowledge or experience. 
 
(b) UCH Policy Interviewees 
• Mariano J. Aznar 
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Mariano J. Aznar Gómez is Professor of Public International Law and International 
Relations at the Universitat Jaume I of Castellón.10  Aznar has published extensively in 
the field of international law and particularly on the subject of UCH law and policy.  He 
also has had numerous advisory roles and areas of responsibility for UCH planning and 
policy. 
 
• Antony Firth 
Director of Fjordr Ltd, a leading marine and historic environment consulting firm for 
heritage agencies and developers, and a former Head of Coastal and Marine at Wessex 
Archaeology Ltd.11  In addition to sitting on Historic England's Expert Advisory Group, 
Firth is also a leading author and expert in the field, having published many reports, 
articles and outputs on all manner of marine archaeology matters. 
 
• Ulrike Guérin 
Programme Specialist and Secretary of the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection 
of the Underwater Cultural Heritage.  Guérin is the head of the UNESCO Secretariat of 
UCH, responsible for coordinating states parties and ensuring management and 
implementation of the UNESCO Convention. 
 
• Thijs J. Maarleveld 
Professor of Maritime Archaeology of the University of Southern Denmark and former 
Head of the Maritime Heritage of the National Service for Archaeological Heritage 
(ROB) in the Netherlands.  Maarleveld is another world-renowned name in maritime 
archaeology, who has published widely on all issues relating to underwater heritage 
management.  He was also a founding member of the International Committee on the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage (ICUCH), as a branch of the International Council on 
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), which has advised UNESCO extensively on heritage 
issues, as well as a chairman of the working group on UCH management at the Europae 




10 ‘Aznar Gómez, Mariano J.’, Universitat de València, (at: https://www.uv.es/uvweb/college/en/pro
file/aznar-gomez-mariano-j-1285950309813/PersExtern.html?id=1285964975788&idA=true; accessed 1 
May 2019). 
11 ‘About Fjordr’, Fjordr Ltd, (at: http://www.fjordr.com/about-fjordr.html; accessed 1 May 2019). 
12 ‘Thijs J. Maarleveld’, Syddansk Universitet (SDU), (at: https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/da/persons/
tmaarleveld; accessed 1 May 2019). 
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• Martijn Manders 
Head of the Maritime Programme for the Cultural Heritage Agency of the Netherlands 
government (RCE) and also a Professor of Maritime Archaeology at University of 
Leiden.  Manders is another well-known scholar in this field and has published 
extensively on marine archaeological policy and UCH management. 
 
• Hans Peeters 
Assistant Professor of Archaeology at Gronigen University in the Netherlands.  Peeters 
was the key founder of the North Sea Prehistory Research Management Framework and 
is still frequently consulted on matters relating to UCH management as planning across 
the North Sea as part of this network.13 
 
• Mike Williams 
Visiting Professor at University of Plymouth Law School and Marine Conservation and 
Policy Research Centre and former Honorary Professor at the Institute of Archaeology, 
University College London.14  Another towering figure in the field of UCH law and 
policy, among numerous other relevant experiences and areas of responsibility, Williams 
has published extensively on the law relating to UCH and advised government 
departments and agencies, both in the UK and abroad, on marine and coastal law. 
 
(c) Marine Governance Interviewees 
• Susanne Altvater  
Maritime planning and policy consultant with s.Pro – sustainable projects GmbH and 
member of the European MSP Platform.  Among other experiences and roles in the field 
of marine governance and marine sustainability, Altvater is also in a leading role within 
the BalticRIM project in the Baltic Sea which is a leading example of a transboundary 
marine spatial planning pilot expressly focused on UCH planning.15 
 
• Frank Maes 
 
13 Supra n. 8, Peeters, Murphy and Flemming. 
14 ‘Who We Are’, University of Plymouth, (at: https://www.plymouth.ac.uk/research/cornerstone-heritage/
who-we-are; accessed 1 May 2019). 
15 ‘Susanne Altvater, Ass.iur.’, Ecologic Institute, (at: https://www.ecologic.eu/2502; accessed 1 May 
2019); ‘Susanne Altvater’, European MSP Platform, (at: https://www.msp-platform.eu/team/susanne-alt
vater; accessed 1 May 2019). 
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Professor of Law, Head of the Department for European, Public and International Law, 
as well as Director of the Maritime Institute, at Ghent University.16  Maes has authored 
or co-authored over 250 outputs in the field of international law, with a particular 
expertise in maritime law and governance.  While marked as a ‘marine governance’ 
expert for this study, he also has an expert knowledge of UCH policy. 
 
• Erik Ooms 
Project Manager on both the NorthSEE and Baltic LINes MSP projects, which are leading 
pilots on transboundary marine planning in the Northern European context.17  Ooms also 
has an MSc in European Spatial Planning and Regional Development and is an active 
team member on the European MSP Platform. 
 
• Leo De Vrees 
Senior Advisor at the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management 
(Rijkswaterstaat), with a particular responsibility for strategic environmental assessments 
and marine spatial planning in the North Sea.  De Vrees was also previously Policy 
Advisor under the EU Directorate-General for Environment, playing a role in the 
development and implementation of the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive. 
 
(d) The Study Approach 
The approach of this study is highly exploratory, analytical and discursive.  In every part 
of the study – from introducing the subject in Chapter 1, critiquing it in Chapters 2 to 5, 
making and evaluating recommendations in Chapters 6 to 10 – the viewpoints of the 
experts have been integrated into the study, with their responses being referenced or 
quoted in combination with secondary evidence.  While the core questions outlined above 
have provided an undergirding to the entire theoretical analysis, there are numerous other 
issues and questions which are either raised and addressed as the narrative of the study 
progresses, which are signposted as areas which are covered elsewhere, or which would 
be suitable for future enquiry.   
 
 
16 ‘Prof. Dr. Frank. Maes’, Rolin Jaequemyns International Law Institute (Ghent), (at: http://www.grili.
ugent.be/members/faculty/prof-dr-frank-maes; accessed 1 May 2019). 




3. The Many Threats and Values of Underwater Cultural Heritage 
(a) The Need for Underwater Cultural Heritage Protection 
It is widely accepted that the protection of UCH formed something of an afterthought 
during the negotiations over the LOSC.18  Given its pivotal role in delegating primary 
rules of ocean governance between states, the LOSC is frequently regarded as a 
‘constitution for the oceans’.19  However, it was subsequent to the conclusions of the 
UNCLOS III negotiations between 1973 and 1982 that the protection of UCH 
experienced a large surge in global concern, demanding firm-footed legislative action.20  
This was particularly a result of vastly improved technology providing deeper access into 
the ocean at considerably less cost,21 as well as a number of controversial global headlines 
on the salvage of famous wrecks such as the SS Central America,22 Geldermalsen,23 or 
CSS Alabama.24 
 
Related legal cases are increasingly common in this post-UNCLOS period.  For example, 
RMS Titanic has been subject to endless court cases and controversies since its discovery 
in 1985.25 Another famous liner, RMS Lusitania, has also been the subject of court 
 
18 O’Keefe described UCH as having a ‘low priority’ in the UNCLOS negotiations (O’Keefe, P.J., (2014), 
Shipwrecked Heritage: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2nd 
Edn, Institute of Art and Law (Builth Wells), at p. 12); Caflisch referred to the LOSC’s consideration of 
UCH as only ‘cursory’ (Caflisch, L., (1982), ‘Submarine Antiquities and the International Law of the Sea’, 
13 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3-32, at p. 6); Watters, D.R., (1983), ‘The Law of the Sea 
Treaty and Underwater Cultural Resources’, 48(4) American Antiquity 808-816. 
19 Koh, T.T.B, (1982), Statement of the Ambassador, President of the Conference at Final Session in 
Montego Bay, 11 December 1982, Reprinted in: United Nations, (1983), The Law of the Sea: Official Text 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations (New York), at p. xxxiiii. 
20 The development of UNCLOS is regularly referred to as having taken place over three periods of 
negotiations, with UNCLOS I (1956-1958), UNCLOS II (1960) and UNCLOS III (1973-1982). 
21 Nafziger, J.A.R., (1999), ‘The Titanic Revisited’, 30(2) Tulane Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 
311-330, at p. 312; Firth, A., (2015), The Social and Economic Benefits of Marine and Maritime Cultural 
Heritage: Towards Greater Accessibility and Effective Management, Fjodr Ltd, Honor Frost Foundation 
(London), (at: http://honorfrostfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/HFF_Report_2015_web-
4.pdf; accessed: 1 May 2019), at p. 15. 
22 Winter, M., (2014), ‘Gold Worth Millions Recovered from 1857 Shipwreck’, 17  July 2014, USA Today, 
(at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/17/shipwreck-atlantic-gold-rush/12800743/; 
accessed 1 May 2019). 
23 Miller, J., (2010), ‘Antique Collectors’ Corner: Cargo Salvaged from Shipwrecks’, 11 March 2010, The 
Telegraph, (at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/interiors/7420034/Antique-collectors-corner-cargo-
salvaged-from-shipwrecks.html; accessed 1 May 2019); Miller, G.L., (1992), ‘The Second Destruction of 
the Geldermalsen’, 26(4) Historical Archaeology 124-131. 
24 Zeller, B., (1987), ‘US Hopes to Emerge the Winner in Battle to Salvage Warship’, 3 November 1987, 
Journal of Commerce, (at: http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/us-hopes-emerge-winner-battle-salvage-
warship_19871103.html; accessed 1 May 2019). 
25 Cases in the United States have included: R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 924 
F.Supp2d 714 (E.D. Va. 1996); R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 9 F. Supp. 2d 624 
(E.D. Va. 1998); R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. 1999); R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked 
& Abandoned Vessel, No. 2:93cv902 (E.D. Va. 1999); R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 
286 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2002); R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 
2006); R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 531 F.Supp.2d 691 (E.D. Va. 2007); 
R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 742 F.Supp.2d 784 (E.D. Va. 2010).  See BBC News, 
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intervention in each the United States, Ireland and Britain.26  Salvage claims relating to 
treasure-laden Spanish galleons carrying gold and bullion from the New World have also 
been frequent headlines in the media, such as the Nuestra Señora de Atocha and Nuestra 
Señora de las Mercedes.27  Furthermore, especially more so today, there are growing 
news reports detailing the looting of metals and other materials from sunken 20th Century 
warships, often protected as important military gravesites.28  Given the multitude of 
growing threats to this finite and irreplaceable resource from diverse activities (see 
subsection 2), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) was therefore consulted by the archaeological community in 1995 on the 
feasibility of an international legal instrument aimed at the protection of UCH as common 
heritage of humanity.29  The resulting 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage (the “Convention”) entered into force in January 2009 with 
its 20th instrument of ratification.30   
 
 
‘Titanic Salvage Hits Storm of Protest’, 14 August 1998, (at: http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/
tech/150962.stm; accessed 1 May 2019); Marschall, K., (1995) ‘A Titanic Task: Confronting the 
Controversy of Salvaging’, November 1995, 24(2606) USA Today Magazine 50-51; Aznar, M.J. and 
Varmer, O., (2013), ‘The Titanic as Underwater Cultural Heritage: Challenges to its Legal International 
Protection’, 44(1) Ocean Development & International Law 96-112, at p. 97. 
26 Bemis v. RMS Lusitania, 884 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1995); Pierce and Another v. Bemis and Others 
(The Lusitania), [1986] QB 384, [1986] 1 All ER 1011; Kingston, W., (2015), ‘Ireland Spent $1 Million 
Preventing Research into Lusitania’, November/December 2015, 6(23) History Ireland, (at: 
http://www.historyireland.com/volume-23/ireland-spent-1-million-preventing-research-into-lusitania; 
accessed 1 May 2019). 
27 Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982); Odyssey Marine Exploration, 
Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011). 
28 E.g., BBC News, (2018), ‘UK Investigates WW2 Shipwreck Looting Claims’, 19 August 2018, BBC 
News, (at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-45238158; accessed: 1 December 2018); Lamb, K., (2018), 
‘Lost Bones, A Mass Grave and War Wrecks Plundered off Indonesia’, 28 February 2018, The         
Guardian, (at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/28/bones-mass-grave-british-war-wrecks-
java-indonesia; accessed: 1 December 2018); Brean, J., (2017), ‘‘It’s Grave Robbing’: Treasure Hunters 
Suspected to have Looted Infamous 1915 Shipwreck’, 5 December 2017, National Post, (at: https://www.
nationalpost.com/news/canada/its-grave-robbing-treasure-hunters-suspected-to-have-looted-infamous-
1915-shipwreck; accessed: 1 December 2018); Holes, O., (2017), ‘Sunken Australian Warship HMAS 
Perth Ransacked by Illegal Scavengers’, 5 June 2017, The Guardian, (at: https://www.theguardian.co
m/australia-news/2017/jun/05/sunken-australian-warship-hmas-perth-ransacked-by-illegal-scavengers; 
accessed: 1 December 2018); Middleton, J. and Neal, C., (2018), ‘Shipwreck Looters Who Plundered 
Historical Artefacts from Royal Navy Warship at Bottom of the Sea Jailed’, 22 June 2018, The               
Mirror, (at: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/shipwreck-looters-who-plundered-historical-127711
86; accessed: 1 December 2018); Mema, B., (2018), ‘Looters Plunder Albania's Sunken Treasures’, 18 
November 2018, Phys.Org, (at: https://www.phys.org/news/2018-11-looters-plunder-albania-sunken-treas
ures.html; accessed: 1 December 2018). 
29 UNESCO, (1995), Feasibility Study for the Drafting of a New Instrument for the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage, 12 March 1995, Executive Board, 146th Session, UN Doc. 146 EX/27, 
UNESCO (Paris). 
30 The 20th instrument was brought by Barbados in October 2008.  See list of states parties at: ‘Convention 
on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage. Paris, 2 November 2001’, UNESCO, (at: 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13520; accessed 1 May 2019). 
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(b) Defining “Underwater Cultural Heritage” 
The term “underwater cultural heritage” is a relatively recent one.  Early references 
include terms such as ‘objects of archaeological or historical significance’ under Article 
149 of the LOSC and ‘archaeological heritage … situated … under water’ under the 1992 
European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage.31  
Contemporaneously, the term “cultural heritage” has in recent years developed its own 
significance and meaning and has come to be the preferred term to broadly capture a host 
of objects, landscapes, buildings, social practices and identities, and stretching to the 
abstract and intangible.32  At one time, as within the 1954 Hague Convention on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,33 or the UNESCO 1970 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,34 the reference to cultural heritage was only 
to cultural “property”.  The substitution of ‘heritage’ for ‘property’ represents the move 
away from an object-oriented approach which merely identifies the economic and 
tangible aspects of property, towards the broad perspective inclusive of all these diverse 
derivatives of “heritage”.35 
 
The addition of the word ‘underwater’, first emerging from the Council of Europe’s 1978 
Recommendation,36 is a logical step.  ‘Underwater’ has in a sense been adopted from the 
field of ‘underwater archaeology’, wherein ‘maritime archaeology’ or ‘nautical 
archaeology’ have connotations to ships, seafaring and naval history, and ‘marine 
archaeology’ denotes archaeology in and around the sea, but is neglectful of inland sites; 
and so the term ‘underwater archaeology’ is regarded as the broader and more inclusive 
 
31 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised), (adopted 16 January 
1992 (Valletta), in force 25 May 1995), Council of Europe, ETS No. 143 (hereafter ‘Valletta Convention’), 
Art. 1(3). 
32 Hoffman, B.T. (Ed.), (2006), Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, Cambridge University 
Press (Cambridge); Blake, J., (2015), International Cultural Heritage Law, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford). 
33 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, (adopted 14 May 
1954, in force 7 August 1956), UNESCO, 249 UNTS 240. 
34 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, (adopted 14 November 1970, in force 24 April 1972), UNESCO, 823 
UNTS 231. 
35 Prott, L.V. and O'Keefe, P.J., (1992), ‘‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural Property’?’, 1(2) International 
Journal of Cultural Property 307-320; Frigo, M., (2004), ‘Cultural Property v. Cultural Heritage: A “Battle 
of Concepts” in International Law?’, 86(854) International Review of the Red Cross 367-378; Convention 
for Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, (adopted 17 October 2003, in force 20 April 2006), 
UNESCO, 2368 UNTS 1. 
36 Council of Europe, (1978), ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage’, Recommendation 848, Parliamentary 
Assembly, 18th Sitting, 4 October 1978, (at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.as
p?fileid=14882; accessed 1 May 2019). 
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definition.37  Thus, as with underwater archaeology, ‘underwater’ does not merely cover 
objects on the seabed, but includes heritage found in rivers, lakes, canals, in intertidal 
zones, as well as partially submerged objects.  Despite UCH being most commonly 
associated with shipwrecks, its definition is intended to also be broadly inclusive of any 
submerged cultural manmade object, be that discarded or lost objects, aircraft and other 
vessels,38 structures and buildings,39 as well as prehistoric objects and sites from classical 
antiquity,40 such as the now-submerged Mesolithic dwellings in the Taiwan Strait,41 to 
inland Bronze Age crannog settlements across Northern Europe,42 to ancient submerged 
harbours and town buildings.43  There were suggestions during the drafting of the 
UNESCO Convention that, as with natural heritage, cultural heritage could also be 
inclusive of landscapes.44  However, given the term’s lack of precision, as well as the 
potential for misuse by encircling swathes of seabed for protection, this proposal was 
eventually shelved.45  
 
In the end, the UNESCO Convention negotiations led to a reasonable definition of UCH, 
which was defined under Article 1 as:  
 
 
37 Delgado, J.P. and Staniforth, M., (2002), ‘Underwater Archaeology’, in Archaeology: Volume 1, 
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), D.L. Hardesty (Ed.), 227-248, Developed under the 
Auspices of the UNESCO, Eolss Publisher (Paris), at pp. 227-229. 
38 E.g. Fix, P.D., (2011), ‘From Sky to Sea: The Case for Aeronautical Archaeology’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Maritime Archaeology, A. Catsambis, B. Ford and D.L. Hamilton (Eds.), 989-1009, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford). 
39 E.g. Rogers, A., (2013), ‘Social Archaeological Approaches in Port and Harbour Studies’, 8(2) Journal 
of Maritime Archaeology 181-196. 
40 E.g. Firth, A., (2011), ‘Submerged Prehistory in the North Sea’, in The Oxford Handbook of Maritime 
Archaeology, A. Catsambis, B. Ford and D.L. Hamilton (Eds.), 786-808, Oxford University Press (Oxford). 
41 Chang, K.C., (1989), ‘The Neolithic Taiwan Strait’, 6 Kaogu 541-569. 
42 Guérin, U. and Raish, C., (2009), The Interest of the Ratification of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 
Convention for Landlocked Countries, Secretariat of the 2001 Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, (at: http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/
images/Landlocked_01.pdf; accessed 1 May 2019), at p. 3. 
43 Marchant, J., (2009), ‘Drowned Cities: Myths and Secrets of the Deep’, New Scientist, November 2009, 
(at: https://www.newscientist.com/round-up/drowned-cities-myths-secrets-of-the-deep/; accessed 1 May 
2019). 
44 UNESCO, (1997), Report by the Director-General on the Findings of the Meeting of Experts Concerning 
the Preparation of an International Instrument for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 
151st Session, 12 March 1997, Paris, UN Doc. 151 EX/10, UNESCO (Paris), at Annex I, para. 9 and 
opinions of Tunisia, Republic of Korea and Venezuela delegates, at pp. 3, 5 and 6; c.f. Tuddenham, D.B., 
(2010), ‘Maritime Cultural Landscapes, Maritimity and Quasi Objects’, 5(1) Journal of Maritime 
Archaeology 5-16. 
45 Ibid, UNESCO, Paras. 9-10. Dromgoole also reports how the UNESCO Convention would have been an 
unsuitable instrument to handle such a multidimensional challenge (Dromgoole, S., (2013), Underwater 
Cultural Heritage and International Law, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 89). 
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‘all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or 
archaeological character which have been partially or totally under water, 
periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years such as:  
(i) sites, structures, buildings, artefacts and human remains, together 
with their archaeological and natural context;  
(ii) vessels, aircraft, other vehicles or any part thereof, their cargo or 
other contents, together with their archaeological and natural 
context; and  
(iii) objects of prehistoric character.’46 
 
The definition also goes on to exclude certain specific manmade objects that serve a 
modern-day technical purpose such as cables, pipelines and other industrial 
installations.47  While this is regarded as a firm definition in law, it should be immediately 
clear that various aspects which have been subject to critique.48  In particular, three such 
criticisms have been: the time limited period of 100 years since submersion; the 
requirement of having ‘a cultural, historical or archaeological character’; and, conversely, 
the lack of a significance criterion which could lead to an overly broad definition of what 
constitutes archaeological heritage. 
 
It has been argued that the lack of significance criterion could mean that all feasible traces 
of human existence over 100-years-old are included, including garbage or discarded 
fragments of objects.49  In fact, the belief in the Convention’s over-inclusiveness was a 
 
46 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 1(a). 
47 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 1(b) and (c).  Given statements made on behalf the pipeline and 
cable-laying industries regarding the removal of disused cables (International Cable Protection Committee, 
(2016), ‘ICPC Achievements’, July 2016, ICPC, (at: http://www.iscpc.org/documents/?id=2050; accessed 
1 May 2019), as well as an awareness that such activities are already regulated under the LOSC and via the 
IMO (e.g., International Maritime Organization, (1989), Guidelines and Standards for the Removal of 
Offshore Installations and Structures on the Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 
Resolution A 672(16), 10 October 1989, IMO (London)) it was decided to remove them from the purview 
of the Convention.  Nevertheless, there is perhaps an argument that any cables or pipelines over 100 years 
old are likely to cross over into the bounds of “UCH”, similar to the regime foreseen for industrial 
installations under Article 1(c). 
48 See generally: Forrest, C., (2002), ‘Defining Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 31(1) The Journal of 
Nautical Archaeology 3-11. 
49 Bederman, D.J., (1998), ‘The UNESCO Draft Convention on Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Critique 
and Counter-Proposal’, 30 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 331-354, at pp. 332-333; Bautista, L., 
(2013), ‘Ensuring the Preservation of Submerged Treasures for the Next Generation: The Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage in International Law’, in Securing the Ocean for the Next Generation: Papers 
from a Law of the Sea Institute, UC Berkeley-Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology Conference 
(May 2012, Seoul), H. Scheiber and M. Kwon (Eds.), Berkeley Law (Berkeley), (at: https://ro.uow.
edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2491&context=lhapapers; accessed: 18 November 2018), at pp. 23-24; 
Williams, M., (2018), Interview with Mike Williams, 18 June 2018, Transcript on File. 
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key objection of several countries abundant with UCH, such as the United Kingdom, who 
rejected the final draft on the basis, inter alia, that it would allocate them the exceedingly 
burdensome task of protecting an estimated 10,000 wrecks in their territorial waters.50  
However, when it comes to the protection of a vulnerable, fragile, and non-renewable 
resource, it is better to be over-inclusive with disagreements over the exceptions; rather 
than under-inclusive with disputes over the potential additions.51  Furthermore, despite 
the concerns raised during negotiations,52 the definition could be said to include a 
significance criterion.  The inclusion of ‘cultural, historical or archaeological character’ 
makes clear that the Convention does not apply to all traces of human existence over 100 
years old, but that there is a minimum base level of characteristics required.53  With regard 
to the objection by the UK that it faced onerous responsibilities, it has also become largely 
accepted that a key distinction in the Convention is between stricter state responsibilities 
in matters ‘directed at’ UCH, with minimised aspirational duties regarding activities 
‘indirectly affecting’ UCH.54  Finally, some have questioned the fairness of defining UCH 
based on characteristics ascribed to it solely by the archaeological or historical 
community, considering the other multifarious communities wishing to similarly protect 
 
50 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, (2001), UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage: UK Explanation of Vote, FCO (London); The exact number of wrecks in UK territorial 
waters remains uncertain, with estimates since the UNESCO negotiations including less than 1,000 wrecks 
which qualify as UCH under the UNESCO Convention, to a total of 40,000 wrecks of all standards in 
English waters alone, and a 2010 survey concluding that there are 7,900 known wrecks with 2,800 of these 
meeting the UNESCO definition (see Roberts, P. and Trow, S., (2002), Taking to the Water: English 
Heritage’s Initial Policy for the Management of Maritime Archaeology in England, English Heritage 
(London), at pp. 5-6; Firth, A., (2011) ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage off England: Character and 
Significance’, in Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage in International Waters adjacent to the UK: 
Proceedings of the JNAPC 21st Anniversary Seminar, Burlington House November 2010, R.A. Yorke (Ed.), 
15-22, Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee (Horsham). 
51 Coleman, P., (2013), ‘UNESCO and the Belitung Shipwreck: The Need for a Permissive Definition of 
Commercial Exploitation’, 45(4) George Washington International Law Review 847-874, at p. 855; 
Carducci, G., (2003), ‘New Developments in the Law of the Sea: The UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 96(2) American Journal of International Law 419-434, at p. 
423. 
52 According to Forrest, delegates from each Japan, Sweden, Egypt, US and UK all voiced concern over 
the lack of any significance criterion (Forrest, C., (2002), ‘A New International Regime for the Protection 
of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 51(3) International Comparative Law Quarterly 511-554, at p. 524; 
Supra n. 49, Bederman, at p. 333. 
53 Dromgoole, S., (2003), ‘2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage’, 18(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 59-108, at p. 64; Supra n. 51, Carducci, 
at p. 423; c.f. ‘Whether the phrase … actually adds anything to the definition is doubtful.’ (Supra n. 18, 
O'Keefe, at p. 34).  Indeed, even marine garbage could be of archaeological interest, thus making the 
definition of UCH an intriguingly complex and value-driven assessment (Arnshav, M., (2014), ‘The 
Freedom of the Seas: Untapping the Archaeological Potential of Marine Debris’, 9(1) Journal of Maritime 
Archaeology 1-25). 
54 UK UNESCO 2001 Convention Review Group, (2014), The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of 
the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001: An Impact Review for the United Kingdom – Final Report, United 
Kingdom National Commission for UNESCO (London), (at: https://www.unesco.org.uk/wp-content/upl
oads/2017/09/UNESCO-Impact-Review_2014-02-10.pdf; accessed: 18 November 2018), at pp. 58-68; 
Supra n. 50, Firth, 18-19; Supra n. 51, Carducci, at pp. 423-424. 
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it as a fishery, recreational, commercial or cultural resource.55  However, as will be 
elucidated in Chapter 2, given that archaeologists are the most protective and least 
consumptive of UCH under a multiple-use model, it is logical that their more 
preservationist stance might establish the threshold on which to adjudicate significance.56 
 
(c) The Value of Underwater Cultural Heritage 
It is crucial that we protect this fragile and non-renewable resource for the many important 
values it provides.  This includes the historical information which is stored within all 
underwater archaeological sites.  Behind every single shipwreck, submerged human 
dwelling, vessel or object, is a hugely important human story, as well as a repository of 
academic theories and scientific data, ready to be decoded and disseminated.57  
Shipwrecks are therefore often regarded by archaeologists as ‘time capsules’: moments 
paused in time with the entire layout and context preserved in suspense.58  It is this 
archaeological, historical and informational value of our global submerged heritage that 
has spearheaded the international movement to ensure its proper care and management. 
 
Less noted, however, and as is also explored in more critical detail in Chapter 2, is how 
UCH also possesses great cultural, social, economic, scientific and intrinsic values.  
Culturally, it helps us identify with the cultures of our past and understand why certain 
cultures are the way they are today,59 as well as assist in understanding early migrations 
and cultural interchanges.60  Through underwater sites we can understand the society and 
culture of early people and civilisation, as well as the roles and activities of sea-going 
communities, sailors and passengers.61  Significantly, we can learn where many objects, 
 
55 Supra n. 49, Bautista, at p. 24; Supra n. 49, Bederman, at p. 354. 
56 See Chapter 2. 
57 Bass, G.F., (2011), ‘The Development of Maritime Archaeology’, in The Oxford Handbook of Maritime 
Archaeology, A. Catsambis, B. Ford and D.L. Hamilton (Eds.), 3-24, Oxford University Press (Oxford); 
Varmer, O., (1999), ‘The Case Against the “Salvage” of the Cultural Heritage’, 30(2) Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce 279-302, 287-291. 
58 Bowens, A., (Ed.), (2008), Underwater Archaeology: The NAS Guide to Principles and Practice, 2nd 
Edn, Nautical Archaeological Society, Wiley-Blackwell (New Jersey), at pp. 16-17. 
59 E.g. Agius, D.A., Cooper, J.P., Semaan, L., Zazzaro, C. and Carter, R., (2016), ‘Remembering the Sea: 
Personal and Communal Recollections of Maritime Life in Jizan and the Farasan Islands, Saudi Arabia’, 
11(2) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 127-177, at pp. 167-171. 
60 Farr, H., (2006), ‘Seafaring as Social Action’, 1(1) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 85-99; Dobbs, C., 
(2008), ‘Heritage Microbiology, Science and the Mary Rose: What are we Trying to Achieve?’, in Heritage 
Microbiology and Science: Microbes, Monuments and Maritime Materials, E. May, M. Jones and J. 
Mitchell, J. (Eds.), 3-10, Royal Society of Chemistry (London), at p. 6. 
61 Ransley, J., (2011), ‘Maritime Communities and Traditions’, in The Oxford Handbook of Maritime 
Archaeology, A. Catsambis, B. Ford and D.L. Hamilton (Eds.), 879-906, Oxford University Press (Oxford); 
Dolwick, J.S., (2008), ‘In Search of the Social: Steamboats, Square Wheels, Reindeer and Other Things’, 
3(1) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 15-41; Domingues, F.C., (2011), ‘Maritime History and Maritime 
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rituals, languages, skills and technologies around the world travelled from and to.62  There 
is also a scientific value in underwater sites in and of themselves, in that they represent 
rare and largely under-researched chemical and biological environments, where the long-
term preservation and degradation of countless materials, in various types of underwater 
environment, needs greater scientific research.63  Furthermore, in understanding how 
submerged manmade objects have inadvertently created life-abundant artificial reefs.64 
 
There is great human value in our historic marine heritage.  Not just in our connection 
with our ancestors, or with the storytelling power of shipwreck, castaways, pirates, trade, 
slave ships, deportations, emigrations, heroic warfare, exploration and disaster, but with 
the innate value we place upon protecting and preserving all that is “us”.65  We all 
understand the human value in treating the human remains of those condemned to the 
depths with utmost respect and regard wrecks of maritime disasters with the same 
sanctitude as burial grounds.66  Underwater sites also represent significant economic 
value: not just the high market value of cultural artefacts, or the salvage value of materials 
and cargo, but more so their in situ value from tourism and recreational activities such as 
wreck diving, dive trails, glass-bottom and submersible-boat tours, or virtual wreck 
tours.67  Finally, there is an innate value in protecting our underwater heritage for its 
aesthetic, unique and totally irreplaceable qualities as a matter of course.   
 
Archaeology’, in The Oxford Handbook of Maritime Archaeology, A. Catsambis, B. Ford and D.L. 
Hamilton (Eds.), 907-916, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 912. 
62 Supra n. 60, Farr; Chirikure, S., Sinamai, A., Goagoses, E., Mubusisi, M. and Ndoro, W., (2010), 
‘Maritime Archaeology and Trans-Oceanic Trade: A Case Study of the Oranjemund Shipwreck Cargo, 
Namibia’, 5(1) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 37-55. 
63 E.g. Oxley, I., (2008), ‘The Investigation of the Factors That Affect the Preservation of Underwater 
Archaeological Sites’, in Maritime Archaelogy: A Reader of Substantive and Theoretical Contributions, 
L.E. Babits (Ed.), 523-530, Springer (New York); Moore, J.D., (2015), ‘Long-Term Corrosion Processes 
of Iron and Steel Shipwrecks in the Marine Environment: A Review of Current Knowledge’, 10(2) Journal 
of Maritime Archaeology 191-204; Overfield, M.L. and Symons, L.C., (2009), ‘The Use of the RUST 
Database to Inventory, Monitor, and Assess Risk from Undersea Threats’, 43(4) Marine Technology Society 
Journal 33-40. 
64 Hiscock, K., Sharrock, S., Highfield, J. and Snelling, D., (2010), ‘Colonization of an Artificial Reef in 
South-West England—ex-HMS ‘Scylla’’, 90(1) Journal of the Marine Biological Association of the United 
Kingdom 69-94; Perkol-Finkel, S., Shashar, N. and Benayahu, Y., (2006), ‘Can Artificial Reefs Mimic 
Natural Reef Communities?’, 61(2) Marine Environmental Research 121-135. 
65 E.g. See the Preamble to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions (adopted 10 October 2005, in force 18 March 2007), 2440 UNTS 311, which 
expresses at length the human value of cultural diversity; Taylor, K., (2004), ‘Cultural Heritage 
Management: A Possible Role for Charters and Principles in Asia’, 10(5) International Journal of Heritage 
Studies 417-433, at p. 426. 
66 Jacobsson, M. and Klabbers, J., (2000), ‘Rest in Peace? New Developments Concerning the Wreck of 
the M/S Estonia’, 69(3) Nordic Journal of International Law 317-332; Harris, J.R., (2001), ‘The Protection 
of Sunken Warships as Gravesites at Sea’, 7(1) Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 75-130. 
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(d) The Threats to Underwater Cultural Heritage 
It is useful to understand the threats to UCH as divided between those which can be 
regulated specifically as activities directed at UCH – namely salvage, removal, regulated 
access, or archaeological studies – and those which are regulated more indirectly, such as 
looting, vandalism, damage, pollution, construction and development, fishing, climate 
change, and naturally occurring damage.  All these secondary indirectly regulated threats 
are therefore incidental, unauthorised or unanticipated in nature.  This distinction is 
important because, as is shown in Chapter 2, the UNESCO Convention has only 
addressed regulation of activities directed at UCH, being salvage and substandard 
archaeology.  By contrast, it does very little to address the ever-growing and increasingly 
critical list of incidental and unpredictable threats. 
 
i. Directly regulated threats to underwater cultural heritage 
• Salvage and the Law of Finds 
As explored further in Chapter 2, one of the most prominent threats to UCH has been the 
use of centuries-old maritime laws to obtain a reward for recovering artefacts, treasures 
and valuable cargoes and returning them into the stream of commerce.  This doctrine, 
along with the similar doctrine of the law of finds, has been preserved, particularly within 
common law legal systems, from its ancient roots in the maritime laws of admiralty.  
Unfortunately, while salvage law remains a suitable system for rewarding a niche 
commercial sector of the maritime community undertaking professional work retrieving 
recently lost wreck and cargo, it is a wholly unsuitable system for managing underwater 
archaeological sites which demand long-term preservation for public value and 
archaeological research.68   
 
Unfortunately, therefore, the 1970s to 1990s witnessed the propulsion to global fame and 
widespread admiration of the riches of treasure hunters who were “salvaging” historic 
wrecks laden with treasure, such as Mel Fisher, Mike Hatcher, Robert Marx and Edward 
Lee Spence.  Although there remain several such examples, one of the more notorious 
 
Throckmorton, P., (2008), ‘The World’s Worst Investment: The Economics of Treasure Hunting with Real-
Life Comparisons’, in Maritime Archaelogy: A Reader of Substantive and Theoretical Contributions, LE. 
Babits (Ed.), 75-84, Springer (New York); Supra n. 44, UNESCO, at para. 59; UNESCO, (2013), The 
Benefit of the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage for Sustainable Growth, Tourism and Urban 
Development, UNESCO (Paris) (at: http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/
UCH_development_study_2013.pdf; accessed 1 May 2019). 
68 See Chapter 2. 
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treasure salvage companies in recent times has been Odyssey Marine Exploration (OME), 
who have been the subject of numerous television documentaries, as well as involved in 
a number of controversial cases relating to the commercial recovery of UCH.69  
Furthermore, the threat from salvage does not just relate to organised treasure hunting 
operations, but also to general pilfering by a small minority of recreational divers and 
other maritime stakeholders.  Depending on the legal system, such opportunists have a 
number of angles by which they can profit from such activities, either by keeping the 
looted goods or selling them on the black market (see ‘Looting’ below), or obtaining 
financial reward in those countries still recognising commercial salvage as possible on 
archaeological sites, such as in the United Kingdom.70   
 
Private individuals and commercial salvage companies are not the only perpetrators.  The 
UK Government itself received significant worldwide criticism when it entered into a 
commercial salvage agreement with OME to share in the spoils of an excavation of HMS 
Victory (1744) in the English Channel.71  The first-rate ship was one of the most famous 
and feared of Britain’s 18th Century Navy before her sinking in the seas off the Channel 
Islands laden with an estimated £500m worth of gold coins, along with 1,100 men and 
over 100 giant bronze cannon, while en route back from fighting in the Tagus Estuary, 
Portugal.72  The arrangement between the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) and OME to 
undertake an “archaeological” recovery of the site and share profits from raising the gold 
caused controversy, given its prima facie conflict with values of the UNESCO 
Convention and its principles.73  As at writing, this case is going towards a judicial review 
in the English High Court, wherein we are facing a showdown between OME and the 
archaeological community.74 
 
69 Odyssey Marine Exploration (at: https://www.odysseymarine.com/; accessed: 1 May 2019); Temiño, 
I.R., (2017), ‘The Odyssey Case: Press, Public Opinion and Future Policy’, 46(1) International Journal of 
Nautical Archaeology 192-201.  
70 Martin, J.B. and Gane, T., (2019), ‘Weaknesses in the Law Protecting the United Kingdom’s Remarkable 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Call for Modernisation and Reform’, Journal of Maritime Archaeology 
(Forthcoming). 
71 Dromgoole, S., (2006), ‘United Kingdom’, in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: 
National Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, 2006, (Dromgoole, S., Ed.), 313-350, 
Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 329. 
72 Howard, F., (1979), Sailing Ships of War 1400-1860, 1979, Conway Maritime Press (Greenwich), at p. 
182. 
73 Supra n. 71, Dromgoole, at p. 340; Shute, J., ‘Tory Lord Defends the Treasure Hunt for HMS Victory’, 
The Telegraph, 15 February 2015, (at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/11411508/Tory-Lord-defends-
the-treasure-hunt-for-HMS-Victory.html; accessed 1 May 2019). 
74 Hussain, D., (2019), ‘Wreck of 300-Year-Old HMS Victory that Pre-Dated Lord Nelson's Famous 
Flagship is Still Tied Up in a Legal Wrangle Over Efforts to Raise it a Decade After it was Discovered 50 
Miles off Plymouth’, The Daily Mail, 15 February 2019, (at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-671




Another example is the much-reported legal contestation between US salvage company, 
Sea Search Armada Inc., and the Colombian government.  In 2015, Colombia announced 
the “discovery” of the San José wreck in what they regard as their territorial waters – 
although it is in fact sitting on their continental shelf in what is widely regarded as 
international waters.75  This archaeologically significant wreck represents a mass 
gravesite where 600 crew and passengers immediately sank to their deaths following a 
calamitous munitions explosion aboard the 60-gun Spanish galleon, during Wager’s 
Action in 1708 during the Spanish War of Succession.76  It is now being guarded by the 
Colombian Navy with the discernible intent of commercially exploiting a gigantic cache 
of gold and jewels which she was carrying back from Peruvian and Bolivian colonies, 
estimated to be worth between $4 billion to $7 billion.77  The ship’s coordinates were 
handed to the Colombian government as far back as 1982 by Sea Search Armada, who 
proposed to split the spoils of her loot equally in accordance with a newly promulgated 
Colombian law.  Evidently the Colombian government is not willing to share after all.78 
 
• Substandard Archaeology 
The other principal threat to UCH arises from activities directed at UCH has been the 
problem of substandard archaeology, such as recovery or excavation projects which are 
carried out prematurely or with a generally deficient research plan which fails to properly 
record archaeological information or properly care for recovered materials.  This threat is 
also closely interlinked with the threat of salvage and commercial exploitation in the sense 
that a common form of substandard archaeology is the undertaking of recovery or 
excavation studies which are eventually funded out of the resale of the artefacts and which 
merely use archaeology as a façade for discernible profit motives.  The general threat of 
poor archaeology being carried out on UCH remains a threat, even within states who are 
members of the UNESCO Convention.79   
 
75 Drye, W., ‘Battle Begins Over World's Richest Shipwreck’, National Geographic News, 18 December 
2015, (at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/12/151218-san-jose-shipwreck-treasure-colombia-arc
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76 Phillips, C.R., (2007), The Treasure of the San José: Death at Sea in the War of the Spanish Succession, 
Johns Hopkins University Press (Baltimore), at pp. 165-171. 
77 Kraul, C., (2016), ‘U.S., Colombian Treasure Dispute May Soon Play Out at Sea’, Los Angeles Times, 
10 January 2016, (at: http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-colombia-treasure-20160110-
story.html; accessed 1 May 2019); Watts, J. and Burgen, S., (2015), ‘Holy Grail of Shipwrecks Caught in 
Three-Way Court Battle’, The Guardian, 6 December 2015, (at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
dec/06/holy-grail-of-shipwrecks-in-three-way-court-battle; accessed 1 May 2019). 
78 Ibid; Supra, n. 75. 




However, given that the very focus of the UNESCO Convention was on addressing such 
directly regulated activities, it is worth noting that it has been quite effective at addressing 
this threat.  For example, as highlighted later, the ‘Rules Concerning Activities Directed 
at the Underwater Cultural Heritage’ in the Annex to the Convention (the ‘Rules’), as 
well as the accompanying Manual for Activities Directed at Underwater Cultural 
Heritage, have driven forward a consistent and reasonably high set of standards for all 
archaeological interventions and management decisions.80  Similarly, as is explored 
further in Chapter 2, the Convention has performed reasonably well at reducing the role 
of private commercial exploitation within archaeological projects directed at UCH and 
has set rules on when intervention should be justified, i.e., the point at which the in situ 
preservation of a site is no longer the best option for its protection. 
 
ii. Indirectly regulated threats to underwater cultural heritage 
• Looting 
Perhaps the biggest threat to the UCH, outside of state-authorised salvage and 
archaeology, has been the covert and unreported looting and pilfering of artefacts, 
souvenirs or materials at UCH sites.81  This is an indirectly regulated threat in the sense 
that regulation can only be enforced after-the-event, once the positive evidence of looting 
can be pieced together.  It is therefore an unauthorised and unpredictable activity from a 
regulatory perspective. A particular difficulty is that most UCH sites are in highly 
exposed, vulnerable and under-policed locations.  In many cases, objects may even be 
opportunistically lifted from sites whose location or existence has not even been yet 
discovered by others.  For those sites which are known, even if they are officially 
designated as protected or if national regulation is in place to prosecute offenders for 
stealing from sites, it is incredibly difficult to detect breaches of the law or, in many cases, 
to compile sufficient evidence to carry forward a successful prosecution.  This challenge 
is compounded even further in areas of the developing world where the incentive to profit 
from stealing is even higher and the resources to carry out effective criminal 
 
80 See infra Section 4(b). 
81 Gould, R.A., (2011), Archaeology and the Social History of Ships, 2nd Edn, Cambridge University Press 
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investigations and prosecutions are lower.  Yet, even in the states which are regarded as 
leading in the management of UCH, such as France and Italy, the use of technology and 
investment in offshore policing capacity has not yet been sufficient to completely deter 
looting. 
 
In addition to the global attention-grabbing headlines, such as those relating to large-scale 
stripping of metals from famous World War I and II warships, it also needs to be 
recognised that looting and pilfering of UCH takes place every day through ostensibly 
innocent souvenir-taking by tourists and recreational divers.82  With each individual 
pocketing the effect seems minimal, but when multiplied by the tens of thousands of 
divers around the world, it all adds up to a major global catastrophe.83  While the vast 
majority of wreck divers have adopted the preservationist stance, the evidence of such 
widespread pilfering over the past decades has been clear and incontrovertible.84  Indeed, 
cultural sites once rich with countless artefacts are, after periods of recreational activity, 
left barren with nothing more than a decaying hulk as proof of their existence.85   
 
• Fishing  
Being an indirectly regulated activity should not detract from the severity of fishing as a 
global threat to UCH.  Some have even tried to argue it represents the greatest threat of 
all.86  While the suggestion is quite wide-sweeping, it is not unfounded: especially if one 
considers that the most destructive method of fishing, bottom-trawling, is estimated to 
cover an area equivalent to 50% of the world’s continental shelf every year.87   
Furthermore, this is happening in the areas where underwater heritage is found in the 
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highest concentration.  Indeed, wrecks can often themselves become artificial reefs 
teeming with aquatic life, colourful biodiversity and marketable sources of seafood.88  
Such ‘bulldozing’ is happening indiscriminately and in locations where we simply do not 
know what historic heritage is there to be found.  Kingsley highlights how historically 
significant sites such as the 8,000-year old Mesolithic site known as Doggerland, the 
wreck of the 73-gun Dutch warship Eendracht sunk in 1665 in the Battle of Lowestoft, 
and the unstudied humungous Mongol invasion fleet of Kublai Khan destroyed by a 
hurricane in 1281 on its way to Japan, are all sites threatened by fishing.89 
 
Shellfish dredging, lobster potting and longline fishing are techniques that present a 
further risk to our heritage.  Shipwrecks often show evidence of such damage by snagged 
hooks, pots, nets and lines eventually cut loose, sometimes after partially damaging or 
displacing the wreck first.90  Also, from an ecological perspective, overfishing severely 
disrupts the fragile biological environment preserving our heritage.  For example, the 
rapid acceleration in biological deterioration of Titanic and Bismarck, since their 
discovery in the 1980’s, is widely put down to overfishing near the surface leading to 
nutrients falling around the ships, which then attracted a greater diversity of deep sea 
marine life, including higher concentrations of iron-consuming bacteria.91  Even though 
cultural heritage protection appears lower down on the international agenda than marine 
environmental protection, it is worth noting that marine flora and fauna often have an 
opportunity of regeneration; however, once bulldozed or dragged away, historic heritage 
is obliterated forever.92 
 
• Industry and Development 
In addition to fishing and trawling, there are numerous other economic activities – such 
as building infrastructure, dredging, oil and gas extraction, building renewable energy 
farms, and cable and pipelaying – which pose an increasingly critical threat to UCH.  In 
 
88 Krumholz, J.S. and Brennan, M.L., (2015), ‘Fishing for Common Ground: Investigations of the Impact 
of Trawling on Ancient Shipwreck Sites Uncovers a Potential for Management Synergy’, 61 Marine Policy 
127-133. 
89 Supra n. 86, Kingsley, at pp. 66-67. 
90 Kingsley, S.A., (2010), ‘Deep-Sea Fishing Impacts on the Shipwrecks of the English Channel & Western 
Approaches’, in Oceans Odyssey: Deep-Sea Shipwrecks in the English Channel, the Straits of Gibraltar 
and the Atlantic Ocean, G. Stemm and S.A. Kingsley (Eds.), 191-234, Oxbow Books (Oxford). 
91 Pellegrino, C., (2012), Farewell, Titanic: Her Final Legacy, John Wiley & Sons (Hoboken), at pp. 53-
54. 
92 HM Government, (2011), UK Marine Policy Statement, March 2011, HM Government Stationery Office 
(London), (at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_




most national legal systems, such activities are increasingly subject to licensing based on 
prior environmental impact assessments being carried out, including a heritage impact 
assessment considering potentially affected UCH.  The unpredictable quality and 
reliability of any such impact evaluation processes, as well as the resulting decision-
making process related to proposed activities, is explored particularly in Chapter 4. 
 
• Vandalism and Destruction 
Vandalism can range from comparatively innocent prodding, pushing and touching, to 
more recognisably criminal activities such as interference, graffiti and arson.93   Such 
destruction can also be accidental, such as when one of James Cameron’s submersibles 
collided with the hull of the Titanic wreck causing significant damage,94 or it can be more 
reckless, such as landing on or anchoring directly above wrecks when visiting.95 
 
• Pollution 
Sea pollution is a sadly familiar tragedy.  From land run-offs of nitrogen-rich agricultural 
pesticides, to large-scale industrial disposal of toxic metals and compounds, to pipeline 
sewerage of harmful wastes, to floating islands of non-biodegradable and hazardous 
debris, to shipping pollution, to oil rig explosions leaving our blue ocean infused with 5 
million barrels of poisonous and suffocating, thick, black oil.96  It should be clear that 
pollution presents a direct and indirect threat to underwater heritage through alteration or 
deterioration of the marine environment. There is also a difficulty of pollution being left 
by tourists visiting dive sites.  All such pollution can damage UCH sites by disturbing or 
confusing their archaeological context, or through heavy or harmful objects falling upon 
them, or by discarded dangerous objects, such as explosives, mines and radioactive 
substances, restricting access to them.97 
 
93 McKinnon, J.F., (2015), ‘Memorialization, Graffiti and Artifact Movement: A Case Study of Cultural 
Impacts on WWII Underwater Cultural Heritage in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands’, 
10(1) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 11-2. On arson, see e.g. Davidson, B., (2003), ‘West Pier Arson 
Probe’, The Argus, 28 March 2003 (at: http://www.theargus.co.uk/news/5113744.West_Pier_arson_probe; 
accessed 1 May 2019). 
94 Eaton, J.P. and Haas, C.A., (1999), “Titanic”: A Journey Through Time - An Illustrated Chronology of 
History's Most Famous Ship, Patrick Stephens Ltd (Sparkford), at p. 205. 
95 Edney, J., (2006), ‘Impacts of Recreational Scuba Diving on Shipwrecks in Australia and the Pacific: A 
Review’, 5(1/2) Micronesian Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 201-233, at p. 214. 
96 Weis, J.S., (2015), Marine Pollution: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press (Oxford); 
McNutt, M.K., Camilli, R., Crone, T.J., Guthrie, G.D., Hsieh, P.A., Ryerson, T.B., Savas, O. and Shaffer, 
F., (2012), ‘Review of Flow Rate Estimates of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill’, 109(50) Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 20260-20267. 
97 Bacchi, U., (2015), ‘Sunken Fascist Ship that Became Mafia Underwater Explosives Trove Sealed by 
Italian Navy’, International Business Times, 27 November 2015, (at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sunken-
fascist-ship-that-became-mafia-underwater-explosives-trove-sealed-by-italian-navy-1530854; accessed 1 




• Climate Change 
A truly indirect harm to our international underwater heritage is that occurring from 
artificially accelerated alterations in the submarine environment.  Both Dunkley and 
Perez-Alvaro recently analysed the ever-present global threat that climate change presents 
to our UCH, showing that increasing sea temperatures may result in greater numbers of 
invasive species.98   For example, warming seas are likely to cause a greater proliferation 
and northward migration of blacktip shipworm Lyrodus pedicellatus, which is a great 
menace of historic wooden wrecks.99  Rising sea levels will exponentially decrease the 
amount of time that archaeological divers will have to study wrecks and, more 
disquietingly, presents an alarming threat to submerged and partially submerged coastal 
and intertidal heritage sites.  How the resulting increase of upper beach and terrestrial 
sediment in the marine environment might destabilise underwater archaeological sites is 
also hard to predict.100   
 
It is well known that the ocean plays an essential regulator of global CO2 levels by 
absorbing CO2 and acting as a giant reservoir of carbon.
101   However, increases in 
anthropogenic CO2 output since the Industrial Revolution has dramatically altered the 
levels of absorption, leading consequently to decreasing pH levels (acidification).102  We 
do not know exactly what the potentially corrosive effects that increased ocean 
acidification will have on underwater structures and objects, but it is perhaps not difficult 
to guess.  Changes to the aquatic environment, such as external weather patterns and 
increasing salinity differentials from increased rainfall and melting polar ice caps, might 
also have significant impacts on the force and unpredictability of underwater currents.103  
Climate change is truly an indirect harm and one needing to be addressed at the global 
level across every sector of society.  Thus, the global imperative of achieving better ocean 
 
(at: http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20151027-the-ticking-time-bomb-of-the-thames; accessed 1 May 
2019). 
98 Dunkley, M., (2015), ‘‘Climate is What We Expect, Weather is What We Get’: Managing the Potential 
Effects of Oceanic Climate Change on Underwater Cultural Heritage’, in Water & Heritage: Material, 
Conceptual and Spiritual Connections, W.J.H. Willems and H.P.J. van Schaik (Eds.), 217-230, Sidestone 
Press (Leiden); Perez-Alvaro, E., (2016), ‘Climate Change and Underwater Cultural Heritage: Impacts and 
Challenges’, 21 Journal of Cultural Heritage 842-828. 
99 Ibid, Dunkley, at p. 221; Ibid, Perez-Alvaro, at p. 843. 
100 Ibid, Dunkley, at p. 222. 
101 Handa, N. and Ohsumi, T. (Eds.), (1995), Direct Ocean Disposal of Carbon Dioxide, Terra Scientific 
Publishing Company (Tokyo). 
102 Raven, J., Caldeira, K., Elderfield, H., Hoegh-Guldberg, O., Liss, P., Riebesell, U., Shepherd, J., Turley, 
C. and Watson, A., (2005), Ocean Acidification Due to Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, The Royal 
Society (London). 
103 Supra n. 98, Dunkley, 225-226. 
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governance in the regulation of fisheries, waste, energy and other marine economic 
activity all further supports us in the preservation of our marine historic heritage. 
 
• Naturally Occurring Damage 
As with all heritage environs – marine, subterranean, terrestrial and extraterrestrial – there 
is an element of naturally occurring degradation caused by non-anthropogenic 
environmental factors.  In terms of UCH, such natural causes are often: the biological 
breakdown of materials, often through bacterial, fungal or faunal organisms;104 the 
chemical breakdown of materials, such as through corrosion, rusting or concretion;105 and 
the physical breakdown of materials, such as from underwater currents, storms, 
earthquakes and volcanoes.106  In many cases, however, it is believed that underwater 
sites are capable of reaching a state of biological, chemical and physical equilibrium 
wherein their condition is relatively stable, especially for non-ferrous materials.107  All 
such harms are worsened as a result of anthropogenic pressures, but have a baseline level 
that is ecologically inevitable and for which the effects can only be minimised by better 
preparation, monitoring and intervention.  
 
4. The UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage 
(a) The Route to the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage 
It is apparent that the protection of UCH was only a brief and last-minute consideration 
during the globally significant UNCLOS III negotiations, between 1973 and 1982, for a 
new law of the sea convention.108  The laudable suggestion of utilising coastal state 
resources to protect UCH, often referred to as a ‘Cultural Protection Zone’, was 
 
104 Ward, I.A., Larcombe, P. and Veth, P, (1999), ‘A New Process-Based Model for Wreck Site Formation’, 
26(5) Journal of Archaeological Science 561-570, at p. 563. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Booth gives the examples of the Girona, a Spanish Armada ship off Northern Ireland which is battered 
by storms each year, and of the Rabaul volcano in Papua New Guinea, which erupted and damaged popular 
dive sites in the vicinity (Booth, F., (2006), ‘The Collision of Property Rights and Cultural Heritage; the 
‘Salvors and Insurers’ Viewpoints’, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, B.T. Hoffman 
(Ed.), 293-299, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 293). 
107 Quinn, R., (2006), ‘The Role of Scour in Shipwreck Site Formation Processes and the Preservation of 
Wreck-Associated Scour Signatures in the Sedimentary Record – Evidence from Seabed and Sub-Surface 
Data’, 33(10) Journal of Archaeological Science 1419-1432; Gregory, D., (1995), ‘Experiments into the 
Deterioration Characteristics of Materials on the Duart Point Wreck Site: An Interim Report’, 24(1) The 
International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 61-66; Supra n. 57, Varmer, at pp. 280-281.   
108 Aznar, M.J.., (2003), ‘Legal Status of Sunken Warships “Revisited”’, 9(1) Spanish Yearbook of 
International Law 61-101, 85; Supra n. 20. 
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eventually raised by Greece and a supporting group of countries; yet came after 
negotiations on the continental shelf had already been completed.109  Regardless, the 
whole concept faced considerable opposition from maritime states, particularly from the 
US, UK and Netherlands in the particular case.110  Maritime states emphasised the 
significant concessions already offered to coastal states, such as the development of the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and a regime for exploiting minerals and resources of the 
continental shelf.111  As a result, the United States proposal of restricting the protection 
of UCH to a more vague and generalised duty on flag states won out.112 
 
Article 303, being the central article on UCH protection under the widely ratified and 
influential LOSC, is therefore awkwardly bolted on to the back of the convention.113  In 
some small effort to appease the numerous coastal states supporting greater substantive 
protections for cultural sites, a right of enforcement was unimaginatively annexed to 
unrelated enforcement powers in the contiguous zone.114  ‘The unfortunate result is that 
article 303 smacks of the worst aspects of a hastily agreed compromise’, that is ‘vague, 
ambiguous and ill-conceived.’115 
 
Article 303 provides that: 
 
‘1. States have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and 
historical nature found at sea and shall cooperate for this purpose. 
2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in 
applying article 33 [relating to the contiguous zone], presume that their 
removal from the seabed in the zone referred to in that article without its 
 
109 Informal proposal by Cape Verde, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia, Informal 
Meeting, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/43 Rev. 3, 27 March 1980, United Nations (New York); Arend, A., 
(1982), ‘Archaeological and Historical Objects: The International Legal Implications of UNCLOS III’, 
22(4) Virgininia Journal of International Law 777-804, at pp. 793-796. 
110 Supra n. 18, Caflisch, at p. 17. 
111 Dromgoole, S., (2013), ‘Reflections on the Position of the Major Maritime Powers with Respect to the 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001’, 38 Marine Policy 116-
123. 
112 Risvas, M., (2013), ‘The Duty to Cooperate and the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 2(3) 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 562-590, at p. 566; Nordquist, (1985), United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. I, M.H. Nordquist, S. Rosenne and 
L.B. Sohn (Eds.), Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 161.  See Chapter 3. 
113 Supra n. 18. 
114 This clause ‘is widely regarded as ineffective and insufficient for protection of the underwater cultural 
heritage’ (O’Keefe, P.J. and Nafziger, J.A.R., (1994), ‘The Draft Convention on the Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 25(4) Ocean Development and International Law 391-418, at p. 409). 
115 Frost, R., (2004), ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage Protection’, 23 Australian Yearbook of International 
Law 25-50, at p. 30. 
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approval would result in an infringement within its territory or territorial 
sea of the laws and regulations referred to in that article. 
3. Nothing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners, the law 
of salvage or other rules of admiralty, or laws and practices with respect 
to cultural exchanges. 
4. This article is without prejudice to other international agreements and 
rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an 
archaeological and historical nature.’116 
 
There are many flaws with Article 303 which have drawn criticism.  For example, in 
addition to awkwardly affixing UCH protection through unrelated enforcement rights in 
the contiguous zone under Article 303(2),117 Article 303(3) was subsequently criticised 
for leaving the entire practice of salvage – the most prominent and direct legal threat to 
UCH – out of the Convention. Indeed, Scovazzi once famously referred to this as an 
‘invitation to looting’.118  There are also uncertainties as to how Article 303(4) interacts 
with Article 311 on the creation of future agreements that are not in keeping with the 
jurisdictional balance of the LOSC.119  In particular, Chapter 3 singles out concentrated 
criticism for Article 303(1) and for the normatively vague ‘general duty’ of cooperation 
sustained by powerful maritime states.120  Overall, therefore, Article 303 is frequently 
regarded as having created a ‘legal vacuum . . .  that could easily lead to a first-come-
first-served approach’.121   
 
In addition to Article 303, there is also an unusual reference to UCH in the LOSC within 
the sui generis legal framework developed for the deep seabed (the ‘Area’) under Part 
XI.122  Here, Article 149 States that: 
 
 
116 Supra n. 3, LOSC, Art. 303. 
117 See Chapter 2. 
118 Scovazzi, T., (2002), ‘The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage’, in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Legal Aspects, G. Camarda and T. 
Scovazzi (Eds.), 113-134, Giuffrè Editore (Milan), at p. 125; Scovazzi, T., (2014), ‘Underwater Cultural 
Heritage as an International Common Good’, in International Law for Common Goods: Normative 
Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture and Nature, F. Lenzerini and A.F. Vrdoljak (Eds.), 215-230, Hart 
(Oxford), at p. 222. 
119 Supra n. 111, Dromgoole, at p. 121. 
120 See Chapter 3. 
121 Supra n. 118, Scovazzi, ‘UCH as a Common Good’, at p. 221. 
122 This separate treatment of UCH is a result of the UNCLOS III negotiation being broken up into 
committees, with the First Committee looking separately at the regime for the peaceful uses of the deep 
seabed and the Second Committee more generally examining the law of the sea. 
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‘All objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area 
shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, 
particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the State or country 
of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and 
archaeological origin.’123 
 
Despite a nod of acknowledgement to the calls by several delegates for effective UCH 
protection in the Area, Article 149 is riddled with uncertainties and carries questionable 
enforceability as a legal norm.124  What are objects of an ‘archaeological or historical 
nature’?  What does it mean by ‘disposed of’?125  How do we know what is ‘for the benefit 
of mankind’?  Why include both ‘country’ and ‘state’ of origin?126  What are ‘preferential 
rights’ and how do we know if they have been regarded?127  Who are states of ‘cultural’, 
‘archaeological’ or ‘historical origin’, if not the state that owns the heritage?128  In using 
the word ‘or’ does it mean ‘as opposed to’ or ‘also including’?129  Who is responsible for 
implementing and overseeing Article 149?  Should it be International Seabed Authority 
(ISA) who have been specifically appointed to administer the Area?130  For all of these 
 
123 Supra n. 3, LOSC, Art. 149. 
124 Scovazzi, T., (2006), ‘The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage’, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, B.T. Hoffman (Ed.), 285-292, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at pp. 286-287; Supra n. 49, Bautista, at p. 16; Oxman, B.H., 
(1988), ‘Marine Archaeology and the International Law of the Sea’, 12(3), Columbia VLA Journal of Law 
and the Arts 353-372, at p. 361; Supra n. 45, Dromgoole, at pp. 31-32; Strati, A., (1991), ‘Deep Seabed 
Cultural Property and the Common Heritage of Mankind‘, 40(4) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 859-894, at pp. 871-892. 
125 ‘The phrase ‘shall be preserved or disposed of’ writes an unfortunate conflict into the article-the question 
whether to preserve a shipwreck requiring the suspension of exploration or construction projects at 
enormous cost, or to “dispose of” it in some other way.’ (Prott, L.V. and O’Keefe, P.J., (1984), Law and 
the Cultural Heritage – Vol. 1: Discovery and Excavation, Professional Books (Abingdon), at p. 98). 
126 Forrest, C., (2008), ‘Historic Wreck Salvage: An International Perspective’, 33(2) Tulane Maritime Law 
Journal 347-380, at p. 369. 
127 The meaning of ‘preferential rights’ remains incredibly vague in terms of UCH and is thus entirely 
ambiguous (Huang, J., (2013), ‘Chasing Provenance: Legal Dilemmas for Protecting States with a 
Verifiable Link to Underwater Culture Heritage’, 84 Ocean and Coastal Management 220-225, at p. 221; 
Supra n. 53, Dromgoole, at p. 60). 
128 E.g., Ibid, Huang, at pp. 220-221; Supra n. 124, Strati, at p. 886; Watters, D.R., (1983), ‘The Law of the 
Sea Treaty and Underwater Cultural Resources’, 48(4) American Antiquity 808-816, at p. 811. 
129 ‘Article 149 recognises three different categories of States as claimants to these rights without defining 
the employed terms and without establishing priorities. Inevitably, conflicts will arise as to which State has 
priority over the discovered items. With shipwrecks, the additional problem may arise as to whether the 
right of the State of origin of the ship prevails over the right of the State of origin of individual artefacts 
from its cargo.’ (Supra n. 124, Strati, at pp. 879-880). 
130 The mandate of the ISA is to oversee ‘activities in the Area’ which are restrictively defined under Article 
1(2) as mineral exploration and exploitation (supra n. 3, LOSC, Art. 157(3); Strati, A., (1995), The 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: An Emerging Objective of the Contemporary Law of the 
Sea, Springer (New York), at pp. 300-306; Caflisch has said of this weakness that it deprives Article 149 
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reasons, it was widely accepted that the LOSC had completely failed to protect UCH.131  
As Aznar recently said, Article 149 ‘contains so many caveats . . . that the legal regime it 
creates fails to provide clear answers on how to protect the UCH’,132 such that Dromgoole 
once referred to it as an ‘empty shell’.133  As a result, as Strati once put it, the LOSC 
‘scheme is, no doubt, incoherent and incomplete.  Archaeological and historical objects 
found on the continental shelf, beyond the 24-mile limit, are “free for all”, while those 
found on the deep seabed are to be preserved for the benefit of mankind as a whole.’134 
 
While UNCLOS III was under way, efforts were undertaken at the Council of Europe to 
draft a convention for the protection of UCH across neighbouring states (hereafter the 
‘1985 Draft European Convention’).135  The exercise proved successful in demonstrating 
that middle ground can be found on many points of contention on UCH protection, such 
as rules on salvage and the proper archaeological treatment of sites.136  In many ways, 
however, given that its negotiation took place immediately after UNCLOS, negotiations 
over the 1985 Draft European Convention struggled to go beyond the strict jurisdictional 
limits which were set in the detailed UNCLOS negotiations.137  Furthermore, the resulting 
draft Convention failed when submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval, where 
once more it was the question of jurisdiction beyond territorial waters, and the Greek 
proposal of a cultural protection zone, which caused particular consternation among 
maritime nations.138  Later, another European Convention, this time a broad 1992 
European Convention relating to the protection of archaeological sites (‘Valletta 
Convention’),139 specifically made reference to preservation of UCH with the intention 
 
131 One noted Law of the Sea commentary has said that the LOSC’s treatment of UCH was ‘complicated 
and not complete’ (Nandan, S.N., (2002), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary, Volume VI, M.H. Nordquist, S.N. Nandan, M.W. Lodge and S. Rosenne (Eds.), Martinus 
Nijohoff (Leiden), at p. 230. 
132 Aznar, M.J., (2017), ‘Exporting Environmental Standards to Protect Underwater Cultural Heritage in 
the Area’, in The International Legal Order: Current Needs and Possible Responses, J. Crawford, A. 
Koroma, S. Mahmoudi and A. Pellet (Eds.), 253-273, Brill Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 256; ‘Article 149 is vague 
enough to allow more than one interpretation.’ (Supra n. 124, Strati, at p. 878). 
133 Supra n. 45, Dromgoole at p. 261. 
134 Supra n. 124, Strati, at p. 890. 
135 Supra n. 36, Council of Europe, para. 1(a); Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, (1985), ‘Ad Hoc 
Committee of Experts on the Underwater Cultural Heritage (CAHAQ), Final Activity Report’, in 
Conclusions of the 387th Meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, Doc. CM/Del/Concl (85) 387, 115-120, 
Council of Europe (Strasbourg). 
136 Supra n. 45, Dromgoole, at p. 44. 
137 ‘The influence of UNCLOS III is hardly surprising given that the final versions of Articles 149 and 303 
had been more or less settled by the time [the committee] started its work’ (supra n. 45, Dromgoole, at pp. 
42-43). 
138 Supra n. 135, CAHAQ Final Activity Report.  Turkey provided the main opposition to the draft given 
particular disagreements with Greece over the impact of a cultural protection zone on the Aegean Sea 
(Supra n. 45, Dromgoole, at pp. 42-43; Supra n. 130, Strati, at p. 87). 
139 Supra n. 31, Valletta Conventtion. 
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of increasing protection in this field.140  However, while highly successful and widely 
adopted as an archaeological site management treaty, it did not address the conflicting 
national perspectives toward UCH protection beyond the territorial sea.141  Furthermore, 
the treaty was developed from a land planning perspective, with a more general objective 
of harmonising archaeological standards, so did not effectively translate into the marine 
environment or address the specific threats to UCH.142   
 
In 1989, the International Law Association’s newly created Cultural Heritage Committee 
began work on a convention for the protection of UCH,143 drawing up a first Draft 
Convention in 1990144 and a second Draft in 1992.145  However, it was the third Draft, 
published in 1994 at the ILA’s 66th Conference in Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires Draft)146 
which was ultimately forwarded on to UNESCO for consideration as an international 
instrument.147  Meanwhile, the International Committee on the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (ICUCH) was established in 1991 as a special sub-committee of ICOMOS, 
tasked with developing a set of archaeological principles to be included within the draft 
convention.148  After developing two draft agreements, one in London in 1994, then in 
Paris in 1995, the ICUCH developed its International Charter on the Protection and 
Management of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, which was presented and adopted at 
the 11th ICOMOS General Assembly in Sofia in October 1996 (ICOMOS Charter).149 
 
140 ‘The archaeological heritage shall include structures, constructions, groups of buildings, developed sites, 
moveable objects, monuments of other kinds as well as their context, whether situated on land or under 
water.’ (Supra n. 3, LOSC, Art. 1(3). 
141 Supra n. 18, O’Keefe, at p. 11; For example, the Explanatory Memorandum of the Valletta Convention 
(supra n. 31) equivocally declares that state jurisdiction over UCH ‘can be coextensive with the territorial 
sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone or a cultural protection zone’. 
142 Supra n. 45, Dromgoole, at p. 47. 
143 Supra n. 114, O’Keefe and Nafziger, at p. 391. 
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(London), Appendix I. 
145 International Committee on Cultural Heritage Law, (1992), ‘Report and Draft Convention for 
Consideration at the 1992 Conference’, in Report of the Sixty-Fifth Conference, Held at Cairo, Egypt, 21-
26 1992, A. Boyle, A.H.A. Soons, E. Gaillard and Y. Iwasawa (Eds.), 338-365, International Law 
Association (London). 
146 International Committee on Cultural Heritage Law, (1994), ‘Buenos Aires Draft Convention on the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage – Final Report’, in Report of the Sixty-Sixth Conference, 
Held at Buenos Aires, Argentina, 14-20 August 1994, J. Crawford and M. Williams (Eds.), 432-451, 
International Law Association (London). 
147 Supra n. 18, O’Keefe, at p. 23. 
148 See generally, ICOMOS, (2014), Statute of the ICOMOS International Committee on the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage, 17 September 2014, ICOMOS (Paris), (at: http://www.icuch.icomos.org/icuch-statutes; 
accessed 1 May 2019) 
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January 1997, ICOMOS (Paris), (at: https://www.icomos.org/newsicomos/news1991/1997-7-1.pdf; 




In 1993, UNESCO began investigating the feasibility of an international instrument along 
the lines of the Buenos Aires Draft,150 with the results being presented to the Executive 
Board at its 146th Session in 1995.151  It found that the LOSC’s treatment of UCH was 
‘not adequate’ and that a sui generis international instrument was needed, as opposed to 
a mere extension of the LOSC through an implementation agreement.152  It further 
concluded that the Buenos Aires Draft would form a good starting point and that 
UNESCO would be the most suited international organisation to oversee its development 
and implementation.153  From here the UNESCO Convention was drafted via yearly 
intergovernmental meetings of expert representatives from UNESCO Member States, 
along with interested states, organisations and experts, which were held in Paris from 
1998 to 2001, with the final adoption of the UNESCO Convention taking place at a 
plenary session, in November 2001, following UNESCO’s 31st General Conference in 
October.154  The final treaty was adopted with 87 states in favour, 4 states against,155 and 
15 states abstaining.156  It contains 35 Articles, with an accompanying Annex codifying 
a further 36 Rules detailing underwater archaeological principles of good practice and 
providing practical guidance on ensuring UCH preservation (the ‘Rules’).  The Rules 
were negotiated separately by a team of marine archaeology experts, but with a close 
reliance on the ICOMOS Charter and Valletta Convention.157 
 
The Convention does not create a permanent body to oversee its implementation, but 
instead instituted a regular Meeting of the Parties (MOP), where the parties will 
themselves negotiate the MOP’s ongoing functions and responsibilities,158 supported by 
a permanent UNESCO Secretariat in Paris.159  The Convention also encouraged the MOP 
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Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, UN Doc. 146 EX/27, UNESCO (Paris). 
152 Ibid, Para. 42. 
153 Ibid, Paras. 18-20. 
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UN. Doc 31/C Proceedings, UNESCO (Paris), at pp. 561-571. 
155 Russian Federation, Norway, Turkey and Venezuela. 
156 Brazil, Czech Republic, Colombia, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Guinea-Bissau, 
Netherlands, Paraguay, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay and United Kingdom.  See statements made by 
many of these states regarding their vote in: Garabello R. and Scovazzi, T. (Eds.), (2003), The Protection 
of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Before and After the 2001 UNESCO Convention, Martinus Nijhoff 
(Leiden), at pp. 239-253. 
157 Supra n. 54, UK UNESCO Convention Review Group, at p. 18. 
158 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 23, paras. 1-3. 
159 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 24. 
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to establish a supporting Scientific and Technical Advisory Body (STAB), to provide 
expert support to the MOP ‘in questions of a scientific or technical nature.’160  Such 
STABs are an increasingly common feature in environmental treaties, being particularly 
effective at ensuring all decisions are guided from a scientific and non-political 
perspective.161  Notably, however, unlike most modern environmental treaties, the 
Convention provides no clear mechanism for reviewing the implementation of the treaty 
in states’ internal legislation, instead relying on the states to monitor their implementation 
of its rules themselves.162 
 
Despite a relatively languid start, the Convention has recently begun to gain global 
traction and, at the time of writing, has 61 states parties.163  Although the text initially 
only seemed palatable to less-developed coastal and landlocked states,164 recent 
indications are that increasingly powerful maritime states – the original detractors of the 
Convention – are beginning to recognise its necessary import, with states such as Spain, 
Portugal, France, Italy, Argentina, Algeria, South Africa, Egypt, Belgium and Morocco 
all having joined. Interestingly, the Netherlands, Germany and Ireland, each once critical 
of the Convention, are also soon to be added to the growing list of maritime states.165  
Even one of the Convention’s most prominent detractors and one whose national laws 
conflict quite considerably, the United Kingdom, even declared in a government White 
Paper in 2016 that it will reconsider its position and may soon ratify.166  However, from 
what can only be perceived as political distraction from the vote to leave in the EU 
Referendum in June 2016 (known as ‘Brexit’), the UK later repealed this promising 
statement of intent in September 2017.167   
 
 
160 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 23, paras. 4 and 5. 
161 For example, the United Nations 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity has been particularly 
effective by incorporating a Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA).  
See generally, van der Hove, S., (2007), ‘A Rationale for Science–Policy Interfaces’, 39(7) Futures 807-
826; c.f. Khakzad, S., (2014), ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage Sites on the Way to World Heritage: To Ratify 
the 2001 Convention or Not to Ratify?’, 2(1) Journal of Anthropology and Archaeology 1-16, at p. 13. 
162 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 22. 
163 See UNESCO, ‘Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage. Paris, 2 November 
2001 – States Parties’, (at: http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13520; accessed 1 May 
2019). 
164 Although it is noteworthy that Spain and Portugal, both relatively powerful maritime States with a strong 
historic interest in UCH, were early adopters, as was Mexico, another State with a powerful naval presence. 
165 Supra n. 54, UK UNESCO Convention Review Group, 23 
166 Department for Culture, Media & Sport, (2016), The Culture White Paper, Presented to Parliament by 
the Secretary of State for Culture, Media & Sport, March 2016, Cm 9218, DCMS (London), at p. 46. 
167 Department for Culture, Media & Sport (2017), ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage’, Written Statement from 
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (John Glen), 31 October 
2017, Hansard, HCWS208, (at: http://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2017-10-31/debates/1710312800
0011/UnderwaterCulturalHeritage; accessed 1 May 2019). 
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(b) Positive Achievements of the Convention 
While this research aims to draw out of weaknesses of the UNESCO Convention, in order 
to make proposals intended to improve its implementation, it is also important to take a 
moment to list many of its exemplary achievements.  Just on the basis of the following, 
the Convention should be universally ratified. 
 
❖ A key objective of the Convention was to create a global shift in attitude towards 
recognising the importance and public value of UCH.  Prior to the Convention, far 
too much legitimacy was given to those who view UCH as either sites of treasure, 
open to exploitation, or discarded scrap, open to demolition or plunder.  It is 
observable that over the past two decades there has been evidence of a wide-scale 
culture shift, as well as a discernible quietness among the once-vocal community 
advocating treasure hunting legitimacy.  The disastrous outcome for OME in the 
Mercedes case in 2012,168 and the UK government backing away from its 2008 
agreement with the same to share in the spoils of the HMS Victory (1744),169 are 
examples of this.170  In order to bring about this transformation in global attitudes 
towards UCH, the Convention utilises a combination of capacity building, skills and 
education programmes, university and academic networking, promotion of proper 
conservation and underwater archaeological practice, investment in poorer regions, 
and improved lines of communication between all stakeholders with an interest or 
stake in UCH protection.171  The Convention should be especially praised for its 
achievements in this regard, as well as for the zeal demonstrated by the MOP, STAB 
and UNESCO in taking to the task.172 
 
❖ The most aspirational feature of the Convention is perhaps Article 2, which assumes 
an essential anchoring role.  This Article calls upon states to ‘cooperate’173 and to take 
‘all appropriate measures . . . using for this purpose the best practical means at their 
 
168 See Chapter 2. 
169 MOD News Team, ‘Blog: Defence in the Media’, 6 March 2015, UK Ministry of Defence (London), 
(at: http://modmedia.blog.gov.uk/2015/03/06/defence-in-the-media-6-march-2015; accessed 1 May 2019).  
See also Reynolds, R., (2019), ‘Judicial Review Undertaken for HMS Victory Salvage’, Institute of Art & 
Law, 10 April 2019, (at: https://ial.uk.com/judicial-review-undertaken-for-hms-victory-salvage/; accessed 
1 May 2019). 
170 Supra n. 71, Dromgoole, at p. 371; Supra n. 49, Bautista, at p. 28. 
171 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Preamble and Arts. 19-22.  See also the UNESCO website on UCH 
which provides an excellent hub for information, cooperation and resources (at: http://www.unesco.org/
new/en/culture/themes/ underwater-cultural-heritage/2001-convention; accessed 1 May 2019). 
172 Supra n. 49, Bautista, at p. 23. 
173 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 2(2). 
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disposal’174 to ‘preserve [UCH] for the benefit of humanity’175 with ‘preservation in 
situ [being] considered as the first option’176 where, at all times, UCH ‘shall not be 
commercially exploited.’177  Taken together this article is effective at inspiring a more 
preservationist approach ab initio.  In particular, by calling for ‘all appropriate 
measures’ it implicates changes to domestic legislation in their treatment of UCH.  
For example, by states trying to ensure law is in place to evaluate ex ante UCH’s 
preserved status before engaging in both direct and indirectly harmful activities.178 
 
❖ The prohibition on commercial exploitation under Article 2(7) is critical.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Convention makes a commendable effort to take UCH out 
of the domain of property which is subject to private short-term profiteering and, 
instead, turning it into global common property for the benefit of humanity.179  Article 
4 supports this further by removing salvage while ensuring that some sensible leeway 
is left for moderate non-exploitative commercial activities.180 
 
❖ The annexed Rules are a resounding success.  By incorporating and updating the 
ICOMOS Charter, with expert involvement from archaeologists, the Convention has 
secured widespread adherence to underwater archaeological good practice in the 
Rules and supporting guidance.  Even states who were outwardly opposed to the 
Convention’s final draft, such as the US, UK and Norway, have made clear that they 
will apply the Rules in all activities directed at UCH.181  This all integrates well with 
the Convention’s development of a global UCH management framework built around 
cooperation, capacity building, training and education.  As Dromgoole said, it is 
‘difficult to overstate’ the significance of the Rules, which ‘are not simply an integral 
part of the Convention in a technical sense; they are integral to its entire spirit and 
 
174 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 2(4). 
175 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 2(3). 
176 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 2(5). 
177 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 2(7). 
178 Maarleveld, T.J., Guérin, U. and Egger, B. (Eds.), (2013), Manual for Activities directed at Underwater 
Cultural Heritage: Guidelines to the Annex of the UNESCO 2001 Convention, UNESCO (Paris), at pp. 61-
78. 
179 See Chapter 2. 
180 For example, Carducci has referred to Article 4 as a ‘major achievement’ of the Convention (supra n. 
51, Carducci, at p. 425). 
181 UNESCO, (2009), Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural 
Heritage: Second Session, Paris, 15 September 2009, UN Doc. UCH/09/2.MSP/220/4 REV, UNESCO 
(Paris), Annex I, paras. 12-13; Department of Culture, Media and Sport, (2005), House of Commons 
Debate, 24 January 2005, Hansard, Vol. 430, Col. 46W; Statements on Vote by Norway, (2002), (from: 
supra n. 118, Camarda and Scovazzi, at p. 430); Varmer, O., Gray, J. and Alberg, D., (2010), ‘United States: 
Responses to the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 5(2) 
Journal of Maritime Archaeology 129-141, at pp. 130-131; Supra n. 18, O’Keefe, at p. 119. 
61 
 
ethos.’182  Similarly, in interview, Williams expressed his indifference to state 
ratification of the whole Convention, given that agreements by most states to adopt 
the Rules as best practice, means that they have effectively signed up to ‘98 to 99% 
of the Convention’.183 
 
❖ The UNESCO Convention neatly integrates into the international legal framework 
protecting cultural heritage, such as the UNESCO 1970 Convention on Cultural 
Property, the UNIDROIT 1995 Convention and the ICOM Museum Code of 
Ethics.184  This same “latching on” can be witnessed for intangible cultural heritage 
under the UNESCO 2003 Convention on the Protection of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage. 
 
❖ Recognising the importance of regional agreements and supranational organisations 
in marine environmental protection, as well the role of bilateral agreements in matters 
of UCH protection, the Convention smartly promotes the use of further such 
treaties.185  The Convention thus acts almost as a ‘Framework Convention’, from 
which future state negotiation, practice and improvement can emerge.186  
Nevertheless, it is obvious to many that despite some ad hoc bilateral agreements or 
broad region-wide accords,187 states remain slow to conclude any powerful 
agreements in this regard.188  The need to finally expand subsequent regimes and 
further multi-level governance approaches, both within and without the UNESCO 
Convention, is therefore the focus of this study. 
 
 
182 Supra n. 45, Dromgoole, at p. 58. 
183 Supra n. 49, Williams. 
184 ‘Realizing the need to codify and progressively develop rules relating to the protection and preservation 
of underwater cultural heritage in conformity with international law and practice, including the [1970 
UNESCO Convention on Cultural Property and the World Heritage Convention]’ (Supra n. 1, UNESCO 
Convention Preamble). 
185 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 6; Supra n. 124, Scovazzi, at p. 291. 
186 Supra n. 51, Carducci, at p. 427.  See Chapter 10. 
187 See Chapter 4.  Two well-known examples of broad multilateral agreements include the Titanic 
Agreement and the MS Estonia Agreement which, in the case of the former only has two states, and with 
the latter provides little beyond very general duties of responsibility (Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, (2004), Agreement Concerning the Shipwrecked Vessel RMS Titanic, 
Washington DC, 18 June 2004; Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Överenskommelse med Estland och 
Finland om m/s Estonia, 1995: SÖ: 36 (adopted in Tallinn, 23 February 1995) [Agreement between the 
Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden regarding the M/S Estonia]). 
188 Dromgoole, S., (2006), ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: 
National Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), xxvii-xxxviii, 
Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. xxxvi; ‘[T]he number of UCH treaties is still small, compared with bilateral 
treaties concerning prohibiting and preventing illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural 
properties’ (supra n. 127, Huang, at pp. 224-225); Supra n. 112, Risvas, at p. 586.  See Chapter 4. 
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❖ As has similarly proven effective with environmental protection treaties, the 
Convention is especially far-sighted for formalising the role of scientific and technical 
experts under the appointed STAB.189  Being a public-private hybrid encourages 
ongoing work which is predominantly scientific, public and evidence-based, rather 
than private or political.190  This academic supervision, furthermore, plays a positive 
role in attracting engagement with the Convention and incentivising states to become 
actively involved.191  In this same way, UNESCO has learned from earlier lessons in 
environmental protection by improving integration of civil society into the workings 
of UNESCO and by permitting registered NGOs continued access and involvement 
within the MOP.192 
 
❖ In comparison with Article 16 of the Buenos Aires Draft – with a single clause 
providing for arbitration or, if this fails, adjudication in the ICJ – the UNESCO 
Convention’s Article 25 on dispute settlement is certainly an improvement.  In 
particular, Article 25(2) invites states parties who have failed to resolve any dispute 
by first negotiating, to explore mediation through UNESCO.  However, in terms of 
appointing a final adjudicator should disputes ever escalate through all the stages, 
Article 25(3) simply adopts Part XV of the LOSC.  There are some issues with this, 
which are beyond the focus of this study, although Part XV does at least provide a 
fair variety of final adjudicators from which to choose, including the more flexible 
institution of arbitration.193 
 
189 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 23(4) and (5).  There are numerous examples of this working in 
other treaties, e.g. the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice of 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), Committee on Science and Technology of the 
UN Convention to Combat Desertification (1994), and the Advisory Committees of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973). 
190 Guérin, U., (2018), Interview with Ulrike Guérin, 16 May 2018, Transcript on File; Alvarez, J.E., (2005), 
International Organizations as Law-Makers, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 338-400; Haas, P.M., 
(1992), ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, 46(1) International 
Organization 1-35. 
191 Supra n. 18, O’Keefe, at pp. 158-159. 
192 This development in fact was made by the MOP themselves, working in cooperation with the newly 
appointed STAB, in the first few meetings of the States Parties (UNESCO, (2009), Resolutions of the First 
Session of the Meetings of States Parties, 26-27 March 2009, UN Doc. CLT/CIH/MCO/2009/ME/98, 
Annex to Resolutions 5/MSP 1, UNESCO (Paris); UNESCO, (2009), Meeting of States Parties to the 
Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, Item 6 on the Provisional Agenda: 
Accreditation of Non-Governmental Organizations for cooperation with the Scientific and Technical 
Advisory Body, 15 September 2009, UN Doc. UCH/09/2.MSP/220/6 REV. 2, UNESCO (Paris), at para. 1). 
193 Daly, B.W., (2006), ‘Arbitration of International Cultural Property Disputes: The Experience and 
Initiatives of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, 
B.T. Hoffman (Ed.), 465-474, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 469; Supra n. 44, UNESCO, 
at Annex I, para. 38; Oxman, B.H., (2015), ‘Courts and Tribunals: The ICJ, ITLOS, and Arbitral Tribunals’, 
in The Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea, D.R. Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, K.N. Scott and T. 




❖ As intended and as examined more closely in Chapter 2, the Convention has in the 
main succeeded in improving global protection for UCH given the particular lack of 
protection under the LOSC.  As discussed, Articles 149 and 303 of the LOSC had 
various faults, such as in the case of the former, suffering from inescapable 
vagueness194 and only treating UCH in the Area as global common heritage, and with 
the latter, lacking legal normativity and completely failing to remove the application 
of salvage law to UCH.195 
 
5. Conclusion: Critically Examining the Implementation of the UNESCO 
Convention  
This chapter has introduced the framework and methodology which is to be adopted for 
this thesis.  The principal questions of the study, as highlighted, require an appraisal of 
the legal system in which the UNESCO Convention is instituted and a search for evidence 
to suggest that a more vertical and multiple-level governance approach – bringing in non-
state and hybrid actors across the global, regional and local community scales – would 
provide better or additional protection for UCH.  As has been explained, the study will 
rely on both secondary sources of material across an array of social sciences research 
fields, as well as both archaeology and law research resources, in addition to stakeholder 
interviews with 11 experts in UCH protection policy or marine governance.  The thesis 
will also take a particular interest in Northern European seas throughout the analysis, as 
a useful case study in which to situate the analysis, with particular regard being paid to 
states and systems operating in the North-East Atlantic. 
 
The chapter has also set the scene by introducing the plight of UCH sites and objects 
around the world, explaining the manifold direct and indirect activities which threaten 
their survival and preservation.  Having highlighted the weaknesses with the substantive 
international legal framework protecting UCH in the past half-century, the chapter 
introduced the UNESCO 2001 Convention and explored its various strengths as a 
globally-oriented multilateral treaty in the protection of UCH.  As the chapters that follow 
will argue, there are numerous strengths of the UNESCO Convention which should 
support its widespread ratification, promotion and committed implementation.  
 
194 Supra nn. 122-134. 
195 Supra nn. 114-121; Supra n. 3, LOSC, Art. 303(3); Supra n. 124, Scovazzi, at pp. 287-288. 
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Nevertheless, the argument of the thesis is that the UNESCO Convention alone will not 
be as effective or efficient at protecting UCH.  Instead, parallel efforts must now be taken 
at the global, regional and local community scales, utilising public and private sources of 
regulation, and operating in productive synergy with horizontal state bargaining at the 
national scale, in order to expand the quality, effectiveness and implementation of such 
regulation across all contexts.  Chapter 2, which follows, will explore the UNESCO 
Convention in further detail, demonstrating how it is unfortunately limited to addressing 
threats from direct activities, such as salvage or substandard archaeology, rather than 
addressing the ever-increasing and increasingly more critical threat to UCH from indirect, 














This chapter provides an introduction to the international legal rules protecting 
underwater cultural heritage (UCH).  It highlights how early literature on the subject 
and much of the UNESCO Convention negotiations were focused on two competing 
approaches to UCH management; one viewing UCH opportunistically, as an object of 
salvage or the law of finds; the other, utilising a more preservationist stance, where it is 
protected and enjoyed within the public sphere.  The chapter then introduces a new 
‘multiple-value’ model for appraising UCH and its numerous abstract values, serving to 
both resolve the ‘preservationism v. opportunism debate’ in favour of prioritising the 
archaeological arguments for better preservation, as well as setting up further analyses 
in later chapters.  Overall, the chapter demonstrates that while the UNESCO Convention 
was successful at addressing the main concern at that time, i.e., treasure hunters and 
state-sanctioned salvage, it failed to properly address the growing list of increasingly 
critical threats to UCH beyond treasure hunting, such as looting and incidental damage 
from indirect economic activities. 
 
1. Introduction: The International Law Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage 
The following chapter provides an introduction to the law protecting underwater cultural 
heritage (UCH).  It demonstrates that a large part of the academic discourse on UCH 
protection law has been dominated, for a number of decades, by a binary debate between 
the opposite approaches of preservationism and opportunism.  As demonstrated, 
‘preservationists’ predominantly refers to the archaeological and conservation 
community, who have propounded academic arguments in favour of protecting UCH in 
situ to the fullest extent; with ‘opportunists’ encapsulating treasure hunters and 
supporting scholars who allege that ancient admiralty laws support their right to collect 
generous salvage rewards for extracting and returning valuable submerged materials to 
the market.  This vivid debate is therefore used within Section 2 as a backdrop to the 
exploration of some of the public and private laws, both domestic and international, which 




The chapter then provides a detailed introduction to a multiple-value approach which can 
be adopted in the future management of UCH.  It argues that such an approach provides 
a suitable mechanism for firmly resolving the preservationism v. opportunism debate and 
also provides a useful tool in future decision-making over the preservation of UCH.  It 
also finds that, in many senses, such a multiple-value approach has been, consciously or 
unconsciously, instituted into several terms of the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (the “UNESCO Convention”).1  In other 
words, the UNESCO Convention has done an adept job of addressing the age-old concern 
among UCH conservationists of legalised treasure salvage.  However, unfortunately, as 
has become increasingly accepted knowledge, the chapter then demonstrates how the 
UNESCO Convention’s devoted focus on the threat of salvage and substandard marine 
archaeology, has meant that all the other hugely important and growing threats to UCH – 
such as looting, trawling, dredging, shipping, and offshore development – have yet to be 
satisfactorily addressed by regulation.2  As Dromgoole once rightly predicted, ‘the 
biggest challenge for the future is likely to be dealing with inadvertent damage or 
destruction to the UCH from human activities.’3   
 
2. The Preservationism v. Opportunism Debate and Underwater Cultural Heritage 
(a) Preservationism v. Opportunism in the Management of Underwater Cultural 
Heritage 
i. The preservationists 
For archaeologists, UCH is a repository of historical information and data.4  Their core 
objective is to preserve such cultural sites and in the best possible condition for future 
 
1 UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 
2001, in force 2 January 2009), 2562 UNTS 1. 
2 Aznar, M.J., (2017), ‘Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage in EU Waters, A Legal Approach (2016-
2017)’, Honor Frost Foundation, (at: http://honorfrostfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
Mariano-Aznar-Protecting-underwater-cultural-heritage-in-EU-waters-a-legal-approach-2016-2017.pdf; 
accessed 8 November 2018). 
3 Dromgoole, S., (2006), ‘United Kingdom’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National 
Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), 313-350, Martinus Nijhoff 
(Leiden), at p. 314.  Similarly, Kvalø and Marstrander have said that the ‘main threats to sites outside 
territorial waters of Norway are today considered to be industrial activities – fisheries, especially trawling, 
dredging and the exploitation of oil and gas. […] Inside territorial waters the main threat comes from 
development activities, which generally take place closer to the shore. […] There is no clear evidence that 
commercial exploitation of UCH . . . is a significant problem or is increasing.’ (Kvalø, F. and Marstrander, 
L., (2006), ‘Norway’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National Perspectives in Light 
of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), 217-228, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 218). 
4 Prott, L.V., (1997), ‘Safeguarding the Underwater Cultural Heritage: UNESCO Moves Ahead’, 49(1) 
Museum International 39. 
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study and analysis.5  This includes consideration of the future archaeology and deep sea 
diving technology providing more productive and less destructive archaeological research 
for future generations.6  Contrary to common belief, modern-day archaeology is not about 
the ruthless exhumation of artefacts,7 but about ongoing non-destructive analyses such as 
site surveying, digital reconstructions, mapping of landscapes and object assemblage, 
desktop research, photographs and films, analysis of organic and inorganic matter, 
conducting sonar and magnetometer surveys, interpreting data, or even experimental 
archaeology.8  For these same reasons, archaeologists resent the notion of widely 
dispersing archaeological collections as individual artefacts around the world’s museums 
and prefer that objects are kept within their original context and layout for future 
contextual analysis or kept together as a complete collection with all of this data 
included.9  The overall aim for all archaeologists is therefore the pursuit of further 
knowledge with the objective being, in all archaeological projects, the discovery and 
dissemination of new data and a detailed academic paper.10 
 
While excavation or recovery of underwater archaeological sites may appear attractive 
initially, for example because of the intimate detail in which raised objects can be studied 
and the commercial value of artefacts collected, there are a number of reasons why this 
is seen as a last resort in the field.11  First, as above, once a site is raised and de-
contextualised, it is no longer a source of information.  What is more, future findings from 
desktop research, studies conducted on related sites, or the development of new 
technologies, should normally stimulate archaeologists into returning to a preserved site 
 
5 See Chapter 1, Section 2. 
6 Hall, J.L., (2011), ‘Things, Inc.: A Case for In Situ Application’, in Maritime Law: Issues, Challenges & 
Implications (Laws and Legislation), J.W. Harris (Ed.), 27-52, Nova Science Publishers (New York), at pp. 
32-33; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, (1978), ‘The Underwater Cultural Heritage: Report of 
the Committee on Culture and Education (Rapporteur: Mr. John Roper)’, Doc. 4200-E, Council of Europe 
(Strasbourg), at p. 6. 
7 Ibid.; Abbass, D. K., (1999), ‘A Marine Archaeologist Looks at Treasure Salvage’, 30(2) Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce 261-268, at p. 262. 
8 See generally, Nautical Archaeological Society, (2008), Underwater Archaeology: The NAS Guide to 
Principles and Practice, 2nd Edn, A. Bowens (Ed.), Wiley-Blackwell (New York). 
9 Fletcher-Tomenius, P. and Forrest, C., (2000), ‘Historic Wreck in International Waters: Conflict or 
Consensus?’, 24(1) Marine Policy 1-10, at p. 3. 
10 Bass, G.F., (2011), ‘The Development of Maritime Archaeology’, in The Oxford Handbook of Maritime 
Archaeology, B. Ford, D.L. Hamilton and A. Catsambis (Eds.), 3-24, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at 
pp. 10-11; Hutchinson G., (1996), ‘Threats to Underwater Cultural Heritage: The Problems of Unprotected 
Archaeological and Historical Sites and Objects Found at Sea’, 20(4) Marine Policy 287-290, at p. 289. 
11 Throckmorton, P., (1990), ‘The World’s Worst Investment: The Economics of Treasure Hunting with 
Real Life Comparisons’, in Underwater Archaeology Proceedings from the Society for Historical 
Archaeology Conference, 1990, T. Carrell (Ed.), 6-10, Society for Historical Archaeology (Germantown). 
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to conduct further analysis.12  Second, particularly in the underwater context, excavation 
is an innately destructive practice and archaeologists accept that present technology will 
damage the layout and integrity of both site and data.13  Finally, among other reasons, 
archaeologists are aware of the true long-term cost of care and conservation of raised 
collections.14  Once submerged in the underwater environment, cultural sites and objects 
can eventually reach an ‘equilibrium’; a peaceful state of harmony with their immediate 
environment – such as through the waterlogging of wooden materials, the protective layer 
of concretion on metallic objects, the coating of the site with protective layers of sand and 
sediment, and the reduction of oxygen and even microbial life – where, for non-ferrous 
materials at least, the long-term degradation is significantly slowed and preservation more 
easily assured.15  When returned to the surface these objects, already having reached a 
fragile state of existence, are put through a second potentially fatal shock in their 
environment.16  The cost and work required to ensure the long-term conservation of the 
Vasa ship, raised in Stockholm in 1961, and the Tudor war vessel, the Mary Rose, raised 
in Portsmouth in 1982, provide proof of the true cost of excavation.17 
 
Archaeologists, however, are not the only preservationists.  There are millions of 
members of civil society and other non-governmental groups who have a formal or 
informal interest in preserving UCH sites.18  Such preservationists also value UCH for 
the historical information it provides.  Like underwater archaeologists, they also cherish 
 
12 Khakzad, S. and Van Balen, K., (2012), ‘Complications and Effectiveness of In Situ Preservation 
Methods for Underwater Cultural Heritage Sites’, 14(1-4) Conservation and Management of 
Archaeological Sites 469-478, at p. 471; Corfield, C., (1996), ‘Preventive Conservation for Archaeological 
Sites’, in Archaeological Conservation and its Consequences: Preprints of the Contributions to the 
Copenhagen Congress, 32-37, International Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works 
(London), at p. 33;  Caple, C., (2016), Preservation of Archaeological Remains In Situ, Routledge 
(Abingdon). 
13 Supra n. 10, Hutchinson, at p. 288; Dromgoole, S., (2004), ‘Murky Waters for Government Policy: The 
Case of a 17th Century British Warship and 10 Tonnes of Gold Coins’, 28 Marine Policy 189-198, at pp. 
194-195. 
14 Maarleveld, T.J., Guérin U. and Egger, B. (Eds.), (2013), Manual for Activities Directed at Underwater 
Cultural Heritage: Guidelines to the Annex of the UNESCO 2001 Convention, UNESCO (Paris), at pp. 
179-200. 
15 Hamilton, D.L. and Smith, C.W., (2011), ‘The Archaeological Role of Conservation in Maritime 
Archaeology’, in The Oxford Handbook of Maritime Archaeology, B. Ford, D.L. Hamilton and A. 
Catsambis (Eds.), 286-304, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found and 
Salvaged from The Nashville, 606 F. Supp. 801, 809, 1985 AMC 609 (S.D. Ga. 1984); Coles, J.M., (1988), 
‘A Wetland Perspective’, in Wet Site Archaeology, B.A. Purdy (Ed.), 1-14, Telford Press (New Jersey). 
16 Supra n. 8, Nautical Archaeological Society, at p. 149; UNESCO, (1995), Preliminary Study on the 
Advisability of Preparing an International Instrument for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage, General Conference, 28th Session, (4 October 1995, Paris), UN Doc. 28C/39, at para. 31. 
17 Hocker, E., (2010), ‘Maintaining a Stable Environment: Vasa’s New Climate-Control System’, 41(3) 
APT Bulletin: Journal of Preservation Technology 3-9, at pp. 7-8; Jones, M. (Ed.), (2011), For Future 
Generations: Conservation of a Tudor Maritime Collection, Mary Rose Publications: Volume 5, Mary Rose 
Trust (Portsmouth). 
18 Supra n. 15. 
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UCH for its aesthetic qualities, its linkages with our human, cultural and social history, 
for their personal or community identification with certain sites, and for the purposes of 
avoiding cultural homogeneity and preserving diverse heritage for our future 
generations.19  Some “preservationists” may argue that underwater sites are of little use 
if they are decaying in dark and inaccessible depths, calling instead for the proper 
excavation of these sites so that the objects can be instead preserved in museums which 
are accessible to the international community.20  This may be true at some point in time, 
when a UCH site’s ex situ values eventually becomes greater than its in situ values.  
However, preservationists are aware of all the true costs of intervention or interference in 
any such valuations,21 assuming a multiple-use perspective of UCH (see Section 3) and 
eschewing the idea that tangible or culturally significant objects are the only important 
element of the site.  In addition to this, there is also the desire in many cases to protect 
UCH which might be linked with tragic loss of life as underwater gravesites, particularly 
for wrecks sunk in military service.22  This compassion is demonstrated by the agreement 
signed between numerous European states to closely guard the wreck of the MS Estonia 
ferry which shockingly capsized when its bow doors burst open on a rough night in the 
Baltic Sea in 1994, leading to the deaths of 852 passengers and crew.23 
 
ii. The opportunists 
Opportunism is the term used here to describe what have been termed “treasure hunters” 
across much of the literature.  Likened by cultural preservationists to modern-day pirates, 
it is true that any penetrative assessment of this community, including a critical analysis 
of the literature supporting their cause – being often written by US-based maritime 
 
19 Lipe, W.D., (1984), ‘Value and Meaning in Cultural Resources’, in Approaches to the Archaeological 
Heritage, H. Cleere (Ed.), 1-11, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge); Runyan, T.J., (1990), 
‘Shipwreck Legislation and the Preservation of Submerged Artifacts’, 22 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 31-45, at pp. 31-32.  See Section 3. 
20 Vadi, V., (2012), ‘War, Memory, and Culture: The Uncertain Legal Status of Historic Sunken Warships 
Under International Law’, 37(2) Tulane Maritime Law Journal 333-378, at p. 355. 
21 Supra nn. 14-17; Cho, H., (2014), ‘The Challenges and Needs of Museums in Safeguarding Underwater 
Cultural Heritage’, 29(5) Museum Management and Curatorship 429-444. 
22 Williams, M., (2000), ‘‘War Graves’ and Salvage: Murky Waters’, 5 International Maritime Law 151-
158; Harris, J.R., (2001), ‘The Protection of Sunken Warships as Gravesites at Sea’, 7(1) Ocean and 
Coastal Law Journal 75-130; Jacobsson, M. and Klabbers, J., (2000), ‘Rest in Peace? New Developments 
Concerning the Wreck of the M/S Estonia’, 69(3) Nordic Journal of International Law 317-332.  Even 
wrecks which sank many centuries ago have contained human remains, such as HMS Pandora (sank in 
1791), Mary Rose (sank in 1545) and the Antikythera wreck (sank 1st Century BC). 
23 Överenskommelse med Estland och Finland om m/s Estonia, 1995: SÖ: 36, (23rd February 1995, Tallinn), 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, [Agreement between the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of 
Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden regarding the M/S Estonia]. 
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lawyers or entrepreneurs24 – leads many to a conclusion that they are more interested in 
short-term profiteering.  The practice of treasure hunting is still discernible in some 
maritime states, most notably the United States, and it is well-known for having been 
glamourised over many years by the media and popular culture.25  Modern-day treasure 
hunters treat their work like any other commercial enterprise, distributing prospectuses to 
potential investors, employing PR agents, observing profit margins and selling shares on 
the stock exchange.26  Despite the efforts of the industry to appear legitimate and selfless, 
it has been impossible to shed their image among cultural preservationists as being 
plunderers of communal heritage.27 
 
Throughout the decades of debate over UCH protection laws there was a building 
collection of persuasive arguments from the treasure hunting community, emboldened by 
the laws of admiralty in pro-salvage common law countries, that their particular trade 
should be preserved under the rule of law.  The following arguments are regularly made 
by the opportunists: 
 
• That their activities are in keeping with the ius gentium and with the ancient laws of 
salvage, with the earliest reference in the Rhodian maritime codes of around 800 BC 
and upheld throughout under the laws of the sea ever since.28 
 
• That there appears no good reason why archaeologists and salvors cannot work 
together.29  This argument is most patent in the pro-salvage US admiralty courts where 
a salvor’s award following the looting of an archaeological site is measured taking 
 
24 Forrest, C., (2008), ‘Historic Wreck Salvage: An International Perspective’, 33 Tulane Maritime Law 
Journal 347-379, at p. 348. 
25 Dromgoole, S., (2001), ‘Law and the Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Question of Balancing Interests’, 
in Illicit Antiquities: The Theft of Culture and the Extinction of Archaeology, N. Brodie and K.W. Tubb 
(Eds.), 109-136, Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 115; Bryant, C. R., (2001), ‘The Archaeological Duty of Care: 
The Legal, Professional, and Cultural Struggle over Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks’, 65(1) Albany Law 
Review 97-145, at p. 106. 
26 Supra n. 9, Fletcher-Tomenius and Forrest, at p. 4; Ibid., Bryant, at pp. 107-108. 
27 O’Keefe, P.J. and Nafziger, J.A.R., (1994), ‘The Draft Convention on the Protection of Underwater 
Cultural Heritage’, 25(4) Ocean Development and International Law 391-418, at p. 414. 
28 Regan, R., (2005), ‘When Lost Liners Become Found: An Examination of the Effectiveness of Present 
Maritime Legal and Statutory Regimes for Protecting Historic Wrecks in International Waters with Some 
Proposals for Change’, 29 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 313-351, at p. 321; Schoenbaum, T., (2012), 
Admiralty and Maritime Law, 5th Edn, West Academic Publishing (Eagan), at p. 208. 
29 Booth, F., (2006), ‘The Collision of Property Rights and Cultural Heritage; the ‘Salvors and Insurers’ 
Viewpoints’, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, B.T. Hoffman (Ed.), 293-299, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge). 
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account how closely the salvage observed principles of archaeological good 
practice.30 
 
• That a large majority of UCH is slowly deteriorating, through both natural and 
anthropogenic pressures.  References are often made to examples of sites 
experiencing accelerated degradation, such as the RMS Titanic or Bismarck, which 
have visibly deteriorated since their discoveries in the 1980s.31  Similarly, references 
are made to sites exposed to threats from looting, such as the Nan’ao No. 1 wreck in 
China,32 or threatened by natural changes in the environment.  An example of shifting 
natural threats being that of the HMS Invincible in the United Kingdom, for which an 
archaeological excavation was permitted once the site became exposed from shifting 
sediments.33  The argument goes that since many such sites face decay, out-of-sight, 
they will never get to be enjoyed or appreciated by the international community.34  
Thus, by surfacing such sites we can enjoy the sites and their artefacts up close in the 
world’s museums before they are gone. 35 
 
• They contend that archaeologists have good intentions, but they lack the public 
funding to properly study sites as and when excavation or recovery becomes 
necessary.  By not being able to take immediate and effective action, they will only 
ever carry out substandard excavations at the eleventh hour.36 
 
 
30 Sometimes referred to as the ‘7th criterion’ or ‘7th factor’.  In the Blackwall Case (The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 
1, 2002 A.M.C. 1808, 19 L. Ed. 870 (1869)), the United States Supreme Court laid out 6 factors to be 
considered when determining salvage award value.   In 1992, the Fourth Circuit added the ‘7 th factor’ with 
regard to the SS Central America, saying that ‘we would add another: the degree to which the salvors have 
worked to protect the historical and archeological value of the wreck and items salved’ (Columbus-America 
Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992)).  Segarra, J.J.B., 
(2012), ‘Above Us the Waves: Defending the Expansive Jurisdictional Reach of American Admiralty 
Courts in Determining the Recovery Rights in Ancient or Historic Wrecks’, 43 Journal of Maritime Law 
and Commerce 349-391, at pp. 376-382. 
31 Varmer, O., (2006), ‘RMS Titanic’, in Underwater Cultural Heritage at Risk: Managing Natural and 
Human Impacts, Heritage at Risk Special Edition, R. Grenier, D. Nutley and I. Cochran (Eds.), 14-16, 
ICOMOS (Paris), at p. 16; Garzke, W. H. and Dulin, R. O., (1994), ‘The Bismarck's Final Battle’, 30(2) 
Warship International 158-190. 
32 Hilgers, L., (2011), ‘Pirates of the Marine Silk Road’, 64(5) Archaeology 20-25. 
33 BBC News, ‘HMS Invincible Shipwreck’s Latest Artefacts Revealed’, 7 June 2018, BBC News, (at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-44357695; accessed 1 June 2019). 
34 Supra n. 30, Segarra, at pp. 387-388; Nicholson, S.R., (1997), ‘Comment – Mutiny as to the Bounty: 
International Law's Failing Preservation Efforts Regarding Shipwrecks and Their Artifacts Located in 
International Waters’, 66(1) UMKC Law Review 135-168, at p. 138. 
35 Supra n. 29, Booth, at pp. 296-297; Bordelon, C.Z., (2005), ‘Saving Salvage: Avoiding Misguided 
Changes to Salvage and Finds Law’, 7(1) San Diego International Law Journal 173-214, at p. 189. 
36 E.g., Supra n. 25, Bryant, at p. 129. 
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• Finally, some salvors cynically argue that archaeologists actually have an 
underhanded motive to encircle cultural property for their own profiteering once they 
secure sufficient public funding.37 
 
(b) Preservationism v. Opportunism Across Admiralty Law 
The law of salvage has been around as long as maritime law itself.38  It is essentially a 
system of law rewarding mariners for rescuing property from the sea, whether flotsam, 
jetsam, lagan, or derelict.39  In the common law tradition, salvage law normally provides 
for the legal owners of recovered materials to pay a reward, almost commensurate with 
market value, to the salvors.  If the true legal owner cannot be found, as is often the case 
for uprooted old artefacts taken out of their archaeological context, then the state will 
assume title, from which it will sell to a museum or on the market, with the salvors being 
rewarded for the profit obtained.  Today, however, there remain a number of common 
law states who continue to offer salvage awards for wreck of an archaeological nature, 
with the United Kingdom being one of the most notorious examples of a legal system 
which has yet to be brought up to the modern preservation-oriented standard.40   
 
 
37 Referred to by McClaughlin as ‘opportunity preservation’ (McLaughlin, S.L., (1995), ‘Roots, Relics and 
Recovery: What Went Wrong with the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987’, 19(3/4) Columbia VLA Journal 
of Law and the Arts 149-198, at pp. 189-192; Supra n. 25, Bryant, at p. 99. 
38 ‘The law of salvage is of ancient vintage.’ (Bederman, D.J., (1998), ‘Historic Salvage and the Law of the 
Sea’, 30(1) University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 99-129, at p. 103; Brice, G., (2012), The 
Maritime Law of Salvage, 5th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell (London), at p. 5; Supra n. 28, Regan, at p. 321. 
39 Flotsam: ‘The wreckage of a ship or its cargo found floating on or washed up by the sea’, Jetsam: 
‘Unwanted material or goods that have been thrown overboard from a ship and washed ashore, especially 
material that has been discarded to lighten the vessel’, Lagan: ‘goods or wreckage lying on the bed of the 
sea’, Derelict: ‘A ship or other piece of property abandoned by the owner and in poor condition’ (Stevenson, 
A. (Ed.), (2010), Oxford Dictionary of English, 3rd Edn, Oxford University Press (Oxford)). 
40 Martin, J.B. and Gane, T., (2019), ‘Weaknesses in the Law Protecting the United Kingdom’s Remarkable 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Call for Modernisation and Reform’, Journal of Maritime Archaeology 
(Forthcoming).  See also, supra n. 3, Dromgoole, at p. 315; English Heritage, (2004), Marine Archaeology 
Legislation Project, School of Legal Studies, University of Wolverhampton (at: https://historicengland.
org.uk/images-books/publications/marine-archaeology-legislation-project/marine-archaeology-
legislation/; accessed 8 November 2018), at pp. 39-40; Yorke, R.A., (2011), ‘Introduction: Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage in International Waters Adjacent to the UK – A JNAPC Perspective 21 Years 
On’, in Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage in International Waters adjacent to the UK: 
Proceedings of the JNAPC 21st Anniversary Seminar, Burlington House November 2010, R.A. Yorke (Ed.), 
1-10, Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee, (published by) Nautical Archaeology Society 
(Portsmouth), (at: http://www.jnapc.org.uk/UNESCO-Seminar-2010-final.pdf; accessed 8 November 
2018), at pp. 3-4; Dromgoole, S., (1989), ‘Protection of Historic Wreck: The UK Approach – Part II: 
Towards Reform’, 4(2) International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 95-116, at pp. 102-103.  The 
Rolls of Oléron were a maritime code of admiralty brought to England by Eleanor of Aquitaine at the end 
of the 12th Century. These stood as a central feature in English salvage law ever since and, as a result of 
British domination of the seas from the 19th Century, have been highly influential upon maritime law around 
the world over the past two centuries – Senior, W., (1921), ‘Early Writers on Maritime Law’, 37(3) Law 
Quarterly Review 323-336, at pp. 326-327. 
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However, it is to the US courts of admiralty that most treasure hunters take their finds, 
and it is US judges who have developed unusual legal rules providing mechanisms by 
which submerged heritage can be ‘salvaged’ in an archaeological manner.41  A key aspect 
of this US approach is its allusion to maritime codes of ancient civilisations which 
supported the law of salvage.42  However, legal commentators and historians have argued 
clearly and cogently that this ancient salvage was only intended to preserve and protect 
contemporary objects from immediate peril at sea.43  The code was thus to reward 
mariners who acted as salvors (offering “salvation” – ‘the preservation or deliverance 
from harm, ruin, or loss’44) for returning objects at risk of loss to the depths.  Never in 
these early maritime codes was consideration ever had of historic objects which are 
clearly no longer in ‘marine peril’ but, contrastingly, where there is a strong global public 
interest in keeping them in context or in their safer submarine environment.45   
 
The US admiralty courts have therefore developed their own unique legal rules which 
permit traditional salvage practices on archaeological sites, with archaeological good 
practice being assessed by the courts when it comes to assessing an award following 
recovery.46  There are many who rightly criticise this approach,47 especially because 
 
41 Marine peril ‘includes peril of being lost through the actions of the elements’ (Platoro Ltd. v. Unidentified 
Remains of a Vessel, 614 F.2d 1051, 1055 (5th Cir. 1980); Cobb Coin Co. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and 
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540, 557 & 660-661 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Bemis v. R.M.S. Lusitania, 
884 F. Supp. 1042, 1051 (E.D. Va. 1995); Bederman, D.J. and Spielman, B.D., (2008), ‘Refusing Salvage’, 
6 Loyola Maritime Law Journal 31-58, at p. 45; Supra n. 29, Booth, at p. 293; Supra n. 30, Segarra, at p. 
378; Miller, M.L., (2006), ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage: Is the Titanic Still in Peril as Courts Battle over 
the Future of the Historical Vessel’, 20(1) Emory International Law Review 345-396, at pp. 353-354. 
42 Supra n. 38; The Fifth Circuit has once put it that ‘[m]arine peril includes more than the threat of storm, 
fire, or piracy to a vessel in navigation’, explaining that every shipwreck ‘is still in peril of being lost 
through the actions of the elements.’ (Treasure Salvors Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned 
Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337 (1978)). 
43 Nafziger, J.A.R., (2003), ‘The Evolving Role of Admiralty Courts in Litigation Related to Historic 
Wreck’, 44(1) Harvard International Law Journal 251-270, at p. 252; Aznar, M.J., (2003), ‘Legal Status 
of Sunken Warships “Revisited”’, 9 Spanish Yearbook of International Law 61-101, at pp. 68-69; Supra n. 
27, O’Keefe and Nafziger, at pp. 393 and 408; Supra n. 24, Forrest, at pp. 364-371; Supra n. 41, Miller, at 
pp. 357-358. 
44 The word “salvage” comes from Old French, salver meaning ‘to save’, from the Latin salvātus meaning 
‘made safe’ (Stevenson, A. (Ed.), (2010), Oxford Dictionary of English, 3rd Edn, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford)). 
45 ‘The advent of major treasure salvage is so recent that there simply is not applicable custom, let alone a 
jus gentium that addresses the unique phenomenon of underwater cultural heritage in any coherent way’ 
(Supra n. 43, Nafziger, at p. 261). 
46 Supra n. 30.  E.g., Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1985 
AMC 2970 (11th Cir. 1985), 1515; Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1995 
AMC 1682 (N.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd, 102 F.3d 379, 1997 AMC 315 (9th Cir. 1996), affd in part, vacated in 
part, and remanded on other grounds, 118 S. Ct. 1464, 1998 AMC 1521 (1998); Marex International, Inc. 
v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 952 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. Ga. 1997), 829. 
47 Varmer, O., (1999), ‘The Case against the “Salvage” of the Cultural Heritage’, 30 Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce 279-302, at pp. 296-297; Fletcher-Tomenius, P., O'Keefe, P. J. and Williams, M., 
(2000), ‘Salvor in Possession: Friend or Foe to Marine Archaeology?’, 9(2) International Journal of 
Cultural Property 263-314, at p. 298; C.f., Bederman, D.J., (1998), ‘The UNESCO Draft Convention on 
74 
 
effective protection is only evaluated ex post destruction of cultural sites48 and on the 
basis that commercially-focused admiralty courts are not familiar with or in any way 
sympathetic to fastidious archaeological practice.49  Many may also feel that the two 
professions are diametrically opposed and incapable of integration.50   
 
As a result, the number of litigations taking place in the US relating to the “salvage” of 
cultural heritage are many.51  In one particularly famous judgment of the Fourth Circuit, 
Judge Niemeyer determined that, given its ancient origins, the application of salvage to 
submerged historic sites forms part of the ius gentium – the law of all nations.52  Niemeyer 
somehow reached the conclusion that, were this ‘venerable law of the sea’ to come before 
a court in Canada or France, the determination would be the same.53   This judgment has 
since been promoted by the commercial salvage and treasure hunting community as a 
sound analysis of customary international law.54  However, numerous comparative law 
scholars have since responded with clear, consistent and credible evidence that treatment 
of submerged archaeological sites in this way is not widespread, but is only present within 
a small number of common law states.55  In fact, a factually similar case in Canada 
adjudged that submerged heritage was not in ‘peril’, but rather that uprooting or 
recovering underwater artefacts without proper archaeological consideration, salvors 
would be increasing the risk of harm to property.56  Indeed, this differing treatment of 
historical sites under the law of salvage appears to be practiced in most jurisdictions, for 
 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Critique and Counter-Proposal’, 30(2) Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce 331-354, at p. 344. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid, Varmer, at pp. 296-297. 
50 E.g., Supra n. 6, Hall, 42-46; Supra n. 8, Nautical Archaeological Society, at pp. 7-8. 
51 Dromgoole, S., (2013), Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law, Cambridge University 
Press (Cambridge), at p. 184. 
52 RMS Titanic Inc v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. 1999), at para. 960; Niemeyer, P.V., (2005), ‘Applying 
Jus Gentium to the Salvage of the RMS Titanic in International Waters - The Nicholas J. Healy Lecture’, 
36(4) Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 431-446. 
53 Ibid., RMS Titanic v. Haver, at paras. 960 and 966-967. 
54 Booth proposes that even opponents of treasure salvage law, such as James Nafziger, have conceded that 
this law forms part of the jus gentium (supra n. 29, Booth, at p. 293). However, Nafziger appeared to only 
acknowledge that the approach of the court, in taking a comparative perspective of international law, was 
‘well considered and significant’. He in fact alleges that the arguments made only seem to consider UK and 
US perspectives, with little confluence elsewhere (supra n. 43, Nafziger, at pp. 261 and 265). 
55 Supra n. 43, Nafziger, at p. 261; Supra n. 27, O’Keefe and Nafziger, at pp. 11-13. 
56 Ontario v. Mar-Dive Corp [1996] 141 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 638; Scovazzi, T., (2006), ‘The 2001 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage’, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, 
Policy and Practice, B.T. Hoffman (Ed.), 285-292, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 288. 
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example Australia,57 China,58 France,59 Ireland,60 Spain,61 Portugal,62 South Africa,63 
Italy,64 Tunisia65 and Israel.66   
 
Furthermore, the IMO 1989 International Convention on Salvage (‘1989 Salvage 
Convention’),67 which sought harmonisation of private laws of salvage, provided an 
explicit exemption to the application of salvage law to objects of an archaeological or 
historical nature.68  A number of noteworthy states formally entered this reservation on 
adoption of the treaty,69 including even the UK, one of the most notorious legal systems 
for leaving harbour to treasure hunters.70  Scholars have also regularly emphasised how 
the US understanding of the law of salvage does not translate at all when crossing from 
common law states to systems with stronger civil law roots.71  Thus, on any 
comprehensive study of the law of nations, the US views of archaeological salvage are 
 
57 Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 (Australia), s. 13; Robinson v. Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 
C.L.R. 283. 
58 Regulation on Protection and Administration of Underwater Cultural Relics, State Council Decree No. 
42, 20 October 1989, ss. 2 and 7; Zhao, H., (1992), ‘Recent Developments in the Legal Protection of 
Historic Shipwrecks in China’, 23(4) Ocean Development and International Law 305-333, at pp. 310 and 
312. 
59 Decree No. 61-1547 on Maritime Wrecks (French Republic), Art. 24; Decree No. 89-874 on Maritime 
Cultural Property (French Republic), Art. 2. 
60 King & Chapman v. The Owners & All Persons Claiming an Interest in La Lavia, Julilana, and Santa 
Maria de la Vision, [1986] No. 11076, 11077, 11078 P (Ir. H. Ct. 1994). 
61 Ley 60/1962 (Boletin Oficial del Estado, No. 310, of 27 December 1962) (Spain), Art 22; Ley 16/1985 
(Boletin Oficial del Estado, No. 155, of 29 June 1985) (Spain), Art. 44. 
62 Decreto Lei No. 164/97 of 27 June 1997, Establishing Standards for Underwater Cultural Heritage, Arts. 
2 and 9. 
63 National Heritage Resources Act 1999, (No. 25 of 1999) (South Africa), Art. 3. 
64 Decreto Legislativo No. 490/1990 on Legislative Provisions for Cultural and Environmental Heritage 
(Italy), Art. 54. 
65 Loi No. 94-35, 24 February 1994 on a Heritage Code (Tunisia), Art. 23. 
66 Antiquities Law 1978 (No. 5738) (Israel), Art. 2(a). 
67 International Convention on Salvage, (adopted 28 April 1989 (London), in force 14 July 1996), 1953 
UNTS 165. 
68 Ibid, 1989 Salvage Convention, Art. 30(1)(d). 
69 Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, 
Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom (International Maritime Organization, (2017), Status of 
Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of which the International Maritime Organization or 
its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions, 10 February 2017, IMO (London), at pp. 
463-469). 
70 Supra n. 38, Brice, at p. 270; Forrest, C., (2011), International Law and the Protection of Cultural 
Heritage, Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 359. 
71 Supra n. 56, Scovazzi, at p. 288.  For example, sauvetage in France and salvataggio in Italy relates more 
narrowly to offering assistance to ships in distress, whereas récuperation and ricupero relates to recovery 
of sunken ships and cargo.  Further, découvreur and ritrovamento – the French and Italian equivalent to a 
legal ‘find’ – do not base themselves on purposeful treasure “seeking” but upon incidental discoveries 
(Drobnig, U., (1981), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law - Instalment 12, U. Zweigert and U. 
Drobnig (Eds.), Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 95; Ronzitti, N., (2012), ‘The Legal Regime of Wrecks of 
Warships and Other State-Owned Ships in International Law’, in Yearbook of the Institute of International 
Law - Volume 74 (Session of Rhodes, 2011), 130-177, Editions A. Pedone (Paris), at pp. 137-138). 
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neither widely accepted and, by contrast, are predominantly viewed as unethical and 
antithetical to the practices and principles of the majority of nations. 
 
Turning to the other arguments from treasure hunters in favour of archaeological salvage, 
many insist that submerged shipwrecks are slowly deteriorating and, after adding other 
pressures such as incidental damage, looting, interference, and natural destruction, will 
eventually fade away with little opportunity to enjoy them.72  Nevertheless, after initial 
reactions, many sunken vessels can eventually reach a relative equilibrium within their 
new submerged environments.73  What happens to submerged sites over extended periods 
in fact depends on many variables such as the immediate physical, biological and 
chemical environment, as well as the composition of materials and their assemblage.74  In 
general, however, wooden ships or organic UCH tend to be better preserved than ships 
made from steel and may be far better preserved in situ than ex situ.  For example, the 
discovery of HMS Erebus and HMS Terror in September 2014 and September 2016, 
from Franklin’s ill-fated Northwest Passage voyage nearly 170 years earlier, found both 
ships in pristine condition.75  Similarly, there many examples even of wrecks from the 
Bronze Age which remain largely intact.76  In situ preservation also tends to be cheaper 
and easier than ex situ.77  Furthermore, even if a wreck were to slowly deteriorate over 
 
72 Supra n. 29, Booth, at p. 297. 
73 Quinn, R., (2006), ‘The Role of Scour in Shipwreck Site Formation Processes and the Preservation of 
Wreck-Associated Scour Signatures in the Sedimentary Record – Evidence from Seabed and Sub-Surface 
Data’, 33(10) Journal of Archaeological Science 1419-1432; Gregory, D., (1995), ‘Experiments into the 
Deterioration Characteristics of Materials on the Duart Point Wreck Site: An Interim Report’, 24(1) 
International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 61-65. 
74 Ward, I.A., Larcombe, P. and Veth, P, (1999), ‘A New Process-Based Model for Wreck Formation’, 
26(5) Journal of Archaeological Science 561-570. 
75 Watson, P., ‘Ship found in Arctic 168 years after doomed Northwest Passage attempt’, 12 September 
2016, The Guardian, (at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/12/hms-terror-wreck-found-arctic-
nearly-170-years-northwest-passage-attempt; accessed 8 November 2018). 
76 The Uluburun Shipwreck is perhaps the oldest known shipwreck to be so well preserved and has been 
the subject of detailed archaeological analysis.  It is estimated to have sunk in the 14th Century BC (Bass, 
G.F., (1986), ‘A Bronze Age Shipwreck at Ulu Burun (Kas): 1984 Campaign’, 90(3) American Journal of 
Archaeology 269-296).  In October 2018, archaeologists also discovered a remarkably well-preserved 
Ancient Greek trading vessel in the Black Sea, believed to have sunk around the 4th Century BC (Rawlinson, 
K., ‘World’s Oldest Intact Shipwreck Discovered in Black Sea’, 23 October 2018, The Guardian, (at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/oct/23/oldest-intact-shipwreck-thought-to-be-ancient-greek-
discovered-at-bottom-of-black-sea; accessed 8 November 2018). 
77 Gregory, D. and Manders, M., (Eds.), (2015), Best Practices for Locating, Surveying, Assessing, 
Monitoring and Preserving Underwater Archaeological Sites, SASMAP Guideline Manual 2, SASMAP 
(Amersfoort), (at: 
http://sasmap.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/temasites/sas_map/pdf/SASMAP_guideline_02_LR.pdf; accessed 
8 November 2018); Manders, M., Oosting, R. and Brouwers, W., (2009), MACHU Final Report – 
Managing Cultural Heritage Underwater Nr. 3, Educom Publishers BV (Rotterdam), (at: http://pub
licaties.minienm.nl/documenten/machu-report-nr-3-final-report-managing-cultural-heritage-underw; 
accessed 8 November 2018); Ballard, R.D. and Durbin, M.J., (2008), ‘Long-term Preservation and 
Telepresence Visitation of Cultural Sites Beneath the Sea’, in Archaeological Oceanography, R.D Ballard 
(Ed.), 249-262, Princeton University Press (Princeton). 
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many centuries, many objects around the site will survive, leaving copious data to be 
analysed.78  It is also increasingly feasible to halt or slow the deterioration of ferrous 
materials by technological measures, such as cathodic anodes or even antifouling agents, 
as well as other materials by polypropylene covers or artificial seagrass mats. 
 
Nevertheless, it is true that all UCH faces a multitude of natural and anthropogenic threats 
which means that sites are likely to, at some point in time, become suitable for excavation 
or recovery before they disappear or are significantly degraded.79  Although attracting 
global controversy, there are still many who agree with the decision of the Indonesian 
government to permit the archaeological excavation of an Arabian dhow found off 
Belitung, Indonesia, estimated to have sunk in 830 CE (Belitung wreck).80  The hurried 
and poorly managed excavation of the site, and the dearth of academic analysis, has been 
roundly criticised by many archaeologists.81   However, others have argued that once the 
location of the wreck had been revealed to the local community, the site was at daily risk 
of looting.82  One curator appropriately responded by suggesting that the site’s placement 
within a poorer socioeconomic context should not be a justification for incompetent 
archaeology.83   
 
The Belitung therefore points to two conclusions.  First, in cases where a site is at genuine 
risk from looting, incidental damage or other threats of deterioration, and only where 
there is credible evidence supporting this, then it may become suitable for archaeological 
recovery.  Second, and equally importantly, where such a recovery is being considered, 
detailed evaluation must then be made of the archaeological rigour and academic integrity 
of the proposed research project, to ensure that it is not merely ‘academic’ or 
 
78 O’Keefe, P.J., (2014), Shipwrecked Heritage: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on 
Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2nd Edn, Institute of Art and Law (Builth Wells), at p. 122. 
79 Supra n. 6, Hall, at pp. 34-36. 
80 Coleman, P., (2013), ‘UNESCO and the Belitung Shipwreck: The Need for a Permissive Definition of 
Commercial Exploitation’, 45 George Washington International Law Review 847-874; Supra n. 13, 
Dromgoole, at p. 194; Ziglar, K., ‘Media Backgrounder: Discovery, Recovery, Conservation and Exhibition 
of the Belitung Cargo’, 16 March 2011, Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur M. Sackler Gallery,         
Smithsonian Institute (Washington), (at: http://archive.asia.si.edu/press/2011/prShipwreckedBackground
er.asp; accessed 18 November 2018). 
81 Bartman, E., (2011), Statement on Belitung Shipwreck, President of the AIA, 8 June 2011, Archaeological 
Institute of America (Boston), (at: https://www.archaeological.org/news/advocacy/5260; accessed 18 
November 2018); Gongaware, L., (2013), ‘To Exhibit or Not to Exhibit: Establishing a Middle Ground for 
Commercially Exploited Underwater Cultural Heritage under the 2001 UNESCO Convention’, 37(1) 
Tulane Maritime Law Journal 203-230, at pp. 221-223. 
82 Supra n. 80. 
83 Johnston, P.F., (2011), (quoted in: Caixia, L., (2011), ‘The Belitung Shipwreck Controversy’, No.58 IIAS 
Newsletter 41, International Institute of Asian Studies (Leiden), (at: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/
centres/nalanda_sriwijaya_centre/documents/belitung_controversy.pdf; accessed 18 November 2018)). 
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archaeological as a façade for an otherwise profit-seeking motive.84  This includes the 
rule, as placed within the Rules to the UNESCO Convention, that such projects can never 
be funded out of the sale of the artefacts raised.85  On this second ground, the 
archaeological community is right to maintain its criticism of the Asia Society Museum 
in New York for its continued display of esteemed Belitung patrimony.86   
 
The same can be said for the ongoing defence by Odyssey Marine Exploration of its plans 
to excavate the HMS Victory (1744) along with its cargo of gold and silver valued at 
several hundred million dollars.87  While there are plausible grounds to suggest that the 
site may be at risk from trawling and looting, the lack of a rigorous archaeological project 
design and the insidiously commercial profit-oriented motivation of the ‘salvors’, makes 
it a wholly unsuitable case for early recovery without a more transparent, non-
commercially exploitative and public benefit-driven archaeological project design.88  In 
each individual case, therefore, there will always need to be a balancing out of the 
potential costs and benefits of each option and, as a site becomes increasingly threatened, 
there is an increasing likelihood that its value would be better preserved for future 
generations by recovery rather than leaving it undisturbed.89   
 
Distinct from these “treasure salvors”, are the bona fide and uncontroversial commercial 
salvage sector who still maintain a legitimate industry contracting with operators to 
recover materials and wrecks recently lost at sea.90  Therefore, if a site does become 
vulnerable and becomes a suitable case for excavation, then there is a plausible contention 
that the technological capabilities, expertise and experience of salvage companies makes 
them a suitable private contractor to work under the direction of archaeologists.91  
 
84 Johnston, P.F., (1993), ‘Treasure Salvage, Archaeological Ethics and Maritime Museums’, 22 
International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 53-60, at p. 59. 
85 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Annex I: Rules Concerning Activities Directed at Underwater Cultural 
Heritage, Rules 2 and 17. 
86 E.g., Watson, T., (2017), ‘Show of Shipwrecked Treasures Raises Scientists’ Ire’, 6  February 2017, 542 
Nature 150. 
87 Brockman, A., (2018), UK Government Denies Maritime Heritage Foundation/Omex Permission to 
Salvage HMS Victory 1744’, 16 September 2018, ThePipeline, (at: http://thepipeline.info/blog/2018/
09/16/uk-government-denies-maritime-heritage-foundation-omex-permission-to-salvage-hms-victory-17
44/; accessed 18 November 2018). 
88 Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee, (2010), HMS Victory 1744: Options for the Management 
of the Wreck Site - A Public Consultation by the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport: Response by the Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee, June 2010, JNAPC (York), (at: 
http://www.jnapc.org.uk/HMSVictory-Response-JNAPC-June-2010.pdf; accessed 18 November 2018). 
89 See Section 3 below. 
90 E.g., See the International Salvage Union (at: http://www.marine-salvage.com; accessed 18 November 
2018). 
91 Supra n. 13, Dromgoole, at p. 196. 
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However, as should be clear from the multiple-value model of UCH management in 
Section 3, publicly-regulated archaeologists or conservators should henceforth become 
the principal decision-makers in all activities directed at UCH, with salvors only having 
permission for involvement as benign subcontractors in the provision of expertise, 
equipment and labour.92  Most importantly, their contract fee should never be dependent 
on the commercial value of the site or above market value for such salvage services.93 
 
The law of finds, being another system of property rights found in common law 
jurisdictions, has also impacted on UCH.94  It is similar to, and often confused with, the 
law of salvage.95  The key difference is that the law of finds will award the object’s 
discoverer with ownership, given that no one else can lay proper claim to its title, whereas 
salvage awards the finder with a monetary reward for returning the object to its owner, 
whether that be a proper claimant showing good title or the state in default.96  The law of 
finds was once a significant threat to UCH, given that the United States courts would use 
it to reward many treasure hunters.  The Abandoned Shipwrecks Act 1987 was therefore 
introduced to curtail this practice by ensuring that all abandoned wrecks within 3 miles 
of US waters had title, being the neighbouring US State in default.97  However, it did not 
work effectively given that claimants simply reverted to salvage law and argued such 
vessels were not positively abandoned.98  Nevertheless, fortunately, the law of finds now 
tends to be removed or neutralised in the context of UCH across most jurisdictions. 
 
 
92 Supra n. 47, Varmer, at p. 296. 
93 ‘[A]rchaeological activity can be governed by commercial principles, as long as the activities are 
authorized in conformity with the Convention, and as long as the finds that belong to the site are not part 
of the commercial equation.’ (Supra n. 14, Maarleveld, Guérin and Egger, at p. 34; Supra n. 8, Nautical 
Archaeological Society, at p. 7). 
94 The infamous Treasure Hunters I case, relating to the Nuestra Señora de Atocha, represented the pinnacle 
of use of the law of finds for wrecks in the US and triggered the Abandoned Shipwrecks Act 1987 (Treasure 
Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 408 F. Supp. 907 (D. Fla. 1976), 
aff’d, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir., 1978)); Lipka, L.J., (1970), ‘Abandoned Property at Sea: Who Owns the 
Salvage "Finds"?’, 12(1) William and Mary Law Review 97-110. 
95 DuClos, J.S., (2007), ‘A Conceptual Wreck: Salvaging the Law of Finds’, 38(1) Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce 25-38. 
96 Wilder, M.A., (2000), ‘Application of Salvage Law and the Law of Finds to Sunken Shipwreck 
Discoveries’, 67(1) Defence Counsel Journal 92-105, at pp. 92-93. 
97 Abandoned Shipwrecks Act 1987, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq (United States), ss. 2105(a) and (c). 
98 Supra n. 51, Dromgoole, at p. 188; Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 974 
F.2d 450 (4th Cir., 1992); Deep Sea Research, Inc v. Brother Jonathan, 102 F. 3d 379 (9th Cir., 1996); Yukon 
Recovery LLC v. Certain Abandoned Property (SS Islander), 205 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir., 2000) cert. denied, 
531 US 820, 121 S. Ct. 62 (2000). 
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(c) Preservationism v. Opportunism in Private International Law 
Predictably, private international law also plays a central guiding role in the protection 
of UCH.  As with all areas of private international law, most cases fall on their individual 
merits and every judicial arbiter will determine competence differently.  The constitutive 
rules used by courts to allocate jurisdiction are the same for broad generic categories and 
based on questions of nationality, residence, situs, registration, and so on, regardless of 
whether the subject is cultural or not.99  However, beyond these formal and technical rules 
used by national courts, there is one unusual jurisdictional aspect of UCH.  Typically, the 
standard means by which a state can regulate UCH is either: (i) flag state jurisdiction, 
over one’s own vessels; (ii) territorial jurisdiction, over UCH sites in one’s territorial 
waters or, in the case of Articles 9 and 10 of the UNESCO Convention (in conjunction 
with Articles 56 and 77 of the LOSC), indirect jurisdiction over UCH in the continental 
shelf or EEZ;100 or (iii), personal jurisdiction, over the actions of one’s own nationals.  
However, UCH resting on the deep seabed effectively sits in “no man’s land” – without 
territory and often without clear owner – making it difficult for a national court to 
determine jurisdiction over the UCH in question.101   
 
On this matter, the United States courts have famously assumed an extraterritorial 
authority over such wrecks.102  If Judge Niemeyer was correct about anything in RMS 
Titanic Inc v. Haver,103 it was in highlighting the jurisdictional quandary presented by the 
wreck site.104  Titanic, at that time presumed to be resting on the deep seabed, was 
effectively in an ‘anational’ territory.105  Prior to the Titanic judgment, the Fifth Circuit 
had assumed ‘quasi’ in rem jurisdiction over the Atocha wreck – some 30 nautical miles 
off the US coast – on the basis that it was competent to adjudge on the personal 
jurisdiction between the two parties, thus exempting any third parties outside of US 
 
99 See generally, Roodt, R., (2015), Private International Law, Art and Cultural Heritage, Edward Elgar 
(Cheltenham); Prott, L.V., (1989), Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural 
Heritage, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden). 
100 See Chapter 3, Section 1. 
101 Miller, G.L., (1992), ‘The Second Destruction of the Geldermalsen’, 26(4) Historical Archaeology 124-
131, at p. 128. 
102 Murphy, S.D., (2000), ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94(1) 
American Journal of International Law 102-139, at p. 125. 
103 Supra n. 52, RMS Titanic v. Haver. 
104 Ibid, at p. 966. 
105 It appears now that the Titanic wreck is within Canada’s claimed outer continental shelf (coordinates 
calculated by referring to Government of Canada, (2013), Partial Submission of Canada to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding its continental shelf in the Atlantic Ocean—Executive 
Summary, FR5-82/1-2013E, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (Ottawa), (at: http://www.
un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/can70_13/es_can_en.pdf; accessed 18 November 2018). 
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jurisdiction.106  Taking this further, in the SS Central America case, the court was able to 
assert ‘constructive’ in rem jurisdiction over the wreck which lay some 140 nautical miles 
off the US coast, on the basis of lumps of anthracite brought before the court.107  
Although, again, here it was acknowledged that jurisdiction was only as between the 
parties.108  However, in the Titanic case the US courts went yet further.  Here, the treasure 
salvors, RMS Titanic Inc., were seeking exclusive and perpetual salvor-in-possession 
status over a 5.2km2 debris field, resting at a depth of 3.8km around 800 nautical miles 
distant from the US baseline, on the basis of a few artefacts brought before the court.  By 
ultimately awarding exclusive salvor-in-possession status over the whole wreck, the 
Fourth Circuit’s award was alleged to stand against all claimants in the world, through 
the “constructive” possession of the wreck based on a few raised objects.109  Judge 
Niemeyer was particularly minded that some national court must be able to accept a 
petition, otherwise the wreck would remain permanently outside the law.110 
 
The decision to accept jurisdiction in the Titanic case has been praised by many.111  For 
without such jurisdiction, the wreck might be left without an applicable legal system and 
beyond international treaties and comity.112  The issue, however, is surely that the US 
courts accepted jurisdiction for the purposes of legitimising salvage activities directed at 
Titanic, despite mounting international academic and judicial commentary arguing in 
 
106 The plaintiffs do not ‘have exclusive title to, and the right to immediate and sole possession of, the vessel 
and cargo as to other claimants, if any there be, who are not parties…to this litigation’ (Treasure Salvors, 
Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir., 1978), at paras. 333-
336); State of Florida v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. 621 F2d 1340 (5th Cir., 1980), at para. 1347; ‘[T]he adverse 
parties in this situation are the competing salvors. Thus, since the court has jurisdiction over them, and the 
subject matter[, ] the court is fully competent to adjudicate the dispute regardless of the location of the 
salvage operations.’ (Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 
640 F.2d 560 (5th Cir., 1981), at paras. 567-568).   Note also the dissenting judgment of Rubin J, who said 
that ‘[t]here are indeed res that lie beyond the jurisdiction of any court to determine in rem ownership’ (at 
para. 1352).  N.B., The first use of such in rem jurisdiction over wrecks within national jurisdiction appears 
to date back to the Brig Ann case 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289 (1815), (supra n. 30, Segarra, at p. 365).  
107 Columbus-America Discovery Group v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 742 
F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Va., 1990), at paras. 1331 and 1333-1334. 
108 Ibid, at para. 1334 
109 ‘[W]e believe that the jus gentium authorizes an admiralty court to do so, even though the exclusiveness 
of any such order could legitimately be questioned by any other court in admiralty’ (per Niemeyer J, supra 
n. 52, RMS Titanic v. Haver, at para. 967). This decision was affirmed also in Odyssey Marine Exploration, 
Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Sailing Vessel 727 FSupp.2d 1341 (M.D. Fla., 2010), at para. 
1346. 
110 Supra n. 52, RMS Titanic v. Haver, at paras. 968-969; Supra n. 52, Niemeyer; Nafziger (supra n. 43, at 
p. 259) points out that the court was likely persuaded by arguments made by Alexander (in Alexander, B.E., 
(1989), ‘Treasure Salvage Beyond the Territorial Sea: An Assessment and Recommendations’, 20(1) 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1-20, at p. 5). 
111 Supra n. 30, Segarra; Supra n. 43, Nafziger, at p. 260; Supra n. 41, Miller, at pp. 386-387; Stern, J.S., 
(2000), ‘Smart Salvage: Extending Traditional Maritime Law To Include Intellectual Property Rights in 




favour of non-interference.113  This argument is all the more acute when the activities are 
conspicuously private and commercial in nature.  The court did therefore attempt to take 
their purported ‘sensitive approach’, by softening the aspects of US salvage law which 
might contravene the values and laws of other nations.114  For example, such a 
compromise of the Fourth Circuit was to attach conditions and covenants requiring that 
the artefacts raised remain kept together and properly conserved as a single collection for 
study and analysis, as well as available for public access and enjoyment.115  However, 
given the strong global sentiments in favour of protecting such sites in situ and of moving 
away from an economic object-oriented perspective of underwater heritage, even this 
watered-down US ‘archaeological salvage’ approach is probably beyond the supposed ius 
gentium.116 
 
While case law on this question outside the US territory has been scant,117 it is interesting 
to note an alternative perspective of the English courts in the Lusitania case.118  Here, the 
court determined that the Crown’s prerogative to claim title to unclaimed wreck in UK 
territorial waters, as it was under Section 523 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, does 
not apply to wrecks originating from outside UK waters.119  While being concerned 
mostly with statutory interpretation rather than jurisdictional rules, the case is interesting 
for its inference that the English laws of salvage are only intended for UK-based wreck.  
The sad result is that such wreck from outside the UK’s narrow territorial sea effectively 
becomes res nullius and arguably open to unrestricted exploitation.120  In so many words, 
the international position on jurisdiction over ocean-based wreck remains unclear.  The 
US courts effectively welcome applications from foreign salvors, over foreign wreck, 
 
113 Supra n. 24, Forrest, at pp. 354-355. 
114 Supra n. 41, Miller, at p. 385; Supra n. 43, Nafziger, at p. 264. 
115  The court (supra n. 52, RMS Titanic v. Haver, at para. 969) noted with approval the judgment of the 
district court which awarded RMST salvage on the basis that they were not “selling” the artefacts, in RMS 
Titanic Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 924 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Va., 1996), at paras. 718 and 723. 
116 Schoenbaum, T. and McClellan, J., (2012), Schoenbaum and McClellan's Admiralty and Maritime Law, 
5th Edn, Hornbook Series, West Academic (Eagan), at p. 856; Doran, K., (2011), ‘Adrift on the High Seas: 
The Application of Maritime Salvage Law to Historic Shipwrecks in International Waters’, 18(2) 
Southwestern Journal of International Law 647-666, at p. 657; Wright B., (2008), ‘Keepers, Weepers, or 
No Finders at All: The Effect of International Trends on the Exercise of U.S. Jurisdiction and Substantive 
Law in the Salvage of Historic Wrecks’, 33(1) Tulane Journal of Maritime Law 285-312, at p. 311. 
117 See generally, supra n. 30, Segarra. 
118 Pierce v. Bemis [1986] 1 All ER 1011. 
119 The Lusitania wreck is 15 nautical miles south of the Old Head of Kinsale, Ireland. 
120 Timmermans, D. and Guerin, U., (2015), Heritage for Peace and Reconciliation: Safeguarding 
Underwater Cultural Heritage of the First World War; Manual for Teachers, UNESCO Publishing (Paris), 
at p. 124; Supra n. 39, Marine Archaeology Legislation Project, at p. 57; See generally, supra n. 51, 
Dromgoole, at pp. 96-118. 
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found in foreign waters;121 while most jurisdictions could continue to rely on narrow 
forms of vessel, personal and territorial forms of jurisdiction.   
 
(d) Preservationism v. Opportunism in National Law 
Two important elements of national private law which have an impact upon UCH are 
contract and property law.  The UNESCO Convention has the advantage of being able to 
neatly slot into the existing international regime protecting against the illicit trade in 
stolen or clandestinely excavated antiques and artefacts.122  The UNESCO 1970 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property provided critical changes across state public 
law regimes, by attempting to address cross-border trade in illicit cultural property.123  
From this, decades of improvements to private laws across jurisdictions have attempted 
to curtail and prosecute cases of trade in stolen cultural property, largely bolstered by the 
UNIDROIT 1995 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, which 
was intended to bring private laws into line.124  These ever-improving domestic laws on 
cultural property assist in protecting UCH by outlawing, and in most cases providing for 
criminal prosecution for carrying out, trade in cultural property which is stolen.  
Furthermore, given that so many jurisdictions now punish offenders, including even 
confiscating goods from good faith purchasers and returning them to their original 
 
121 Supra n. 56, Scovazzi, at p. 287; Supra n. 51, Dromgoole, at p. 184. 
122 Maarleveld, T.J., (2006), ‘A Perspective from Across the Channel’, in The UNESCO Convention for the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Proceedings of Burlington House Seminar October 2005, 
R.A. Yorke (Ed.), 19-22, Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee, (published by Nautical 
Archaeology Society (Portsmouth)), (at: http://www.jnapc.org.uk/Burlington%20House%20Proceedings
%20final%20text.pdf; accessed 18 November 2018), at p. 20; Strati, A., (1999), Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Commentary Prepared for UNESCO, UN Doc. CLT-
99/WS/8, UNESCO (Paris), at paras. 85-88. 
123 For example, Article 8 of the UNESCO 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing 
the Illicit Import, Export and Transport of Ownership of Cultural Property (adopted 14 November 1970; 
entered into force 14 April 1972) 823 UNTS 231 (Paris)) calls upon states to impose penalties against its 
citizens who import cultural property which has been illicitly exported from the country of origin; Prott, 
L.V., (1983), ‘International Control of Illicit Movement on the Cultural Heritage: The 1970 UNESCO 
Convention and Some Possible Alternatives’, 10(2) Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 
333-351, at p. 339. See generally, Askerund, P. and Clément, E., (1997), Preventing the Illicit Traffic in 
Cultural Property: A Resource Handbook for the Implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, UN 
Doc. CLT-97/WS/6, UNESCO (Paris). 
124 Fincham, D., (2008), ‘How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule Can Impede the Flow of Illicit Cultural 
Property’, 32(1) Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 111-150, at p. 234; Kinderman, S.A., (1993), ‘The 
UNIDROIT Draft Convention on Cultural Objects: An Examination of the Need for a Uniform Legal 
Framework for Controlling the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property’, 7(2) Emory International Law 
Review 457-584, at pp. 461-462. 
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owners, such ‘hot’ property is increasingly unattractive to most auction houses and 
dealers.125 
 
All states also have public or private laws which more clearly regulate the protection of 
submerged cultural heritage.  Despite varying idiosyncrasies, a comparative perusal 
across the regulatory landscape highlights many similarities and patterns of cross-
fertilisation.126  Commonly, there are often laws in place to protect wrecks of a significant 
or historical nature, both inland and within the territorial sea.127  Some common law states 
adopt a “listing-based” approach, which seeks protection of sites on the basis of perceived 
significance.128  Most jurisdictions, however, including civil law states,129 Scandinavian 
states,130 Australia,131 and Ireland,132 utilise a blanket-based approach, providing a base 
level protection for all submerged heritage over a certain age or regulating specific 
activities.133  These blanket-based mechanisms are less ‘reactive’, usually do not interfere 
with any laws on ownership, and can also still offer additional protections for specifically 
identified wrecks.134  A combined approach such as this, as used in Australia, is perhaps 
the best method.135  Indeed, the UK approach of listing of 52 protected wrecks (as at 
 
125 Blake, J., (2015), International Cultural Heritage Law, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 68; C.f., 
MacKenzie, S.R.M., (2005), ‘Dig a Bit Deeper: Law, Regulation and the Illicit Antiquities Market’, 45 
British Journal of Criminology 249-268. 
126 See generally, Dromgoole, S. (Ed.), (2006), The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National 
Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, 2nd Edn, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden). 
127 Some jurisdictions however apply these laws up to the contiguous zone (24-nautical miles) or up to the 
outer limits of the EEZ or continental shelf (see Chapter 3, Section 1). 
128 A well-known example is the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 (c. 33) in the United Kingdom.  
129 Dromgoole, S., (2003), ‘2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage’, 18(1) International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 59-108, at p. 64.  For example, France 
(Law No. 89-874) and Netherlands (The Monument and Historic Buildings Act 1988). 
130 For example, Denmark (The Protection of Nature Act 1992, 3 January 1992, No. 9), Norway (The 
Cultural Heritage Act 1979, Act of 9 June, No. 50), and Sweden (Act Concerning Ancient Monuments and 
Finds, 30 June 1988). 
131 Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 (Australia). 
132 National Monuments (Amendment) Act 1987, No.17 (Republic of Ireland). 
133 For example, in Netherlands (supra n. 129) the limit is 50 years since submergence, Australia (supra n. 
131) it is 75 years, in Ireland, Sweden and Denmark (supra nn. 130 and 132) it is 100 years, whereas in 
Norway (supra n. 130) it is actually 100 years since the UCH objects themselves were created.  In some 
states, such as Greece and Turkey, the concern is more clearly with ancient heritage (supra n. 51, 
Dromgoole, at p. 70), therefore, for example in Greece, automatic protection is afforded to all sites wrecked 
before 1453 (Forrest, C., (2002), ‘A New International Regime for the Protection of Underwater Cultural 
Heritage’, 51(3) International Comparative Law Quarterly 511-554, at p. 524). 
134 Supra n. 51, Dromgoole, at p. 92; Del Bianco, H.P., (1987), ‘Underwater Recovery Operations in 
Offshore Waters: Vying for Rights to Treasure’, 5(1) Boston University International Law Journal 153-
176, at p. 171; Henderson, G., (2001), ‘Significance Assessment or Blanket Protection?’, 30(1) 
International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 3-4, at p. 3. 
135 UK UNESCO 2001 Convention Review Group, (2014), The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of 
the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001: An Impact Review for the United Kingdom – Final Report, United 
Kingdom National Commission for UNESCO (London), (at: https://www.unesco.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2017/09/UNESCO-Impact-Review_2014-02-10.pdf; accessed 18 November 2018), at p. 65; 
Luxford, D., (2006), ‘Finders Keepers Losers Weepers – Myth or Reality? An Australian Perspective on 
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writing), while many thousands of archaeological sites remain unprotected and open to 
commercial salvage, is prone to considerable weakness.136 
 
Committed state protection has perhaps been most ostensible in states, such as China137 
or South Africa,138 who have asserted state ownership and stewardship of all wrecks in 
their waters, regardless of actual ownership.139  The Chinese 1989 Regulation on 
Protection and Administration of Underwater Cultural Relics is in fact an unusual 
example of national legislation which asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction over wrecks 
outside of its claimed area of competence, by alleging state rights over all vessels of 
possible Chinese origin, even in other states’ territorial seas.140  The UK provides another 
unusual example of extraterritorial UCH regulation.  Under the Protection of the Military 
Remains Act 1986 (PMRA), inter alia, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for listing 
sunken UK war vessels which are to be treated as either protected or restricted sites.141  
This includes the listing and regulation of sites, wherever they may be located, including 
in other states’ territories.142  This legislation uses a combination of personal and flag 
state jurisdiction, therefore applying to UK natural persons and vessels, as well as port 
state jurisdiction, controlling any property brought back into the UK.143  However, there 
is no legal obligation on other states to observe the UK’s PMRA outside the UK’s 
territorial waters and securing such cooperation is unlikely to be easy.144 
 
Most states also have cultural property or environmental laws which contain references 
or provide indirect protection to submerged heritage.145  Just as an example, in England 
& Wales, the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 provides for the 
scheduling and protection of monuments and archaeological sites, including those on or 
 
Historic Shipwreck’, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, B.T. Hoffman (Ed.), 300-
307, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 301. 
136 Supra n. 40, Yorke, at p. 4; Supra n. 40, Marine Archaeology Legislation Project, at pp. 38-40. 
137 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Cultural Relics, (adopted at the 25th Meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress on 19 November 1982). 
138 National Heritage Resources Act 2000, (No. 25 of 1999), (South Africa). 
139 Forrest, for example, has pointed out the problems that such legislation creates (Forrest, C., (2006), 
‘South Africa’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National Perspectives in Light of the 
UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), 247-270, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 260). 
140 Supra n. 137, Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Cultural Relics, ss. 2(2), 2(3) 
and 3; Zhao, H., (1992), ‘Recent Developments in the Legal Protection of Shipwrecks in China’, 23(4) 
Ocean Development and International Law 305-333, at pp. 315-325. 
141 Protection of Military Remains Act 1986 (1986, c. 35), (United Kingdom), s.1(2). 
142 Ibid, Protection of Military Remains Act, s.3(1). 
143 Supra n. 3, Dromgoole, at p. 329. 
144 Dromgoole S. and Gaskell, N., (1993), ‘Who Has a Right to Historic Wrecks and Wreckage?’, 2(2) 
International Journal of Cultural Property 217-274, at p. 227. 
145 See supra n. 126, Dromgoole. 
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in the seabed up to the outer limits of the territorial sea.146  Proper protection of the 
maritime cultural or natural environment is also built into the important Marine and 
Coastal Access Act 2009 (MCAA), such as requiring that many licensable activities in 
the UK’s territorial waters and EEZ require ex ante impact assessments from the Marine 
Management Organisation, working in consultation with scientific advisory bodies such 
as Historic England, to determine ways to minimise any adverse impact on the cultural or 
natural environment.147  The UK’s 2008 Marine Policy Statement also directs public 
authorities towards the protection of UCH.148   
 
As has been demonstrated in this Section, there are a number of laws in place to protect 
UCH beyond the inter-state bargaining undertaken through the UNESCO Convention.  
This includes both private and public laws, as well as private international laws or laws 
of admiralty which have an impact across jurisdictional boundaries.  It should be clear 
from the analysis that, while the UK was often chosen as an example jurisdiction, each 
national legal system has its own idiosyncrasies and approaches to the protection of UCH.  
Indeed, one question of particular variability is the question of ownership of wrecks once 
they become submerged, as well as questions relating to inferred or express abandonment 
over time.  Such is the complex variety of opinion on this that the UNESCO Convention 
negotiations sought to avoid the subject altogether and allow variations in national law to 
continue.149 
 
3. A Multiple-Value Approach to Underwater Cultural Heritage 
(a) The Gradual Shift to a Multiple-Value Understanding of Underwater Cultural 
Heritage 
Balancing conflicting perspectives on the optimum means to manage UCH, as explored 
above, has implicated diverse value groups, such as archaeologists, treasure hunters, 
wreck divers, fisheries, commercial ocean users, local and national government, and civil 
society.  Occasionally, commentators have noted the possibility of seeing UCH from a 
multiple-use perspective, by underscoring the multiple ‘uses’ of UCH across these diverse 
 
146 Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 (1979, c. 46), s.53. 
147 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, (2009, c. 23), ss. 54(4), 117(8), 151(8)(b) and s.197(6ZA). 
148 HM Government, (2011), UK Marine Policy Statement, March 2011, HM Government Stationery Office 
(London), (at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/69322/pb3654-marine-policy-statement-110316.pdf; accessed 18 November 2018), at para. 1.2.3. 
149 Carducci, G., (2003), ‘New Developments in the Law of the Sea: The UNESCO Convention on the 




stakeholders.  However, up to now there has been a lack of effective academic analysis 
on what such a multiple-use model for UCH management might actually mean or how it 
could enhance its protection.  This section argues that instead of viewing UCH as a 
multiple “use” resource, focused on its practical utility, an approach should be adopted in 
line with developments in heritage literature generally, recognising the multiple and 
abstract “values” of UCH.  Indeed, there is a close similarity between a multiple-use and 
a multiple-value model, although values is perhaps broader and emphasises all forms and 
types of enjoyment which can be derived by UCH, even if the consumer never even comes 
into contact with, i.e., uses, the heritage.  Introducing a multiple-value approach not only 
informs the following section, which appraises how well the UNESCO Convention 
adopts a multiple-value approach to resolving the preservationism v. opportunism debate; 
but also sets up Chapter 4, which explores the challenges of ensuring national compliance 
with commitments to protect such multiple (and inherently transnational) values. 
 
An early reference to a potential multiple-value understanding of UCH can be found in 
the negotiations by the International Law Association, in 1992, on a draft instrument for 
the international protection of UCH before it was subsequently forwarded to UNESCO.  
Here, according to Fletcher-Tomenius and Forrest, the Committee were ‘aware of other 
interests in this resource, and conceded in 1991 that provision had to be made for the 
interests of divers and salvors’.150  According to O’Keefe and Nafziger, it also ‘became 
questionable whether the convention should attempt to incorporate all of these and 
possibly other values, at the risk of diluting the chief effort to conserve the cultural 
heritage’.151  Another embryonic and early multiple-use approach was that suggested by 
Strati in 1995, which appeared to limit the interest in UCH to identifiable owners, 
archaeologists, commercial salvors, hobby-divers, collectors, auctioneers, and the nation 
states claiming links to the heritage.152 
 
In April 1999, both Varmer and Nafziger wrote articles discussing the future treatment of 
UCH through a multiple-use approach.153  However, Nafziger again appeared to equate 
the multiple interests in UCH as an argument in favour of reconciling the incompatible 
 
150 International Law Association, (1993), Report of the Sixty Fifth Conference, Held at Cairo, Egypt, 21 
to 26 April 1992, International Law Association (London), at p. 339. 
151 Supra n. 27, O’Keefe and Nafziger, at p. 394. 
152 Strati, A., (1995), The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: An Emerging Objective of the 
Contemporary Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at pp. 19-20. 
153 Supra n. 47, Varmer, at pp. 287-294; Nafziger, J.A.R., (1999), ‘The Titanic Revisited’, 30(2) Tulane 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 311-330, at pp. 326-328. 
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practices of salvage and archaeology.154  One of the more thorough approaches, however, 
was perhaps that demonstrated by Varmer, who noted the diverse interests in preserving 
UCH, the benefits of preservation for present and future generations, and the applicability 
of a precautionary approach.155   As he puts it, ‘[m]ultiple users of the UCH include (in 
addition to the general public at large) researchers, educators, sport divers, fishermen, 
boaters, museums, commercial salvors and their investors, owners and insurers of the 
wreck (including its cargo), journalists, tourist companies, and the family and descendants 
of those who lost their lives and for whom the wreck site is a final resting place.  Most of 
these user groups benefit from on-site protection of the UCH.’156  Yet again, however, he 
principally applied the multiple-use model to resolve the binarily opposed values of 
treasure salvors and archaeologists.157 
 
The view that a multiple-use approach is simply a system for reconciling the binary 
interests of salvors and archaeologists continued in the subsequent decade.  For example, 
in 2000, Fletcher-Tomenius and Forrest stressed the importance of seeing the diverse and 
multiple attachments to decisions impacting upon UCH.  However, they felt that a failure 
to consider the interests of treasure salvors will only drive them to subvert the law.158  
Similarly, Scrimo in 2000 and Cohan in 2004, both alluded to numerous interests in the 
preservation of UCH, but came to the similarly dubious conclusion that such a multiple-
use approach would merely focus upon reconciling commercial salvage and 
archaeology.159  In his customary pro-treasure hunting stance, Bederman goes so far as to 
suggest the multiple-use model leads to a preference for early recovery above in situ 
management.160  Smith and Couper also touched upon the multiple values co-existent in 
UCH in 2003, particularly from a state-based perspective, as well as noting the need for 
an ‘integrated management’ response.161  However, again they do not expand on this and, 
once more, come to the narrow conclusion that the multiplicity of diverse interests in 
 
154 Ibid, Nafizger, at pp. 326-328. 
155 Supra n. 47, Varmer, at pp. 291-294. 
156 Supra n. 47, Varmer, at p. 291.  He also he also later writes how the ‘Titanic is of great interest to 
scientists, archaeologists, historians, naval architects, educators, salvors, the media, and the public.’ (Supra 
n. 31, Varmer, at p. 15). 
157 Supra n. 47, Varmer, at pp. 296-297. 
158 Supra n. 9, Fletcher-Tomenius and Forrest, at pp. 6 and 9. 
159 Scrimo, J.T., (2000), ‘Raising the Dead: Improving the Recovery and Management of Historic 
Shipwrecks’, 5(2) Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 271-308, at pp. 276-282; Cohan, J.A., (2004), ‘An 
Examination of Archeological Ethics and the Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part 
One)’, 27(2) Environs Environmental Law and Policy Journal 349-442. 
160 Supra n. 47, Bederman, at p. 354. 
161 Smith, H.D. and Couper, A.D., (2003), ‘The Management of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 4(1) 
Journal of Cultural Heritage 25-33, at pp. 30 and 32. 
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UCH simply necessitates the integration of the oppositional practices of salvage and 
archaeology.162   
 
More recently, however, it is possible to see an increasing recognition of UCH’s multiple 
values beyond the dichotomy between archaeology and treasure hunting narratives.  In 
2009, Manders noted the need to differentiate the protection of different UCH sites 
pragmatically and based on their ‘archaeological, historical and artistic or aesthetic 
value.’163  In 2012, Maarleveld also wrote that recently ‘there has been an understanding 
that decisions relating to heritage are based not just on one dimension of significance, but 
on a range of overlapping “values”, ranging from sheer antiquity, through historic, artistic 
and remembrance values to utility values in the spheres of identity, ideology and 
otherwise.’164  Similarly, in 2015, Secci and Spanu noted how ‘[l]egal, economic, social, 
cultural (stricto sensu), and psychological aspects all find their expression in strategies’ 
for managing UCH.165  In 2015, while discussing UCH management, Burgin notes how 
heritage is ‘important to many groups for many reasons’, including historic associations, 
spiritual and ancestral connections, safeguarding flora and fauna, or through opportunities 
for exploration.166 
 
Furthermore, in 2015, Antony Firth published a report which highlighted the numerous 
benefits and beneficiaries of preserved maritime heritage in the United Kingdom, making 
‘the case for much greater attention to be directed at the social and economic benefits of’ 
UCH.’167  Such benefits ‘are already occurring but they are obscured or unrecognised; 
and they have potential to be enhanced.’168  This also accompanies the growing body of 
general research into some of the recreational and ecological value obtained by preserving 
 
162 Ibid, at pp. 31-32. 
163 Manders, M., (2009), ‘In Situ Preservation: The “Preferred Option”’, 60(4) Museum International 31-
41, at p. 34. 
164 Maarleveld, T.J., (2012), ‘The Maritime Paradox: Does International Heritage Exist?’, 18(4) 
International Journal of Heritage Studies 418-431, at p. 419. 
165 Secci, M. and Spanu, P.G., (2015), ‘Critique of Practical Archaeology: Underwater Cultural Heritage 
and Best Practices’, 10(1) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 29-44, at p. 29. 
166 Burgin, L.R., (2015), ‘Managing Michigan’s Underwater Heritage: The Past, Present, and Future of 
Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary’, University of Michigan Working Papers in Museum Studies: 
Future Leaders, Number 1 (2015) (at: http://ummsp.rackham.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/bur
gin-working-paper-fl-series-aug-7.pdf; accessed 1 May 2019), at p. 2. 
167 Firth, A., (2015), The Social and Economic Benefits of Marine and Maritime Cultural Heritage: 
Towards Greater Accessibility and Effective Management, Fjodr, Honor Frost Foundation (London), (at: 
http://honorfrostfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/HFF_Report_2015_web-4.pdf; accessed 
18 November 2018), at p. 51. 
168 Ibid, at p. 51. 
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UCH in situ.169  Then, in 2018, Firth also produced a further report relaying ten different 
sectors who have an ‘interest’ in the management of shipwrecks.170  However, by focusing 
on ‘interests’ it cast equal consideration of the different costs of shipwrecks – such as 
being an obstacle to development or representing pollution – among the multisectoral 
interests, as well as maintaining a focus on practical utility, i.e., use.171   
 
(b) A Multiple-Value Approach in Heritage Management Literature 
Outside of the underwater context, in fact, an expanded understanding of cultural 
heritage’s significance from a multiple-value perspective has been a growing discourse 
in heritage management over the past few decades.  The starting point for many was in 
fact Riegl’s seminal paper in 1903 on the valuation of art, which described a number of 
intangible qualities about cultural ‘monuments’ which must be calculated in order to 
derive their true value.172  This included age, historical, intentional-commemorative, use, 
artistic, and newness values.173  In 2014, for example, Lamprokos wrote how Riegl ‘is 
often cited as the first, and most profound, formulation of values-based conservation.’174  
Although dated in terms of the methodology, such as by his exclusion of numerous social 
characteristics,175 it is clear that Riegl’s paper has been highly influential in establishing 
and legitimising the role of the state in heritage conservation.  This then translated through 
into the 1931 Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments and 1964 Venice 
Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites, which ‘privileged 
historic, scientific and aesthetic values, as defined by various forms of expertise’.176  
However, it is the Burra Charter, drawn up in Australia in 1979, that forms the event 
which ‘most authors agree . . . finally turned the attention of heritage experts towards 
 
169 E.g., Krumholz, J.S. and Brennan, M.L., (2015), ‘Fishing for Common ground: Investigations of the 
Impact of Trawling on Ancient Shipwreck Sites Uncovers a Potential for Management Synergy’, 61 Marine 
Policy 127-133; Supra n. 167, Firth, at pp. 35-37. 
170 Firth, A., (2018), Managing Shipwrecks, Fjordr, Honor Frost Foundation (London), (at: http://honor
frostfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Managing-Shipwrecks-April-2018-web.pdf; 
accessed 18 November 2018). 
171 Ibid. 
172 Riegl, A., (1903), Der Moderne Denkmalkultus: Sein Wesen Und Seine Entstehung, W. Braumuller 
(Vienna), (Translation:  Forster, K.W. and Ghirardo, D., (1982), ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its 
Character and Its Origins’, 25 Oppositions 21-51). 
173 Ibid; Barassi, S., (2007), ‘The Modern Cult of Replicas: A Rieglian Analysis of Values in Replication’, 
Tate Papers, No. 8, Autumn 2007, (at: https://www.tate.org.uk/download/file/fid/7325; accessed 18 
November 2018); Gibson, L. and Pendlebury, J., (2009), ‘Introduction: Valuing Historic Environments’, in 
Valuing Historic Environments, L. Gibson and J. Pendlebury (Eds.), 1-19, Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 7. 
174 Lamprokos, M., (2014), ‘Riegl’s “Modern Cult of Monuments” and The Problem of Value’, 4(2) Change 
Over Time 418-435. 
175 Díaz-Andreu, M., (2017), ‘Heritage Values and the Public’, 4(1) Journal of Community Archaeology & 
Heritage 2-6, at p. 2. 
176 Jones, S., (2017), ‘Wrestling with the Social Value of Heritage: Problems, Dilemmas and Opportunities’, 
4(1) Journal of Community Archaeology & Heritage 21-37, at p. 23. 
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social values and the public.’177  This Charter, developed through ICOMOS, sought to 
take an inclusive approach to the categorisation and valuation of heritage, integrating the 
views of local, indigenous, and non-specialist communities.   
 
Gibson and Pendlebury refer to this pluralistic conception of heritage as the ‘cultural turn’ 
which ‘led to a questioning of what constitutes value [and] resulted in erosion of the 
previously dominant notion of value which understood it as . . . able to be revealed by . . 
. a limited body of experts.’178  This more inclusive understanding of heritage values has 
therefore increasingly become a focal point for analysis in the past two decades.  For 
example, in 2014-2015, the EU funded a Europe-wide study into the types of values 
attributed to cultural heritage and how these values are determined and ascribed.  Various 
outputs from this project can be found, but one in particular is a special issue of the Journal 
of Community Archaeology & Heritage in 2017 entitled ‘Heritage Values and the 
Public’.179  Recent scholarship by archaeologists and heritage managers has thus led to 
the development of numerous interlinking and overlapping lists of the various 
‘categories’ of heritage value.  As Gibson and Pendlebury aptly defend such systems of 
value categorisation, ‘whilst there is some acknowledgement of the reductionist problems 
they can cause, typologies lie perhaps even more than ever at the heart of the conservation 
process.’180 
 
For example, the Burra Charter itself referred to cultural significance as including 
‘aesthetic, historic, scientific, social or spiritual value for past, present or future 
generations’.181  The English Heritage Conservation Principles, originally published in 
2008, and influenced by the Burra Charter,182 ascribed heritage value based on its 
evidential, historical (associative and illustrative), aesthetic, commemorative, symbolic, 
 
177 Supra n. 175, Díaz-Andreu, at p. 2 (emphasis added); Ibid, Jones, at p. 23. 
178 Supra n. 173, Gibson and Pendlebury, at p. 1.  As Olivier puts it, academic attention had previously been 
on ‘scientific and evidential values that derive from specialist and expert knowledge.  However, changing 
approaches to heritage management . . . shifted away from a reliance on expert and professional values to 
incorporate appreciation and consideration of wider and more inclusive values.’ (Olivier, A., (2017), 
‘Communities of Interest: Challenging Approaches’, 4(1) Journal of Community Archaeology & Heritage 
7-20, at p. 8); Supra n.  176, Jones, at p. 21. 
179 This included Díaz-Andreu, Jones, and Olivier, supra nn. 175-176 and 178. 
180 Supra n. 173, Gibson and Pendlebury, at p. 7. 
181 The Burra Charter, The Australia ICOMOS Charter for Places of Cultural Significance, Australia 
ICOMOS Incorporated (Burwood), (last edition adopted October 2013, first adopted in August 1979), (at: 
https://australia.icomos.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Burra-Charter-2013-Adopted-31.10.2013.pdf; 
accessed 18 November 2018), at para. 1(2). 
182 Supra n. 176, Jones, at p. 23. 
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social, and spiritual qualities.183  In 1994, Kellert identified natural heritage, and 
specifically flora and fauna which carry an interesting parallel with the intangible 
qualities of cultural heritage, as possessing utilitarian, naturalistic, ecologistic-scientific, 
aesthetic, symbolic, humanistic, moralistic, dominionistic, and negativistic values.184  In 
2000, De La Torre and Avrami said how cultural heritage values have been put into 
‘categories such as aesthetic, religious, political, economic, and so on.’185  In 2002, Mason 
refined the typology as including historical, cultural/symbolic, social, spiritual/religious, 
aesthetic, use, existence, option, and bequest values.186  Further, in his highly influential 
and insightful chapter on the subject in 2009, Lipe suggests archaeological valuation 
includes questions of ‘preservation, research, cultural heritage, education, aesthetics, and 
economics.’187  Then, in 2017, Díaz-Andreu rightly notes how heritage values vary 
depending on the context and country in question, but many lists of values, ‘including 
historical, aesthetic, economic, social, scientific and an array of other types’.188   
 
Taking all this together and by simply turning these multiple-value understandings of 
heritage towards the underwater environment, it could be persuasively argued that UCH 
contains some or all of the following values (many of which invite pluralistic 
interpretations or can overlap or interlink):  
 
• Historical value 
UCH provides vital historical values by providing a physical and evidential link from the 
present to the past.189  For archaeological sites, artefacts and historic properties ‘have 
 
183 English Heritage, (2008), Conservation Principles: Policies and Guidance for the Sustainable 
Management of the Historic Environment, English Heritage (London), (at: https://content.historic
england.org.uk/images-books/publications/conservation-principles-sustainable-management-historic-envi
ronment/conservationprinciplespoliciesguidanceapr08web.pdf/; accessed 18 November 2018), at paras. 30-
60. 
184 Kellert, S.R., (1994), The Value of Life: Biological Diversity and Human Society, Island Press 
(Washington). 
185 Avrami, E., Mason, R. and de la Torre, M. (Eds.), (2000), Values and Heritage Conservation: Research 
Report, Getty Conservation Institute (Los Angeles), (at: http://www.getty.edu/conservation/publications_
resources/pdf_publications/pdf/valuesrpt.pdf; accessed 18 November 2018), at p. 8. 
186 Mason, R., (2002), ‘Assessing Values in Conservation Planning: Methodological Issues and Choices’, 
in Assessing the Values of Cultural Heritage: Research Report, M. de la Torre (Ed.), 5-31, Getty 
Conservation Institute (Los Angeles), at p. 5. 
187 Lipe, W.D., (2009), ‘Archaeological Values and Resource Management, in Archaeology and Cultural 
Resource Management: Visions for the Future, L. Sebastian and W.D. Lipe (Eds.), 41-64, School for 
Advanced Research (Santa Fe), at p. 41.  Lipe’s list, which slightly differed at first, started in 1984 (see 
supra n. 19, Lipe). 
188 Supra n. 175, Díaz-Andreu, at p. 2. 
189 ‘Historical values are at the root of the very notion of heritage.’ (Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 11); Supra 
n. 183, English Heritage Conservation Principles, at paras. 39-45; UNESCO, (1995), Preliminary Study on 
the Advisability of Preparing an International Instrument for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage, General Conference, 28th Session, (4 October 1995, Paris), UN Doc. 28C/39, at para. 7. 
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great power to symbolize and represent the past, at least in part because they provide a 
physical, tangible link between past and present.’190 
 
• Archaeological value 
Similarly, the archaeological value relates to the society’s enjoyment of UCH, whether 
participating as professional or amateur archaeologists, or benefitting from the fruits of 
the discipline’s research.191  Indeed, ‘archaeological research has resulted in great 
increases in reliable knowledge about the human past and has continuously invigorated 
public interest in and understanding of that past.’192   
 
• Educational value 
There are many educational values of UCH, by providing an engaging medium through 
which society can engage in learning, envisioning, understanding and interpreting other 
lives and cultures.193  As Lipe notes, the ‘large number of books, magazine articles, 
television productions, lectures, classes, museum exhibits, and websites devoted to 
disseminating the findings of archaeological research testify to the broad public interest 
in this type of inquiry and its results.’194   
 
• Social value 
Social value is a broad category which relates to heritage’s capacity to ‘enable and 
facilitate social connections, networks, and other relations’.195  In the UCH context, this 
could be manifested by the comingling of wreck divers, archaeologists, fishers, scientists, 
tourists, and the maritime community around submerged sites or in groups and networks.  
Although under-utilised, it would also include the capacity for the local community to 
strengthen their connections through shared local heritage.  Furthermore, there is also the 
social value attained from engaging in preservation itself, whether derived from the 
feelings of compassion and being part of a community.196  Social value also, of course, 
 
190 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at p. 53. 
191 Supra n. 183, English Heritage Conservation Principles, at paras. 35-38. 
192 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at p. 49. 
193 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at p. 58; Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 11; Brown, E.D., (1996), ‘Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: Draft Principles and Guidelines for Implementation of Article 303 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982’, 20(4) Marine Policy 325-336, at pp. 334-335; 
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Convention, Preamble). 
194 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at p. 49. 
195 Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 12. 
196 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at p. 47; Supra n. 183, English Heritage Conservation Principles, at para. 30. 
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includes personal benefits obtained by protecting UCH sites, such as the value obtained 
by relatives and descendants of those on board a shipwreck.197 
 
• Recreational value 
There is also the more direct recreational value, whether that be from diving on sites and 
underwater museums and trails, viewing UCH through submersibles or glass bottom 
boats, or virtually or through digital media, as well as enjoying the sites or objects in a 
public museum.198   
 
• Cultural value 
There are also cultural or identity values, which provides people, communities and 
nations today with a connection to their ancestors.199  Although this could include the 
preservation of local monuments and buildings, or the practice of cultural rites, rituals, 
commemorations, and celebrations, it is also just as possible to locate the very same 
cultural or identity values – such communal, national, ethnic, religious, or spiritual – in 
archaeological heritage underwater.200   This therefore also ties in with the many spiritual 
and religious links to UCH, as well as the commemoration and veneration of UCH as 
burial sites and places of human suffering. 
 
• Ecological value 
Another value to also consider is the ecological value that UCH provides within its new 
submerged environment, by providing ecological benefits such as providing a reef or 
 
197 Supra n. 183, English Heritage Conservation Principles, at para. 30. 
198 Supra n. 183, English Heritage Conservation Principles at para. 32; Secretariat and the Scientific and 
Technical Advisory Body of the UNESCO 2001 Convention, (2013), The Benefit of the Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage for Sustainable Growth, Tourism and Urban Development, UNESCO 
(Paris), (at: http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/UCH_development_stu
dy_2013.pdf; accessed 18 November 2018); Supra n. 193, Brown, at p. 334;  The UNESCO Convention’s 
preamble refers to the ‘recreational . . . benefits’ of UCH (supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Preamble); 
199 Serageldin, I., (1999), ‘Cultural Heritage as Public Good: Economic Analysis Applied to Historic Cities’, 
in Global Public Goods: Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 240-
263, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 240; Darvill, T., (1994), ‘Value Systems and the 
Archaeological Resource’, 1(1) International Journal of Heritage Studies 52-64, at p. 59; Francioni, F., 
(2012), ‘Public and Private in the International Protection of Global Cultural Goods’, 23(3) European 
Journal of International Law 719-730, at p. 720; Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 11.  See UNESCO Convention, 
Preamble, which refers to UCH as an ‘important element in the history of peoples, nations, and their 
relations with each other concerning their common heritage’. 
200 Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 12; Supra n. 183, English Heritage Conservation Principles, at paras. 54-60.  
As Brown once said, UCH ‘contributes to the formation of identity and can be important to people's sense 
of community.’ (Supra n. 193, Brown, at p. 334). 
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sanctuary for biodiversity and providing numerous ecosystem services as an integrated 
aspect of the biosphere.201   
 
• Aesthetic value 
There are also the aesthetic values that UCH can deliver, including the overall sensory 
experience,202 where divers can enjoy real-life experience of a site and the non-diving 
community can enjoy imagery, photographs, telepresence and recreations of sites and 
objects.  Preserving cultural heritage for its aesthetic and visual quality also provides the 
world with greater diversity and colour.203  This also relates to appreciation of the 
organisation of physical elements, such as admiring architectural beauty or technical 
ingenuity.204 
 
• Excitement value 
More abstract is the intangible excitement value that the global community enjoys: they 
may never swim around and explore shipwrecks or sunken cities, but imagining the 
adventure of being a free-ranging Jacques Cousteau character continue to inspire and 
excite around the world, with countless books, films and television programmes 
engrossing viewers in adventures of underwater exploration.  This includes the public’s 
excitement about stories of shipwreck, disaster, piracy, war, natural disasters, and 
mythology, which can all be wrapped up in UCH,205 as well as the mysticism of stories 
which are as yet, or may remain, untold.  As Darvill says, the ‘attraction of places such 
as Stonehenge is probably that relatively little is known about their use and social 
context.’206 
 
• Existence value 
Some have written about the existence value of heritage, which provides ‘feelings of well-
being, contentment, and satisfaction’, just by simply ‘knowing it exists.’207  Indeed, as 
Serageldin writes, ‘even if they have never seen one and probably never will; if blue 
 
201 Supra n. 169; Matero, F.G, (2008), ‘Heritage, Conservation, and Archaeology: An Introduction’, AIA 
site Preservation Programme, Archaeological Institute of America (Boston), (at: https://www.archaeo
logical.org/pdfs/Matero.pdf; accessed 18 November 2018), at pp. 4-5. 
202 Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 12; Supra n. 183, English Heritage Conservation Principles, at paras. 46-53. 
203 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at pp. 56-57; Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 11. 
204 Supra n. 183, English Heritage Conservation Principles, at para. 30; Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 11. 
205 Supra n. 176, Jones, at pp. 24-25. 
206 Supra n. 199, Darvill, at p. 58 (emphasis added). 
207 Supra n. 199, Darvill, at p. 59; Samuels, K.L., (2008), ‘Value and Significance in Archaeology’, 15(1) 




whales became extinct, many people would feel a definite sense of loss.’208  The very 
same could therefore be said for UCH sites around the world. 
 
• Empathy value 
A less-explored, but related value, is the empathy value inherent in the enjoyment that 
one receives by witnessing others attached to their own cultural heritage or in witnessing 
the heritage of others being compassionately protected. 
 
• Intrinsic value 
It is also inevitable that heritage, separate to socially constructed values, must possess 
some intrinsic value in isolation.209  Moving beyond the anthropocentric account, and 
even the ecocentric, this could further anticipate the likely thoughts, feelings and interests 
of the inanimate objects themselves.  For example, an archaeological site would 
theoretically prefer to remain integrally whole and in context.210  Just as human remains 
would prefer, conceptually, to be treated humanely.211  Although it is difficult to rebut the 
possibility that such values are still human-constructed and not necessarily “intrinsic”, 
they still nevertheless appear to reside within the heritage itself. 
 
• Economic value 
The economic value of heritage includes both extractive and non-extractive values, such 
as the market value of the artefacts and materials at the site, as well as the capacity for 
commercialisation through tourism at a preserved site.212  This also includes an option 
value which, in the case of UCH, would see the preservation of UCH as a gift to future 
generations to be able to enjoy the archaeological analysis to be carried out, particularly 
factoring in the better and less destructive archaeological technology which is available 
to future researchers or users.213  Various economic models have been adopted over the 
years to attempt to quantify all these various tangible and intangible values (e.g., 
contingent valuation method), but none have proven satisfactory from an economic 
 
208 Supra n. 199, Serageldin, at p. 245. 
209 Supra n. 199, Serageldin, at p. 240; Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 13. 
210 Alberts, H. C. and Hazen, H. D., (2010), ‘Maintaining Authenticity and Integrity at Cultural World 
Heritage Sites’, 100(1) Geographical Review 56-73; Ram, Y., Björk, P. and Weidenfeld, A., (2016), 
‘Authenticity and Place Attachment of Major Visitor Attractions’, 52 Tourism Management 110-122. 
211 Wills, B., Ward, C. and Sáiz Gómez, V., (2014), ‘Conservation of Human Remains from Archaeological 
Contexts’, in Regarding the Dead: Human Remains in the British Museum, A. Fletcher, D. Antoine and JD 
Hill (Eds.), 49-74, British Museum (London); Roberts, C.A., (2009), Human Remains in Archaeology: A 
Handbook, Council for British Archaeology (York). 
212 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at p. 61; Supra n. 199, Serageldin, at p. 245. 
213 Supra n. 199, Darvill, at p. 57-58; Supra n. 199, Serageldin, at p. 245; Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 13. 
97 
 
perspective.214  This is perhaps unsurprising, given that most of heritage’s values – as 
demonstrated in this section and explored further in Chapter 4 – are prototypically 
intangible, abstract, fluid, and therefore prone to positive externalities and, thus, adverse 
to economic quantifications.215 
 
(c) A Multiple-Value Approach to Underwater Cultural Heritage Management 
It is now possible to draw a clearer picture of the coveted yet under-explored ‘multiple-
value approach’ to UCH management.  Most significantly, such a model is not focused 
on finding common ground between the innately incongruent practices of salvage and 
archaeology, as was explored by a number of writers throughout the 1990s and 2000s,216 
but emphasises the need to more thoroughly consider the diversity of non-economic, 
abstract and intangible values which are continuously delivered to multifarious 
communities by protecting and preserving UCH.  The result must be that the multiple-
value model to UCH management necessitates the quantification and aggregation of all 
of these diverse and intangible values in future decision-making relating to sites.217  In 
effect, therefore, the optimum treatment of UCH is that which produces the highest 
distribution of utility (values) to present and future generations, seeking the most Pareto-
efficient outcome.  As Lipe says, stakeholders must therefore ‘recognize the multiple 
values at play, as well as the need for long-term protection and management of the 
archaeological properties in question.  This may require mediating conflicting demands 
made by various populations of resource users.’218  Similarly, as Labadi says, an approach 
which anticipates diverse social interests in heritage leads to the ‘democratization of 
heritage discourses and conservation.’219 
 
The multiple-value approach is therefore temporally and spatially expansive, such as by 
recognising that utility is delivered to both present and all future generations, as well as 
appreciating how values can often radiate to local or global community levels.  It thus 
naturally includes consideration of future interests and future technologies, which will 
expand the opportunities for value distribution efficiency, such as better archaeological 
and recreational capacities, as well as the opportunity for value distribution reach, such 
 
214 See generally, Hutter, M. and Rizzo, I. (Eds.), (1997), Economic Perspectives on Cultural Heritage, 
Palgrave Macmillan (London). 
215 Ibid; Supra n. 186, Mason, at p. 13. 
216 Supra nn. 150-171. 
217 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at p. 63; Supra n. 183, English Heritage Conservation Principles, at para. 31. 
218 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at p. 46. 
219 Labadi, S., (2007), ‘Representations of the Nation and Cultural Diversity in Discourses on World 
Heritage’, 7(2) Journal of Social Archaeology 147-170, at p. 149.  
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as expanded capacity for value consumption beyond local or niche community scales.  In 
contrast to the views of the opportunists, in Section 2, the multiple-level model fits well 
with the policy of in situ preservation of UCH as the ‘preferred’ option, except in cases 
where facts demand an alternative strategy (see above).220  This is principally because 
UCH preserved in situ continues to produce and deliver diverse values;221 whereas 
recovery may halt the production of many values and convert some of them into one-off 
tangible or private economic values.222  In other words, recovery removes the opportunity 
for in situ archaeological analysis, recreational enjoyment, ecosystem services, or cultural 
and social value, for example.   However, by contrast, when assessing whether a site has 
become suitable for recovery, a part of that calculation should include the value available 
to present and future generations from obtaining information from the site before it is lost 
or from accessing the UCH when conserved in an accessible museum.  Indeed, it can 
produce many such global values when preserved or respected ex situ. 
 
Thus, while opportunists might argue that ex situ cultural property still delivers 
comparable value, they neglect to recognise that all of this value remains preserved within 
the heritage when it is stabilised.223  As Scott-Ireton once said, activities such as research, 
education and heritage tourism are ‘appropriate ways to “use” shipwrecks [given that the] 
common factor for all of these uses is that none of them cause shipwrecks to be “used 
up”.’224  Indeed, even when in situ UCH is placed ‘off-limits’, such as by enforcing strict 
no-dive zones or shielding the site under sand or protective polypropylene mesh, most of 
these values are also frozen in storage for the enjoyment of future generations.  In some 
ways, therefore, in situ UCH holds considerable ‘option value’ (as noted above), which 
enables future generations to determine the point at which the option to recover should 
be exercised.  That decision, however, should acknowledge that raising and conserving 
UCH in a public repository might lead to the preserved and unremitting historical, 
archaeological, educational, recreational, social, cultural, aesthetic, empathy, existence, 
intrinsic, excitement, and even economic value from in situ preservation may be 
diminished or lost.  As a result, activities directed at UCH which provide short-term value 
 
220 Supra n. 163, Manders. 
221 Supra n. 47, Varmer, at pp. 288 and 291. 
222 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at p. 42; Supra n. 166, at pp. 4-5. 
223 Supra n. 9, Fletcher-Tomenius and Forrest, at p. 3; c.f., Supra n. 25, Bryant, at p. 103. 
224 Gribble, J., Parham, D. and Scott-Ireton, D.A., (2009), ‘Historic Wrecks: Risks or Resources?’, 11(1) 
Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 16-28, at p. 19 (per Scott-Ireton). 
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for smaller ‘elite’ groups (such as profit-oriented salvors), but which neglect the collective 
and diverse values available for wider groups, should be prohibited or criminalised.225   
 
As Manders writes, decisions to override the in situ principle should be ‘a matter of 
balancing the costs, the effects of protective measures, and the importance of the site.’226  
According to this methodology, the multiple-use approach does not endorse in situ 
preservation over excavation as a matter of course, but instead requires the careful 
calculation of diverse uses from various groups, employing precautionary and ecosystem 
approaches, accounting for group size, internal distribution of utility, and future 
generations, as well as the relative costs of maintaining a site in situ, as compared with 
the cost of maintaining artefacts raised to the surface.227  This also guides the design of 
archaeological projects.  For example, project designs should ensure that the values 
inherent in UCH are preserved to their fullest extent and that any loss in value (including 
loss by proximate non-human life or loss to objects themselves) are compensated for as 
far as possible, such as by ensuring that the local community participates in the future 
management and interpretation of the artefacts, or by installing a new artificial reef, 
memorial or recreational dive site.  Achieving this multiple-use model, which mediates 
the diverse interests and values of multiple stakeholders, informs many of the arguments 
raised in the remainder of this thesis. 
 
4. The UNESCO Convention: Settling the Debate by Adopting a Multiple-Value 
Approach 
Despite private interests in the preservation and exploitation of UCH forming the most 
active and impassioned debate in the academic literature surrounding the UNESCO 
Convention, in the final text the matter was dealt with swiftly and satisfactorily.  The 
UNESCO Convention does finally, and in some rudimentary sense, address these 
multiple values of UCH as they pertain to the management of UCH from the competing 
perspectives of treasure salvage and archaeology.  The Preamble specifically highlights 
the values represented by UCH when preserved in situ and ensuring the public’s growing 
interest in its protection and right to enjoy the educational and recreational benefits 
 
225 Supra n. 187, Lipe, at p. 57. 
226 Supra n. 163, Manders, at p. 34 (emphasis added). 
227 Maarleveld, T.J., (2011), ‘Open Letter to Dr. Sean Kingsley Wreck Watch International Regarding his 
Questionnaire on In Situ Preservation’, 6(2) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 107-111; Supra n. 47, 
Varmer, at pp. 287-291; Supra n. 8, Nautical Archaeological Society, 35; Supra n. 133, Forrest, at p. 535. 
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thereof.228  It also emphasises that threats facing UCH include ‘legitimate activities that 
may indirectly affect it’ (e.g., development, fishing, mining, construction), ‘unauthorized 
activities’ (e.g., pilfering, vandalism, IUU fishing, pollution), and expresses deep concern 
about its ‘increasing commercial exploitation’ (e.g., salvage, looting and trade in UCH 
artefacts).229  These concerns were directly translated into an agreement under Article 2 
to ‘cooperate’230 in the mission to ‘preserve underwater cultural heritage for the benefit 
of humanity’,231 where the ‘preservation in situ of underwater cultural heritage shall be 
considered as the first option before allowing or engaging in any activities directed at this 
heritage.’232   
 
This therefore recognises the identified principle that in situ preservation may, when 
adjudged against competing uses, be the most sustainable approach for providing the 
optimum utility to the greatest number over the space of time.  It also recognises that 
while preservation is the ‘first option’, it is not the only option, and any decision to 
excavate or dispose of UCH must be done in a manner that abides with the ethos of the 
Convention and is in the benefit of wider humanity, i.e., which provides for optimum 
value allocation.233  Furthermore, should UCH be removed from its context, it needs to 
‘be deposited, conserved and managed in a manner that ensures its long-term 
preservation.’234  Thus, rightly, the costs of long-term conservation – which can be 
significant and ongoing235 – need to be factored in before any decision is taken to recover 
material: only when these costs are lower than those of preservation in situ, or the in situ 
value of the UCH is rapidly diminishing, should recovery become an option.236 
 
A crucial aspect of the Convention in upholding the multiple-value approach is the 
agreement that underwater heritage ‘shall not be commercially exploited.’237  This forms 
an important cornerstone to the entire Convention.  By seeking to eradicate any 
association of underwater cultural property with commercial profiteering, it is removed 
from a private-centred regime, founded upon commercial speculation, profit and personal 
 
228 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Preamble. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 2(2). 
231 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 2(3). 
232 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 2(5). 
233 Supra n. 14, Maarleveld, Guérin and Egger, at pp. 38-40. 
234 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 2(6). 
235 Supra n. 21, Cho; Supra n. 14, Maarleveld, Guérin and Egger, at p. 200. 
236 Supra n. 14, Maarleveld, Guérin and Egger, at p. 28 
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gain,238 and transformed into a public good, premised upon sharing, public access and 
distribution of diverse values to wider society.  Any activity directed at UCH which 
appears commercially motivated in terms of private gain at the expense of public value, 
therefore, should be antithetical to the purpose of the Convention.  Importantly, this does 
not mean that activities utilising UCH cannot be commercial in toto, but that they cannot 
be both ‘commercial’ and ‘exploitative’.239    
 
For example, Article 4 permits of certain publicly-supervised salvage operations and the 
Rules permit, under Rule 2, payment for professional archaeological services240 and for 
the deposition of UCH property to a public institution such as a museum, ‘provided such 
deposition does not prejudice the scientific or cultural interest or integrity of the recovered 
material or result in its irretrievable dispersal.’241  In many other ways, the Rules also 
emphasise the need to preserve UCH and maximise its benefits for the greater good and 
for future generations, including the re-emphasis of preservation as the first option,242 
promotion of non-destructive analysis on sites,243 minimising unnecessary disturbance or 
deterioration of preserved sites,244 proper recording of activities,245 and promoting 
sustainable public access to sites.246  Therefore, commercial activities directed at UCH 
which have a public-oriented focus and which bring sustainable investment into a 
community, such as underwater museums and other ecotourism activities, are to be 
encouraged.247 
 
238 UCH is ‘threatened by activities that are wholly undesirable because they are intended to profit few at 
the expense of many’ (ICOMOS, (1996), Charter on the Protection and Management of Underwater 
Cultural Heritage, 11th ICOMOS General Assembly, October 1996 (Sofia), (at: https://www.icomos.
org/charters/underwater_e.pdf; accessed 18 November 2018), at Introduction). 
239 Supra n. 81, Gongaware, at pp. 207-208; Supra n. 78, O’Keefe, at pp. 124-125; C.f., Stemm and 
Bederman have argued that ‘exploitation’ should be interpreted in the context of Article 18 (on the unrelated 
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a museum (Stemm, G. and Bederman, D.J., (2011), ‘Virtual Collectors and Private Curators: A Model for 
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https://archive.asia.si.edu/exhibitions/SW-CulturalHeritage/downloads/ICMMArchaeologyPolicy.pdf; 




Another vital part of the UNESCO Convention, promoting the sustainable protection of 
UCH’s multiple values, is provided under Article 4, which permits salvage only to the 
extent that is authorised by a competent authority, is in full conformity with the 
Convention, and ensures that recovery achieves the maximum protection of the UCH in 
question.248  It is unsurprising that this article is one that has since invited considerable 
debate and critique.  However, the article is simple and attractive.  It is permitting of some 
form of salvage, but only under very stringent conditions.  It certainly makes salvage 
harder, but it does not remove its relevance altogether.249  The Convention could be seen 
to permit salvage law provided the law itself is revised to be entirely unlike the US model 
based on private profit-seeking, premature recovery, and short-termism.250   
 
Not all agree on this, with some commentators questioning whether the strictly worded 
exceptions under Article 4 will deny salvage so much as to make it irrelevant.251  
However, because the drafters did not draft a complete prohibition, the opposing 
argument is more convincing: that salvage is permitted, but only under exceptional non-
exploitative circumstances.252  It encourages a complete rehaul of salvage law away from 
archaeology, making it necessarily built upon carefully drafted permits which require 
prior investigation of potentially affected users and which recognise the global values 
delivered by in situ preservation.  It also ensures that any necessary recoveries are 
conducted under strict compliance with the UNESCO Convention and Rules, i.e., 
operated under the firm guidance of the archaeological and scientific community and not 
conducted for private gain.253  It could further allow salvors-in-possession or finders a 
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new “reward”, such as co-management of sustainable ecotourism activities which are 
non-destructive and largely in the public benefit.254  Article 4 is therefore to be praised as 
a sound compromise between the two polarities of salvage and archaeology.  It fairly 
achieves the Convention’s overall aim of removing UCH from activities for private gain, 
while still respecting the tradition in common law states for regulating UCH protection 
through historic salvage laws.255   
 
5. Conclusion: Moving Beyond Treasure Hunting in International Underwater 
Cultural Heritage Policy 
The overriding objective of the UNESCO Convention was to end the debate between 
archaeologists and treasure salvors, while instituting a common approach to managing 
submerged cultural property according to archaeological and conservational principles.256  
As Williams said of the UNESCO Convention, ‘they were out to deal with treasure 
salvors and that’s all they were out to deal with.’257  Similarly, as González once put it, 
the ‘central objective of the Convention is to prevent looting of underwater cultural 
heritage.’258  As Firth summarised in interview, the ‘Convention is mainly about treasure 
hunting, but that has been one of the major issues.  So, if it were to be put in place and to 
really literally give no harbour to treasure hunters, then that would be a major step 
forward.’259  In terms of this objective, as this chapter has shown, the Convention deserves 
considerable praise.  There seems little doubt that it has greatly assisted a culture change 
in public perceptions and attitudes to UCH: whereas in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
particularly in common law traditions, UCH was widely viewed as a source of treasure, 
providing its finder with quixotic riches; it now seems more readily accepted that 
submerged archaeological resources, across the globe, need to be treated as a threatened 
and important publicly held asset.  In addition to the numerous benefits identified in 
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Chapter 1,260 therefore, ratification of the Convention is likely to continue this move 
towards multiple-value and public-oriented management approaches.   
 
However, it is also clear that the UNESCO negotiations focused too much energy on the 
specific challenges wrapped up in this objective, such as revising the law of salvage for 
historic objects, addressing trade in underwater cultural property, and raising the 
standards of marine archaeology.  As a result, the negotiations did not have an opportunity 
to address many other increasingly critical and destructive threats to UCH of an 
incidental, indirect or illicit nature, such as the threats of trawling, fishing, development, 
pollution, mining, dredging, energy production and climate change.  Perhaps the biggest 
threat of all, outside the traditional concern for legalised treasure hunting, is the ever-
growing reports of illegal or unreported looting and pilfering.  Stories are emerging from 
all corners of the world which show how a new breed of opportunists have dispensed with 
law altogether and are continuing to loot metals, materials and artefacts from UCH sites 
covertly and without legal sanction.261 
 
As a result, it seems increasingly recognised that it is these growing indirect, illegal and 
incidental threats which have very recently been promoted to the most urgent and critical 
concern.  Indeed, as Dromgoole said in 2006, ‘the biggest challenge for the future is likely 
to be dealing with inadvertent damage or destruction to the UCH from human 
activities.’262   She adds later that ‘the threat of incidental damage to the UCH as a result 
of human activities around the shores . . .  is substantial.’263  Kingsley has even proposed 
 
260 See Chapter 1, Section 4. 
261 E.g., BBC News, (2018), ‘UK Investigates WW2 Shipwreck Looting Claims’, 19 August 2018, BBC 
News, (at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-45238158; accessed 1 December 2018); Lamb, K., (2018), ‘Lost 
Bones, A Mass Grave and War Wrecks Plundered off Indonesia’, 28 February 2018, The Guardian, (at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/28/bones-mass-grave-british-war-wrecks-java-indonesia; 
accessed 1 December 2018); Brean, J., (2017), ‘‘It’s Grave Robbing’: Treasure Hunters Suspected to have 
Looted Infamous 1915 Shipwreck’, 5 December 2017, National Post, (at: https://nationalpost.com/
news/canada/its-grave-robbing-treasure-hunters-suspected-to-have-looted-infamous-1915-shipwreck; 
accessed 1 December 2018); Holes, O., (2017), ‘Sunken Australian Warship HMAS Perth Ransacked by 
Illegal Scavengers’, 5 June 2017, The Guardian, (at: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/
jun/05/sunken-australian-warship-hmas-perth-ransacked-by-illegal-scavengers; accessed 1 December 
2018); Middleton, J. and Neal, C., (2018), ‘Shipwreck Looters who Plundered Historical Artefacts from 
Royal Navy Warship at Bottom of the Sea Jailed’, 22 June 2018, The Mirror, (at: https://www.mirror.
co.uk/news/uk-news/shipwreck-looters-who-plundered-historical-12771186; accessed 1 December 2018); 
Mema, B., (2018), ‘Looters Plunder Albania's Sunken Treasures’, 18 November 2018, Phys.Org, (at: 
https://phys.org/news/2018-11-looters-plunder-albania-sunken-treasures.html; accessed 1 December 
2018). 
262 Supra n. 3. 
263 Supra n. 3, Dromgoole, at p. 346. 
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that fishing presents the greatest threat of all.264  As Coroneos also said in 2006, 
‘[h]istorically, the impact of seabed development has often been relegated to a position 
of low priority on the list of threats to [UCH].  However, threats to underwater cultural 
heritage via seabed development are increasing due to the rapid increase of urbanisation 
and expansion of coastal development into such remote areas.’265  Similarly, in 2012, 
Flatman listed growing threats to UCH, including fishing, hydrocarbon extraction, 
mining, dredging, marine engineering, storage of CO2 or effluent under the seabed, ocean 
fertilisation, and renewable energy production.266   
 
As Aznar stressed in 2016, ‘despite the importance of recent treasure hunting activities in 
EU waters, the most severe dangers come from licit, legitimate human activities in coastal 
waters including fishing, mining, coastal planning’.267  In interview, Manders also relays 
that ‘the big problem with the UNESCO Convention is that . . . it was basically made to 
keep commercial salvagers out of the game, but that’s not the biggest issue.’268  He 
continues, ‘the biggest issue is trawling, the biggest issue is ignorance . . . the biggest 
issue is infrastructural buildings, wind farms on the North Sea, those kinds of things, 
climate change and the effect it has on the seabed.  Those are the biggest problems’.269  
Such threats are a completely different challenge and require a very different set 
regulatory responses which were not addressed effectively by the Convention.  As 
Flatman said in 2012, ‘[f]ar less well understood [and] under-studied, are the “indirect” 
threats posed by energy developments to submerged and coastal archaeological sites.’270  
Saying earlier in 2009, that these ‘unprecedented threats [are] arguably, greater than that 
 
264 Kingsley, S.A., (2015), Fishing and Shipwreck Heritage: Marine Archaeology’s Greatest Threat?, 
Bloomsbury Academic (London), at pp. 45-59. 
265 Coroneos, C., (2006), ‘The Four Commandments: The Response of Hong Kong SAR to the Impact of 
Seabed Development on Underwater Cultural Heritage’, in Heritage at Risk Special Edition, Underwater 
Cultural Heritage at Risk: Managing Natural and Human Impacts, R. Grenier, D. Nutley and I. Cochran 
(Eds.), 46-48, ICOMOS (Paris), at p. 46. 
266 Flatman, J., (2012), ‘What the Walrus and the Carpenter Did Not Talk About: Maritime Archaeology 
and the Near Future of Energy’, in Archaeology in Society: Its Relevance in the Modern World, M. 
Rockman and J. Flatman (Eds.), 167-192, Springer (New York), at pp. 172-173. 
267 Supra n. 2, Aznar, at p. 4; Bautista, L., (2013), ‘Ensuring the Preservation of Submerged Treasures for 
the Next Generation: The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage in International Law’, in Securing 
the Ocean for the Next Generation: Papers from a Law of the Sea Institute, UC Berkeley-Korea Institute 
of Ocean Science and Technology Conference (May 2012, Seoul), H. Scheiber and M. Kwon (Eds.), 
Berkeley Law (Berkeley), (at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2491&context=lhapapers; 
accessed 18 November 2018), at p. 25. 
268 Manders, M., (2018), Interview with Martijn Manders, 15 February 2018, Transcript on File. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Supra n. 266, Flatman, at p. 174. 
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presented by the treasure-hunting community.’271  As such, they require ‘new and often 
novel approaches to their conservation and management.’272 
 
Unfortunately, the only part of the Convention to address these critical threats was a mere 
hortatory article committing each state to ‘use the best practicable means at its disposal 
to prevent or mitigate any adverse effects that might arise from activities under its 
jurisdiction incidentally affecting’ UCH.273  Forrest once said that this provision ‘provides 
too weak an obligation on states’.274  Similarly, Varmer underscores the provision as 
merely a ‘soft legal obligation’.275  It was originally not even clear what normative duty 
results from it or whether it would place too great a burden on states with waters rich in 
UCH, as was a principal objection of the UK to the final text.276  O’Keefe has effectively 
addressed this concern, saying that the ‘best practicable means’, referred to in both 
Articles 2(4) and 5, ‘means that states are not bound to pursue the most extreme means 
of preventing or mitigating adverse effects.  “Practicable means” would be those most 
appropriate taking into account the physical situation, the science involved and the cost 
of taking action.’277   
 
O’Keefe defends the general weakness of Article 5, by saying that ‘politically it was 
probably as much as could be gained in the context’, which at first seems reasonable 
enough.278  However, given the critical threat posed by such indirect activities to a delicate 
and non-renewable resource, greater reflection should have perhaps been made on more 
ambitious state obligations in this regard.  For example, the UNESCO 1968 
Recommendation Concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by 
Public or Private Works279 could have been incorporated or adapted in various parts to 
bolster the Convention.  This is why, in interview, Aznar expressed that his ‘great 
 
271 Flatman, J., (2009), ‘Conserving Marine Cultural Heritage: Threats, Risks and Future Priorities’, 11(1) 
Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 5-8, at p. 7. 
272 Ibid, at p. 5. 
273 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 5 (emphasis added). 
274 Supra n. 70, Forrest, at p. 339. 
275 Varmer, O., (2014), ‘Closing the Gaps in the Law Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage on the Outer 
Continental Shelf’, 33(2) Stanford Environmental Law Journal 251-286, at p. 263. 
276 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (2001), Explanation of Vote to UNESCO on the 2001 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 31 October 2001 (can be accessed in 
supra n. 135, UK UNESCO Convention Review Group, at pp. 87-88); Supra n. 135, UK UNESCO 
Convention Review Group, at p. 59. 
277 Supra n. 78, O’Keefe, at p. 51. 
278 Ibid; Supra n. 135, UK UNESCO Convention Review Group, at pp. 59-68. 
279 UNESCO, (1968), Recommendation Concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by 
Public or Private Works, adopted at the 41st Plenary Meeting, 19 November 1968, UNESCO (Paris). 
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concern’ with the UNESCO Convention ‘is with the low attention given to Article 5 and 
what it represents’.280  Similarly, Maarleveld urged that:  
 
‘the weak spot is that it only addresses activities that are directed at the 
underwater cultural heritage.  It does not really go for an overall approach.  
The overall approach that you are writing about now.’281 
 
As this chapter has demonstrated, there remains considerable concern with how states 
should now address the mounting indirect, incidental and illegal threats to UCH, beyond 
the traditional threat of treasure hunting.  The weaknesses of the UNESCO Convention 
in addressing these critical threats is the subject of the next three chapters: where Chapter 
3 focuses on the normative substance of the ‘duty to cooperate’, which undergirds the 
entire UNESCO Convention; Chapter 4 addresses the poor levels of state compliance 
with the UNESCO Convention and, particularly, its provisions on dealing with incidental 
threats to UCH; and Chapter 5 analyses the underlying weaknesses of relying solely on a 




280 Aznar, M.J., (2018), Interview with Mariano J. Aznar, 12 February 2018, Transcript on File. 


































International Cooperation and the UNESCO Convention 
 
Chapter Abstract:  
This chapter is the first to critically examine the UNESCO Convention, qua inter-state 
treaty, as a means to address the protection of underwater cultural heritage (UCH).  It 
introduces the traditional political contests which have taken place between states, 
especially between flag and coastal states, in the allocation of rights and responsibilities 
across ocean space.  It then examines how the UNESCO Convention sought to resolve 
this contestation between sovereign interests by simply requiring that states “cooperate” 
ad hoc.  Therefore, it provides a thorough examination of the normative quality of a ‘duty 
to cooperate’ under international law, finding that this duty carries very little meaningful 
obligation and obliges states to engage in “passive” forms of cooperation, when “active” 
forms of cooperation are what is needed.  It demonstrates this by showing examples of 
‘regime thickening’ in the protection of fisheries and marine living resources, wherein 
the urgency of protection has led to an ongoing process of coagulating and expanding 
multilateral, supranational and transnational obligations.  It then paves the way for 
Chapter 4 to examine the extent to which states will be proactive in protecting UCH or 
in developing more detailed regimes towards its protection. 
 
1. Challenges with the Allocation of Flag, Coastal and Port State Jurisdiction over 
Underwater Cultural Heritage Management 
(a) Issues with International Cooperation and the UNESCO Convention 
The ocean is a global theatre for geopolitics.  Any reading on the formation of the law of 
the sea over the past few centuries provides a historiographical account of national power, 
belligerent territoriality and militaristic posturing.  It is in this politically-charged domain 
that the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (UNESCO Convention) sought to make headway and reconcile the competing 
interests and countervailing forces within the ocean’s political drama; which has typically 
been between flag state jurisdiction and coastal state jurisdiction.1  In the context of the 
UNESCO Convention, the conflict between the concept of the Freedom of the Seas, 
extolled by dominant maritime states, and with the concept of a ‘Cultural Protection 
 
1 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 2001, 
in force 2 January 2009), 2562 UNTS 1. 
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Zone’ contingent with the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as promoted by coastal 
states, led to deadlock within the UNESCO Convention negotiations.   
 
In the end, the interests of the traditionally dominant maritime states were given priority 
and the present ‘balance’ of state rights and responsibilities found under the United 
Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) were respected.  As this chapter 
demonstrates, considering this difficult contest between coastal and flag state interests, 
the Convention did a reasonably commendable job of achieving a widely respected and 
increasingly ratified treaty.  Unfortunately, however, the political tensity of the subject 
meant that a large number of constructive ambiguities and normative gaps were left in the 
international law, which were resolved by merely relying on an agreement between states 
to ‘cooperate’ when their interests in UCH intersect.  In other words, the resulting treaty 
struggled to go much further than the existing system of cooperation under the LOSC.2   
 
As a corollary, the UNESCO Convention was intended to provide a ‘detailed and 
practical’3 international cooperation system which would set the ground rules for such 
future cooperation between the numerous conflicting states relating to the protection and 
management of UCH, utilising the appointment of ‘coordinating states’.  While there are 
arguments that the system is perhaps unnecessarily complex or may add little beyond the 
existing international law,4 the biggest concern identified in this chapter appears to be 
with the concept of a duty of cooperation itself.  The argument is that the present system 
of cooperation envisaged by the UNESCO Convention is developed for a “passive” 
system of cooperation, wherein states only negotiate their respective interests when those 
interests have come into actual conflict and therefore, by standard, after-the-event.  
However, most of the urgent and imminent threats facing UCH – such as looting, fishing, 
dredging, shipping, cable-laying, and construction, and so on – demand “active” modes 
of cooperation, wherein states engage in ongoing processes of multilateral and 




2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 397. 
3 UNESCO, ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage: The State Cooperation System’, (at: http://www.unesco.org/
new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-heritage/2001-convention/state-cooperation-system/; accessed 
15 December 2018). 
4 Williams, M., (2018), Interview with Mike Williams, 18 June 2018, Transcript on File. 
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The importance of cooperation and its meaning has been noted by UCH scholars 
previously.  For example, Dromgoole once referred to cooperation as the ‘fundamental 
principle’ of the UNESCO Convention.5  Similarly, in 2013 Risvas published an article 
which looked directly at the challenges of cooperation and the UNESCO Convention and, 
like the analysis that follows, also called into question the normative content of a duty to 
cooperate within international law.6  Nevertheless, his brief article only touches upon the 
issues addressed in this chapter, such as noting the normative uncertainty of the duty of 
cooperation, without going into depth on the challenges or underlying causes.  
Nevertheless, his brief concluding proposals – that states should negotiate a new treaty or 
new regional and bilateral treaties – accords with many of the arguments made in Chapter 
7, which calls for more detailed regime-building at the regional level.  Referring to 
examples from the protection of fishing and marine living resources, this chapter 
eventually proceeds by arguing that effective governance of UCH protection will require 
more ‘active’ forms of cooperation, usually epitomised by the continuous building of 
more detailed and integrated multi-level normative regimes, rather than a merely 
‘passive’ form of cooperation, traditionally built on bilateral conflict resolution. 
 
(b) Competing Flag and Coastal State Interests within the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 
The political tug-of-war between states – to determine sovereign rights and freedoms over 
ocean space and allocated across maritime zones – is predominantly built upon the 
economic ambitions of sovereign states and often played out through diplomacy, political 
posturing and displays of military power.7  As Cheever once said, ‘[n]owhere is the 
indissoluble relationship between politics and law demonstrated more cogently than in 
the law of the sea.’8   In this domain, as is well-known, the law of the sea has played out 
as an intractable debate between the competing binary concepts of flag state jurisdiction 
and non-flag state jurisdiction, usually simplified down to an argument between the 
 
5 Dromgoole, S., (2006), ‘United Kingdom’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National 
Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), 313-350, Martinus Nijhoff 
(Leiden), at p. 344. 
6 Risvas, M., (2013), ‘The Duty to Cooperate and the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 2(3) 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 562-590. 
7 E.g., Kraska, J., (2011), Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World 
Politics, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Mahan, A.T., (1890), The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 
Little, Brown and Company (Columbus); O’Connell, D.P., (1975), The Influence of Law on Sea Power, 
Manchester University Press (Manchester). 
8 Cheever, D.S., (1984), ‘The Politics of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’, 37(2) Journal of 
International Affairs 247-252, at p. 247. 
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competing concepts of the Mare Liberum (“Open Sea”) and Mare Clausum (“Closed 
Sea”).9   
 
The former, which has been the dominant ideology throughout the development of the 
law of the sea, has espoused the view that the ocean is free and limitless and, as such, 
should not be subject to territorial dominion.  This concept – necessitating the regulation 
of ocean space by flag state jurisdiction – is based loosely on Grotius’s 1609 legal brief 
opposing Portuguese territorialisation of the high seas and has ever since been devotedly 
retold as an argument in favour of preserving the ‘Freedom of the Seas’.10  The resulting 
system – which provides for an open ocean which is effectively lawless, but where it is 
the vessels operating which are themselves regulated by their distant flag states – has 
provided a liberal system of regulation which has uncoincidentally benefited the 
dominant maritime and colonialist powers of the past few centuries.  By contrast, the 
Mare Clausum, also loosely based on a book of the same name by John Selden in 1635,11 
provides the counter-view that the ocean is capable of territorial encroachment by coastal 
states and that such states should be able to control activities in the areas proximate to 
their coastlines or, today, that such states should be entitled to exploit living and non-
living resources in the area found hundreds of miles off their shoreline. 
 
This debate between the two competing systems of governance is often couched in the 
language of a normative debate over the more suitable, effective and customary system 
for managing the seas.  Indeed, this was the case within the UNESCO Convention itself, 
where negotiations grappled with the flawed ability of distant coastal states or 
economically-oriented port states to regulate UCH in their territorial seas, EEZ or 
continental shelf; against the similarly flawed ability of distant flag states to regulate 
activities taking place in other state’s maritime zones.12  However, a further look at the 
 
9 E.g., Vieira, M.B., (2003), ‘Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden's Debate on 
Dominion over the Seas’, 64(3) Journal of the History of Ideas 361-377; Papastavridis, E., (2011), ‘The 
Right of Visit on the High Seas in a Theoretical Perspective: Mare Liberum versus Mare Clausum 
Revisited’, 24(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 45-69; Russ, G.R. and Zeller, D.C., (2003), ‘From 
Mare Liberum to Mare Reservarum’, 27(1) Marine Policy 75-78; Anand, R.P., (1983), Origin and 
Development of the Law of the Sea: History of International Law, Brill (Leiden), at pp. 105-111. 
10 Grotius, H., (1609), Mare Liberum, sive de jure quod Batavis competit ad Indicana commercia 
dissertatio, Ludovici Elzevirij (Leiden); Jacques, P., (2009), ‘The Power and Death of the Sea’, in 
Environmental Governance: Power and Knowledge in a Local-Global World, G. Kütting and R. Lipschutz 
(Eds.), 60-78, Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 67. 
11 Selden, J., (1635), Mare Clausum, seu de Dominio Libri Duo, Juxta Exemplar Will (London). 
12 Blumberg, R.C., (2005), ‘International Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, in Recent 
Developments in the Law of the Sea and China, M.H. Nordquist, J.N. Moore and K. Fu (Eds.), 491-512, 
Brill (Leiden).  See infra subsection (c) and Chapter 5, Section 3(d). 
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motives underlying the contest makes clear that the debate is not about which is more 
effective, but about which ultimately delivers the propounding state the greatest amount 
of resources and power.  Indeed, the growing tension between the United States with 
China in the South China Sea appears more like a defence of the right of states to navigate 
trade, conduct military operations and prevent coastal exploitation of a resource-rich 
region, rather than any justified defence of the quality of flag state regulation as the most 
effective system of marine governance.13  The same can be seen in reverse, where 
arguments promoting the rightful placement of coastal state “jurisdiction” are really a 
masked argument in favour of coastal state power and ownership of distant resources, 
regardless of the environmental protection challenges this entails.14 
 
As is argued in Chapters 4 and 5, the resulting law of the sea has largely been crafted by 
hegemony, wherein economic might and military power have been the dominant force 
driving the development of the law.  As such, the ocean has maintained a laissez-faire 
system of regulation benefitting the powerful flag states of the era.  However, this historic 
entrenchment of the Freedom of the Seas underwent a seismic rupture in the post-WWII 
period, after the Truman Proclamations of 1945.15  Despite the United States being the 
principal benefactor of the incumbent liberal system of ocean regulation, the economic 
interests of states with large coastlines dramatically altered following the development of 
offshore mining capabilities, causing the US to trigger the coastal state ‘expansionist 
movement’.16  Suddenly many powerful states, often benefiting from extensive 
continental shelves, including once-imperial powers with coastlines ranging off distant 
postcolonial islands and territories, had the resources and technology to properly exploit 
 
13 Zhang, F., (2017), ‘Assessing China’s Response to the South China Sea Arbitration Ruling’, 71(4) 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 440-459; Roy, D., (1994), ‘Hegemon on the Horizon? China's 
Threat to East Asian Security’, 19(1) International Security 149-168, at pp. 163-164; Zhang, H., (2010), 
‘Is It Safeguarding the Freedom of Navigation or Maritime Hegemony of the United States? Comments on 
Raul (Pete) Pedrozo's Article on Military Activities in the EEZ’, 9(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 
31-47. 
14 See infra Chapter 5, Section 3(d). 
15 Truman, H.S., (1945), Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil 
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, US Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, (at: https://www.truman
library.org/proclamations/index.php?pid=252&st=&st1; accessed 15 October 2018); Truman, H.S., (1945), 
Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, US 
Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, (at: https://www.trumanlibrary.org/proclamations/index.php?pid=253
&st=&st1=; accessed 15 December 2018); Watt, D.C., (1979), ‘First Steps in the Enclosure of the Oceans: 
The Origins of Truman's Proclamation on the Resources of the Continental Shelf, 28 September 1945’, 3(3) 
Marine Policy 211-224; Oxman, B.H., (2006), ‘The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea’, 100(4) 
American Journal of International Law 830-851, at p. 832. 
16 Galdorisi, G. and Stavridis, J., (1993), ‘Time to Revisit the Law of the Sea?’, 24(3) Ocean Development 
and International Law 301-315, at p. 302; Jacobson, J.L., (1982), ‘Sea Changes’, 91(4) Yale Law Journal 
842-855, at p. 845. 
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resources beyond the narrow belt of the territorial sea.17  The following decades witnessed 
a race, as all states moved to proclaim their own extended coastal interests or to emulate 
the claims of others, in a dramatic turn towards coastal state expansionism, or the ‘Mare 
Clausum’.18  
 
The UNCLOS III treaty negotiations, starting in 1973 and signed in 1982, represented a 
momentous international effort to place a ceiling on this mounting seaward encirclement 
by coastal states.19  The territorial sea – giving absolute territorial sovereignty comparable 
to those on land subject to the right of innocent passage20 – had expanded everywhere 
beyond the historic ‘cannon shot rule’ limit up to varying distances, but the LOSC firmly 
settled upon a fixed 12-nautical mile maximum limit.21  The LOSC also famously 
declared the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area) and the mineral 
resources therein as belonging to the international community and designated them as the 
‘Common Heritage of Mankind’.22  Furthermore, in order to manage coastal claims to 
living resources, the LOSC led to an entirely new legal zone – the EEZ – extending up to 
200-nautical miles from baselines.23  Similarly, to deal with claims over the minerals and 
hydrocarbons upon continental shelves, many legal rules were developed to provide such 
rights over the continental shelf up to 200-nautical miles and beyond up to a maximum 
limit as defined in Article 76(5) and (6) of the LOSC.24  Within these zones, states claimed 
a host of other important entitlements such as freedom to conduct scientific experiments 
and enforce environmental laws.25  Importantly, such zones are not coastal state territory, 
 
17 Given the ability of previous colonial powers to include overseas territories, including small Pacific and 
Indian Ocean islands, as comprising state territory, the following are among the world’s 10 largest states in 
terms of total EEZ size (up to 200-nautical miles offshore): United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand. 
18 Oda, S., (2003), Fifty Years of the Law of the Sea: With a Special Section on the International Court of 
Justice, Kluwer Law International (Alphen), at pp. 19-23. 
19 Supra n. 16, Galdorisi & Stavridis, at p. 302. 
20 E.g., Nasu, H., (2018), ‘The Regime of Innocent Passage in Disputed Waters’, 94 International Law 
Studies 241-283; Ghosh, S., (2017), ‘The Legal Regime of Innocent Passage Through the Territorial Sea’, 
in Law of the Sea, H. Caminos (Ed.), 37-64, Routledge (Abingdon); Hakapää, K. and Molenaar, E.J., 
(1999), ‘Innocent Passage – Past and Present’, 23(2) Marine Policy 131-145. 
21 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Arts. 3 and 4; Kaye, S., (2009), ‘State Practice and Maritime Claims: Assessing the 
Normative Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention’, in The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in 
Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston, A. Chircop, T. McDorman and S. Rolston (Eds.), 133-158, Martinus 
Nijhoff (Leiden), at pp. 135-136. 
22 See supra n. 2, LOSC, Part XI; United Nations Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, (adopted 28 July 1994 (New 
York), in force 28 July 1996), 1836 UNTS 3; Egede, E., (2011), Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: 
Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage of Mankind, Springer (New York); Baslar, K., 
(1997), The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden). 
23 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Arts. 55-57. 
24 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Art. 76. 
25 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Parts XII and XIII. 
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but sui generis spaces in which coastal states enjoy additional sovereign rights and 
responsibilities.26 
 
During UNCLOS negotiations, the vast majority of issues could therefore be reduced 
down to this conflict between the freedom of flagged vessels to exploit; pitted against the 
rights of coastal and port states to regulate activities in nearby waters or to exploit the 
resources derived therefrom. This led to the unfortunate result that most states were 
deleteriously pre-occupied with rights, especially rights of ownership in resources, and 
neglected the opportunity to more thoroughly consider their respective responsibilities, 
or any consequent liability, for protecting the marine environment.27  The practical result 
was that where flag states secured agreed ‘rights’ upon the ocean, they also assumed the 
attendant responsibilities, despite their practical and logistical unsuitability to regulate 
vessels at a distance.28  Similarly, where rights were secured by coastal states, they were 
predominantly biased toward exploitation of resources with a lack of concomitant 
responsibility for protection.29  Harrison makes a noteworthy remark that, by inferring a 
positive duty to protect the marine environment, the judgment on the Merits in the South 
China Sea arbitration in 2016 appears to finally hint at a gradual shift away from 
prioritising coastal state ‘rights’ above their ‘responsibilities’.30  Nevertheless, the 
essential question underneath remains what precisely is included in this positive 
 
26 Oana, A., ‘Exclusive Economic Zone: The Concept of Sui Generis Area and its Implication for the Legal 
Order of the Seas’, Vol. 20 (Year XIV) Constanta Maritime University Annals 187-190; Andreone, G. and 
Cataldi, G., (2014), ‘Sui Generis Zones’, in The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: Volume I: 
The Law of the Sea, D.J. Attard, M. Fitzmaurice and N.A. Martínez Gutiérrez (Eds.), 217-238, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford). 
27 Tsamenyi, M. and Hanich, Q., (2012), ‘Fisheries Jurisdiction Under the Law of the Sea Convention: 
Rights and Obligations in Maritime Zones under the Sovereignty of Coastal States’, 27(4) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 783–793; Andreone, G., (2015), ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone’, in 
The Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea, D.R. Rothwell, A.G.O. Elferink, K.N. Scott and T. Stephens 
(Eds.), 159-180, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 179; König has referred to an ‘enforcement deficit’ 
(König, D., (2002), ‘The Enforcement of the International Law of the Sea by Coastal and Port States’, 62 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1-15, at p. 10). 
28 E.g., Oanta, G.A., (2014), ‘Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment as a Goal for 
Achieving Sustainable Development on the Rio+ 20 Agenda’, 16(2) International Community Law Review 
214-235, at pp. 223-226; Soons, A.H.A., (2004), ‘Law Enforcement in the Ocean’, 3(1) WMU Journal of 
Maritime Affairs 3-16, at pp. 15-16; Henriksen, T., Hønneland, G. and Sydnes, A., (2006), Law and Politics 
in Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and Regional Fisheries Management Regimes, 
Martinus NIjhoff (Leiden), at pp. 46-47; Orrego Vicuña, F., (1999), The Changing International Law of 
High Seas Fisheries, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at pp. 200-268. 
29 High Seas Task Force, (2006), Closing the Net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Seas, Governments 
of Australia, Canada, Chile, Namibia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, WWF, IUCN and the Earth 
Institute at Columbia University, Sadag SA (Bellegrade), (at: https://www.oecd.org/sd-roundtable/papers
andpublications/39375276.pdf; accessed 18 December 2018), at pp. 41 and 52.  See infra Chapter 5, Section 
3(c). 
30 Harrison, J., (2017), Saving the Oceans Through Law: The International Legal Framework for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 24; South China Sea 
Arbitration, Philippines v China, Award, PCA Case No. 2013-19, 12 July 2016, Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, at para. 941. 
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obligation incumbent on coastal states and the substantive legal basis on which they can 
be found to actually hold international responsibility and legal culpability to the 
international community.31 
 
Since the conclusion of the LOSC, there has been this continuing tension between flag 
state and non-flag state interests.  This resistance from maritime states is an aspect of the 
wider fears of horror jurisdictionis (‘creeping jurisdiction’) of coastal states.32  This 
concept entails powerful maritime states pre-empting interests of non-flag states in 
expanding their share of power or rights in the ocean’s resources, as their claims gradually 
creep beyond strictly defined jurisdictional boundaries and freedoms concluded under the 
LOSC.33  This tension between coastal state jurisdiction and the Freedom of the Seas is 
therefore no less acute today than many decades ago, with many expressing deep concern 
at the shifting balance in favour of coastal states who, through processes of ‘creeping’ or 
‘thickening’ jurisdiction, are gradually curtailing flag state powers to freely navigate, 
exploit or militarise the ocean and strategically vital waterways.34 
 
(c) Challenges of Allocating Flag, Coastal and Port State Jurisdiction within the 
UNESCO Convention 
It was within this highly charged and rancorous political domain that the UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection of UCH had to walk a fine tightrope,35 where all the 
efficacious proposals in the first draft became effectively flattened once wrung through 
the same political mangle.36  As Dromgoole writes, because maritime activity is ‘bound 
 
31 See also, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities With Respect to 
Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, 1 February 2011, ITLOS Case 
No. 17, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, (at: https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/docu
ments/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf; accessed 18 December 2018) which explored the duty to 
protect the environment in relation to deep seabed mining activities. 
32 Tuerk, H., (2013), Reflections on the Contemporary Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijohff (Leiden), at p. 159. 
33 Ibid, Tuerk, at p. 159. 
34 Ventura, F. and Mayer, V.A. (2018), ‘Revisiting the Critique Against Territorialism in the Law of the 
Sea: Brazilian State Practice in Light of the Concepts of Creeping Jurisdiction and Spoliative Jurisdiction’, 
15(1) Brazilian Journal of International Law 161-179; Yang, H., (2008), Jurisdiction of the Coastal State 
over Foreign Merchant Ships in Internal Waters and the Territorial Sea, Springer (New York); Bautista, 
L., (2015), ‘The Role of Coastal States’, in Routledge Handbook of Maritime Regulation and Enforcement, 
S. Kaye and R. Warner (Eds.), 59-70,  Routledge (London); Scovazzi, T., (2006), ‘The 2001 UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage’, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, 
Policy and Practice, B.T. Hoffman (Ed.), 285-292, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 292. 
35 Dromgoole, S., (2013), ‘Reflections on the Position of the Major Maritime Powers with Respect to the 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001’, 38 Marine Policy 116-
123, at p. 116; Carducci, G., (2003), ‘New Developments in the Law of the Sea: The UNESCO Convention 
on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 96(2) American Journal of International Law 419-434, 
at p. 420. 
36 The ‘grueling negotiations … resonated and resurrected old debates and tensions during the [LOSC] 
Conferences’ (Bautista, L., (2005), ‘Gaps, Issues, and Prospects: International Law and the Protection of 
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up with, and impacts upon, matters of enormous strategic, military and economic 
importance inevitably means that heritage protection considerations may be sacrificed for 
the sake of much broader political imperatives.’37  Indeed, coastal state delegates 
attending the UNESCO Convention negotiations were often disparagingly viewed as 
opportunistically taking ‘another bite at the jurisdictional apple’ in an attempt to 
renegotiate the distribution of wealth and regulatory power further in their favour.38  Just 
like the UNCLOS III negotiations,39 it was Greece who were one of the major proponents 
of coastal state protection of submerged heritage lying on the vulnerable continental shelf 
during the UNESCO negotiations, along with many states rich in UCH such as in the 
Caribbean and Latin America.40  Nevertheless, it was predictably the dominant maritime 
powers, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, Germany, France, 
Spain, Netherlands and Norway, who were firmly against such creeping jurisdiction of 
coastal states and insisted on maintaining the strict limits on coastal state prescriptive 
jurisdiction provided under the LOSC.41 
 
As a result, as is explored in the sections that follow, in order to allay the concerns of the 
dominant maritime states, the UNESCO negotiations resolved to reinstate the present 
balance of rights and responsibilities in the ocean, slanted as they are in favour of flag 
state control and coastal state exploitation of resources in their wider waters.42  Instead, 
coastal states would continue to be limited to the current lack of jurisdictional authority 
over activities directed at UCH, with some exceptions,43 with the simple solution of 
 
Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 14 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 57-89, at p. 67); Ibid, Carducci, at 
p. 420. 
37 Supra n. 35, Dromgoole, at p. 116. 
38 Supra n. 12, Blumberg, at p. 499; González, A.W., (2006), ‘The Shades of Harmony: Some Thoughts on 
the Different Contexts that Coastal States Face as Regards the 2001 Underwater Cultural Heritage 
Convention’, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, B.T. Hoffman (Ed.), 308-312, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 308; Aznar, M.J., (2004), ‘Review: Archaeological and/or 
Historic Valuable Shipwrecks in International Waters. Public International Law and What it Offers; Eke 
Boesten’, 15(3) European Journal of International Law 603-605, at p. 603; UNESCO, (1997), Report by 
the Director-General on the Findings of the Meeting of Experts Concerning the Preparation of an 
International Instrument for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Executive Board, 151st 
Session, (12 March 1997, Paris), UN Doc. 151 EX/10, Annex I,  at para. 27. 
39 See Chapter 1, Section 4. 
40 Forrest, C., (2002), ‘A New International Regime for the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 
51(3) International Comparative Law Quarterly 511-554, at p. 552; Supra n. 12, Blumberg, at p. 499; Vadi, 
V., (2012), ‘War, Memory, and Culture: The Uncertain Legal Status of Historic Sunken Warships Under 
International Law’, 37(2) Tulane Maritime Law Journal 333-378, at p. 366. 
41 Supra n. 12, Blumberg, at p. 499.  Many state delegates attending the UNESCO negotiations opposed the 
concept of a cultural protection zone, such as Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Tunisia and 
United Kingdom (see supra n. 38, UNESCO). 
42 Varmer, O., (2014), ‘Closing the Gaps in the Law Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage on the Outer 
Continental Shelf’, 33(2) Stanford Environmental Law Journal 251-286, at pp. 256-257. 
43 See infra Section 2(b) and 2(c). 
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asking that relevant states “cooperate” for new activities directed at UCH.  Naturally, a 
number of challenges are inherent within this cooperation system in terms of: the question 
of sovereign immunity;44 the utility of the cooperation system created; the ongoing 
management of conflict between coastal and flag states; the identification of ‘verifiably 
linked’ states;45 and questions over the underlying norms and the efficacy of any 
agreement to ‘cooperate’.46 
 
2. The UNESCO Convention as a Commitment to Cooperate 
The original Buenos Aires Draft Convention favoured an extension of coastal jurisdiction 
by using a ‘Cultural Protection Zone’, permissive of sovereign rights to develop and 
enforce UCH protection laws across the continental shelf.47  When this idea confronted 
leading maritime states in the UNESCO negotiations it was quickly derailed in preference 
 
44 There is further debate on the application of sovereign immunity to the wrecks of warships across the 
various maritime jurisdictional zones, but it has not been a focus of this study.  See, generally, for example: 
Forrest, C., (2003), ‘An International Perspective on Sunken State Vessels as Underwater Cultural 
Heritage’, 34(1) Ocean Development and International Law 41-57; Ronzitti, N., (2012), ‘The Legal Regime 
of Wrecks of Warships and Other State-Owned Ships in International Law’, in Yearbook of the Institute of 
International Law - Volume 74 (Session of Rhodes, 2011), 130-177, Editions A. Pedone (Paris); Bederman, 
D.J., (2000), ‘Rethinking the Status of Sunken Warships’, 30(1-2) Ocean Development and International 
Law 97-125; Harris, J.R., (2002), ‘Protecting Sunken Warships as Objects Entitled to Sovereign Immunity’, 
33(1) The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 101-126; Yeates, J.W., (2000), ‘Clearing Up 
the Confusion: A Strict Standard of Abandonment for Sunken Public Vessels’, 12(2) University of San 
Francisco Maritime Law Journal 359-388; Aznar, M.J., (2003), ‘Legal Status of Sunken Warships 
“Revisited”’, in Spanish Yearbook of International Law: Volume IX, 61-101, Koninklijke Brill (Leiden); 
Walker, J.E., (2000), ‘A Contemporary Standard for Determining Title to Sunken Warships: A Tale of Two 
Vessels and Two Nations’, 12(2) University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 311-358; Roach, J.A., 
(1996), ‘Sunken Warships and Military Aircraft’, 20(4) Marine Policy 351-354; Williams, M., (2000), 
‘‘War Graves’ and Salvage: Murky Waters’, 7(5) International Maritime Law 151-158; Aznar,  M.J., 
(2010), ‘Treasure Hunters, Sunken State Vessels and the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 25(2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 209-236. 
45 Similarly, more could be said on the issue of determining which states have preferable rights, based on a 
‘verifiable link, especially a cultural, historical or archaeological link’ to UCH, but which was beyond the 
focus of this study.  See, for example: Huang, J., (2013), ‘Chasing Provenance: Legal Dilemmas for 
Protecting States with a Verifiable Link to Underwater Culture Heritage’, 84 Ocean and Coastal 
Management 220-225; Huang, J., (2013), ‘Odyssey’s Treasure Ship: Salvor, Owner, or Sovereign 
Immunity’, 44(2) Ocean Development and International Law 170-184; Sarid, E., (2017), ‘International 
Underwater Cultural Heritage Governance: Past Doubts and Current Challenges’, 35(2) Berkeley Journal 
of International Law 219-261. 
46 See Sections 2 and 3. 
47 International Law Association, (1994), ‘Cultural Heritage Law Committee - Buenos Aires Draft 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage Final Report Part II: Report’, in Report 
of the Sixty Sixth Conference, Held at Buenos Aires, Argentina 14-20 August 1992, J. Crawford and M. 
Williams (Eds.), 432-451, International Law Association (London), Art. 1.  It has been suggested that the 
200-mile limit for a ‘cultural heritage zone’, which was also proposed by Cape Verde, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia during UNCLOS III (UN Doc. C.2/Informal Meeting/43/Rev. 3, 27 
March 1980), originated in the initiative of the 1978 Roper Recommendations (Nordquist, M.H., Rosenne, 
S. and Sohn, L.B., (1989), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Volume 
V, M.H. Nordquist (Series Editor-in-Chief), Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at pp. 159-161). 
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for the ‘finely balanced’48 allocation of coastal, port and flag state power under the 
LOSC.49  Despite this last-ditch attempt to preserve the flag state model, state practice 
actually shows clear divergence.  For example, the Buenos Aires drafters were aware that 
many states already declared prescriptive jurisdiction over UCH on their continental 
shelves,50 for example Australia,51 Ireland,52 Spain,53 Norway,54 Cape Verde55 and 
Portugal,56 with other states measuring this jurisdiction as commensurate with the 
exclusive economic zone, such as Denmark,57 Morocco58 and Jamaica.59  In interview, 
Williams pointed out that, with the introduction of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 
2009, even in the United Kingdom there is now a legal requirement to obtain a licence 
before lifting any object from the entire continental shelf area.60 
 
Regardless, at the time of the negotiations, because powerful maritime states feared the 
consolidation or expansion of coastal state prescriptive jurisdiction over the broad 
continental shelf (horror jurisdictionis), they resisted any formal extension of coastal state 
 
48 UNESCO, (1995), ‘Observations by States and the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations’, in Preliminary Study on the Advisability of Preparing an 
International Instrument for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, General Conference, 28th 
Session, (4 October 1995), UN Doc. 28 C/39, at Annex, p. 5. 
49 The United States, United Kingdom and Netherlands were three states most strongly opposed the 
extension of coastal state authority under UNCLOS III (Caflisch, L., (1982), ‘Submarine Antiquities and 
the International Law of the Sea’, 13 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3-32, at p. 17). 
50 ‘Measures have been taken by Belgium, Sri Lanka, Spain, the Seychelles and Turkey to exercise various 
forms of control over historic wrecks beyond the zones permitted by UNCLOS’ (Smith, H.D. and Couper, 
A.D., (2003), ‘The Management of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 4(1) Journal of Cultural Heritage 25-
33, at p. 32). 
51 Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976, (Act No. 190 of 1976) (Australia), s. 28.  
52 National Monuments (Amendment) Act 1987, (No. 17 of 1987) (Republic of Ireland), s. 3(1). 
53 Law 16/1985, on Spanish Historical Heritage, (Official State Bulletin of 29 June 1985) (Spain), Art. 40. 
54 Royal Decree of 8th December 1972 relating to Exploration and Substrata of the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf (taken from: Roach, J.A. and Smith, R.W., (2012), Excessive Maritime Claims, 3rd Edn., Martinus 
Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 558). 
55 Law No. 60/IV/92 Delimiting the Maritime Areas of the Republic of Cape Verde, 10 December 1992 
(Cape Verde), Art. 28. 
56 Decreto Lei No. 289/93 Establishing Standards for Underwater Archaeological Cultural Heritage, 21 
August 1993 (Portugal) (taken from: Strati, A., (1995), The Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage: An Emerging Objective of the Contemporary Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 
289). 
57 Act No. 9, 3 January 1992, on the Protection of Nature (Denmark), Art. 1(2) (taken from: Bangeert, K., 
(1997), ‘Denmark and the Law of the Sea’, in The Law of the Sea: The European Union and Its Member 
States, T. Treves and L. Pineschi (Eds.), 97-126, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 109). 
58 Act No. 1-81 of 18th December 1980, Promulgated by Dahir No. 1-81-179 of 8th April 1981, Establishing 
a 200-Nautical-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone off the Moroccan Coasts (Morocco), Art. 5. 
59 The Exclusive Economic Zone Act, (No. 33 of 1991) (Jamaica), Art. 4(c)(i). 
60 Supra n. 4, Williams.  See, e.g., Marine Management Organisation, (2016), ‘Man found guilty of marine 
licensing offences relating to salvage of shipwreck’, 23 May 2016, (at: https://www.gov.uk/governmen
t/news/man-found-guilty-of-marine-licensing-offences-relating-to-salvage-of-shipwreck; accessed 18 
December 2018); Marine Management Organisation, (2018), ‘Master and owner charged for illegal salvage 
of sunken vessel’, 7 August 2018, (at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/master-and-owner-charged-
for-illegal-salvage-of-sunken-vessel; accessed 18 December 2018). 
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authority.61  Similarly, many have remarked how the LOSC has been heralded as such a 
momentous achievement of that generation of international lawyers, that the same 
generation were nervous of undermining the balance of power so soon.  The resulting 
UNESCO Convention thus resembles a false promise; recognising the need to protect 
UCH across EEZs and continental shelves, but providing no formal legislative means by 
which coastal states can do so.62  Exactly the same occurred with regard to the LOSC, 
wherein battle lines between the proposal for a CPZ and the United States proposal of a 
‘general duty’ of flag states resulted in a victory for the most powerful state, accompanied 
by a tokenistic acknowledgement of the numerous states expressing concern over UCH 
beyond narrow territorial seas.63 
 
Thus, to attract necessary support of leading maritime states – most of whom abstained 
or signed against the final agreement anyway64 – the decision was taken to perpetuate the 
Freedom of the Seas.  This was reinforced by Article 3, which expressed that the 
UNESCO Convention is entirely secondary to the LOSC: it does not seek to alter any 
aspect of the LOSC and must always be interpreted in a manner consistent with the latter’s 
constitutional ambit.65  The Convention instead directs UCH protection through a system 
of state cooperation, undergirded by ad hoc administration by the UNESCO MOP and 
Secretariat and the appointment of appropriate ‘Coordinating States’, for all activities 
directed at UCH.  This state cooperation scheme is detailed throughout Articles 7 
(territorial sea and internal waters), 8 (contiguous zone), 9 and 10 (EEZ and continental 
shelf), 11 and 12 (the Area).66  In summary, the Coordinating State is intended to 
cooperate closely with interested states, such as the flag states of sunken vessels or any 
other states with a ‘verifiable cultural, historical or archaeological link’,67 and with 
 
61 Supra n. 34, Scovazzi, at pp. 289-290. 
62 Supra n. 34, Scovazzi, at p. 290. 
63 Dromgoole, S., (2013), Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law, Cambridge University 
Press (Cambridge), at pp. 32-34. 
64 See Chapter 1, Section 4 (Rejected: Russian Federation, Norway, Turkey and Venezuela / Abstained: 
Brazil, Czech Republic, Colombia, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Guinea-Bissau, Netherlands, 
Paraguay, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay and United Kingdom).  Note also that the United States was also 
formally against but did not vote as was not a member of UNESCO at the time; ‘When the United Kingdom 
eventually did not sign the Convention this was regarded by many as an act of bad faith which appears to 
have occasioned very real resentment.’ (González, A.W., O'Keefe, P.J. and Williams, M., (2009), ‘The 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Future for our Past?’, 11(1) 
Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 54-69, at p. 65 (per Williams)). 
65 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 3.  Also, see Article 311 of LOSC (supra n. 2), which anticipates 
the development of future lex specialis which diverge from LOSC (supra n. 34, Scovazzi, at p. 290). 
66 Articles 9 and 11 of the UNESCO Convention (supra n. 1) deal with the discovery and reporting of 
discovery of UCH in the EEZ/Continental Shelf and Area respectively, whereas Articles 10 and 12 regulate 
activities directed at UCH in these zones. 
67 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Arts. 9(5), 10(3)(a), 11(4) and 12(2). 
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UNESCO – and the International Seabed Authority when the UCH is located in the Area68 
– on the best measures to protect UCH in accordance with the Convention.69  When 
activities are directed at UCH in the continental shelf or EEZ the first choice for 
Coordinating State is the coastal state for that zone.70  If in the Area, it is between linked 
states and UNESCO to determine who has the strongest link and appointed as 
coordinating state.71 
 
The powers handed to coastal states under this cooperation regime are vague and lacking 
in some important detail.  For example, one notable right for coastal states (or 
Coordinating States) allows them to take ‘all practicable measures’, prior to any 
negotiations, to protect UCH which is in ‘immediate danger’.72  This has been criticised 
by some as offering a floodgate to coastal state intervention.73  However, the logic of this 
protection – intended to provide authority to act immediately in emergency situations 
without the need to engage in unhurried state negotiations – is entirely astute.74  If it were 
meant as a backdoor to coastal state protection, then identical rights would not have been 
assigned to all states in the Area.75  Coastal and Coordinating States also have rights to 
implement measures of protection . . . agreed by the consulting states’,76 ‘issue all 
necessary authorizations for such agreed measures’,77 and they ‘may conduct any 
necessary preliminary research’ on UCH in order to support such processes.78  This is 
likely to provide coastal states with sufficient authority to coordinate inclusive 
multilateral agreements which create marine protected areas around specific sites, such 
as perhaps developing a protected zone around the Titanic wreck on Canada’s outer 
continental shelf.79  However, beyond this affirmation that coastal states can coordinate 
ad hoc negotiations, their rights to protect UCH are quite limited. 
 
68 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Arts. 11(2) and 12(2). 
69 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Arts. 10(3)(a), 10(5)-(7), 12(2) and 12(4)-(6). 
70 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Arts. 10(3)(b). 
71 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Arts. 12(2). 
72 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 10(4). 
73 Dromgoole refers to Article 10(4) of the Convention as an ‘area of unease’ among powerful maritime 
states ‘where the precise nature of the measures envisaged is unclear’ (Supra n. 35, Dromgoole, at p. 119); 
Murphy, S.D., (2002), ‘U.S. Concerns Regarding UNESCO Convention on Underwater Heritage’, 96(2) 
American Journal of International Law 468-470, at pp. 469-470. 
74 Supra n. 35, Carducci, at pp. 430-431; Supra n. 34, Scovazzi, at p. 290. 
75 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 12(3). 
76 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 10(5)(a) and 12(4)(a). 
77 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 10(5)(b) and 12(4)(b). 
78 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 10(5)(b).  This right is not available for Coordinating States in 
the Area (i.e., outside of the Coordinating State’s EEZ or continental shelf). 
79 Martin, J.B., (2018), ‘Protecting Outstanding Underwater Cultural Heritage through the World Heritage 
Convention: The Titanic and Lusitania as World Heritage Sites’, 33(1) International Journal of Marine 




The obedience of the UNESCO regime to the LOSC, along with the regulatory lacuna 
under the latter’s treatment of UCH in areas beyond territorial waters, is especially 
apparent in Article 10(2).80  This clause confirms that a state party with UCH located on 
its continental shelf or EEZ can only ‘prohibit or authorize any activity directed at such 
heritage to prevent interference with its sovereign rights or jurisdiction’ under 
international law and the LOSC.81  Thus it was consequently surrendered that, in 
accordance with the wishes of the US delegates,82 UCH protection can only be achieved 
through the enforcement of unrelated jurisdictional rights under the LOSC, such as 
mineral and natural resources, mining, health and safety, fishing, construction, scientific 
research and navigation rights.83  Many maritime powers nervous of creeping jurisdiction 
have, for example, referred to LOSC Article 77 and the sovereign right to protect against 
disturbance of natural resources embedded in the continental shelf, which could be 
invoked through UNESCO Convention’s Article 10(2).  This would be on the grounds 
that, as UCH will likely be encrusted with barnacles and living organisms, Article 77 
provides sufficient indirect jurisdiction to prevent disturbance thereof.84   
 
Leading scholars such as O’Keefe seem satisfied with this maladroit protection, arguing 
that the power assigned to states is ‘broad and can be used to provide extensive protection’ 
and that a ‘determination by a state that its sovereign rights are suffering is not likely to 
be put aside.’85  Scovazzi, however, has rightly questioned the suitability of only 
protecting UCH indirectly through wholly unrelated subject-matter rules.86  In particular, 
stretching Articles 56 over ‘non-living resources’ or Article 77 over ‘natural resources’ 
 
80 Risvas referred to a ‘widespread consensus’ that there remains a ‘legal vacuum’ with regard to the 
protection of UCH on the continental shelf (supra n. 6, Risvas, at pp. 582-583). 
81 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 10(2). 
82 Varmer, O., Gray, J. and Alberg, D., (2010), ‘United States: Responses to the 2001 UNESCO Convention 
on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 5(2) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 129-141, at 
p. 132. 
83 Supra n. 34, Scovazzi, at p. 287. 
84 O’Keefe, P.J., (2014), Shipwrecked Heritage: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on 
Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2nd Edn, Institute of Art and Law (Builth Wells), at p. 68; Supra n. 44, 
Aznar, ‘Legal Status’, at p. 86.  In a similar manner, states could protect their rights to the exploitation of 
non-living resources under LOSC (supra n. 2), Art. 56.  Dromgoole also discusses the rights under the 
LOSC to erect structures (Arts. 60 and 80), exploit natural resources (Art. 77), or to regulate drilling ‘for 
any purpose’ (Art. 81), as possible, yet ineffectual, means to regulate UCH (Dromgoole, S., (2010), 
‘Revisiting the Relationship between Marine Scientific Research and the Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 
25(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 33-61, at pp. 39-40). See also, supra n. 42, Varmer, 
at p. 273. 
85 Ibid, O’Keefe, at p. 69. 
86 Supra n. 34, Scovazzi, at p. 291; By questioning the suitability of the LOSC’s Articles 60, 77, 80, 81 as 




is unlikely to be accepted by all.87  Similarly, Dromgoole reminds us that the negotiators 
at UNCLOS specifically dealt with UCH in the contiguous zone, in recognition that rights 
over UCH do not exist in the continental shelf.88  States in dispute could very easily refuse 
to interpret the coastal states rights over indirect issues as capable of being twisted to 
entirely separate subjects,89 especially when considered against Article 3 of the UNESCO 
Convention expressing the Convention’s overriding deference to the LOSC. 
 
Given strong adherence among the legal community towards the LOSC, an interpretation 
favouring UCH protection by completely contorting the 1982 Convention, is not assured.  
As Cogliati-Bantz and Forrest make clear, Article 3 was very intentionally included 
within the UNESCO Convention to ensure that any element which is potentially 
opposable to the LOSC is interpreted in favour of the latter.90  Moreover, the ILC’s 
Commentary on Article 68 in the UN 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, on which 
Part VI of the LOSC is held out to be a codified reiteration, explicitly removes the 
protection of UCH on the continental shelf from the purview of coastal states and was not 
formally rebutted at UNCLOS III.91  Critically, Article 10(2) also does not equate UCH 
with the resources that coastal states can exclusively regulate, but simply reiterates that 
coastal states can only prevent interference with their exclusive rights to exploit their 
living resources, minerals and hydrocarbons.  Coastal states might therefore be under 
strain if arguing that they intended to exploit such living resources, such as encrusted 
barnacles on shipwrecks. In sum, the ability to protect UCH is heavily constrained within 
the existing empty scheme under the LOSC. 
 
Furthermore, coastal state jurisdiction in these zones can be limited.  In many cases it is 
not prescriptive, but limited to the enforcement of narrow rights contained in 
 
87 Scovazzi, T., (2006), ‘The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: Article 303 and the UNESCO 
Convention’, in The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, D. Freestone, R. Barnes, R. and D.M. Ong 
(Eds.), 120-136, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 124. 
88 Supra n. 86, Dromgoole, at p. 45. 
89 Such a right in UCH ‘bears no relationship’ with a right over other matters (supra n. 35, Dromgoole, at 
p. 119). 
90 Cogliati-Bantz, V.P. and Forrest, C.J., (2013), ‘Consistent: the Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’, 2(3) Cambridge 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 536-561. 
91 International Law Commission, (1956), Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Eighth Session, 23 4 July 1956, Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Supplement 
No. 9, A/3159, at p. 298.  See, for example, the views of Japan (UNESCO, (2000), Svnoptic Report of 
comments on the Draft Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (3-7 July 2000, 




internationally agreed rules, such as those developed at the IMO.92  For example, a 
number of commentators have examined the notion of utilising LOSC rights to regulate 
marine scientific research (MSR) under Article 246.93  However, again there are 
difficulties with defining the precise meaning of MSR under the LOSC and the strict 
limitation placed on coastal states under LOSC Article 246, paragraphs (3) to (5).94  Here, 
coastal state enforcement can be sidestepped if it is reasonably argued that such UCH-
directed projects are for the benefit of humanity (‘pure research’), rather than with a view 
to exploitation of resources (‘applied research’).95  Given that US jurisprudence and much 
of the supporting academic commentary has suggested that treasure salvage is beneficial 
to humanity, this loophole is particularly awkward.  Furthermore, again it appears that 
negotiations during UNCLOS on the meaning of MSR came to the conclusion that 
underwater archaeology was explicitly excluded.96   
 
Finally, it is likely that most of the threats to UCH in this zone, as shown by Chapter 2, 
will occur illicitly, covertly or accidentally.  The critical question therefore also becomes 
what rights coastal states have to board and inspect vessels suspected of looting, in order 
to gather evidence or to effectively police activity.  However, unlike living resources,97 
there is no right under the LOSC for a coastal state to intercept or board vessels suspected 
of interfering with non-living natural resources in the EEZ or continental shelf.98  Indeed, 
 
92 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Arts. 56(1)(b) and 56(2); International Maritime Organization, (2012), Implications 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization, 19 
January 2012, LEG/MISC.8, IMO (London), at pp. 8-10; Supra n. 27, Andreone, at p. 176. 
93 Supra n. 86, Dromgoole; Boesten, E., (2002), Archaeological and/or Historic Valuable Shipwrecks in 
International Waters: Public International Law and What It Offers, TMC Asser Press (The Hague), at pp. 
65-71; Croff, K., (2009), ‘The Underwater Cultural Heritage and Marine Scientific Research in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone’, 43(1) Marine Technology Society Journal 93-100; Lee, K.G., (2006), ‘An 
Inquiry into the Compatibility of the UNESCO Convention 2001 with UNCLOS 1982’, in Finishing the 
Interrupted Voyage: Papers of the UNESCO Asia-Pacific Workshop on the 2001 Convention on the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, L.V. Prott (Ed.), 20-26, Institute of Art & Law (Builth 
Wells), at p. 25; Maarleveld, T.J., (2018), Interview with Thijs J. Maarleveld, 22 March 2018, Transcript 
on File. 
94 Supra n. 86, Dromgoole, at pp. 53-54. 
95 Aznar, M.J., (2017), ‘The Legal Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: Concerns and Proposals’, 
in Ocean Law and Policy: Twenty Years of Development Under the UNCLOS Regime, C. Espósito, J. 
Kraska, H.N. Scheiber and M.S. Kwon (Eds.), 124-147, Brill Nijhoff (Leiden), at pp. 140-142; Supra n. 86, 
Dromgoole, at pp. 41-43. 
96 Supra n. 56, Strati, at p. 262; Soons, A.H.A., (1982), Marine Scientific Research and the Law of the Sea, 
Kluwer Law (Alphen), at p. 275. 
97 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Art. 73. 
98 Supra n. 27, Andreone, at p. 170; Shearer, I.A., (1986), ‘Problems of Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement 
Against Delinquent Vessels’, 35(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 320-343, 335-336; The 
LOSC only permits states to board and inspect other vessels, under very strict conditions, in order to ensure 
compliance with fisheries law (supra n. 2, LOSC, Art. 73), when they have reasonable grounds for 
suspecting piracy (Art. 105), or for slave trading, unauthorised broadcasting or sailing without a flag (Art. 
110), see Beckman, R. and Davenport, T., (2012), ‘The EEZ Regime: Reflections after 30 Years’, in 
Securing the Ocean for the Next Generation: Papers from a Law of the Sea Institute, UC Berkeley-Korea 
Institute of Ocean Science and Technology Conference (May 2012, Seoul), H. Scheiber and M. Kwon 
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there remains much uncertainty on whether ‘sovereign rights’ over non-living resources 
under Articles 56 and 77 include this right,99 particularly when considered against explicit 
prohibition of interference with free navigation in the waters in the EEZ and continental 
shelf.100  Much of the academic commentary in this field suggests that, in connection with 
the right of hot pursuit,101 there needs to be a sufficient nexus between the vessel and the 
illicit activity at the time of interdiction.102  Unless looters or incidental destructors are 
caught red-handed, therefore, Article 10(2) may be of little value.   
 
For all of these reasons, a number of studies have confirmed that the UNESCO 
Convention does not in any sense interfere with any of the existing rules on jurisdiction 
under the historic Law of the Sea Convention.103  Indeed, during interviews, Williams 
described the argument about incongruence with the LOSC and the UNESCO Convention 
as ‘swinging’ by maritime powers intent on maintaining the present flag state system.104  
Manders also said that he does not see this supposed conflict between the LOSC and the 
UNESCO Convention.105  Further, in 2013, Cogliati-Bantz and Forrest provided a 
persuasive argument that the UNESCO Convention is entirely in harmony with the 
balance of state interests negotiated under the LOSC.106  This is all despite the limitations 
of the LOSC being the very issue which the UNESCO Convention was intended to 
address. 
 
(Eds.), Berkeley Law (Berkeley), (at: https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Beckman-Davenport-final.pdf; 
accessed 18 December 2018), at pp. 20-21. 
99 Mossop, J., (2016), The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Rights and Responsibilities, 
Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 204-215; Guilfoyle, D., (2009), Shipping Interdiction and the Law 
of the Sea, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press 
(Cambridge), at p. 15. 
100 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Art. 78. 
101 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Art. 111. 
102 Supra n. 99, Mossop, at pp. 205-207; Wolfrum, R. and Kelly, E., (2013), ‘Joint Separate Opinions of 
Judge Wolfrum and Judge Kelly’, in The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian 
Federation, Order of 22nd November 2013, ITLOS Case No 22, 256-261, (at: https://www.itlos.org/fileadm
in/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/published/C22_Wolfrum_Kelly_221113.pdf; accessed 1 June 2019), 
at paras. 12-13. 
103 Supra n. 90, Cogliati-Bantz and Forrest; Manders, M., (2018), Interview with Martijn Manders, 15 
February 2018, Transcript on File; UK UNESCO 2001 Convention Review Group, (2014), The UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001: An Impact Review for the United 
Kingdom – Final Report, United Kingdom National Commission for UNESCO (London), (at: https://www.
unesco.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/UNESCO-Impact-Review_2014-02-10.pdf; accessed 18 
November 2018). 
104 Supra n. 4, Williams. 
105 Supra n. 103, Manders.  See The Netherlands Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International 
Law, (2011), Advisory Report on the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (Translation), Advisory Report No. 21, (December 2011, The Hague), (at: https://www.peace
palacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/357963652.pdf; accessed 18 December 2018), at p. 12; González, A.W., 
(2002), ‘Negotiating the Convention on Underwater Cultural Heritage: Myths and Reality’, in The 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Legal Aspects, G. Camarda and T. Scovazzi (Eds.), 105-
111, Giuffrè (Milan). 




3. The UNESCO Convention and its Cooperation Scheme 
A truly decisive element of the Convention, bringing into question much of its central 
value, is its reliance on an agreement between states to cooperate in the protection of 
UCH.107  This has even been described as the Convention’s ‘fundamental principle’.108  
As O’Keefe writes, ‘[c]o-operation among States is crucial for achieving the objectives 
of the . . . Convention.’109  Guérin and Egger also refer to cooperation with flag states as 
being ‘crucial’ for achieving the protection of UCH.110  The major difficulty with making 
such a hortatory agreement to cooperate as the cornerstone agreement of the Convention 
is that we already had a global agreement to cooperate.  Indeed, if UNCLOS III had 
already achieved anything, it was concluding an agreement between states to ‘cooperate’ 
in the protection of UCH.111  The very raison d’être of the UNESCO Convention was to 
flesh out this extant arrangement under LOSC Article 303(1), particularly in areas beyond 
the territorial sea.112  The UNESCO website alleges that the UNESCO Convention 
‘provides a detailed State cooperation system’113 and has published a page setting out 
how this state cooperation scheme works.114  However, looking at this system more 
closely, beyond appointing a Coordinating State – who shall equivocally ‘act on behalf 
of the States Parties as a whole and not in its own interest’115 and consult other “linked” 
states116 – there is no more guidance on how such cooperation should be carried out, let 
alone, conducted successfully (see infra Section 4).117   
 
107 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 2(2). 
108 Supra n. 5, Dromgoole, at p. 344. 
109 Supra n. 84, O’Keefe, at p. 90 (emphasis added); ‘I do believe that an effective protection of UCH 
necessarily passes through the cooperation between states.’ (Aznar, M.J., (2018), Interview with Mariano 
J. Aznar, 12 February 2018, Transcript on File). 
110 Guérin, U. and Egger, B., (2010), ‘Guaranteeing the Protection of Submerged Archaeological Sites 
Regardless of their Location: The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (2001)’, 5(2) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 97-103, at p. 101. 
111 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Art. 303(1); Scovazzi, T., (2012), ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and Underwater 
Cultural Heritage’, 27(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 753-761, at p. 755. 
112 Supra n. 6, Risvas, at p. 584; Supra n. 35, Carducci, at p. 421; Supra n. 84, O’Keefe, at p. 50; Supra n. 
40, Vadi, at p. 361. 
113 UNESCO, ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage: About the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage’, (at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-heritage/2001-
convention/; accessed 18 December 2018). 
114 UNESCO, ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage: The State Cooperation System’, (at: http://www.unesco.org/
new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-heritage/2001-convention/state-cooperation-system; accessed 
18 December 2018). 
115 ‘Any such action shall not in itself constitute a basis for the assertion of any preferential or jurisdictional 
rights not provided for in international law’ (Scovazzi, T., (2001), 'The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage', 11(1) Italian Yearbook of International Law 9-24, at p. 
19). 
116 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Arts. 10(5), 10(6), 12(4) and 12(6). 
117 Scovazzi describes the regime has having a 3-step model of ‘reporting-consultations-urgent measures’ 




This reliance on ad hoc cooperation was not done explicitly, except for the occasional 
case relating to the treatment of a flag state’s warship in another coastal state’s territorial 
waters.118  Instead, it was tacitly included by leaving out any formal rules or agreements 
on how to resolve future conflicts between states on the different issues.  For example, 
should a state sanction an archaeological recovery on a merchant vessel which is resting 
on another state’s continental shelf, there is little contained in the ‘Coordinating State’ 
regime to elucidate how such negotiations should be conducted.119  Instead, all states are 
to be firmly guided by their general duty to cooperate with one another under Article 2(2). 
 
It can therefore be seen that there is something of a cooperation gap in the UNESCO 
Convention: it calls on states to cooperate, but provides no framework, structure or rules 
by which such cooperation must be carried out.  While Article 19 attempts to expand and 
provide clarity on the concept of “cooperating”, it only deals with administrative and 
research-based tasks like collaboration over archaeological projects or dissemination of 
academic research and information sharing.120  It provides no detail on how effective 
cooperation is to be carried out over UCH protection121 or the markers against which 
compliance can be evaluated.122  The Convention does not even clarify who is required 
to collaborate with whom, other than ensuring that states with verifiable cultural, 
historical or archaeological links are also consulted.123  At once, therefore, states might 
dispute what powers a Coordinating State is actually intended to possess.  For example, 
Coordinating States overseeing activities on their continental shelf might determine that 
they have the deciding vote in matters of deadlock; whereas states with a verifiable link 
would say that Coordinating States are merely neutral administrators who facilitate 
negotiations.   
 
118 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 7(3); Supra n. 36, Bautista, at pp. 75-76; Rau, M., (2002), ‘The 
UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural Heritage and the International Law of the Sea’, 6(1) Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 387-464. 
119 Supra nn. 66-102 and 115-117. 
120 Although, some of the detail can be provided additionally by the Rules and the UNESCO Manual for 
Activities Directed at UCH (Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Annex I: Rules Concerning Activities 
Directed at Underwater Cultural Heritage, Rules 2 and 17; Maarleveld, T.J., Guérin U. and Egger, B. (Eds.), 
(2013), Manual for Activities Directed at Underwater Cultural Heritage: Guidelines to the Annex of the 
UNESCO 2001 Convention, UNESCO (Paris)). 
121 Supra n. 35, Dromgoole, at p. 119; Zhao, Y.J., (2008), ‘The Relationships Between Three Multilateral 
Regimes Concerning the Underwater Cultural Heritage’, in Le patrimoine culturel de l'humanité / The 
Cultural Heritage of Mankind, J.A.R. Nafziger, J.A.R. and T. Scovazzi (Eds.), 601-642, Brill Nijhoff 
(Leiden), at p. 619. 
122 It is ‘difficult to identify the normative implications of the duty to cooperate and more specifically how 
a state can be in breach thereof’ (supra n. 6, Risvas, at p. 578). 




Criticism has been levied against the extant ‘general duty’ under LOSC’s Article 303(1), 
which would therefore apply to the same general duty under Article 2(2) of the UNESCO 
Convention.  Caflisch, for example, stated that it is ‘far too general and vague to have any 
significant normative content.’124  Risvas, also seriously questioned its normative base, 
saying that the duty is ‘too general and too unclear’125 and much will always depend on 
context and the maritime zone in question.126  Concerningly, while promoting this 
approach which maintains the status quo and is exclusively reliant on ad hoc cooperation, 
Blumberg equally concedes that the duty is ‘hortatory only’.127  Nevertheless, Scovazzi 
has more clearly identified that the duty to cooperate in the protection of UCH under 
Article 303(1) ‘is not devoid of meaning’.128  Referring directly to the judgment of the 
ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, Scovazzi reminds us that a duty of 
international cooperation refers to acting in good faith and engaging in meaningful 
negotiations, along with a genuine intention to come to an agreement, rather than merely 
going through a formal process.129  Risvas also draws our attention to the Lac Lanoux 
case, where the court determined that a duty to cooperate held by France with Spain over 
the management of their respective portions of a shared lake, only required them to merely 
consider the interests of the other and not any form of shared decision-making.130   
 
It could also be argued that the Cooperation Scheme developed throughout Articles 7 to 
12 is unnecessarily complicated.  As Williams asks, why did they need such a 
‘horrendously complex’ system?131  ‘They would have been better off just saying that 
coastal states regulate activities directed at UCH in the EEZ/continental shelf, but 
requiring that they consult other interested states with verifiable links.’132  Similarly, 
Forrest has described the system for sharing information throughout Articles 7 to 12 as 
 
124 Supra n. 49, Caflisch, at p. 20; c.f., Oxman somehow concludes that Art 303(1) is ‘fairly specific’ on 
issues of title and use, unlike the ‘sweeping conceptual generalities of article 149’ (Oxman, B.H., (1988), 
‘Marine Archaeology and the International Law of the Sea’, 12(3) Columbia VLA Journal of Law and the 
Arts 353-372, at p. 362). 
125 Supra n. 6, Risvas, at p. 571. 
126 Supra n. 6, Risvas, at pp. 568-569; Also e.g., Directive 2014/89/EU of the European parliament and of 
the council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning, OJEU L257/135, 
Preamble, at para. 20. 
127 Supra n. 12, Blumberg. 
128 Supra n. 87, Scovazzi, at p. 122 
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Netherlands, Merits, Judgment, 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 3, International Court of Justice, at para. 
85; Supra n. 6, Risvas, at pp. 563-569. 
130 Supra n. 6, Risvas, at p. 569; Affaire du lac Lanoux (Espagne, France), 16 November 1957, XII Reports 
of International Arbitral Awards 281-317, at p. 307. 
131 Supra n. 4, Williams. 
132 Supra n. 4, Williams. 
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‘overly bureaucratic and potentially time consuming’.133  Meanwhile, Firth rightly 
defends the notion of shared sovereignty in the ocean space, saying that the concept of all 
states being encouraged to share and cooperate in this zone ‘is a positive thing’.134   He 
points out that, by contrast, it could be that ‘coastal state territory was measured up to the 
median line, giving them full control over all activities within’.135  This argument that the 
governance of the oceans needs to remain a shared competence is right and must continue 
to be defended.  Indeed, the risk otherwise might be that coastal eventually begin to equate 
prescriptive jurisdiction with a sense of exclusive ownership over UCH therein, which 
clearly must be avoided.  The difficulty, however, is the substantive meaning of an 
‘agreement to cooperate’ which is at the heart of this system of sharing responsibility for 
the protection of UCH. 
 
4. Challenges with International Cooperation and the UNESCO Convention 
(a) An Agreement to Cooperate as an Agreement to Enter ‘Good Faith Negotiations’ 
The first glaring difficulty with exploring the legal meaning of a duty to cooperate under 
international law is that the duty to cooperate, as a norm, also forms the entire ‘bedrock’ 
of international law itself.136  Providing an erudite legal definition of international 
cooperation becomes a thankless task once it is abundantly clear that international 
‘cooperation’ and ‘law’ are both so deeply enmeshed.137  As Rayfuse notes, cooperation 
 
133 Supra n. 40, Forrest, at p. 544. 
134 Firth, A., (2018), Interview with Antony Firth, 15 March 2018, Transcript on File. 
135 Ibid, Firth. 
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137 E.g., United Nations, (1945), Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, 26 June 1945, San Francisco, 59 Stat. 1031, Arts. 1, 11, 13 and 55; For example, the UN Declaration 
on Principles of International Law includes the word ‘co-operation’ no less than 21 times (United Nations, 
(1970), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution Adopted by the General 
Assembly, Report from the Sixth Committee, 24 October 1970, UN Doc. A/RES/25/2625, United Nations 
(New York)); United Nations, (2005), In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005, at para. 18; The UN 
‘Our Shared Responsibility’ report refers to the essential need for cooperation no less than 32 times (United 
Nations, (2004), A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on 
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United Nations, (1966), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
1966, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), United Nations (New York), Art. 2(1); 
United Nations, (1992), Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 3-14 June 1992, Rio de Janeiro, 
UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26, United Nations (New York), Principle 27. 
130 
 
itself ‘has its origins in the general principles of international law’.138  While Englender 
et al once said how cooperation ‘is a basic element in international relations’139 and 
Bautista once that it formed ‘the basis of all international law.’140  Indeed, Robin Churchill 
once remarked how cooperation formed the very essence of the law of the sea, where the 
principle is ‘deeply embedded’ in the LOSC.141  Certainly, he adds, ‘one could say that 
co-operation is its leitmotiv, so frequently do its provisions call for co-operation between 
its parties in relation to a host of diverse matters.’142 
 
It seems that it is in relation to governing shared environmental spaces and resources, 
such as lakes, rivers and seas, where the notion of a duty to cooperate, and what this could 
entail normatively speaking, has been explored in meaningful detail.143  Even here, 
however, it would still be incredibly difficult to find a precise meaning, given that 
agreeing to cooperate is included ‘in virtually all international environmental 
agreements.’144  Indeed, there is no greater challenge for inter-state cooperation than that 
presented by climate change,145 where the extent to which a duty to cooperate actually 
and legitimately ‘encroaches upon state sovereignty remains firmly debated.’146  Given 
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in ICJ Reports (2014) 226-300, at para. 13. 
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145 For example, the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change requires the ‘widest 
possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international 
response’ (United Nations, (1992), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (9 May 
1992, New York), FCCC/INFORMAL/84, Preamble). 
146 Supra n. 136, Wouters, at p. 91. 
131 
 
this ubiquity to contemporary international polity,147 the precise legal meaning of a duty 
to cooperate has been under increasing theoretical examination.148  In Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros, it was affirmed that international cooperation is a recognised duty in the 
management of international watercourses.149  However, when drafting the original 
convention at the heart of the dispute, opinions differed considerably in the International 
Law Commission on whether such a duty could carry any real normative force.150  One 
side of the debate argued that cooperation was ‘not simply a lofty principle, but a legal 
duty.’151  While others said merely that ‘cooperation was a goal, a guideline for conduct, 
but not a strict legal obligation which, if violated, would entail international 
responsibility.’152   
 
According to McCaffrey, the majority saw cooperation equivocally as an ‘umbrella term, 
embracing a complex of more specific obligations which, by and large, do reflect 
customary international law.’153   This perspective perhaps provides a clue: cooperation 
is only as normative as the existing general duty to cooperate one already expects under 
international law.  Such a conclusion might raise significant doubt about whether it 
provides for any additional duties above the minimum baseline already extant within the 
legal framework.  This perspective would also concur with the views of the ICJ in the 
MOX Plant case, where it was held that a duty to cooperate is already entrenched as ‘a 
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401; ‘[T]he duty to cooperate was a kind of label for an entire range of obligations’ (ibid, International Law 
Commission, at p. 75 (per Reuter); Leb, C., (2013), Cooperation in the Law of Transboundary Water 
Resources, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 81. 
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fundamental principle under Part XII of [LOSC] and general international law’.154  Taken 
to its furthest extent, therefore, this view might only equate failure to cooperate as being 
evidenced by regression into violent conflict or geopolitical tension, such as that 
witnessed between the UK and Iceland during the Cod Wars.155   
 
In the Lac Lanoux case, noted above between France and Spain, it was held that such a 
duty entails ‘an obligation to accept in good faith all communications and contacts which 
could, by a broad comparison of interests and by reciprocal good will, provide States with 
the best conditions for concluding agreements.’156  Similarly, the Pulp Mills case 
translated a duty of cooperation simply as the ‘procedural obligations of informing, 
notifying and negotiating’.157  Despite recognising that, as under North Sea Continental 
Shelf, negotiations had to be carried out in good faith and a meaningful manner, the court 
did however stress that, in accordance with the Railway Traffic case, ‘an obligation to 
negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement’.158  Along similar lines, the 
Icelandic Fisheries case held that while the parties must seek an equitable solution, it 
should still be one which pays ‘reasonable regard to the legal rights’ of each party and is 
‘derived from the applicable law.’159  In other words, there seems to be an inescapable 
conclusion that an international duty to cooperate probably does not require a great deal 
 
154 The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Request for provisional measures, International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 3 December 2001, ITLOS Case No. 10, at para. 82. 
155 See, e.g., Welch, A., (2006), The Royal Navy in The Cod Wars: Britain and Iceland in Conflict 1958-
1976, Maritime Books (Liskeard). 
156 Supra n. 130, Affaire du lac Lanoux, at p. 308. 
157 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, 20 April 2010, International Court 
of Justice, ICJ Reports (2010) 14, at para. 81. 
158 Ibid, Pulp Mills case, at para. 150; While the Permanent Court of Justice held that there is no obligation 
to come to an agreement, they did say the duty ‘is not only to enter into negotiations, but also to pursue 
them as far as possible, with a view to concluding agreements.’ (Railway Traffic between Lithuania and 
Poland, (Railway Sector Landwarow-Kaisiadorys), Advisory Opinion, 15 October 1931, Permanent Court 
of International Justice, Series A/B No. 42, 108-123, at p. 116). 
159 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland v. Iceland; Federal Republic 
of Germany v. Iceland), International Court of Justice, ICJ Reports (1973) 3-23 and 175-216, at pp. 192-
193 and 202;  For example, the Straits of Johor Land Reclamation case required that future disputes are 
‘resolved through amicable negotiations, without prejudice to the existing rights of the Parties under 
international law to resort to other pacific means of settlement’ (Land Reclamation by Singapore in and 
around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Decision of the 1 September 2005, Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, Volume XXVII 133-145, at p. 144). 
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more than a duty to take part in meaningful and good faith negotiations,160 as was earlier 
suggested by Scovazzi in the context of UCH protection.161 
 
(b) The Normative Substance of an Agreement to Engage in Good Faith Negotiations 
Legal rules are only as effective as their normative elements, with clarity against which 
compliance can be accurately evaluated under the threat of sanction.162  Both normatively 
and practically speaking, therefore, there are many issues with reliance upon an 
agreement to negotiate in good faith and with the circularity complex that it entails.163  
Many legal agreements contain wording to this effect, which have long been interpreted 
as requiring parties inter alia to ‘engage in negotiations with a sincere desire to reach an 
agreement and . . . make an earnest effort to reach common ground.’164  While some 
positive benefits can likely be drawn from such agreements,165 there are also undoubtedly 
many latent defects.166  It is immediately obvious that there is little normative clarity on 
when a party has acted in “bad faith”.  To what extreme can malevolence, recalcitrance, 
intransigence, indifference or imprudence be tolerated before mala fides can confidently 
be identified?167   
 
 
160 ‘In international environmental law, cooperation is thus a central principle in order to prevent disputes, 
to provide timely notification of plans to carry out or permit activities . . . and to engage in good faith 
consultations to arrive at a fair and equitable resolution of the situation’ (supra n. 144, Voigt, at p. 180); 
Sands says that the duty to cooperate is ‘translated into more specific commitments through techniques 
designed to ensure information sharing and participation in decision-making [including] rules on 
environmental impact assessment[s]...; rules on ensuring that neighbouring states receive necessary 
information (requiring information exchange, consultation and notification)…; the provision of emergency 
information…; and transboundary enforcement of environmental standards.’ (Supra n. 144, Sands, at p. 
250). 
161 Supra n. 87, at p. 122. 
162 Chiassoni, P., (2012), ‘Defeasibility and Legal Indeterminacy’, in The Logic of Legal Requirements: 
Essays on Defeasibility, J.F. Beltrán and G.B. Ratti (Eds.), 151-181, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at 
p. 181. 
163 Trakman, L.E. and Sharma, K., (2014), ‘The Binding Force of Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith’, 
73(3) Cambridge Law Journal 598-628, at pp. 603-604; Feinman, J.M., (1983), ‘Critical Approaches to 
Contract Law’, 30(4) UCLA Law Review 829-860, at p. 837. 
164 Cox, A., (1958), ‘The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith’, 71(8) Harvard Law Review 1401-1442, at p. 
1416. 
165 Hylton, K.N., (1994), ‘An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain’, 83(1) Georgetown Law Journal 
19-78; Burton, S.J., (1980), ‘Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith’, 
94(2) Harvard Law Review 369-404, at p. 393. 
166 Supra n. 163, Trakman and Sharma, at pp. 603-604; Colombo, S., (1993), ‘Good Faith: The Law and 
Morality’, 8 Denning Law Journal 23-60, at pp. 24-29; Wellens, K., (2014), Negotiations in the Case Law 
of the International Court of Justice: A Functional Analysis, Routledge (Abingdon), at pp. 163-192. 
167 Lawrence, J.K.L., (2014), ‘Lying, Misrepresenting, Puffing and Bluffing: Legal, Ethical and 
Professional Standards for Negotiators and Mediation Advocates’, 29(1) Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 35-58; Matthews, R.R., (1979), ‘Talking Without Negotiating: The Case of Rhodesia’, 35(1) 
International Journal 91-117; Barasnevicius Quagliato, P., (2008), ‘The Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith’, 
50(5) International Journal of Law and Management 213-225. See, e.g., Southern Bluefin Tuna, (New 
Zealand v. Japan, Australia v. Japan), (1999), 27 August 1999, International Tribunal for the Law of the 
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In all negotiations the parties’ motives, underlying interests and factual positions will 
differ significantly,168 all too often leading to impasse.169  There may be distrust, 
reluctance to lose ground or face, or intensifying feelings of antagonism, resentment or 
entitlement.170  These problems can be further intensified as a result of political or 
ideological tensions, such as in relations between former imperial powers and 
postcolonial states, as can be common with flag-coastal state disputes over UCH.171  
Contrasting cultural traditions and values may also antagonise efforts to come together in 
negotiations.  All of these factors can exacerbate one another, meaning that parties in a 
negotiation may not get anywhere or, equally, may get further apart.172  One only needs 
to witness the current political disputes over the rights to resources in the Arctic, to see 
how agreements between states to just “get along” can easily derail and enter into a 
downward spiral of increasing entrenchment and distrust.173   
 
Having failed to cooperate, whether with the use of a third party neutral or not, states 
might eventually resort to impartial third parties, in the form of judicial or quasi-judicial 
arbiters, for a determination of who is the outright winner and loser.  Such adjudicated 
outcomes not only curtail self-determination and the freedom of states to manage their 
individual needs more accurately and creatively,174 but can resemble the cliché ‘lose-lose’ 
characterisation after the time, money, energy and emotions invested in pursuit of 
“victory”.175  Beyond formal dispute resolution, even in non-conflictual and non-
 
168 Supra n. 121, Zhao, at p. 619; Supra n. 40, Forrest, at p. 544; Supra n. 93, Boesten, at p. 167. 
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170 Kennedy, K.A. and Pronin, E., (2012), ‘Bias Perception and the Spiral of Conflict’, in Ideology, 
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Barriers to Conflict Resolution, K. Arrow, R.H. Mnookin, L. Ross, A. Tversky and R. Wilson (Eds.), 2-25, 
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Arctic?’, 42(1-2) Ocean Development and International Law 173-210. 
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contentious negotiations, there is still a wanting of firmness in the call for cooperation 
which undermines its intended purpose.  With all the initial intention of wanting to show 
goodwill, states will have their own interests, motivations, fears and entrenched 
positions.176  There may be deleterious power differentials,177 cultural plurality 
advantaging one state over another,178 information asymmetry,179 an uneven allocation of 
resources and expertise,180 and a pervasively harmful force of distrust and a perception of 
inequity. Ultimately, effective negotiation requires far more than an agreement to 
negotiate effectively.181  Although, indubitably, it is a valuable first step.   
 
Analysing the ICJ judgment in the Lac Lanoux case, McIntyre informs us that good faith 
negotiations would likely be breached ‘where one party terminates the negotiations 
without justification, imposes abnormal delays or time limits, fails to adhere to the agreed 
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procedure, or systematically refuses to consider the proposals or the interests of the other 
party.’182  Requiring refusal of reasonable proposals to be systematic before a breach of 
duty is found suggests a very high threshold.183  On this narrow perspective, states may 
be “cooperating” even if negotiating with a pure focus on their own interests and on the 
acquisition of a better individual outcome, while engaging in a zero or negative sum game 
with their opponents.  Given the historic role that power and political posturing play in 
the law of the sea, such self-interested approaches to negotiation could still be justifiably 
pursued with all good faith.184  Scovazzi confirms this minimalist definition of the duty 
when he suggests that states will only fall foul of it when ‘persistently disregard[ing] any 
request by other States to negotiate’.185  However, given that the UNESCO Convention 
already requires member states to consult one another and to engage in meaningful 
negotiations, the cooperation duty perhaps adds little more beyond a hortatory agreement 
to pay due regard to the interests of others,186 engage in minimal standards of ‘good 
neighbourliness’,187 and act within the bounds of ‘good faith’, i.e., the mere avoidance of 
bad faith.  Yet, indeed, such principles are the very foundational elements of international 
legal order itself and only require that the door be open to “listening” to opposing views. 
 
Some authors have therefore tried to argue in favour of an ‘evolutionary interpretation’ 
of the duty to cooperate, in order to bring broader principles – such as sustainable 
development, precautionary management, integrated planning, and the polluter pays 
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any modification of it’ (Oude Elferink, A.G., (2013), ‘North Sea Continental Shelf Cases’, in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, R. Wolfrum (Ed.), Oxford University Press (Oxford), (at: 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e180?prd=EPIL; 
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principle – within the general obligations of states.188  It could be argued that these wider 
values and principles could influence negotiations from the “shadows”.189  However, this 
is questionable.  The very problem with the duty to cooperate, as shown above, is its 
inimicality to the absorption of meaningful substance.190  Furthermore, while these 
environmental principles are positive aspirations and idealistic constitutional objectives, 
they are effectively a separate body of norms sought outside of the “duty” to cooperate, 
with their own challenges of enforcement and ambiguity.  It is also possible to see a 
number of areas where the duty to pay due regard has expanded to practical matters such 
as requiring the exchange of information, notification, and consultation.191  Nevertheless, 
importantly, it does not mandate participation in internal decision-making, but merely the 
need to show one has listened to the interests of others. 
 
In other words, we are yet to reach a system of international law built upon international 
‘cooperation’ rather than ‘co-existence’ as sought by Friedmann in 1964.192  This 
uninspired view of the duty to cooperate was confirmed in the recent Whaling case 
judgment in 2014.193  Here the ICJ, according to Young and Sullivan, ‘was modest in its 
exposition of the duty to cooperate.  Rather than pronounce upon the nature of modern 
international law, or refer to similar concepts in other treaties or case law, or a “good 
faith” standard, it tied the source of the duty to cooperate to the provisions and procedures 
of the [International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling].’194  In other words, it 
maintained an uninspiring and positivist view, assigning cooperation obligations only 
based on the prior consent of states.  Such meagre duties to pay ‘due regard’ to established 
international principles or to the interests of other states, as elucidated in all these cases,195 
would not on any of these accounts, create a positive duty on the part of states to pre-empt 
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and actively address potential threats to UCH, but merely resolve international conflicts 
as they arise. 
 
(c) The Need for a Duty of ‘Active’ – not ‘Passive’ – Cooperation 
In 2015, Voigt described the present duty of cooperation as a ‘central principle in order 
to prevent disputes’,196 merely implying that the law as it stands is about dealing with 
where interests collide in international affairs, rather than about forward-thinking and 
creatively problem-solving collective action challenges.  As explored in Chapter 4, the 
protection of global public goods such as the natural and marine environment requires 
more than merely agreeing to listen with open minds.  Conca and Dabelko, for example, 
refer to the need for greater trust, reciprocity, transparency, cooperative knowledge, and 
shared responsibility.197  Ideally, therefore, states should be required to engage in a 
positive sum approach (‘win-win’), to energetically seek resolution to the issue by 
actively considering all options, and to positively pre-empt the underlying interests of 
other states and the international community.198  This concurs with Zartman and Touval’s 
perspective that cooperation should be ‘more than simply the opposite or absence of 
conflict’, but rather a ‘conscious, specific, positive action.’199   
 
In the context of UCH protection, however, the system of cooperation as it currently 
stands under the UNESCO Convention does not appear to entail such an ‘active’ duty – 
such as compelling states to engage in further multilateral treatymaking and integrative 
processes in order to protect UCH – but a merely ‘passive’ duty, requiring that states only 
listen when a formal complaint is made that legal rights have been breached, usually after-
the-event.  As highlighted, Scovazzi accurately summarises the duty as merely requiring 
that states ‘take into account’ the interests of others and do not ‘persistently reject’ 
requests for cooperation.200  Furthermore, while destruction of UCH could entail an 
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200 Scovazzi, T., (2014), ‘Underwater Cultural Heritage as an International Common Good’, in 
International Law for Common Goods: Normative Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture and Nature, F. 
Lenzerini and A.F. Vrdoljak (Eds.), 215-230, Hart (Oxford), at p. 219. 
139 
 
internationally wrongful act,201 it would be a duty which only emerges post-destruction 
and would require a burdensome level of evidence of activity which is knowing or 
intentionally reckless. 
 
In other words, the UNESCO Convention has not created a positive normative obligation 
for states to engage in active protection of UCH from incidental, accidental, potential or 
illegal threats.  Instead, it reiterates an empty agreement between flag and non-flag states 
to just “get along” in the shared ocean space, without a clear methodological mechanism 
for filling in this crucial normative void.  Such an unpredictable system carries 
considerable defects, both in terms of compliance and enforceability,202 as well as in terms 
of gaping substantive regulatory gaps.203  Instead, it must rely upon abstruse general 
principles, vague customary rules, unenforceable and gap-ridden soft law, and ex post 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, to unpredictably and spasmodically bridge 
conflicting issues.  The result will be that the other principles which buttress the UNESCO 
Convention – including in situ preservation, seeing UCH as a public good, recognising 
broader cultural or historical claims of interest in UCH sites from other communities, and 
acting in the benefit of humanity – are required to play an enhanced guiding role in 
international future bilateral and multilateral interactions, as they gradually improve in 
the coming decades, while UCH continues to be damaged or destroyed.   
 
This can perhaps be evidenced by the manner in which the principle-led Rules in the 
Annex have been adopted by states willingly, but the terms developed for achieving 
effective ‘cooperation’ throughout the main articles have received more resistance.204  
Importantly, however, while such broad principles buttressing the Convention may assist 
in setting some boundaries for substantive norm development, they do not yet legally 
assure acceptance of responsibility, state compliance or, critically, a positive 
responsibility towards the international community.  As Judge Weeramantry once said in 
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a statement receiving widespread approval, what is now needed to achieve sustainable 
justice is: 
 
‘not merely passive cooperation, but rather active cooperation.  If we are 
to save our global inheritance, we must do so actively.  We need, for this 
purpose, to be willing to surrender some part of sovereignty to the rest of 
the world, accepting common guidance by the global community.’205 
 
In other words, agreements to “cooperate” over common maritime challenges should be 
understood for what they are: an admission that more detailed and transnational systems 
of collaboration, coordination, integration and harmonisation between stakeholders are 
needed.   This is no doubt what was foreseen in LOSC Article 303(4) and the UNESCO 
Convention Article 6 which both make it clear that states are expected to engage in 
negotiations towards further bilateral and multilateral arrangements which provide for 
better protection of UCH.206  This also seems to be what the duty of cooperation in the 
UNESCO Convention was intended to cover.207  Put another way, and as the following 
subsection illustrates, the general commitment to cooperate in the protection of UCH 
under LOSC Article 303(3) is of little bearing in isolation: what matters is the ensuing 
decades dedicated to the development of multi-level regimes which address the protection 
of UCH.   
 
(d) Active Cooperation as Another Word for Ongoing Regime-Building 
This need for marine cooperation to translate into the expansion of regimes, or the 
thickening of their power and complexity, can perhaps be best illustrated by the 
increasingly active forms of cooperation necessitated in the protection of marine living 
resources, particularly, fisheries.  Here, again, the meaning of duties towards cross-border 
“cooperation” have been debated at length.  For example, a recent UN report on regional 
fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) noted the ‘broader issue undermining the 
sustainability of high seas fisheries is the absence of a consensus on the nature of the duty 
to cooperate’.208  In reference to the challenge of protecting marine living resources, Takei 
 
205 Weeramantry, H.E. Judge C.G., (2017), ‘Achieving Sustainable Justice Through International Law’, in 
Sustainable Development Principles in the Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals: 1992-2012, 
M.C. Segger and H.E. Judge C.E. Weeramantry (Eds.), 109-124, Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 120 
(emphasis added). 
206 See Chapter 7. 
207 Supra n. 64, González, O'Keefe and Williams, at p. 60 (per O’Keefe). 
208 United Nations, (2005), Oceans and the Law of the Sea, Report of the Secretary-General, (4 March 
2005), United Nations General Assembly, 60th Session, UN Doc. A/60/63, at para. 211. 
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also said that cooperation is an ‘essential element’ which means very little until it is 
fleshed out.209  He then highlighted how, as a standalone commitment, ‘[i]t is not clear: 
(1) which states are required to cooperate; (2) which states are entitled to require 
cooperation from other states; (3) what form cooperation needs to take.’210  As Guilfoyle 
says, it is ‘an obligation so diffuse that it is difficult to see how one individual state is 
directly injured by another state’s individual (or even repeated) breach of it.  Indeed, there 
is significant scope for disagreement as to what might constitute a ‘breach’ of an 
obligation to co-operate in the first place.’211  As Henriksen et al acknowledge, 
exploration into the meaning of the duty to cooperate in the case of fisheries is ‘not 
surprising, considering the problems of compliance with this obligation.’212   
 
Any perusal of the concept in the fisheries context, however, makes it clear that such 
widespread agreements to cooperate – as began appearing in early multilateral 
conventions, such as the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas213 or 1959 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention214 – have 
made little difference in and of themselves.  Rather, the vital factor in the sustainable 
protection of marine living resources has mostly been made by the ongoing and proactive 
multilateral treatymaking, soft law development, and multi-level regime-building which 
provide for detailed stakeholder coordination, rules for shared stock management, and 
regulatory harmonisation.  Indeed, most have rightly argued that the duties to cooperate 
in the protection of the environment within the LOSC place an obligation upon states to 
subsequently establish and integrate activities through regional regimes.215   
 
 
209 Takei, Y., (2013), Filling Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries: Discrete High Seas Fish Stocks, 
Deep-sea Fisheries and Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at pp. 56 and 256. 
210 Ibid, at p. 57. 
211 Supra n. 99, Guilfoyle, at p. 166. 
212 Henriksen, T., Hønneland, G., and Sydnes, A., (2005), Law and Politics in Ocean Governance: The UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement and Regional Fisheries Management Regimes, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 18. 
213 ‘Considering . . . the nature of the problems involved in the conservation of the living resources of the 
high seas . . . there is a clear necessity that they be solved, whenever possible, on the basis of international 
cooperation’ (United Nations Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas, (adopted 29 April 1958, in force 20 March 1966), 559 UNTS 285, Preamble).  
214 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention, (adopted 24 January 1959 (London), in force 27 June 1963), 
Treaty Series No. 28 (1963). 
215 Supra n. 209, Takei, at pp. 58 and 62; Supra n. 212, Henriksen, Hønneland and Sydnes, at pp. 15-18; 
Supra n. 138, Rayfuse, at p. 441; c.f., Applebaum and Donohue, by contrast, have suggested that states are 
pretty much free to choose how to effect the cooperation called for under the LOSC (Applebaum, B. and 
Donohue, A., (1999), ‘The Role of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’, in Developments in 
International Fisheries Law, E. Hey (Ed.), 217-250, Kluwer Law International (The Hague), at p. 220); 
Supra n. 28, Orrego Vicuña, at pp. 200-266; Supra n. 98, Beckman and Davenport, at p. 32; Supra n. 99, 
Guilfoyle, at p. 167. 
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Such intensification of cross-border rules for cooperation has been particularly visible in 
regional or sea basin contexts, where the demands of shared utilisation of a common 
ecosystem have strengthened the political motivation to meaningfully cooperate, rather 
than co-exist.216  This led to the proliferation of numerous global, regional and local 
accords, agreements and regimes which initially covered issues such as maximum quota 
allocations, harmonised conservation standards, and common frameworks for cross-
border cooperation and enforcement.  For example, since the 1970s, RFMOs have 
introduced a long list of practical mechanisms to address overfishing and non-
compliance, including ‘positive and/or negative lists of [authorised/unauthorised] vessels 
[…], transhipment bans, the use of observers, port State controls, catch documentation 
schemes, and at-sea measures’.217   
 
Yet further – with an intriguing analogy to the UNESCO Convention’s intention to flesh 
out the meaning of the hollow duty to cooperate under LOSC Article 303(1) – the UN 
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement was introduced to close the ‘legal loophole’ created by the 
near-empty meaning of commitments to cooperate within the LOSC.218  It therefore went 
even further in the thickening of inter-state obligations by elaborating many detailed rules 
of cooperation, including technical rules on quota allocation, shared surveillance, data 
exchange, non-flag state enforcement, rules for cross-border enforcement, port-state 
measures, non-flag state jurisdiction, rules on inspection and interdiction, and 
strengthening the power and function of RFMOs themselves.219  There has also been the 
provision of numerous compacts, regulations and soft law agreements, such as those 
propounded by the FAO, OECD and UN,220 as well as a growing number of cross-border 
 
216 See Chapter 5 at Section 4 and Chapter 6. 
217 Supra n. 138, Rayfuse, at p. 453. 
218 Supra n. 28, Orrego Vicuña, at p. 201; Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, (8 September 1995),  United 
Nations, UN Doc. A/CONF.164/37. 
219 Ibid. 
220 E.g., Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures 
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, approved on 24 November 1993 by Resolution 15/93 of the Twenty-
Seventh Session of the FAO Conference, Food and Agricultural Organisation (Rome); FAO, (1995),  Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Food and Agricultural Organization (Rome), (at: 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-v9878e.htm; accessed 18 December 2018); FAO, (2001), International Plan of 
Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Food and 
Agricultural Organization (Rome), (at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-y1224e.pdf; accessed 18 December 2018); 
FAO, (2015), Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance, Food and Agricultural Organization 
(Rome), (at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4577t.pdf; accessed 18 December 2018); FAO, (2009), Agreement on 
Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Food 
and Agricultural Organization (Rome), (at: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/037t-
e.pdf; accessed 18 December 2018); OECD, (2009), Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Paris); Lodge, M.W.,  
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processes which fully integrate stakeholders and communities into the system of 
governance, such as the provision of Advisory Councils across the EU,221 the 
dissemination of numerous industry codes of practice, and the facilitation of co-
management and marine spatial planning projects and pilots across the world. 
 
The EU has also played a highly proactive rule in this transnational issue area, mandating 
the coordination and provision of spatial planning across EU waters through directives,222 
a prohibition on bottom trawling in certain areas,223 as well as numerous instruments 
aimed at addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.224  The EU’s Common 
Fisheries Policy has regulated multitudinous technical and harmonisation matters with 
effective use of sovereignty-constraining supranational law, including fleet management, 
quota allocations, equipment standards, research, health and safety policy, port and sea 
inspections, aquaculture management, seafood quality assurance, and internal and 
external trade.225  A number of global, regional and national epistemic bodies and 
communities also play an active role in protecting marine living resources, providing vital 
scientific data, guiding decision-making, analysing ecosystem vitality, and monitoring 
the actions of the maritime community.  Most importantly, all of these processes are 
continuing to intensify in their inevitable march towards common rules, cross-border 
 
Anderson D., Løbach, T., Munro, G., Sainsbury, K. and Willock, A., (2007), Recommended Best Practices 
for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, The Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), 
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United Nations Secretary-General, United Nations (New York), (at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/ocean
_compact/SGs%20OCEAN%20COMPACT%202012-EN-low%20res.pdf; accessed 18 December 2018). 
221 European Commission, ‘Advisory Councils’, (at: https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/partners/advisory-
councils_en; accessed 18 December 2018). 
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measures for the protection of the marine environment in the North Sea, C/2016/5549, 19 Official Journal 
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224 E.g., Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system 
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European Union 1-32; Commission No 1010/2009 of 22 October 2009 laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, 
deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, 280 Official Journal of the European Union 
5-41; Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control 
system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy, 343 Official Journal of the 
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225 See European Commission, ‘The EU’s Fisheries Control System’, (at: https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/
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144 
 
restraint and transnational standardisation.  Indeed, the sense of lost ‘national 
sovereignty’ over the rules for conserving and managing fish stocks was an important 
factor in the UK’s 2016 Brexit Referendum result, despite it seeming unlikely that the use 
of common rulebooks can be avoided if interests in shared ecosystems are to be in any 
way managed sustainably.226 
 
As many have intimated and has been demonstrated very clearly in the fisheries context, 
the duty to cooperate in the context of marine living resources is thus a duty incumbent 
on coastal states to actively participate in further efforts towards regime-building and 
strengthening.227  By comparison, the mere agreement to agree in Article 2(2) with the 
UNESCO Convention, and further brief and hortatory commitments to seize illicit UCH 
at ports,228 share general information,229 and report new discoveries of UCH to other states 
parties,230 lack so much detail and substance as to border on meaningless.  As Chapters 4 
and 5 explore, therefore, the consent-based nature of international law also weakens the 
implementation and enforcement of such hortatory rules.  Instead, such rules should 
ideally be fleshed out in greater and more substantive detail, rather than just drafting 
highly general and hortatory objectives for states to self-implement.  This would include 
a constraint upon the freedom of states to only acknowledge outside interests in very 
narrow circumstances, as well as developing the true integration and empowerment of all 
stakeholders in the regime.  It is precisely this kind of cooperation – a detailed and active 
form of cooperation which takes place across multiple levels and which integrates 
multiple state and non-state actors – which this study seeks to examine in the context of 
UCH protection.   
 
5. Conclusion: The Need for ‘Active’ Cooperation in the Protection of Underwater 
Cultural Heritage 
In March 2018, nearly a decade after the UNESCO Convention came into force, Italy 
formally notified the UNESCO Secretariat and MOP of their intention to protect the 
 
226 Phillipson, J. and Symes, D., (2018), ‘‘A Sea of Troubles’: Brexit and the Fisheries Question’, 90 Marine 
Policy 168-173; McAngus, C., Huggins, C., Connolly, J. and van der Zwet, A., (2018), ‘The Politics and 
Governance of UK Fisheries after Brexit’, 9(3) Political Insight 8-11; Millard, A., (2017), ‘The European 
Union’s Common Fisheries Policy and the Implications of Brexit’, 1(2) Journal of Global and Area Studies 
45-64. 
227 Supra n. 209, Takei, at pp. 56 and 257; Supra n. 28, Orrego Vicuña, at pp. 203-205. 
228 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Arts. 14, 15 and 18. 
229 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 19. 
230 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Arts. 9 and 11. 
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Skerki Banks through the Convention’s cooperation framework.231  As Guérin relayed in 
interview, this is a significant and important moment for the UNESCO Convention, being 
the first time that UNESCO has been notified under the procedures of Articles 7-12 and 
that the Coordinating State system is put into action.232  It could even serve as a model of 
instituted multilateral cooperation over a specific site, in parallel with international efforts 
to develop a new instrument under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea for 
protecting biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction.233   
 
In such occasional cases, relating to the investment by coastal states into protective 
activities over specific and known sites, in which states with a verifiable link can lodge 
their interest in the UCH and ask to play a part in its subsequent protection, it is possible 
that the UNESCO Convention is a potentially useful framework for initially setting up 
the coordination between ‘linked’ states.  This also includes the new rules which permit 
coordinating states to authorise activities and provide necessary permissions.234  
Unfortunately, however, such formal declarations of new protective activities directed at 
specific UCH assets in offshore environment are likely to be a rare occurrence.  As noted 
in Chapter 2, the real threat to UCH no longer comes from legally-sanctioned salvage or 
archaeological research, but from incidental damage from unrelated economic activities 
or from illicit activities, where the vast majority of UCH sites are either unknown or 
generally under-protected.  The question therefore really becomes what the new 
cooperation system developed through the UNESCO Convention adds, particularly in 
terms of addressing the legal vacuum of UCH placed upon the continental shelf.235  One 
can certainly question whether Article 10, which deals with the rights of coastal states in 
this zone, ‘is a potentially powerful provision’,236 representing an ‘innovative expansion’ 
of their rights, as was once ambitiously stated by O’Keefe.237   
 
231 UNESCO, (2018), ‘First Cultural Heritage Site to be Protected in International Waters’, 16 March 2018, 
(at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/single-view/news/first_cultural_heritage_site_to_be_
protected_in_internationa/; accessed 18 December 2018). 
232 Guérin, U., (2018), Interview with Ulrike Guérin, 16 May 2018, Transcript on File. 
233 United Nations Intergovernmental Conference on an international legally binding instrument under the 
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biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction, convened under UN General Assembly 
Resolution 72/249, 24 September 2017, UN Doc. A/RES/72/249. 
234 Supra n. 79, Martin. 
235 Supra n. 63, Dromgoole, at p. 370; The Dutch Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International 
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and flag states (supra n. 105, Netherlands Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, at 
pp. 8 and 10). 
236 Supra n. 63, Dromgoole, at p. 290. 




Although the UNESCO Convention provides that coastal states can coordinate the 
negotiation of multilateral regimes towards the protection of UCH in their EEZs or 
continental shelves,238 there was of course nothing in the existing LOSC system 
prohibiting this.  In fact, most sections throughout the LOSC explicitly encourage the 
development of bilateral and multilateral treaties on all matters requiring cooperation and 
coordination.  Further, the jurisdictionalisation of the EEZ and continental shelf for the 
purposes of UCH management and research is occurring gradually through coastal state 
practice anyway, long before the UNESCO Convention came into force.239  In this sense, 
the Convention actually placed some meaningful and practical limitations upon this 
encroaching coastal state regulation of UCH and, as such – on the basis that it could place 
firm limits on the extent to which coastal states can direct activities at UCH on their 
continental shelves unilaterally – its ratification should be more, and not less, attractive 
to maritime nations. 
 
In the alternative, it is the development of rules and laws designed to pre-emptively protect 
sites from wide-ranging threats in shared ocean spaces where the need for effective 
cooperation is most prevalent.240  Yet, while there has been the development of industry 
codes and some small-scale planning activities which might have assisted the protection 
of UCH in the cross-border context,241 the awareness of marine historic heritage among 
maritime stakeholders, and the level of ‘active’ cooperation towards its protection, pales 
in comparison to the multi-level regime-building and continuous regulatory integration 
which has taken place in the context of economic interests, such as fisheries.  Even in this 
world, however, fish stocks continue to dwindle towards unsustainable collapses or near-
extinction.  As Ardron et al recently remarked, cooperation on overfishing continues to 
be the ‘Achilles heel of the existing constellation of agreements.’242 
 
There are many new rules of actual substance which will be needed to properly address 
the protection of incidentally threatened UCH, beyond states merely inviting a few 
‘linked’ states together to cooperate over a specifically threatened site.  For example, 
 
238 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 10. 
239 Supra nn. 50-60. 
240 ‘[T]he biggest challenge for the future is likely to be dealing with inadvertent damage or destruction to 
the UCH from human activities’ (supra n. 108, Dromgoole, at p. 314). 
241 See Chapter 2, Section 2. 
242 Ardron, J.A., Rayfuse, R. Gjerde, K. and Warner, R., (2014), ‘The Sustainable Use and Conservation of 
Biodiversity in ABNJ: What Can be Achieved Using Existing International Agreements?’, 49 Marine 
Policy 98-108, at p. 106. 
147 
 
meaningful rules might include: introducing bans on bottom trawling; creating large no-
fishing zones; rules on the inspection of goods and the seizure of artefacts or the bailing 
of vessels and crew in port; schemes to permit the interception and even the boarding and 
inspection of vessels suspected of looting; rules on security cooperation and exchange of 
data; expediting the repatriation of UCH property between states; research cooperation; 
banning development or construction in certain zones; rerouting maritime traffic or 
relocating economic activities; putting in place archaeological protection zones; pooling 
maritime surveillance technology and policing resources; increasing transparency and 
empowerment of stakeholders in planning processes; developing common rules for 
monitoring project planning; incentivising agencies to disseminate best practices; and 
developing rules for cross-border arrest warrants and criminal enforcement; and so on.   
 
These represent just a few examples of important, yet undeveloped and highly contested, 
legal rules needed to mediate between the diverse interests of transnational marine 
stakeholders impacted by UCH management.  Importantly, however, none of these will 
be effectively resolved by the systems of passive cooperation which have been interpreted 
as the duties foreseen under the UNESCO Convention or the LOSC.  As Risvas put it, 
even though ‘one of the primary objectives of the UNESCO Convention was to create a 
legal framework of cooperation by fleshing out LOSC Article 303(1), this effort has not 
been crowned with success.’243  In other words, the system of cooperation created ‘could 
not escape the always troubled waters of the Law of the Sea’244 and, in essence, preserves 
the sovereign autonomy of states to act independently of others and to engage in open-
minded discussions only after their co-existing interests happen to have collided.  As 
O’Keefe confirms with regard to UCH in 2014, therefore, ‘[t]o date there have been no 
significant disputes between States concerning underwater cultural heritage’.245  This is 
despite the fact that the world’s UCH continues to be demolished, bulldozed, looted and 
polluted. 
 
Unfortunately, therefore, while O’Keefe makes an admirable effort to suggest that Article 
5 in the UNESCO Convention, dealing with incidental threats beyond salvage and 
archaeological projects, is an ‘imperative’ duty, meaning that states ‘cannot sit back and 
 
243 Supra n. 6, Risvas, at p. 584. 
244 Supra n. 64, González, O'Keefe and Williams, at p. 55 (per González).  As Williams said in interview, 
maritime powers ‘wouldn’t even entertain the argument that the 2001 Convention was filling in the gaps’ 
of the LOSC (Supra n. 4, Williams). 
245 Supra n. 84, O’Keefe, at p. 104; Supra n. 103, Manders. 
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do nothing’; this is in fact incorrect.246  This is not reflective of the actual legal duties of 
states, which have instead been shown to be relatively passive and indifferent to potential 
or imminent threats, and instead appears to be reflective of wishful thinking.  Similarly, 
given that the threats are not directly regulated activities, Forrest might be incorrect to 
suggest that the slowness of cooperation under UNESCO Convention is a positive 
development because it slows the pace of activities directed at UCH.247  As Firth more 
accurately relays about the duties to protect UCH from indirect activities, ‘the limitations 
on the duty are that they apply only to such means as are “practicable” . . . and the 
imperative to prevent adverse effects is moderated by the inclusion of “or mitigate”.  The 
state is not, therefore, under an absolute obligation to prevent adverse effects from 
activities incidentally affecting UCH’.248  Dromgoole rightly concluded, therefore, that 
Article 5 is a ‘relatively soft obligation’.249  It is in the context of this weak and passive 
duty incumbent on states to protect UCH against indirect, incidental and illegal threats, 
and in which unilateralism and sovereign autonomy remain the beating heart of 
international UCH protection, that we turn to Chapter 4 which explores the extent to 
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International Compliance and the UNESCO Convention 
 
Chapter Abstract:  
Having explored the normative weaknesses inherent within a ‘duty to cooperate’ within 
international law in Chapter 3, this chapter now goes on to explore the critical issue of 
poor international compliance with agreements to protect underwater cultural heritage 
(UCH).  It casts pessimistic aspersions on the capacity of public international law, as an 
equilateral architecture and characteristically consent-based system, to properly coerce 
or compel states to comply with international obligations where they receive little net 
gain from compliance, whether in the form of economic or political currency.  By 
identifying UCH as a ‘global public good’, on account of its non-rival and non-
excludable characteristics, it argues that the overspilling of benefits to communities 
outside of the states charged with its protection are lost as externalities.  This results in 
a poor incentive for states to produce such goods and, instead, facilitates poor collective 
action and the systemic temptation to free ride off the production of others.  It evidences 
this by giving numerous worldwide examples of poor compliance in the area of UCH 
protection, as well as drawing on relevant literature, interview feedback and other 
reports and documentary forms of evidence. 
 
1. Introduction: Compliance with International Obligations to Protect Underwater 
Cultural Heritage 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, merely agreeing to cooperate ad hoc will do little to protect 
UCH from the increasingly severe threats from indirect, incidental or illicit activities.  
What is needed is for states to be motivated to implement and enforce effective 
legislation.  In other words, there also needs to be a high level of compliance among states 
with the principle of UCH protection.  However, there has been surprisingly little 
discussion on the issue of state compliance with the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO Convention)1 and United 
Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),2 in terms of UCH protection.  
For example, in her leading book, Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law, 
 
1 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 2001, 
in force 2 January 2009), 2562 UNTS 1. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 397. 
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published in 2013, Dromgoole has a chapter examining ‘implementation issues’ under 
the UNESCO Convention.3  However, the chapter is more concerned with how states 
might interpret the Convention’s rules on the management of UCH protection, rather than 
critically examining the systemic lack of compliance by states or whether states would 
implement and enforce such rules in the first place.4  Nevertheless, recent scholarship has 
begun to show an awareness of this weakness within the global framework.  For example, 
a PhD submitted in 2018 at the University of Southampton conducted a comparative 
analysis of laws and archaeological practices among states parties in the Adriatic Sea, 
locating issues with compliance by states with the UNESCO Convention.5 
 
This chapter now goes considerably further than these previous studies by drilling into 
the underlying causes and theoretical underpinnings of pervasive low compliance with 
the UNESCO Convention and LOSC.  It therefore maps the landscape in which new 
solutions to poor compliance can finally be examined, drawing upon social scientific 
strands of literature detailing global public goods, rational choice theory, legal realism 
and constructivism, and a broader critique of utilising consent-based systems of law as a 
means to address the very consent-based weaknesses of such systems.  After bringing in 
a panoply of examples of poor worldwide compliance, the chapter goes on to conclude 
that additional motivations are needed before sovereign states can be expected to properly 
engage in the protection of UCH, such as by making additional political or economic 
gains from such protection.  It also defends this pessimistic depiction of international law 
by highlighting widespread subscription to a realist view of international relations, 
demonstrating that self-centred rationalism remains at the heart of all compliance 
challenges, even when viewed under a constructivist and institutionalist lens. 
 
 
3 Dromgoole, S., (2013), Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law, Cambridge University 
Press (Cambridge), at pp. 307-337. 
4 Ibid, at pp. 307-337. 
5 MacKintosh, R.F., (2018), The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage: Implementation and Effectiveness, University of Southampton, Doctoral Thesis. 
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2. Global Public Goods and the Challenges of International Compliance 
(a) Underwater Cultural Heritage as a Global Public Good 
Published in 1999 and building upon theories first introduced in the 1970s,6 Kaul et al’s 
‘ground-breaking’7 multi-authored text set the groundwork for an entire social sciences 
movement exploring the challenges of global public goods.8   Research across this field 
highlighted that, in the inter-national context, the benefits of producing public goods may 
not be captured by the states producing them, leading to a natural disinclination to produce 
such goods.9  In terms of definitions, when referring to a “good”, the theory is not focused 
on a tangible item of tradeable property, but upon an act or process which has a positive 
overall benefit for society; the opposite of which is a “bad”.10  The previously noted 
multiple abstract values of UCH protection, in Chapter 2, would therefore be examples 
of such public good.  The term “global”, in terms of public goods, is open to some 
interpretation.  Inge Kaul herself regarded “global” as meaning that the goods ‘must cover 
more than one group of countries’.11  It should also display universal characteristics, by 
reaching ‘a broad spectrum of the global population’, including across genders, 
ethnicities, religions, income lines, as well as future generations.12   
 
 
6 Russett, B.M. and Sullivan, J.D., (1971), ‘Collective Goods and International Organization’, 25(4) 
International Organization 845-865; Olson, M., (1971), ‘Increasing the Incentives for International 
Cooperation’, 25(4) International Organization 866-874. 
7 Brousseau, E. Dedeurwaerdere, T. and Siebenhüner, B., (2012), ‘Introduction’, in Reflexive Governance 
for Global Public Goods, E. Brousseau, T. Dedeurwaerdere and B. Siebenhüner (Eds.), 1-18, MIT Press 
(Cambridge, MA), at p. 2; Carbone once referred to ‘Global Public Goods’ as the ‘buzzword’ of the 2000s 
decade, much like ‘New International Economic Order’ in the 1970s and ‘Sustainable Development’ in the 
1990s (Carbone, M., ‘Supporting or Resisting Global Public Goods? The Policy Dimension of a Contested 
Concept’, 13(2) Global Governance 179-198, at p. 185). 
8 Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M. (Eds.), (1999), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in 
the 21st Century, Oxford University Press (Oxford). See also Kaul, I., Conceição, P., Le Goulven, K. and 
Mendoza, R.U. (Eds.), (2003), Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford); Kaul, I. and Conceição, P. (Eds.), (2006), The New Public Finance: Responding 
to Global Challenges, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Supra n. 7, Brousseau, Dedeurwaerdere and 
Siebenhüner. 
9 Goldsmith, J.L. and Posner, E.A., (2006), The Limits of International Law, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford), at pp. 100-101; Barrett, S., (2007), Why Cooperate?: The Incentive to Supply Global Public 
Goods, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 11-13; Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M., (1999), ‘Global 
Public Goods: Concepts, Policies and Strategies’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in 
the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 450-507, Oxford University Press (Oxford). 
10 Ibid, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 456; Vadi, V., (2014), ‘Public Goods, Foreign Investments and the 
International Protection of Cultural Heritage’, in International Law for Common Goods: Normative 
Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture and Nature, F. Lenzerini and A.F. Vrdoljak (Eds.), 231-248, Hart 
(Oxford), at p. 242. 
11 Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M., (1999), ‘Defining Global Public Goods’, in Global Public Goods: 
International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 2-16, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford), at p. 10. 
12 Ibid, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 11. 
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Defining “publicness” might be more technical, yet economists have consistently relied 
on measures of non-rivalry and non-excludability to assess a good’s public value.13  In 
economic terms, a non-rival good is one in which the cost of its production for a marginal 
(additional) consumer is zero.14  In other words, the consumption of the good by one 
person does not reduce its value or enjoyment by others.  A non-excludable good, on the 
other hand, is one in which it is not possible to prevent consumers who have not paid for 
that good from gaining the benefit of it.15  It is here that the multiple value perspective of 
UCH, as explored in Chapter 2, translates neatly into its recognition as a global public 
good.  First, the protection of UCH is a non-rival good: somebody receiving multiple 
‘values’ from the protection of the Titanic wreck, for example, would not reduce the 
amount of available value for others to enjoy.  Second, the protection of UCH is 
predominantly a non-excludable good: while you may protect the Titanic wreck and even 
establish borders around the site in an attempt to exclude others from enjoying it; it would 
still be difficult, if not impossible, to exclude others around the world from, for example, 
receiving cultural, historical, ecological, existence, excitement, or intrinsic values or, in 
the case of subsequent photos and videos, aesthetic values, from the protected site.  Seeing 
UCH as a global public good therefore concurs with the findings of others that public 
archaeological sites,16 as well as the protection of cultural heritage17 and the 
environment,18 are all examples of global public goods. 
 
 
13 Ibid, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 1; Supra n. 9, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at pp. 453-456. 
14 Adams, R.D. and McCormick, K., (1987), ‘Private Goods, Club Goods, and Public Goods as a 
Continuum’, 45(2) Review of Social Economy 192-199; Kaul, I. and Mendoza, R.U., (2003), ‘Advancing 
the Concept of Public Goods’, in Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, I. Kaul, P. 
Conceição, K. Le Goulven and R.U. Mendoza (Eds.), 78-111, Oxford University Press (Oxford). 
15 Pasour Jr, E.C., (1981), ‘The Free Rider as a Basis for Government Intervention’, 5(4) Journal of 
Libertarian Studies 453-464; Cornes, R. and Sandler, T., (1996), The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, 
and Club Goods, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at pp. 159-161. 
16 Mason, R., (2002), ‘Assessing Values in Conservation Planning: Methodological Issues and Choices’, in 
Assessing the Values of Cultural Heritage: Research Report, M. de la Torre (Ed.), 5-31, Getty Conservation 
Institute (Los Angeles), at p. 13. 
17 Francioni, F., (2012), ‘Public and Private in the International Protection of Global Cultural Goods’, 23(3) 
European Journal of International Law 719-730, at p. 719; Supra n. 10, Vadi, at pp. 231-239; Navrud, S. 
and Ready, R.C., (2002), ‘Why Value Cultural Heritage?’, in Valuing Cultural Heritage: Applying 
Environmental Valuation Techniques to Historic Buildings, Monuments and Artifacts, S. Navrud and R.C. 
Ready (Eds.), 3-9, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham); Serageldin, I., (1999), ‘Cultural Heritage as Public Good: 
Economic Analysis Applied to Historic Cities’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 
21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 240-254, Oxford University Press (Oxford). 
18 Bodansky, D., (2012), ‘What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and Legitimacy’ 
23(3) European Journal of International Law 651-668, at p. 662; Heal, G., (1999), ‘New Strategies for the 
Provision of Global Public Goods: Learning from International Environmental Challenges’, in Global 
Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 
220-240, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Barrett, S., (1999), ‘Montreal versus Kyoto: International 
Cooperation and the Global Environment’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st 
Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 192-219, Oxford University Press (Oxford). 
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It is worth noting that non-rivalry and non-excludability are rarely pure, but can be seen 
on a continuum.19  For example, while an endless number of people could theoretically 
enjoy the Titanic wreck (making it non-rival in characteristic), eventually the site would 
suffer from congestion or pollution as a result of over-use, which may gradually decrease 
its marginal value to other users.20  Similarly, especially through the development of 
technology, it is increasingly possible to adjust the exclusivity of goods, i.e., privatising 
them, even if they are intrinsically public goods in nature.21  These two economic 
variables can therefore define three other categories of goods: private goods are generally 
those which are highly excludable and rivalrous;22 club goods are those which are 
generally non-rivalrous, but highly excludable;23 and common pool resources are those 
which are highly rivalrous, but which lack excludability.24   
 
Each of these is capable of being applied to UCH, depending on the particular regulatory 
treatment that UCH receives.  For example, if UCH were only viewed as res nullius, 
capable of being commoditised by salvage rights as it was under LOSC Article 303(3), 
then it would be a common pool resource suffering the same unfortunate pathologies of 
the Tragedy of the Commons (see infra).25  Similarly, anachronistically viewing cultural 
heritage as only cultural “property”, subject to private dominion, would also turn the good 
excludable (by property law) and rivalrous (by being enjoyed by a limited number of 
people), thus making it a private good.26  Club goods are more rare, although it is possible 
to still see some examples in the UCH context.  For example, a pay-per-view underwater 
 
19 Supra n. 11, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at pp. 4 and 11. 
20 Kotchen, M.J., (2005), ‘Impure Public Goods and the Comparative Statics of Environmentally Friendly 
Consumption’, 49(2) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 281-300; Birulin, O., (2006), 
‘Public Goods with Congestion’, 129(1) Journal of Economic Theory 289-299. 
21 Krisch, N., (2014), ‘The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods’, 108(1) 
American Journal of International Law 1-40, at p. 4; Supra n. 9, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 460; Kaul, 
I., (2012), ‘Rethinking Public Goods and Global Public Goods’, in Reflexive Governance for Global Public 
Goods, E. Brousseau, T. Dedeurwaerdere and B. Siebenhüner (Eds.), 37-54, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA), 
at p. 40. 
22 Supra nn. 11 and 14. 
23 Supra n. 15, Cornes and Sandler; Sandler, T. and Tschirhart, J., (1997), ‘Club Theory: Thirty Years 
Later’, 93(3-4) Public Choice 335-355; Nitzan S. and Ueda., K., (2009), ‘Collective Contests for Commons 
and Club Goods’, 93(1-2) Journal of Public Economics 48-55. 
24 Hardin, G. (1968), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, 162 Science 1243-1248; Wijkman, P.M., (1982), 
‘Managing the Global Commons’, 36(3) International Organization 511-535; De Moor, T., (2015), The 
Dilemma of the Commoners: Understanding the Use of Common Pool Resources in Long-Term 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge); Dasgupta, P. Karl‐Göran M. and Vercelli, A., 
(Eds.), 1997, The Economics of Transnational Commons, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Ostrom, E. 
Gardner, R. and Walker, J., (1994), Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, University of Michigan 
Press (Ann Arbor). 
25 Ibid, Hardin; Vadi, V., (2016), Cultural Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 32-33. 
26 Supra n. 11, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 3; Supra n. 17, Francioni, at p 723. 
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museum or dive trail would deliver non-rival (near renewable) benefits, but could exclude 
access (and value enjoyment) for non-paying visitors.  Similarly, as is explored further in 
Chapter 7, utilising regional rules to share the protection and enjoyment of heritage across 
sea basins arguably turns them into club goods for the benefit of members (i.e., states in 
the region).27  Therefore, Barbash-Riley was probably mistaken when she referred to 
UCH as a ‘common pool resource’ in 2015, on the basis that it is characterised by high 
subtractability (rivalry) and saying that this is because ‘removing artifacts from a 
shipwreck subtracts the benefits that other users could gain’.28  Such a view would imply 
that UCH’s main values are its extractive and tangible values, i.e., values which are prone 
to rivalry.  However, as argued above and in Chapter 2, many of the most important values 
from UCH protection are in fact non-rival and can permit a theoretically infinite number 
of beneficiaries. 
 
(b) International Compliance Failure in the Production of Global Public Goods 
By the interoperation of free riding and Prisoner’s Dilemma, global public goods – such 
as UCH protection – are especially prone to underproduction and international 
cooperation failure.29  Free riding effectively arises when users can gain the utility of a 
good without having to pay the cost of its production, encouraging producers to cut their 
output in order to capture the benefits invested by others.30  It dictates that when public 
goods are non-excludable, stakeholders will be perpetually tempted to capture the 
marginal benefits of production invested by other producers, given that the marginal cost 
of consumption is near to zero.31  For highly rivalrous goods, like salvageable treasure, 
 
27 Sandler, T., (2006), ‘Regional Public Goods and International Organizations’, 1(1) Review of 
International Organizations 5-25; Estevadeordal, A., Frantz, B. and Nguyen, T.R. (Eds.), (2005), Regional 
Public Goods: From Theory to Practice, Inter-American Development Bank (Washington DC).  See 
Chapter 7. 
28 Barbash-Riley, L., (2015), ‘Using a Community-Based Strategy to Address the Impacts of Globalization 
on Underwater Cultural Heritage Management in the Dominican Republic’, 22(1) Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 201-240, at p. 233. 
29 Kaul, I., (2012), ‘Global Public Goods: Explaining Their Underprovision’, 15(3) Journal of International 
Economic Law 729-750; Shaffer, G.C., (2012), ‘International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal 
Pluralist World’, 23(3) European Journal of International Law 669-693, at p. 674; Cafaggi, F., (2012), 
‘Transnational Private Regulation and the Production of Global Public Goods and Private ‘Bads’, 23(3) 
European Journal of International Law 695-718, at p. 703; Supra n. 10, Vadi, at p. 239ff. 
30 Supra n. 18, Barrett, at p. 198; Supra n. 11, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at pp. 6-7; Olson, M., (1971), The 
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, 
MA), at p. 113. 
31 Ibid; Dionisio, F. and Gordo, I., (2006), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons, the Public Goods Dilemma, and 




such a competition for limited goods, with rapidly diminishing marginal benefits, will 
cause a “tragic” race to consume the commons.32   
 
In the global public good context, this difficulty of free riding is then further antagonised 
by the famous game theoretical model of Prisoner’s Dilemma, relating to cooperation 
strategy.33  This holds that in situations where cooperation between players would lead to 
a more positive outcome for all players, but selfish game playing would lead to greater 
benefits for the selfish players and losses for the players attempting to cooperate, then 
rational game players who are unaware of the other party’s strategy will naturally pursue 
a selfish strategy – even if it risks all players losing.34  The interoperation of these two 
principles then translate into a negative trade-off between marginal costs and marginal 
benefits for the numerous ‘players’ (nation states) in international governance.35  Working 
collectively, sharing the cost of production, states could produce a global good at a far 
lower marginal cost.36  However, as the marginal benefits from the production of others 
rises, the temptation to free ride on their investment without bearing any of the costs 
becomes greater.37   
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma ensures that states will be increasingly tempted to pursue a selfish 
strategy in order to receive the marginal benefit available to themselves, even if a long-
term strategy of cooperation would be better for everyone overall.38  Unfortunately, the 
supremacy of sovereign equality and absolute territorial rule39 only encourages states to 
consider their own marginal costs and benefits from each course of action.40  With nearly 
200 players and a large array of strategic options to producing global goods, achieving 
such cooperative patterns between states can become ‘unwieldy’ for highly public 
 
32 Supra n. 9, Barrett, at p. 70; Supra n. 24, Hardin. 
33 Supra n. 11, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at pp. 7-8; Snidal, D., (1985), ‘Coordination versus Prisoners' 
Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes’, 79(4) American Political Science 
Review 923-942. 
34 E.g., Keohane, R.O., (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
Princeton University Press (Princeton); Krasner, S.D. (Ed.), (1983), International Regimes, Cornell 
University Press (Ithaca).  See infra subsection (d). 
35 Supra n. 18, Bodansky, at p. 653; Supra n. 10, Vadi, at p. 239. 
36 Supra n. 18, Barrett, at pp. 197-198. 
37 Barrett, S., (2003), Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford), at p. 29. 
38 Supra n. 18, Barrett, at p. 198; Walker, B., Barrett, S., Polasky, S., Galaz, V., Folke, C., Engström, G., 
Ackerman, F., Arrow, K., Carpenter, S., Chopra, K. and Daily, G., (2009), ‘Looming Global-Scale Failures 
and Missing Institutions’, 325(5946) Science 1345-1346. 
39 See Chapter 5. 
40 Supra n. 18, Barrett, at p. 198. 
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goods.41  All states are intrinsically tempted towards a selfish strategy unless there is 
sufficient evidence that the other players will cooperate and, yet, without strong levels of 
trust, there is a likely risk that a state’s good production will not reach the total output 
needed, before other states begin free riding and undermining that state’s production.42  
As Shaffer says, ‘states and other actors will not invest in global public goods if their 
independent action will have no impact or if they can free ride on the investment of 
others.’43 
 
Further, given that private economic goods are more excludable and rivalrous, they are 
routinely preferred as an investment over social and environmental goods.  States can 
capture the full benefit of economic activities invested for their national gain, whereas 
social and environmental goods have inefficient externalities which spill over to the 
international community, making them an inherently poor investment.44  This is 
particularly antagonised by the intergenerationality of global public goods.  The fact that 
the protection of cultural heritage delivers benefits to future generations means that those 
investing in that good today will not reap the full benefit of that investment.45  This 
freedom to externalise losses also corroborates with the notion of a regulatory “race to 
the bottom”, where states – motivated by the higher marginal gains to lower marginal 
costs available – compete in the provision of lax regulatory environments for economic 
activity.46  In the marine environment, this race to lower standards is all too familiar and 
routine, as manifested by poor enforcement and flags and ports of convenience.47 
 
The various strategies to overcome collective action failures with regard to global public 
goods have thus become a critical focus for international scholars.  It is argued that the 
 
41 Supra n. 11, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 15; Supra n. 29, Shaffer, at p. 681; Supra n. 37, Barrett, at 
p. 39. 
42 Goldsmith and Posner refer to this issue as ‘multilateral Prisoner’s Dilemma’, rather than coordination 
games (supra n. 9, Goldsmith and Posner, at p. 87); Supra n. 21, Krisch; Supra n. 11, Kaul, Grunberg and 
Stern, at p. 15; Supra n. 9, Barrett, at p. 13; Supra n. 18, Bodansky, at p. 653; Morgera, E., (2012), 
‘Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests? Non-Judicial Enforcement of Global Public Goods in 
the Context of Global Environmental Law’, 23(3) European Journal of International Law 743-767, at p. 
749. 
43 Supra n. 29, Shaffer, at p. 674. 
44 Supra n. 37, Barrett, at pp. 50-51; Supra n. 18, Bodansky, at p. 668. 
45 Sandler, T., (1999), ‘Intergenerational Public Goods: Strategies, Efficiency and Institutions’, in Global 
Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 20-
50, Oxford University Press (Oxford). 
46 Butler, H.N. and Macey, J.R., (1996), ‘Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority’, 14(2) Yale Law & Policy Review 23-66; Woods, N.D., 
(2006), ‘Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race‐to‐the‐Bottom Thesis’, 
87(1) Social Science Quarterly 174-189. 
47 See Chapter 5. 
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more that ‘game players’ (states) are able to communicate, understand one another’s 
likely strategy and build collective trust and goodwill, the more that they will be willing 
to risk the cost of investment on trust that other players will not defect and begin free 
riding.48  Gradually, increased trust and communication through ‘repeated games’ could 
lead the players to transform a negative sum game, where one player gaining will cause 
another player to lose, into a positive sum game, i.e., the cliché win-win in which the 
players pool resources and negotiate the allocation of effort according to true collective 
preferences.49  In addition to creating more effective systems than consent-based law to 
capture and deter free riding, the full cognisance of one another’s true interests and 
preferences can also prevent harms becoming an externality, by ensuring that states 
cannot simply ignore the damage to another’s interests.50   
 
There is therefore a requirement to ensure that all states are meaningfully bound by 
regimes which capture, compensate, or trade off all of the underspills and overspills 
produced by their actions.51  The difficulty for negotiating states, however, is that there is 
no superior order which can effectively and meaningfully punish or deter free riding states 
who will eventually defect and pursue a selfish strategy and gain a significant short-term 
benefit to themselves, while diminishing any built-up goodwill among the players.52  The 
fear that others will free ride also disincentivises states from investing political and 
economic resources into collective action solutions.  Thus, the players must first 
themselves set up the rules to detect and punish defecting states and to effectively 
incentivise compliance through the development of new supranational enforcement 




48 Martin, L.L., (1999), ‘The Political Economy of International Cooperation, in Global Public Goods: 
Cooperation in the 21st Century’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, 
I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 51-64, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 52-55; Cuéllar, 
M-F., (2004), ‘Reflections on Sovereignty and Collective Security, 40(2) Stanford Journal of International 
Law 211-258. 
49 Ibid, Martin; Supra n. 11, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 8; Supra n. 18, Heal, at p. 236; Supra n. 29, 
Shaffer, at p. 675. 
50 Ibid, Martin; Supra n. 9, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 464.  See Chapter 6, Section 5. 
51 Supra n. 48, Martin, at p. 55; Supra n. 18, Heal, at pp. 237-238; Supra n. 37, Barrett, at p. 11. 
52 Supra n. 9, Goldsmith and Posner, at p. 86; Oye, K.A. (Ed.), (1986), Cooperation under Anarchy, 
Princeton University Press (Princeton). 
53 Supra n. 9, Goldsmith and Posner, at p. 87; Supra n. 21, Krisch, at p. 4; Supra n. 48, Martin, at pp. 53-
54; Supra n. 33, Snidal; Stein, A.A., (1983), ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic 
World’, in International Regimes, S.D. Krasner (Ed.), 115-140, Cornell University Press (Ithaca); Martin, 
L.L., (1992), ‘Interests, Power, and Multilateralism’, 46(4) International Organization 765-792. 
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(c) Overcoming Consent-Based Law in a Consent-Based Legal System 
The arguments above have suggested that states who agree to protect UCH will require a 
considerable degree of motivation before they agree to restrain their own activities or 
before they carry out aspirational obligations with any meaningful effect.54  Thus, even 
when states have committed towards a collective aim within an international treaty, there 
needs to be specific characteristics inherent within the framework which actually induces 
such active cooperation.55  Although a subject which has been undernourished in the 
past,56 the last few years has witnessed a greater interest in the capacity (or incapacity) of 
public international law to address this shortfall.57  While some authors have highlighted 
the potential for ‘general principles’ of international law, as a source of law, to provide 
for such erga omnes norms;58 such principles are in reality too abstruse, unpredictable 
and ambiguous to pre-emptively drive state behaviour towards the global good.59  
Furthermore, they are most frequently based on soft law and very generalised objectives 
which are, by their nature, poorly executed in the day-to-day legal systems of states and 
subject to constant contradiction and conflict.60  Most critically of all, general principles 
have been likened to ‘meta-principles’ which only assist in the interpretation of law or 
the resolution of conflicting rules, with little concreteness as a behaviour-modifying 
norm.61 
 
54 See also infra Section 3. 
55 Supra n. 18, Barrett, at p. 193. 
56 Supra n. 18, Bodansky, at p. 657. 
57 Benvenisti, E. and Hirsch, M. (Eds.), (2004), The Impact of International Law on International 
Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge); Petersmann, E.U., 
(2012), ‘Mini-Symposium on Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods Introduction and 
Overview: A Research Agenda for Making ‘Global Public Goods Theory’ More Policy Relevant’, 15(3) 
Journal of International Economic Law 709-719; Supra n. 29, Kaul; Esty, D.C. and Moffa, A.L.I., (2012), 
‘Why Climate Change Collective Action has Failed and What Needs to be Done Within and Without the 
Trade Regime’ 15(3) Journal of International Economic Law 777-791; Cafaggi, F. and Caron, D.D., 
(2012), ‘Global Public Goods amidst a Plurality of Legal Orders: A Symposium’, 23(3) European Journal 
of International Law 643-649; Supra n. 18, Bodansky; Supra n. 29, Shaffer; Supra n. 29, Cafaggi; Supra n. 
17, Francioni; Supra n. 42, Morgera; Nollkaemper, A., (2012), ‘International Adjudication of Global Public 
Goods: The Intersection of Substance and Procedure’, 23(3) European Journal of International Law 769-
791. 
58 Simma, B. and Alston, P., (1988), ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General 
Principles, 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 82-108; Petersen, N., (2007), ‘Customary Law 
Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State Practice in International Norm Creation’, 23(2) 
American University International Law Review 275-310; Baslar, K., (1997), The Concept of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at pp. 368-369. 
59 Guzman, A.T., (2002), ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’, 90(6) California Law 
Review 1823-1888, at pp. 1878-1883; Paradell‐Trius, L., (2000), ‘Principles of International Environmental 
Law: An Overview’, 9(2) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 93-99, at 
pp. 94-95; Chinkin, C.M., (1989), ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International 
Law’, 38(4) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 850-866.  See also Chapter 6. 
60 Ibid; Brownlie, I., (2008), Principles of Public International Law, 7th Edn, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford), at p. 278. 
61 Boyle, A., (2010), ‘Soft Law in International Law-Making’, in International Law, M.D. Evans (Ed.), 3rd 




Similarly, development of customary law – traditionally by the combination of 
widespread state practice (usus) with a belief that such practice is legally required (opinio 
juris sive necessitates)62 – is a wholly unreliable and unsuitable avenue for the production 
of rules to produce global public goods.  Such legal rules are archetypically reactive in 
nature and, given their general uncertainty and ambiguity, would only capture defective 
behaviour after it has occurred.63  This general uncertainty also places an unacceptably 
high burden of proof upon claimant states64 and has the same problems of securing 
compulsory jurisdiction and effecting consequent enforcement.65  Perhaps most of all, it 
also fails to mollify persistently objecting states, who are inevitably the main offenders 
for free riding or recalcitrance in the case of global public goods.66  Indeed, it is the very 
 
the Cross-Fertilization of International Law’, 1(1) Yale Human Rights and Development Journal 85-106; 
Elias, O. and Lim, C., (1997), ‘General Principles of Law, ‘Soft’ Law and the Identification of International 
Law’, 28(3) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3-49. 
62 C.f., It is not forgotten that there is a ‘modern’ approach to identifying customary legal rules, however, 
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point of global public goods that they suffer from a ritualised lack of activity among 
states; thus, making it highly unlikely that sufficient usus and opinio juris can be found 
to alter this prospectively. 
 
In other words, customary law is no better than general principles or international treaties 
in overcoming the consent-based nature of international law.67  As Harrison is forced to 
concede in his account of international law protecting the marine environment, 
international law ‘is a decentralized legal system, which means that no court or tribunal 
has compulsory jurisdiction . . . and jurisdiction ultimately rests upon the consent of the 
relevant States.’68  Similarly, Crawford has written how the ‘absence of a legislature with 
universal authority, and the consensual basis for judicial jurisdiction, reinforce the 
voluntarist and co-operative character of most international law most of the time.’69 
 
Given the inadequacy of unresponsive and unknown customary rules and general 
principles, the best avenue for traditional international law to address global public goods 
appears to be by international treaty.70  However, the use of international treaties to 
address global public goods is, in effect, an attempt to use legal rules requiring prior 
consent to be bound as the means to address a legal system whose faults are based on the 
need for prior consent: states are free to reject international treaties or to negotiate them 
in a manner which best represents their internal interests, thus making international 
treaties an ineffective means to address complex and highly public global goods.71  As 
Krisch says: 
 
‘the consent element in international law has proved to be highly resilient 
[and] direct challenges to it have remained circumscribed.  Treaty law does 
not seem to have come under significant pressure at all; the key role of 
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70 Supra n. 63, Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, at p. 23. 
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consent in creating new rules via treaties, though obviously impeding 
efforts at lawmaking, continues to be firmly anchored.  If anything, 
processes of treaty making may have moved toward broader and firmer 
inclusiveness, making multilateralism more robust.’72 
 
State motivation to join treaty regimes is going to often be formulated from a calculated 
decision which appraises relative advantages and disadvantages, or the ‘net benefit’, to 
that state in joining (although, see infra Section (d) for additional constructivist 
motivations).73  Furthermore, their motivation to comply once inside a regime remains 
heavily linked to both the normative strength of the legal duty, as well as the relative risks 
and potential benefits to them in not properly complying or carrying through on their 
commitments.74  A critical issue is therefore the capacity of inter-state commitments, such 
as the UNESCO Convention, to actually bring about both participation and compliance.75  
For goods of a particularly ‘public’ nature – such as those addressing global 
environmental and cultural interests – states are unlikely to find considerable net gain in 
joining effective treaty frameworks or in rewriting the rules of the game to unilaterally 
constrain one another.76  In fact, they are more likely to view stringent regimes towards 
public aims as a risky investment, in which other states may easily free ride and 
undermine global collective action.77   
 
However, it is possible for states to obtain net gain from regimes through other sources 
beyond direct provisions within the treaty, such as in the form of political or economic 
currency.78  Political currency, for example, can arise through the notion of comity, 
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wherein states are motivated to accept potential losses inherent in one treaty with a view 
to securing future cooperation from states relating to other matters.79  However, political 
currency more commonly arises by a government’s desire to maintain the support of their 
living national citizenry.80  The more political pressure that is levied on a national 
government, by political campaigning, democratic processes or effective media coverage, 
the greater baseline political gain a state can expect from accepting greater limitations 
upon their sovereignty through stringent treaty obligations.  For example, in terms of 
environmental degradation, it often takes some catastrophic or global headline disaster 
before such political pressure foments transboundary commitments and willingness to 
resign national independence towards the prevention of such disasters after-the-event.81  
The increased governmental action on marine plastic pollution in the aftermath of recent 
television series and media campaigns, despite the threats having remained the same for 
decades, is a good example of this.82   
 
As a result, a large part of research in the social sciences and international law fields in 
the context of global public goods has been the development of treaty frameworks which 
can address this shortfall in motivation.  The challenge is two-fold: not only must states 
be motivated to participate in treaty regimes, but those treaty regimes must also possess 
effective rules for ensuring internal compliance.83  In other words, even if a treaty 
framework such as the UNESCO Convention is successful in securing widespread state 
ratifications, it still might not be enough to induce states to cooperate.  Scholars have 
spent the last two decades evaluating the design of effective ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ which 
can effectively induce a positive or negative incentive in states to join regimes which also 
possess powerful and effective rules.84  Sticks, in particular, have predominantly come in 
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the form of market-based measures, such as a threat of economic loss when regimes limit 
or prohibit trade with non-members.  Whereas carrots might include the provision of eco-
funds or capacity building frameworks to incentivise participation.  Strategic treaty design 
can also include a number of variables, such as the nature and stringency of a regime's 
commitments (soft versus hard, general versus precise, shallow versus deep), as well as 
its rules on membership, procedure, compliance and enforcement.85  Once inside a 
regime, other mechanisms to secure state compliance have also included command-and-
control rules, maximum limits, taxation, and the use of market measures.86   
 
In addition to developing effective sticks and carrots which can attempt (and often 
struggle) to compensate or constrain states based on the relative overspills and underspills 
associated with respective outputs,87 the only other alternative is the use of some 
centralised legal framework, such as a global court or World Environment Organization, 
to more effectively punish free riding or non-compliance.88  Ironically, however, the 
public nature of such a global undertaking also makes its development particularly prone 
to collective action failure.  As O’Keefe and Nafziger long ago admitted in the context of 
UCH protection, while it may be more effective, the establishment of a global regulatory 
body ‘seems unrealistic at this time [and the] best alternative may be to allocate control 
of the underwater cultural heritage to states’.89   
 
The effect of this system built around state willingness to be bound, which is a calculation 
of political or economic gain, merely maintains a system in which most regimes are only 
ever as effective as their most powerful advocates, thus reinforcing the hegemonic nature 
of international law.90  Indeed, as Bodansky concedes, the success of the Montreal 
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Protocol within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was more likely a 
result of the calculated decision of the United States to phase out the global market in 
chlorofluorocarbon-emitting products, rather than anything to do with the regime’s mix 
of sticks and carrots.91  This hegemony of international law which translates power into 
legal influence is also fully visible in the law of the sea where, as Chapter 5 highlights, 
the law has always remained reflective of the interests of the dominant sea powers.  Thus, 
while the ‘power’ may be gradually shifting from the Western sphere to other parts of the 
world, such as by the increasing economic power of traditionally developing regions or 
their coalescence into more effective ‘clubs’ at the international table, the fundamental 
engine at the heart of international treaty law remains prone to questions of 
incentivisation, unilateralism, inertia and power. 
 
(d) Defending Thick Rationalism from a Constructivist Uncoupling  
Before proceeding to evaluate whether the global public goods theories can be evidenced 
in the context of UCH protection, it is worth finally defending the pessimistic account of 
international cooperation espoused here, which some may try to critique for its central 
reliance upon Rational Choice theory.  By rationalising all states down to self-interested 
bargaining “players” which only negotiate by cold and self-interested calculations of net 
gain and loss, some might argue that this realist perspective of state motivation neglects 
the much more complex picture of compliance drivers.92  Constructivists might argue, for 
example, that the power politics inherent in the realist account is a highly simplistic and 
pessimistic interpretation of state behaviour, which can in fact be formed from 
constructed elements in their surrounding environment, such as feeling obligated to 
observe norms through socialisation and deliberation, or feeling bound through a moral 
or political sense of fairness or legal normativity.93  Here, such normativity of posited 
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legal rules therefore comes from states’ constructed beliefs in the moral or legal 
requirement to be bound, not necessarily requiring the positive legal architecture of hard 
‘law’.94  As with Institutionalists and even Liberalists, they would also propose that the 
increasing participation in the UNESCO Convention and the proliferation of future 
multilateral negotiations over the optimum treatment for UCH, will increase the substance 
and normative force of inter-state rules.95  All would therefore argue that changing 
cultures and patterns of interaction, dialogue and narrative around new-found 
“interdependence” and “cooperation”, rather than “independence” and “co-existence”, 
will gradually shift the behaviour of states towards stronger cooperation ethics and a sense 
of interrelated duties and moral obligations.96   
 
However, a resolute body of sociolegal realists and pluralists comfortably maintain that 
‘legal rules are only effective insofar as the underlying incentives of the actors are 
properly aligned’, or in other words, the extent to which they are willing to be bound.97  
As Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey have said, ‘the rationalist strands of international 
relations theory [criticise] this design logic through a progressive deepening of initial 
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framework treaties . . . on the ground that it is unlikely to succeed where a regime requires 
states to make costly policy changes.’98  The consent-based nature of international 
lawmaking thus ensures sufficient latitude is preserved in the interpretation of 
intentionally ambiguous norms, through which players can more freely select the norm’s 
compliance pull.99  This rationalisation of global cooperation and the inherent weaknesses 
appears to be found by many academic analyses and is too often demonstrated by the 
empirical evidence.100  As Lisa Martin has said, ‘[t]heories of international cooperation 
made a big leap forward by accepting the assumption that states are self‐interested and 
have conflicts of interest with one another.’101  In other words, while norms can easily 
become “law” in a constructive sense, without first being processed through Westphalian 
or positivist mechanisms of authority,102 this does not alter the fact that compliance with 
all norms is driven by individual motives or interests.  
 
Critically, one can comfortably establish that none of the international relations theories 
on state motivation to cooperate are, or need be, necessarily exclusive.103  The rationalist 
account is still alive in the constructivist and institutionalist depiction of events: states 
may be motivated by questions of fairness, legitimacy and rightness, or feel increasingly 
bound by growing structural interactions and shifting dialogue, but the underlying engine 
through which decisions are made – as with any decision for ordinary persons in an 
everyday context – will still be based on rational thinking and logic.  In other words, 
realists can still critically consider how behavioural factors impact decision-making.  The 
growth of a sense of legal or moral duty, or wider social or cultural motivations, may thus 
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expand a state’s rational argument in favour of cooperation; not, necessarily, negating 
the rationalisation of their chosen strategies.104  This blending between rationality and 
reflexive normativity is likely to be where most international lawyers would place 
themselves.105 As Guzman has explained it, international actors are motivated to comply 
with commitments from socially constructed rational concerns, such as fear of 
reciprocated non-compliance, retaliation, or loss of reputation.106  Therefore, while 
institutionalists and regime theorists attempt to argue that global regimes and institutions 
coordinate all states towards progressive objects,107 they cannot escape the fact that such 
institutions and regimes are orienting states towards objects to which they have already 
consented and continue to consent by rational choice.108 
 
This is how realism should really be understood: not as viewing international relations as 
a global libertarian or anarchic contest between powers, eschewing all social 
construction;109 but recognising that compliance does essentially arise through a web of 
social relations, while also remaining anchored to concepts of individual autonomy, self-
 
104 Chayes, A. and Chayes, A.H., (1995), The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press, at pp. 25-27; Raustiala, K., (2000), ‘Compliance &(and) 
Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation’, 32(3) Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 387-440; Huang, P.H., (2002), ‘International Law and Emotional Rational Choice’, 
31(1) Journal of Legal Studies 237-258; Raustiala, K. and Slaughter, A-M., (2002), ‘International Law, 
International Relations and Compliance’, in Handbook of International Relations, W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse 
and B. Simmons (Eds.), Sage (London), 538-558, at p. 548; Supra n. 11, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 
14; Krasner, S.D., (1991) ‘Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier’, 43(3) 
World Politics 336–366; Kratochwil, F., (1989), Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of 
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge University 
Press (Cambridge), at p. 72; Kingsbury, B., (1998), ‘The Concept of Compliance as a Function of 
Competing Conceptions of International Law’, 19(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 345-372, at 
pp. 354-356. 
105 Supra n. 93, Brunnée and Toope, ‘Constructivism and International Law’, at p. 129. 
106 Guzman, A.T., (2008), How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory, Oxford University 
Press (Oxford); Guzman, A.T., (2002), ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’, 90(6) 
California Law Review 1823-1888.  Many scholars have also highlighted the importance of participation 
and reputation in the international community of states, which indirectly supports this account of state 
motivation: Kelly, C.R., (2004), ‘Realist Theory and Real Constraints’, 44(2) Virginia Journal of 
International Law 545-636; Koskenniemi, M., (1990), ‘The Pull of the Mainstream’, 88(6) Michigan Law 
Review 1946-1962; Levit, J.K., (2004), ‘The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The 
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits’, 45(1) Harvard International Law Journal 65-182; 
Scott, R.E. and Stephan, P.B., (2004), ‘Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of 
Coercion’, 2004 Wisconsin Law Review 551-630; Simmons, B.A., (2000), ‘Money and the Law: Why 
Comply with the Public International Law of Money?’, 25(2) Yale Journal of International Law 323-362. 
107 Supra n. 75, Abbott and Snidal; Abbott, K.W. and Snidal, D., (2002), ‘Values and Interests: International 
Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption’, 31(1) Journal of Legal Studies 141-177. 
108 Simmons, B.A., (2002), ‘Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and 
Territorial Disputes’, 46(2) Journal of Conflict Resolution 829-856. 
109 E.g. Supra n. 90, Krisch; Kono, D.Y., (2007), ‘Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions 
and Trade Cooperation’, 69(3) The Journal of Politics 746-759; Swaine, E.T., (2002), ‘Rational Custom’, 




determination and freedom of choice.110  It is thus difficult to clearly distinguish between 
them: rationalists are apparently concerned with compliance push and pull, with an 
awareness of how this is impacted by social context; whereas constructivists and 
institutionalists are just as concerned with the impact of social context, with a similar 
awareness of how this exerts a push and pull towards compliance.  The key difference is 
that a rationalist’s yearning for a verifiable science would merely lead them to conclude 
that legitimacy, power, punishment, reputation, retaliation, coercion, negotiation, 
incentivisation, and sanction are all important in creating effective “law”.  Thus, while 
state-based and treaty-based law may have greater legitimacy, they are not the only 
legitimate source of law and not the only effective sources of law.111  As Chapter 9 argues 
further, transnational and local communities can indeed develop their own legal norms, 
which have significant behaviour-modifying properties; but while such rules can enjoy 
good observation and implementation in managerialist frameworks, they can drive 
forward more effective collective action when integrated with motivational systems of 
coercion and incentivisation, i.e., sticks and carrots. 
 
Similarly, such ‘repeated interactions’ – as are the essence of the institutionalist and 
constructivist arguments – are an accepted and central aspect of the rational choice 
model.112  Indeed, as is often emphasised, effective international cooperation is developed 
from ‘trust, reciprocity, transparency, cooperative knowledge, shared gains, and habits of 
cooperation among’ parties.113  In fact, the building up of collective trust and goodwill 
among states constructs the surrounding environment in which states rationalise their own 
 
110 There are countless examples of studies which show that decisions to comply are largely derived from 
rational decision-making, which relates to external contexts.  For example: Abbott, K.W., (2003), ‘Trust 
But Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements’, 
26(1) Cornell International Law Journal 1-58; Fisher, R., (1981), Improving Compliance With 
International Law, University Press of Virginia (Charlottesville); Ginsburg, T. and Adams, R.H., (2004), 
‘Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of lnternational Dispute Resolution’, 45(4) William and 
Mary Law Review 1229-1340; Goldsmith, J.L. and Posner, E.A., (2003), ‘International Agreements: A 
Rational Choice Approach’, 44(1) Virginia Journal of International Law 113-144; Haas, P.M., (2000), 
‘Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative Politics’, in Commitment 
and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, D. Shelton (Ed.), 43-
64, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Moore, D.H., (2003), ‘A Signaling Theory of Human Rights 
Compliance, 97(2) Northwestern University Law Review 879-910; Nakagawa, J., (1998), ‘Securing 
Compliance in Traditional and Contemporary International Law: A Theoretical Analysis’, in Trilateral 
Perspectives on International Legal Issues: From Theory to Practice, T.J. Schoenbaum, J. Nakagawa and 
L.C. Reif (Eds.), 49-57, Transnational Publishers (New York); Tallberg, J., (2002), ‘Paths to Compliance: 
Enforcement, Management, and the European Union’, 56(3) International Organization 609-643. 
111 See Chapter 5. 
112 Supra n. 18, Heal, at p. 236; Supra n. 18, Bodansky, at pp. 659-660; Smith, E.M., (1991), ‘Understanding 
Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements’, 64(6) Southern California Law Review 1549-1606. 
113 Conca, K., (2002), ‘The Case for Environmental Peacemaking’, in Environmental Peacemaking, K. 
Conca and G.D. Dabelko (Eds.), 1-22, Johns Hopkins University Press (Baltimore), at p. 11. 
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interests, as highlighted above.114  Even if one recognises the essential role of multilateral 
regimes as the inducement of post-ratification cooperation,115 which was recognised as a 
vital function of the UNESCO Convention,116 one must still acknowledge that the rules 
of such cooperation processes and the motivations for complying with bargains are still, 
at their core, based on calculated decisions by those subject to the law.  As Slaughter has 
said of regime theory-based institutionalism, in her influential introduction to 
international relations theories on cooperation; it still ‘depends on the existence of 
common interests among states […].  Where state interests do not converge, power 
politics is likely to continue to rule.’117   
 
Most of all, the real chink in the armour of all anti-rationalist accounts of compliance 
motive, at least when reframing it normatively, is the harmful reliance on facilitating 
gradual shifts in state behaviours over time, through processes of iteration and interaction, 
rather than by more immediate processes of persuasion, coercion or incentivisation.118  
As Risvas says of the potential for future international laws protecting UCH which are 
more restrictive of state power, ‘states are the ultimate rule-makers in public international 
law and history shows that what is currently controversial can be acceptable after some 
time.’119  Descriptively, this may have grains of truth; but normatively it results in an 
international law which is highly reactive (or passive), through its reliance on gradual 
changes in motivation, socialisation and trust over extended periods – a period in which 
catastrophic environmental destruction is presently taking place.120  Indeed, it is difficult 
 
114 Supra n. 104; Abbott, K.W. and Snidal, D., (2000), ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 
54(3) International Organization 421-456; Joyner, C.C., (1998), ‘Recommended Measures Under the 
Antarctic Treaty: Hardening Compliance with Soft International Law’, 19(2) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 401-444; Supra n. 75, Abbott and Snidal, at p. 50; Supra n. 37, Barrett, at p. 11. E.g., 
According to Levy, the Helsinki Protocol’s power was ‘not in binding states to undertake measures they 
otherwise would not . . . but in helping shift states’ perceptions of their self-interest' (Levy, M.A., (1995), 
‘International Co-Operation to Combat Acid Rain’, in Green Globe Yearbook of International Co-
Operation on Environment and Development, H.E. Bergesen, G. Parmann and Ø.B. Thommessen (Eds.), 
59-68, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 61); Skjærseth, J.B., Stokke, O.S. and Wettestad, J., (2006), 
‘Soft Law, Hard Law, and Effective Implementation of International Environmental Norms’, 6(3) Global 
Environmental Politics 104-120. 
115 E.g., Krasner, S.D., (1983), ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables’, in International Regimes, S.D. Krasner (Ed.), 1-22, Cornell University Press (Ithaca); Supra n. 
34, Keohane; Supra n. 95, Keohane and Martin. 
116 See infra Section 3(d). 
117 Supra n. 80, Slaughter, at pp. 27-28. 
118 Setear, J.K., (1996), ‘An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory 
and International Law’, 37(1) Harvard International Law Journal 139-230; Supra n. 104, at p. 544; Hafner-
Burton, E.M. and Tsutsui, K., (2007), ‘Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law to 
Matter Where Needed Most’, 44(4) Journal of Peace Research 407-425, at p. 414. 
119 Risvas, M., (2013), ‘The Duty to Cooperate and the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 2(3) 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 562-590, at p. 590. 
120 See Chapter 5. 
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to see a transformation of state practice to prioritise UCH protection over economic 
activity, despite the very formal recognition among most states and stakeholders of the 
need for an urgent response to its ritual destruction.121  In sum, there may be truths in all 
the diverse international relations theories of international cooperation depending on the 
specific context, but most of them infer a need to accept a truly fundamental role for 
rational choices and realistic motivations.  They are also practically limited in resolving 
free riding challenges by their reliance on securing compliance by slow processes of 
deliberation and socialisation. 
 
3. Difficulties of International Compliance and the Protection of Underwater 
Cultural Heritage 
(a) The Unknown Nature of Underwater Cultural Heritage 
The first driver of low compliance with international commitments to protect UCH – as 
contained throughout the UNESCO Convention and within Article 303(1) of LOSC – can 
be understood as being the result of UCH’s widely undiscovered, under-explored, and 
under-studied nature.  The lack of visibility of UCH is a well-known and central concern 
among the UCH community and is likely to lead to the under-protection of UCH for a 
number of reasons.122  First, the lack of public awareness of UCH and of access to it, 
means that many of its potential values – e.g., historical, archaeological, educational, 
social, recreational, cultural, ecological, aesthetic, excitement, existence, empathy, 
intrinsic, economic, and so on – remain dormant and under-utilised.  This is perhaps why 
the general public feel UCH might as well be brought to the surface, so as to enjoy some 
of these values – if a little less of them – in a more immediately accessible format, such 
as in a museum.123  This is also why most in the UCH preservation community now see 
the most vital aspect of their mission as engaging the non-diving public with UCH by 
 
121 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Preamble. 
122 Guérin, U., (2018), Interview with Ulrike Guérin, 16 May 2018, Transcript on File; Dunkley, M. and 
Smith, A., (2015), Accessing England’s Protected Wreck Sites: Guidance Notes for Divers and 
Archaeologists, Historic England (London), (at: https://historicengland.org.uk/images-books/publica
tions/accessing-englands-protected-wreck-sites-guidance-notes/heag075-guidance-notes-for-divers-and-ar
chaeologists/; accessed 18 December 2018), at p. 18; Gribble, J., Parham, D. and Scott-Ireton, D.A., (2009), 
‘Historic Wrecks: Risks or Resources?’, 11(1) Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 16-
28, at pp. 20-21 (per Parham). 
123 Supra n. 82, Williams; ‘I guess you have been looking into the wrecks on the coast of Java as well.  And 
if you have a 9th Century wreck, okay nobody is interested […].  It’s only when the incredible collection of 
ceramics comes out that the art world gets interested.’ (Maarleveld, T.J., (2018), Interview with Thijs J. 
Maarleveld, 22 March 2018, Transcript on File).  E.g., Bordelon, C.Z., (2005), ‘Saving Salvage: Avoiding 
Misguided Changes to Salvage and Finds Law’, 7(1) San Diego International Law Journal 173-214, at p. 
189; Bederman, D.J. and Spielman, B.D., (2008), ‘Refusing Salvage’, 6 Loyola Maritime Law Journal 31-
58, at pp. 56-57. 
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increasing in situ access,124 such as by virtual reality, shallow dive trails, glass-bottom 
boats, photogrammetry, 3D-imagery, and “telepresence”.125  In many ways, this is a 
strategy which aims to have the public convert much of this dormant value into kinetic 
value.   
 
As Guérin said in interview, ‘in old times we dragged the Obelisk from Egypt to Paris or 
elsewhere because we thought in Egypt, no one can see it anyway.’126  Adding, ‘we can 
change this’, but ‘it’s just a question of making the effort to . . . make underwater heritage 
visible.  Museums, dive trails, virtual whatever, but you have to make that effort.’127  This 
view seems to be almost unanimous among the UCH community (excepting those who 
still maintain a pro-salvage view, as explored in Chapter 2).  Unfortunately, as has been 
said many times, UCH seems presently locked in a vicious cycle of underfunding, 
wherein the lack of public awareness of the many values of in situ preservation, leads to 
a lack of investment in the resource by public authorities, which then decreases the public 
funding into activities for protection, engagement, access, and enjoyment.128 
 
Another reason for the underproduction of UCH protection on account of its generally 
unknown nature is that it encourages states to utilise reactive and ad hoc processes of 
protection.  Thus, given that the precise nature and potential value of UCH impacted by 
a state’s economic activity is mostly unknown, there is a strong reliance on the use of 
Heritage Impact Assessments and ongoing reporting mechanisms for offshore operators 
who might impact UCH.  Such reactive systems of protection can obviously carry 
potential problems, such as the economic and time pressures on offshore developers and 
heritage agencies.  Some could argue that the quality of pre-work surveys within 
Environnmental Impact Assessments are sufficient for the purposes of UCH.  For 
example, De Vrees suggested that, before giving out a licence to offshore developers, the 
 
124 E.g., Supra n. 122, Guérin; Burgin, L.R., (2015), ‘Managing Michigan’s Underwater Heritage: The Past, 
Present, and Future of Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary’, University of Michigan Working Papers 
in Museum Studies: Future Leaders, Number 1 (2015) (at: http://ummsp.rackham.umich.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/burgin-working-paper-fl-series-aug-7.pdf; accessed: 18 December 2018), at p. 6; 
Watts, G.P. and Knoerl, T.K., (2007), ‘Entering the Virtual World of Underwater Archaeology’, in Out of 
the Blue: Public Interpretation of Maritime Cultural Resources,  J.H. Jameson Jr. and D.A. Scott-Ireton 
(Eds.), 223-239, Springer (New York), at p. 224; Halsey, J.R., (1996), ‘Shipwreck Preservation in 
Michigan: 20 Years On’, 1(3-4) Common Ground: Archeology and Ethnography in the Public Interest 27-
33, at p. 33. 
125 Hall, J.L, (2011), ‘Things, Inc.: A Case for In Situ Application’, in Maritime Law: Issues, Challenges & 
Implications (Laws and Legislation), J.W. Harris (Ed.), 27-52, Nova Science Publishers (New York), at pp. 
42 and 48-49. 
126 Supra n. 122, Guérin. 
127 Supra n. 122, Guérin. 
128 Supra n. 122, Gribble, Parham and Scott-Ireton, at p. 23. (per Parham). 
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Dutch government conducts quite detailed surveys and produces quite detailed sonar 
maps of the seabed, such that they ‘already know roughly what is there.’129  The same has 
been said by many others recently.  For example, Pieters and Varmer have both suggested 
that a greater amount of funding should go into the preliminary investigations before 
licencing offshore activities.130 
 
However, as Maarleveld says, unfortunately it is only the value of ‘scientific interest’ 
which is considered before determining whether UCH should be protected, recovered, or 
discarded, meaning that ‘the range of scales on which it is valued is mostly not very 
elaborate.’131  As Peeters also responded, given the considerable costs and impracticalities 
of adopting land-based planning approaches in the submarine environment, the result is 
‘that surveys are less extensive, more or less guaranteeing that no archaeology can be 
found’.132  What is more, during prior Impact Assessments the present technology, such 
as side-scan sonar, multi-beam sonar, sub-bottom profiling and magnetometer scans, do 
not capture sufficient detail about potentially impacted UCH, or effectively distinguish 
human-linked organic material from natural organic material, or indeed properly detect 
the detail of materials below the seabed.133  The result is that potentially impacted sites 
invariably require further and more expensive analysis in order to assess their value, such 
as by visual inspection and grab sample analysis.134  Even then, it is not always possible 
to ‘value’ such distant UCH in abstract and without the cultural and archaeological 
context.  What is more, the expense and technological limits of survey data means that 
most impacted UCH sites or objects will not be discovered unless and until they 
immediately interfere with economic activities, such as being found while drilling 
 
129 De Vrees, L., (2018), Interview with Leo De Vrees, 21 March 2018, Transcript on File. 
130 DeRudder, T. and Maes, F. (Eds.), (2015), Workshop: The Legal Protection of Underwater Cultural 
Heritage 23 April 2015 – Final Report, Maritime Institute, University of Ghent (Ghent), (at: http://www.vli
z.be/imisdocs/publications/ocrd/274121.pdf; accessed 8 January 2019), at p. 12 (per Pieters and Varmer). 
131 Maarleveld, T.J., (2012), ‘The Maritime Paradox: Does International Heritage Exist?’, 18(4) 
International Journal of Heritage Studies 418-431, at pp. 419-420. 
132 Peeters, H., (2018), Written Response of Hans Peeters, 28 April 2018, Filed with Author. 
133 Tuttle, M.C., (2012), ‘Search and Documentation of Underwater Archaeological Sites’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Maritime Archaeology, A. Catsambis, B. Ford and D.L. Hamilton (Eds.), 114-132, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford); Supra n. 130, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 11; Ibid, Peeters; Sarris, A., Kalayci, 
T., Moffat, I. and Manataki, M., (2018), ‘An Introduction to Geophysical and Geochemical Methods in 
Digital Geoarchaeology’, in Digital Geoarchaeology: New Techniques for Interdisciplinary Human-
Environmental Research, C. Siart, M. Forbriger and O. Bubenzer (Eds.), 215-236, Springer (New York); 
Bailey, G.N., (2014), ‘New Developments in Submerged Prehistoric Archaeology: An Overview’, in 
Prehistoric Archaeology on the Continental Shelf: A Global Review, A. Evans, J. Flatman and N. Flemming 
(Eds.), 291-300, Springer (New York). 
134 Ibid, Tuttle. 
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channels or wells, in demersal trawler nets, or by being sucked up into a dredger’s drag 
head.135   
 
Although most countries provide incentives to encourage reporting of such incidental 
discoveries, using either carrots (e.g., rewards, salvage awards, attribution) or sticks (e.g., 
prosecution, fines, reprimand), or a combination of both;136 the manner in which different 
countries address these reports can vary.  For example, Aznar has discussed how in Spain 
the heritage experts who initially provided the all-clear in the Heritage Impact Assessment 
then bear the financial responsibility for ensuring the unexpected heritage is effectively 
managed.137  In most countries, however, it is often the economic operator who will have 
agreed to halt operations or undertake mitigative or protective work as a condition of their 
licence from the government.138  However, countries remain nervous of placing too much 
economic uncertainty and risk on their offshore industries, retaining commitments which 
are ambiguous and open to flexible forms of responsibility.  Furthermore, given the nature 
of such offshore projects wherein delays could cost upwards of a million dollars a day, to 
what extent are the operators motivated to report new discoveries which might halt 
operations?  This is a question which has rightfully been raised before.  For example, in 
2006, Coroneos wrote that the reactive system: 
 
‘has significant flaws, as it relies on incidental observation and goodwill 
on the part of the sea bed developer.  Unexpected archaeological 
discoveries during construction programmes generally cost money in 
terms of time lost.  Unless there is some financial advantage in publicising 
a site – or the authorities have been unofficially alerted – such sites are 
usually severely compromised or destroyed by the construction works.’139 
 
135 Flatman, J., (2012), ‘What the Walrus and the Carpenter Did Not Talk About: Maritime Archaeology 
and the Near Future of Energy’, in Archaeology in Society: Its Relevance in the Modern World, M. 
Rockman and J. Flatman (Eds.), 167-192, Springer (New York), at p. 174; BMAPA and English Heritage, 
(2003), Marine Aggregate Dredging and the Historic Environment: Assessing, Evaluating, Mitigating and 
Monitoring the Archaeological Effects of Marine Aggregate Dredging – Guidance Note, Wessex 
Archaeology (Salisbury), (at: https://historicengland.org.uk/images-books/publications/marine-aggregate-
dredging-and-the-historic-environment-2003/marineaggregatedredging200320050315143759/; accessed: 
18 December 2018). 
136 See generally, Dromgoole, S. (Ed.), (2006), The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National 
Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, 2nd Edn, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden). 
137 Supra n. 130, DeRudder and Maes, at pp. 10-11. 
138 Supra n. 130, DeRudder and Maes, at pp. 10-11; Supra n. 136, Dromgoole. 
139 Coroneos, C., (2006), ‘The Four Commandments: The Response of Hong Kong SAR to the Impact of 
Seabed Development on Underwater Cultural Heritage’, in Heritage at Risk Special Edition, Underwater 
Cultural Heritage at Risk: Managing Natural and Human Impacts, R. Grenier, D. Nutley and I. Cochran 




Yet, while most are open-minded to the rare possibility of non-compliance, they defend 
the likely actions of economic operators who are widely believed to be sympathetic to the 
concerns for UCH and aware of their unique responsibility towards it.  As Evans once 
expressed in appreciation of this issue, ‘[a]lthough compliance is not always enthusiastic, 
the majority of oil and gas operators adhere to the requirement [to report discoveries].’140  
Similarly, in interview, Maarleveld said that offshore developers can afford to 
accommodate the interests of archaeologists, but just need better guidance as to when and 
how.141  Further, he adds that they are very image conscious in terms of their PR, branding 
and marketing, and therefore willing to invest in UCH for the purposes of projecting their 
social responsibility.142  Nevertheless, he concedes that it does depend on when the new 
discoveries are made, given that large developers will have already invested considerable 
resources in the preliminary research such that, once they get the ‘go-ahead . . . in several 
months it goes enormously quickly and there’s no time for any time-consuming 
archaeology anymore.’143   
 
Similarly, De Vrees accepted that, while he could think of many examples where works 
had been halted after commencing on account of new discoveries while building on land, 
he could not think of any examples where halting of operations has happened at sea.144  
Nevertheless, in terms of ensuring compliance, while it may be infeasible to have 
permanent heritage experts or inspectors on board vessels undertaking operations,145 
national regulation can still significantly drive up reporting by commercial sectors 
through other means, such as prosecuting and banning future contracts from operators 
which are found to have breached these rules during spot checks.146   
 
Equally importantly, assuming that offshore economic operators even identify and report 
UCH which could negatively impact on their business interests; it then needs to turn to 
government or heritage agencies to make an assessment of the potential value of the UCH, 
in order to determine possible courses of action.147  Such responses might include creation 
 
140 Evans, A.M., Firth, A. and Staniforth, M., (2009) ‘Old and New Threats to Submerged Cultural 
Landscapes: Fishing, Farming, and Energy Development’, 11(1) Conservation and Management of 
Archaeological Sites 43-53, at p. 44 (per Evans). 
141 Supra n. 123, Maarleveld. 
142 Ibid; Supra n. 130, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 11. 
143 Supra n. 123, Maarleveld. 
144 Supra n. 129, De Vrees. 
145 Supra n. 130, DeRudder and Maes, at pp. 12-13 (per Aznar, Klomp Maes and Pieters). 
146 Supra n. 130, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 12 (per Varmer). 
147 Supra n. 130, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 23 (per Klomp and Dromgoole); Supra n. 136, Dromgoole. 
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of a protection zone which places a burden on the operator to deviate planned works 
around the site, which might include additional expense and still leaving residual risks of 
later inadvertent damage or interference.  Another option may be conducting further 
surveys, on-site analysis or protective work of the UCH, given its generally unknown 
characteristics, which is also a costly delay for operators, as well as a public expense.  
Alternatively, a more cost-efficient option might be to simply permit the operator to 
remove the UCH (or even salvage it in some countries).  Given that delays can cost 
offshore operators millions of dollars and that further on-site investigative work is also 
expensive, time-consuming and may turn out to be a waste of private or public funding, 
the heritage agencies implicated with this task might therefore be in a delicate, if not 
impossible, position.148  As such, creating small ‘archaeological protection zones’ (APZs) 
and deviating work around geophysical anomalies of potential archaeological interest is 
the norm, even though the site’s location has often become public knowledge at this 
point.149 
 
No better example is that illustrated by the recent controversial decision of the UK’s 
Marine Management Organisation (MMO) to award a licence to the Dover Harbour 
Board (DHB) to dredge for sand in the Goodwin Sands, being a UCH hotspot and 
potential Marine Conservation Zone, in August 2018.150  Despite clear public anxieties 
about proximate UCH in an area which contains a high concentration of UCH and even 
potential human remains, the heritage advisors did not initially require a detailed 
magnetometer survey from the developers.151  What is more, in addition to numerous 
other concerns from the local community about the planned dredging, the use of a radius 
of 25 metres for the APZs around anomalies of potential archaeological interest has been 
considered by many to be too meagre, given the difficulty of identifying dispersed 
archaeological materials from multi-beam echosounder, side-scan sonar and 
magnetometer survey alone.152  It is conceivable, however, that were such impacted UCH 
clear and visible to society and government agencies from the outset, it would be far 
 
148 See generally, Martin, J.B. and Gane, T., (2019), ‘Weaknesses in the Law Protecting the United 
Kingdom’s Remarkable Underwater Cultural Heritage: The Need for Modernisation and Reform’, Journal 
of Maritime Archaeology (Forthcoming); Supra n. 130, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 11 (per Somers). 
149 Ibid, Martin and Gane. 
150 BBC News, ‘Goodwin Sands dredging plans ‘disgusting’’, 26 July 2018, BBC News, (at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-44971642; accessed: 18 December 2018); Lennon, S., ‘Call 
to Suspend Dover Harbour Board Dredging of Goodwin Sands, off Deal, After discovery of Possible World 
War Two Bomber Plane’, 14 September 2018, Kent Online, (at: https://www.kentonline.co.uk/deal/news/
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151 Supra n. 148, Martin and Gane. 
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harder to ignore within such processes.  In other words, as it stands, states are at liberty 
to ignore or misinterpret the concept of precautionary management and, unsurprisingly, 
most of the destruction of UCH therefore continues to be discovered after-the-event.153  
As De Vrees said in interview, ‘[y]ou are not going to preserve any areas because you 
might . . . find things.  That's the difference I think.’154  Noting that the system is 
particularly ‘reactive’ and is not proactive in the sense that we ‘maintain or manage 
different sites, because there are too many anyhow.’155 
 
(b) The Uncertain Regulatory Context of Underwater Cultural Heritage 
The second factor driving non-compliance with state commitments to protect UCH is 
likely to be the general unpredictability and uncertainty on critical questions of law 
surrounding UCH, including questions of ownership, jurisdiction, sovereign rights, and 
salvage law, as implicated and interacting across a diverse range of states and maritime 
zones.  As Chapter 2 illustrated, the laws of a coastal state may be uncertain or unsettled 
from a question of international customary practice; and, similarly, as Chapter 5 
illustrates, the law of the sea is characterised by a fragmentary patchwork of divergent 
and unpredictable juridical contexts.  In this environment, it is a large unknown how 
prospective flag states, coastal states, and other “linked” states, may respond to one 
another’s legal views and perspectives on these issues: one state may believe that UCH 
found within its coastal waters legally belongs to them or that they have rights under 
UNESCO Article 10(2) or Part XIII of LOSC to regulate such heritage; whereas a 
prospective flag state may argue that it or one of its nationals has ownership rights in the 
site; while another state may allege its own ownership or cultural interests in the site or 
assert salvage rights.156  This problem is no better beyond coastal waters, where it remains 
even more uncertain what rights and responsibilities each state has.157 
 
This uncertainty makes the job of governments and heritage agencies called upon to value 
potentially impacted heritage from economic activities more challenging.  While it is the 
case that the potential value of UCH should be constant regardless of regulatory context; 
the regulatory context could impact greatly upon who will be able to effectively capture 
 
153 See infra.  Supra n. 148, Martin and Gane. 
154 Supra n. 129, De Vrees. 
155 Supra n. 129, De Vrees. 
156 Bederman, D.J., (2008), Globalization and International Law, Palgrave Macmillan (London), at p. 121. 
157 UNESCO, (2009), Information Kit for the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage, (at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-
heritage/documents-publications/information-kit-for-the-2001-unesco-convention-on-the-protection-of-
the-underwater-cultural-heritage/; accessed: 18 December 2018), at p. 10. 
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and possess legal rights over those values.  Indeed, as was noted in Chapter 2, the 
UNESCO Convention even steered clear of the subject of legal ownership, given its 
pervasive uncertainty and political tensity.158  It appears that most states continue to 
rightly reject the right of coastal states to assert any form of exclusive control over wreck 
found in their waters unless it legally belongs to them.  As such, if the flag state is 
uncertain or there is likely to be a contestation over flagged or linked states, or there is 
any potential for legal wrangling over ownership of parts of the wreck such as the cargo, 
fixtures, passenger’s belongings, or any human remains, it will create a resource which 
the states or stakeholders implicated in its guardianship will have little knowledge as to 
who has the legal right to “consume” the multiple intangible values.  Given the high cost 
to a state of exploring the complex legal situation in terms of time, money, and political 
goodwill, it would probably be determined that a better use of time and resources would 
be to regard all potential UCH in this environment as of little political or economic value, 
given the risks of investing further resources without a return.  This also includes 
governance at the subnational level.  For example, Aznar has said that implementation of 
UCH protection is undermined in Spain on account of disagreements between regional 
municipalities over relative rights and competences.159 
 
This complexity of ‘Who does what?’ is compounded and detrimentally interoperates, 
therefore, with the generally unknown and undiscovered nature of much UCH.  As 
Maarleveld responds, ‘the main problem is that in taking care of the really fragile, really 
important sites that are out there, you never know beforehand to which nationality it has 
a link . . . and in fact those links only develop through research.’160  Adding that the 
unusual, unidentified or transnational elements of UCH are usually the most interesting 
and important, but that current processes require some kind of ‘labelling’ of UCH, often 
seeing it allocated to a particular state’s interests.  The labelling of UCH therefore has 
‘enormous consequences for the way the site is treated, the way the site is managed, the 
way a site is researched, the way there is interest in the site or not.’161  This weakness – 
relating to the unpredictable and complex nature of the international legal system – could 
 
158 Carducci, G., (2003), ‘New Developments in the Law of the Sea: The UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 96(2) American Journal of International Law 419-434, at p. 
424. 
159 Aznar, M.J., (2006), ‘Spain’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National Perspectives 
in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), 271-296, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 
292; Kowalski, W., (2006), ‘Poland’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National 
Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), 229-246, Martinus Nijhoff 
(Leiden), at p. 246. 
160 Supra n. 123, Maarleveld. 
161 Supra n. 123, Maarleveld. 
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be improved by harmonisation of law and developing more consistent approaches across 
the ocean context, thus reducing uncertainty about the proper rights and responsibilities 
of all implicated stakeholders.  As Aznar said in 2016, approaches to UCH protection 
‘have to be coherent with well-established rules governing maritime spaces’.162 
 
(c) The Global Public Good Nature of Underwater Cultural Heritage 
The most significant driver of low compliance with international commitments to protect 
UCH is UCH’s characteristics as a paradigm global public good, as underscored in 
Section 2 above.  This relates to a critical contradiction found in the international legal 
framework for the protection of UCH, where key instruments such as the UNESCO 
Convention and the LOSC take a statist view of responsibility, but contradictorily stress 
the importance of that task in terms of the value derived by all non-state actors.  For 
example, the UNESCO Convention calls on Coordinating States to ‘act on behalf of the 
States Parties’,163 but then urges states to consider the ‘importance of protecting 
underwater cultural heritage for all humanity’, noting how UCH is everyone’s ‘common 
heritage’.164  Similarly, Article 149 of the LOSC calls on nation states to preserve or 
dispose of UCH in the Area ‘for the benefit of mankind’.165  Both agreements recognise 
the universality of heritage and, thereby, the radiation of multiple abstract values to global 
present and future generations, but they undermine this by having to rely on states – 
protected by national sovereignty and making decisions exclusively benefiting their own 
citizens – to carry out this protection on behalf of the global community.   
 
This is the nature of our “inter-national” legal system and the indirectness of the system 
is well known.166  For example, Dromgoole reminds us that the LOSC does not provide 
any rights to the key stakeholders actually involved in UCH protection, but rather 
provides their national governments with the final decision as to how to regulate them 
 
162 Aznar, M.J., (2017), ‘Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage in EU Waters, A Legal Approach (2016-
2017)’, Provisional Report, Honor Frost Foundation, (at: http://honorfrostfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2017/02/Mariano-Aznar-Protecting-underwater-cultural-heritage-in-EU-waters-a-legal-approach-
2016-2017.pdf; last accessed: 8 November 2018), at p. 4. 
163 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Arts. 10(5) and 12(4). 
164 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Preamble and Art. 2(3) (emphasis added). 
165 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Art. 149. 
166 The ‘state is only a fringe player-it may be guilty of failing to legislate, but it will not, in the typical 
scenario, be itself guilty of polluting the environment’ (supra n. 63, Klabbers, at p. 1001); Supra n. 63, 
Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, at p. 6; Supra n. 74, Nollkaemper, at p. 167; Bodansky, D. and Brunnée, J., 
(1998), ‘The Role of National Courts in the Field of International Environmental Law’, 7(1) Review of 
European Community & International Environmental Law 11-20, at p. 17; Supra n. 75, Coleman and Doyle, 
at p. 4; Supra n. 9, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at pp. 466-467. 
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accordingly.167  The difficulty, however, as the following subsections and Chapter 5 all 
serve to illustrate, is that the aggregated interests of humankind, including future 
generations, are often likely to differ from the interests of present-day states, whose 
governments are often more narrowly focused on national economic growth and seeking 
approval of their living national citizenry.168   
 
i. Underwater cultural heritage as transnational heritage 
This section brings back into sharp focus the analysis made in Chapter 2, introducing a 
multiple-value understanding of UCH.  It should be recalled therefrom that UCH 
produces numerous intangible and abstract values, such as historical, archaeological, 
educational, social, recreational, cultural, ecological, aesthetic, excitement, existence, 
empathy, intrinsic, and economic value.169  There are a number of observations that can 
be made about these many values: (1) they are mostly intangible or even abstract;170 (2) 
they are therefore incredibly difficult to quantify and are mostly non-economic and non-
marketable in nature;171 (3) they can vary in quantification from person-to-person 
meaning they can penetrate political or community borders with relative ease; (4) they 
are both intragenerational and intergenerational; and (5) their spatial enjoyment can exude 
to local or to universal levels.  In other words, the values are prototypically non-
excludable and non-rival in nature and therefore subject to underproduction and free 
riding: after investing political or financial effort into the preservation of UCH, the actual 
benefits of such protection may be leaked to other non-excludable beneficiaries as an 
externality. 
 
As an illustration of their local to global reach, a century-old fishing boat wrecked in a 
village harbour may only be of historical, cultural and archaeological value to the local 
community.  Alternatively, some heritage may have values that may permeate 
transnational linkages or networks.  For example, this fishing boat may provide 
 
167 Dromgoole, S., (2010), ‘Revisiting the Relationship between Marine Scientific Research and the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 25(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 33-61, at pp. 53-
54; Papanicolopulu, I., (2012), ‘The Law of the Sea Convention: No Place for Persons?’, 27(4) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 867-874, at p. 871. 
168 Snidal, D., (1991), ‘Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation’, 85(3) American 
Political Science Review 701-726; Axelrod, R. and Keohane, R.O., (1985), ‘Achieving Cooperation Under 
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’, 38(1) World Politics 226-254; Benvenisti, E., (2013), ‘Sovereigns as 
Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders’, 107(2) American Journal 
of International Law 295-333. 
169 See Chapter 2, Section 3. 
170 Jones, S., (2017), ‘Wrestling with the Social Value of Heritage: Problems, Dilemmas and Opportunities’, 
4(1) Journal of Community Archaeology & Heritage 21-37, at p. 21. 
171 Ibid, Jones, at p. 26. 
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archaeological information about a particularly unique form of fishing, which makes it of 
interest to worldwide historians and archaeologists with an interest in fishing heritage.  
Moreover, transnational linkages may exist from living relatives, or from communities 
possessing religious, spiritual, cultural or ethnic connections to certain UCH.172  For 
example, the Kinneret Boat in Israel is likely to deliver value to observers around the 
world of the Christian faith, given its close timing and proximity to the life of Jesus 
Christ.173  Sometimes it has been viable to create a sense of shared heritage around 
regional UCH, such as a common interest in UCH linked to Vikings or to the Hanseatic 
League in the Baltic.174  Alternatively, some values may be more discernibly enjoyed by 
national communities, such as the strong national attachment to naval warships sunk with 
large loss of life.175  Alternatively, some heritage might be of such great “significance” 
that its values permeate a large number of individuals and groups across the world, such 
that it is regarded as global or universal heritage.  The World Heritage Committee has 
developed its own rules for defining ‘universal’ heritage176 and the Titanic wreck would 
likely emanate such multiple values to the international community to be regarded as 
universal UCH.177   
 
 
172 Simock, A., (2017), ‘Aesthetic, Cultural, Religious and Spiritual Ecosystem Services Derived from the 
Marine Environment’, in The First Global Integrated Marine Assessment: World Ocean Assessment I, 
United Nations Group of Experts on the First Process (Eds.), 159-170, Cambridge University Press 
(Cambridge); UNESCO, (2000), Third Meeting of Governmental Experts to Consider the draft Convention 
on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Synoptic Report of Comments on the Draft 
Convention, Paris, 3-7 July 2000, UN Doc. CLT-2000/CONF.201/3, at p. 3; Maarleveld, T.J., (2009), 
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Spirit of Place: Between Tangible and Intangible Heritage, L. Turgeon (Ed.), 97-108, Presses de 
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boat; accessed: 18 December 2018); Raban, A., (1988), ‘The Boat from Migdal Nunia and the Anchorages 
of the Sea of Galilee from the Time of Jesus’, 17(4) International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 311-
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This capacity for UCH to permeate value to local and global scales reinforces the well-
known argument that UCH is archetypically transnational heritage.  Indeed, vessels on 
the sea were themselves the paradigm of transnationality, having customarily travelled 
between nations and cultures, accumulating passengers, crew, objects, stories, techniques, 
skills, norms, and languages from around the world.178  Such transversality becomes 
greater the further one goes back in history.  As Aznar once aptly put it: 
 
‘What is the modern-day flag State of Etruscan vessels?  Greek, Italian?  
What of the Khmer wrecks embedded in the Mekong Delta?  Must they be 
considered Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian or Thai?  Or what about the 
Phoenician fleet? Must it be considered Lebanese, Syrian, Tunisian or, 
even, Spanish?’179    
 
Indeed, if you reach as far back as the study of now-submerged Palaeolithic landscapes, 
such as in the North Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and South China Sea, long before the creative 
fiction of nation states, UCH can only be understood as transnational heritage.  In 
interview, each Maarleveld, Firth and Manders provided illustrations of this characteristic 
‘transnationality’ of UCH.180  Indeed, Maarleveld has previously written on the 
transnational nature of UCH which is poorly understood through national narratives.181  
Similarly, Firth’s prominent monograph on Managing Underwater Archaeology utilised 
a case study of states across North-Western Europe to provide an excellent discussion of 
the pervasive nationalism present in the management of UCH.182  His thesis demonstrated 
that maritime archaeology has the power to challenge the dominant Westphalian narrative 
on account of the inherently transnational and much more complex nature of heritage and 
its linkages.  However, in some perverse irony, maritime archaeology and the 
 
178 Maarleveld, T.J., (2012), ‘Ethics, Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Maritime Archaeology, A. Catsambis, B. Ford and D.L. Hamilton (Eds.), 917-941, Oxford 
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International Law 61-101, at p. 98. 
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consumption of maritime heritage is often used to perpetuate the nationalistic approach 
to heritage management and to strengthen national identity, eschewing the complex and 
pluralistic reality.183  Despite the fact that ‘practically, at a human level,’ Firth responds 
in interview, ‘ships are sort of supranational entities.’184 
 
This capacity for linkages between multiple states is apparent in both the LOSC and 
UNESCO Convention, which both anticipate ad hoc cooperation between ‘linked’ 
states.185  The weaknesses and inherent difficulties of this ‘linked state’ system is beyond 
the remit of this study, but suffice to say that the concept has yet to prove itself as a 
satisfactory method for expanding actual input of states beyond the binary interests 
(which are also often politically or economically motivated) of ‘flag’ states and ‘coastal’ 
states.  As Maarleveld has said:  
 
‘[Using] national “identity” as the basis for management worldwide, is 
politically counter-productive in the postcolonial world.  In practice, it is 
mostly impossible to distinguish such an approach from imperialist 
thinking and it is bound to create tension, rather than to alleviate it.  
[E]xclusiveness is the inevitable result.’186 
 
ii. The misallocation of UCH ‘consumers’ and ‘producers’ in the state-based 
system 
The further result is that the distribution of UCH’s values remains a complex and often 
unsatisfactory equation: coastal states will frequently have regulatory jurisdiction (and 
protective responsibility) over UCH for which the values are distributed to outsiders of 
that state; just as flag states and port states will make decisions about how to manage 
UCH which could negatively impact their economic advancement, while insulated from 
external scrutiny.  The inter-national system therefore creates an inefficient allocation of 
‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ of UCH protection.  For example, the protection of the 
wrecks of the Battle of Jutland would deliver considerable intangible benefits to the 
national community of citizens in the United Kingdom (who would consume the value of 
production); but much less value to the community of citizens in the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Norway (who could each produce more effective protection as coastal 
 
183 Ibid, Firth; Supra n. 180, Firth. 
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states).187  This is a concern when, as Manders illustrates just in the context of the 
Netherlands (as at 2009), ‘[s]hipwrecks from different nations are located all over the 
globe.  For example, German, English, French, American, Belgian, Swedish and Danish 
shipwrecks have all been discovered in Dutch waters and over a hundred Dutch 
shipwrecks have been found in different parts of the world’.188 
 
One of the primary means to resolve this misallocation of rights and responsibilities has 
been through bilateral arrangements between flag states of origin and coastal states where 
the UCH is located.189  Such bilateral accords can be successful in that they effectively 
compensate the coastal state in exchange for its agreement to cooperate or protect heritage 
on behalf of the flag state.  An example of a country particularly active in this field has 
been the Netherlands who, according to Manders in interview, have MOUs relating to the 
treatment of historic Dutch wrecks with numerous states including Sri Lanka, Australia, 
Japan, Indonesia, Suriname, and Cuba.190  Here, the bilateral nature of interest in the 
wreck makes it possible for both coastal and flag state to share a large division of its 
values, such as by creating schemes for joint recreation, research, education, and social 
enjoyment.  It is also possible for the flag state – alleging some form of ‘ownership’ over 
the wreck – to readily compensate the coastal state for the leaked values when the wreck 
is threatened by economic development in the coastal state, such as by offering funding, 
training, collaboration, or other resources to incentivise the coastal state to preserve the 
wreck’s values for the foreign state.  As Manders said, often these MOUs incentivise 
coastal states by offering ‘funding, training’ and ‘opportunities for future cooperation’.191  
This accords with Maes’s response that such bilateral cooperation could include ‘in situ 
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scientific research, data exchange, knowledge sharing, state practice in policy and the 
implementation of the UNESCO Convention in national legislation.’192   
 
This is an important purpose of the UNESCO Convention: to encourage the further 
negotiation of bilateral accords and MOUs and agreements between coastal and former 
flag states with a view to securing coastal state permission or engagement with the 
protection of such foreign wrecks.193  As Manders said in interview, however, this 
compensation does not always work.  For example, a common scenario is when coastal 
states find greater value in casting off the assertion of ownership of wrecks from a former 
colonial power.194  Furthermore, much bilateral cooperation has been more concerned 
with the distribution of the spoils salvaged from wrecks, rather than focused on protection 
in situ or carrying out research compliant with the UNESCO Rules.195  Most importantly 
of all, however, UCH which is of unknown provenience, or which is yet to be identified, 
or has yet to be discovered, will not be protected by such cases of bilateral cooperation, 
given that it only works for wreck sites of special interest and with a clear legal ownership 
by the flag state. 
 
As such, bilateral cooperation only works in ‘particular instances’;196 being 
predominantly naval warships of the past few centuries.  In these cases, flag states possess 
an incentive to protect and conduct research on such wrecks, given that they have a strong 
cultural link to the vessel, accompanied by strong legal grounds to establish their right to 
capture the UCH’s values.  In the vast majority of cases, however, an identifiable wreck, 
with a flag state with sufficient resources, political incentive and a confident claim to 
exclusive legal ownership, is a rare occurrence.  Most UCH values will remain unknown 
and, when they are known, they will more usually exude value, possess links or establish 
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claims of interest for numerous communities – present and future – far outside a solitary 
‘flag state’.   
 
UCH therefore continues to be poorly managed within a system which relies on the 
appointment of an exclusive sovereign to be responsible for investing in its protection, 
given its transnational character.  As George Bass, the pre-eminent maritime 
archaeologist, said in 1983: 
 
‘Suggestions that antiquities found in international waters should belong 
to the country of historical or cultural origin are meaningless.  If scholars 
cannot agree on the origins of the Cape Gelidonya wreck and its cargo, 
some holding that it is Syrian, others that it is Greek, and still others that 
it is either Cypriot or of mixed nationality, how could claims to modern 
ownership be argued in courts of law?  Similarly, it is known that classical 
Greek statues were cast not only in what is modern Greece, but also in 
Italy, Asia Minor, and elsewhere.  Would a unique bronze from far at sea 
belong to Greece, Italy, or Turkey today?’197 
 
iii. The leaking of multiple values of UCH protection to external and future 
generations 
The most critical risk to undervaluation of UCH protection is the non-excludable and non-
rival character of UCH’s multiple abstract values; in other words, viewing UCH as a 
global public good prone to compliance failure.  It has been noted that a distinctive feature 
of multiple heritage values is their inimicality to market-based methods of valuation, 
given that their innate non-rivalry and non-excludability causes them to ‘leak’ multiple 
values which are lost as an externality to beneficiaries who receive the benefit of the good 
without paying the cost of production.198  The resulting problem for UCH protection is 
that it is continually weighed up by national governments against other competing 
national interests, in a system where the national regulators are free to value national 
interests above those of ‘external’ interests who receive value from protecting UCH, 
including future generations.   
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As Flatman once put it, there is nothing within the LOSC or the UNESCO Convention 
‘to prevent or chastise a country wilfully damaging [UCH] within its own territorial seas 
or coastal zone whilst in the pursuit of other objectives’.199  By comparison, states are 
perhaps less inclined to disregard cultural heritage found within their territorial sphere, 
such as buildings and monuments, where they can radiate the majority of their value – 
both tangible and intangible – to proximate local and national communities. Given this 
lack of return-on-investment for offshore or underwater marine goods, however, where 
the highly public nature of UCH causes its protection to produce numerous externalities 
to the present and future generations, states need to be motivated by additional incentives 
to fully invest in the provision of effective and meaningful legislation; or, in other words, 
there needs to be additional political or economic gains to incentivise such protection.   
 
The compounding difficulty is that the investment by states in developing and 
implementing effective UCH policy is in constant competition with other public goods, 
such as the provision of health, defence, welfare, infrastructure, public safety, corporate 
protection, and so on, as well as with the sustainment of competing maritime sectors, such 
as shipping, fishing, dredging, construction, cable and pipe-laying, tourism, and offshore 
energy.200  As a result, unless an especially strong economic or political case can be made 
out – taking into account that the allocation of effort and resources is likely to negatively 
impact all of these other competing opportunity costs to a national government – the 
protection of UCH remains permanently undervalued and prone to underproduction from 
the global perspective looking in.201  As Dromgoole once summarised state motivation to 
protect UCH: ‘[w]hile the threat posed by such activities is manifest, the importance to 
national economies of commercial activities in the marine environment is such that any 
potential interference with them is a matter that is highly politically sensitive.’202   
 
The unfortunate result is that examples of non-compliance with international 
commitments to protect UCH are so pervasive as to suggest such oft-repeated 
commitments between states are almost entirely meaningless.  For example, Dromgoole 
refers to the prioritisation of economic advancement in Nigeria through the extraction of 
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crude oil from the Niger Delta, even though this development is known to severely 
threaten important submerged heritage relating to slave trade.203  This is despite Nigeria 
ratifying the UNESCO Convention in 2005.  As UNESCO has even said itself, despite 
commitments to protect UCH under the LOSC and in the Convention itself, a ‘number of 
States offer no legal protection for their underwater cultural heritage, [and] even when 
such protection exists, gaps in the legislation and State sovereignty enable treasure 
hunters to pursue their activities and exploit artefacts’.204  No more stark an example can 
be illustrated than that of Panama, who ratified and began implementing the UNESCO 
Convention in March 2003, only to then officially authorise a salvage operation to strip 
the San José 1631 of its 51 tons of silver and bullion in the few months that followed.205   
 
Well-resourced nations can be just as weak in terms of protection efforts.  For example, 
the United Kingdom agreed to adopt the UNESCO Rules, before then entering into a 
salvage contract with treasure hunters to share the spoils of the HMS Sussex, the SS 
Gairsoppa and, later, the HMS Victory (1744).206  Indeed, despite the adoption of the 
UK’s Marine Policy Statement, which clearly calls for marine licensors to prioritise the 
protection of the historic environment in Section 2.6.6, the MMO still licensed the 
dredging of a UCH hotspot in the Goodwin Sands, despite significant public pressure and 
campaigning from NGOs.207  UK policy has therefore even been described as an example 
of ‘active neglect’.208  Similarly, according to Guérin in interview, Canada, whose 
archaeological community were an important force driving the creation and negotiation 
of the UNESCO Convention, still cannot curtail treasure hunting in Nova Scotia.209  As 
 
203 Supra n. 3, Dromgoole, at p. 345, n. 24; UNESCO, (2011), Final Report of the Second Meeting of the 
Scientific and Technical Advisory Body established under the Convention, 8 May 2011, UN Doc. 
UCH/11/2.STAB/220/7, at p. 4. 
204 Supra n. 157, UNESCO, at p. 10. 
205 UNESCO, (2015), Report of the Mission to Panama (6-14 July and 21-29 October 2015) to Evaluate 
the Project Related to the Wreck of the San José, 7 December 2015, Scientific and Technical Advisory 
Body for the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (Paris), (at: http://
www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/STAB-Panama-Report-EN-public.pdf; 
accessed: 18 December 2018); Supra n. 130, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 8 (per Aznar). 
206 ‘The UK is declared that they will apply the Annex, but at the first occasion they apply something else.  
[…] It would be better if you would ratify . . . and then you would be necessarily having to respect the 2001 
Convention.’ (Supra n. 122, Guérin); Dromgoole, S., (2004), ‘Murky Waters for Government Policy: The 
Case of a 17th Century British Warship and 10 Tonnes of Gold Coins’, 28(3) Marine Policy 189-198; Supra 
n.148, Gane and Martin. 
207 Supra n. 150. 
208 Supra n. 122, Gribble, Parham and Scott-Ireton, at p. 20 (per Parham). 
209 ‘It is interesting.  You know, Canada hasn’t ratified the UNESCO Convention, but it was one of the 
most [supportive].  The President of ICUCH was Robert Grenier and he was one of the biggest fighters for 
[protection], while Canada has a lot of commercial salvaging companies going around.’ (Supra n. 180, 
Manders); Canada is moving towards ratification, but ‘there was some hindrance because Nova Scotia 
people were still treasure hunting’ (supra n. 122, Guérin). 
188 
 
Williams responded in interview, ‘signing up is one thing; implementing is another.  And 
I don’t see much evidence of implementation around the world.’210   As Manders similarly 
responds, ‘it’s easy to say that you are going to ratify if you’re not going to implement 
it.’211  He continues by explaining that states were happy to accept the annexed Rules 
‘because they did no harm.’  However, ‘if you . . . really consider all the rules in there, it 
can cost you a lot of money.’212   
 
This failure of implementation is a familiar story throughout all regions.  For example, a 
PhD thesis submitted at the University of Southampton in 2018 uncovered various aspects 
of archaeological practice across the Adriatic Sea which were not compliant with the 
UNESCO Convention, despite all coastal states being party to the UNESCO 
Convention.213  As Firth replied, although there is a long list of states who have now 
signed up the Convention, ‘if you were to test whether they were following the provisions 
or not; if you were to look at treasure hunting and look at which ones have got inventories; 
which ones have got a named heritage service which has actually got maritime capabilities 
and so on; the sort of things at the back-end of the Convention which says . . . the things 
we should be doing, I imagine quite a few of them would struggle.’214  For example, 
DeRudder evaluated Belgium’s implementation of the Convention, after they joined in 
2013, discovered that some key elements were still missing from Belgian law, such as 
rules on reporting finds, on consulting and cooperating with other states, and perhaps 
most disconcertingly, dealing with incidental destruction of UCH from regulated and 
unregulated activities.215 
 
As Manders responds, there is a long list of states who have just signed up and not done 
any more than that.216  He points to Panama as an example: 
 
‘The first ratifying country was Panama and a lot of ships are sailing under 
the flag of Panama.  Even ships that have been accused of being 
commercial salvage ships.  Well, I haven’t heard of the Panamanian 
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government doing something about that.  Even worse, the archaeologist 
[who supported it] ended up in jail in Panama because the government 
officials said that he tricked them into the UNESCO Convention!’217 
 
This is all the more concerning when one considers, as is explored in Chapter 5, that such 
states are frequently open registry states with the primary responsibility, in their capacity 
as ‘flag states’, for regulating many of the vessels operating freely across the ocean. 
 
As Williams admits in interview: 
 
‘What I’ve come to realise . . . it’s naïve really, but . . .  my impression 
was that when a country signed up to a Convention – that was it.  
Everything was going to be done.  Like a recipe!  Then you realise that 
politicians sign up to things and they don’t realise what they’re signing.  
Civil servants are barely aware of it.  And after two years, they move on 
and a successor comes in.’218 
 
After giving an example of government lawyers dealing with the remaining Mary Rose 
structure who had not heard of the Valletta Convention, being the primary European 
convention for archaeological heritage, he continued: 
 
‘I am beginning to wonder whether the 2001 Convention is a classic 
example of . . . yes you can get people to sign up to it, but . . . if it’s too 
technically complex and it’s too controversial, people will stop there – at 
the time they signed up to it.  And they won’t do anything else with it.’219 
 
(d) Difficulty Incentivising States to Comply through Sticks and Carrots 
i. Ratification and compliance: a question of national ‘net gain’ 
The realist-constructivist understanding of state motivation, as argued in Section 2 above, 
is therefore borne out with unfortunate accuracy when looking at worldwide protection 
of UCH by states.  As Barbash-Riley says, even if the Dominican Republic did ‘accept or 
ratify the 2001 Convention, [they] would still face the same temptation, due to lack of 
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funding and infrastructure, to give concessions to treasure hunters’.220  Manders also 
concurs with this view that sees protection of UCH and compliance as a question of net 
gain for states, saying that parts of the Convention, such as the Annexed Rules, were 
accepted ‘because [they] did no harm.’221  In the same way, he responds, states had no 
issue ratifying the UNESCO 2003 Convention on the Protection of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage because there is no laws involved and it does not cost them anything.222  The 
problems occur, he notes, when it comes to implementing rules that actually cost states 
money;223 for example, the opportunity cost of developing commerce or exploiting 
natural resources across the EEZ or continental shelf. 
 
This gets right to the heart of the sustainable development concept and the failure of that 
idealistic principle – requiring the balancing of long-term economic, social and ecological 
interests – to impact governmental decision-making.224  The concept of ‘sustainable 
development’ has become unfortunately misconstrued and misinterpreted.  It was 
intended to promote ecological and social concerns to be a trivariate part of the net gain 
calculus, eschewing the dominant focus of states upon solely economic (or political) 
gains; however, states to continue to freely prioritise internal values over external, such 
that sustainable development continues a paradigm whereby the natural and cultural 
environment is only protected when this sustains national economic growth.  It has 
therefore even been misconstrued as requiring environmental conservation activities to 
be economically sustainable and to fit with a state’s economic ambitions.225  As Altvater 
responded, ‘the reality is [that] policy is more looking into their economical side and 
there’s still this gap between environmental . . . and the economical side.  We’re all saying 
we want to behave sustainably and bring all these three angles together, but in reality, 
economy seems to overrule the other values.’226 
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ii. Economic and political motivations to protect UCH 
The question therefore becomes the extent to which international architecture can 
incentivise states to protect UCH in lieu of economic gains.  Turning first to the economic 
justification for protecting UCH, the critical issue as noted is that in situ UCH is really 
only “valuable” for its intangible and non-marketable qualities, which leak value to free 
riders, future generations and transnational communities, rather than any economic value 
for the nation states required to invest in its protection.  This lack of economic incentive 
is even stronger the further the UCH is from the shore; while it is feasible that UCH found 
within a few miles of shore may deliver some economic benefit; effectively monetising a 
wreck site located many hundreds of miles offshore or in another state’s waters is near-
fantasy for the foreseeable future.  Arguments by the heritage community about the 
potential economic value of UCH sites through dive tourism often appear weak and very 
difficult to make persuasively, especially further offshore.227  In other words, beyond its 
multiple intangible values which are usually impossible or inefficient to capture, the only 
real incentive to protect such distant wrecks is the potential political currency in that 
strategy to a particular government.  As Ooms responded, in order to make changes one 
ultimately needs ‘the political support’, but the difficulty is that each state ‘is negotiating 
in its own interest’.228 
 
Locating a political incentive to allot public resources and energy towards the protection 
of UCH, when conflicting with more immediate political priorities of national 
governments, is also an uphill battle.  Political action ex ante destruction is rarely a 
justifiable expense for governments.  Indeed, all too often, UCH protection is viewed as 
a worthwhile pursuit, but a politically expendable recreational or academic pastime 
among a niche community of enthusiasts.229  Only occasionally can the political case be 
made.  For example, in relation to naval warships (counter-productively serving to 
strengthen nationalistic narratives),230 or for sites of world-famous disasters, which 
demand universal political motivation and are easily undermined by free riding and non-
compliance by third states.231  Furthermore, some states can possess a strong political 
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incentive to preserve their historical or cultural record, such as Italy, Greece, and France, 
who have a strong tradition in investing in the protection of their cultural heritage, 
including maritime heritage.232   Far more often, however, political motivation has 
become corrupted and antithetical to preservationism.  For example, a large number of 
wrecks have only been forcefully protected on account of their extractive economic value, 
with many others being studied with a focus on establishing historic territorial claims, 
such as in the South China Sea.233 
 
Not only does UCH protection compete with other political or economic gains for states, 
but it faces an uphill battle for dwindling public resources with other global public goods, 
such as the socioeconomic gains from expanding renewable energy through the 
construction of wind farms.234  As Flatman has said, ‘there appears to be a “resource 
hierarchy” [in marine governance] comprising: aggregates, hydrocarbons, . . . fish stocks, 
environment and heritage.’235  Adding that heritage ‘comes both last and most definitely 
least in this hierarchy’.236  Similarly, Firth responds, ‘[i]t's fairly typical that cultural 
heritage falls completely out of anyone’s mix in any ocean management, you know, it 
rarely gets a mention.  So that’s kind of an ongoing problem’.237  Its out-of-sight nature 
means it even ranks below land-based cultural heritage.238  Many concur with this view 
that UCH is low on the political agenda and, combined with its global public good nature, 
the outlook in the present climate for UCH threatened by offshore economic activity looks 
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bleak.239  As Guérin said in interview, when looking at the amount of money being 
invested into protecting the ocean:  
  
‘you agree that this is nothing.  So, how much is going to underwater 
archaeology?  Even less than nothing?  [The international community is 
talking] about protecting the offshore environment, but cultural heritage is 
a largely neglected aspect.’240   
 
A solution might lie in increasing public awareness and public enjoyment of UCH’s 
values, so as to shift the political and economic incentives of governments.241  However, 
as a global public good, the same issue arises that strong political incentive only appears 
in the discovery of destruction after-the-event, when there is usually significant media 
attention.242  The difficulty, as Gribble once described it, is that we have a ‘vicious cycle 
of fail’; whereby a lack of investment into UCH recreation, research and enjoyment, 
equates to less of the public being aware of the value and plight of UCH, which in turn 
lowers the funding available for its enjoyment and discovery.243  This is all tied up in the 
concept of “seablindness”, to which Firth and Williams both referred, which evokes how 
the general public are not engaged with the value of the ocean and how these values are 
under continuous threat.  As Firth points out, interestingly, UCH actually has the 
opportunity to change this common perspective and to ignite the public’s awareness of 
the value and importance of the ocean, provided that it is consumed appropriately.244 
 
iii. Difficulty incentivising states to protect UCH by ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ 
While Article 17 of the UNESCO Convention requires states to impose sanctions on those 
citizens who breach the rules, as Sarid says, ‘these sanctions are directed at inner-
jurisdiction enforcement’;245 i.e., states are free to decide how or whether to punish their 
own citizens.246  As a result, Sarid rightly notes, the Convention has some difficulties in 
terms of ensuring enforcement, instead relying on self-enforcement and power dynamics 
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between states.247  Guérin defends this state of affairs in interview, saying that compliance 
‘is always a question’.248  ‘Every law has to be implemented’, she says, ‘and there will 
always be a question about how we will implement it.’249  UNESCO (and the MOP and 
STAB) might help states with ideas and inspiration at regional conferences, but at the 
more official meetings: 
 
‘It’s not about training anyone and to say like “Oh you haven’t…”  
Everyone does their best effort and ratification already indicated the state 
wants to be very seriously doing better.  So, it’s more about going your 
way together, than putting someone against a wall and saying “Well, you 
should…”, you know.’250 
 
For example, she remarks, an important motivation for limiting the membership of 
technical experts in the STAB to only those appointed by states parties was intended to 
motivate non-ratifying states to sign up and take part.251  This is both a stick and a carrot, 
in that it punishes non-party states for failing to be a part of the club and provides a 
positive incentive to join. 
 
Defenders of the present system might therefore argue that ratification is only the first 
stage in the process and that it is after joining up that states then subsequently develop 
their legal rules and enhance standards of implementation, without the need for punitive 
measures.252  Indeed, it is often an issue of resource-deficiency and regulatory capacity 
of states which largely causes an inability to comply with international law, rather than a 
lack of motivation.253  A problem just as central to compliance with UCH protection 
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law.254  They therefore argue that compliance will be driven up once these states are given 
a greater level of capacity to implement UCH policy.255  Dromgoole even implies that 
Article 2(4) of the UNESCO Convention limits the responsibility of states so that ‘they 
need only use’ the best practicable means at their disposal, thus appearing to excuse poor 
compliance on account of state capacity.256  These authors see that the role of UNESCO 
and of the MOP is predominantly to facilitate progression to higher standards by capacity 
building, training, and enhancing public awareness.257  For many, therefore, the duty of 
cooperation is a duty to share resources and expand the capacity of underdeveloped states 
to undertake protection of UCH.258  This fits with Klabbers’s remarks that, while internal 
compliance procedures within treaty regimes carry the same interpretation and 
enforcement challenges as traditional state responsibility models, they provide facilitative 
support and resource pooling to help states to avoid non-compliance ex post 
ratification.259 
 
As such, the incentives offered by flag states to coastal states with a view to securing 
cooperation,260 as well as the support, networking and training offered by UNESCO in 
exchange for better compliance for states parties, can all be likened to a ‘carrot’ form of 
incentive, to encourage state compliance among states and to compensate them for global 
protection.261  However, is post-ratification capacity building alone sufficient?  While this 
incentivisation might help address the specific issue areas or UCH sites targeted, the vast 
majority of legal systems and communities within them still continue to fail in the 
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protection of UCH.  For example, despite concerted efforts at UNESCO to engage states 
and communities with UCH protection in South East Asia through various capacity 
building initiatives,262 news headlines continue to relay the increasingly systematic and 
ruthless stripping of metal and objects from warships representing large war graves.263  
Furthermore, while he reserved praise for the UNESCO Convention and the concept of 
capacity building, Firth acknowledged that it is an open question whether capacity 
building and networking would have happened anyway, without the UNESCO 
Convention.264  As Williams also responded, UNESCO are only capacity building ‘in 
terms of educating a few people.  You’re not getting the changes in national 
legislation.’265   
 
Indeed, the benefits of capacity building are brought into focus when one considers that 
poor implementation and compliance with commitments to protect UCH are witnessed 
just as strongly across Europe and in more developed regions of the world.266  What is 
more, capacity building has been suggested to be an effective means of only addressing 
what are known as weakest link goods,267 which in this case would include specific 
targeting of wreck looting or criminal activity, but may be less effective for aggregate-
effort goods – such as a global prioritisation of UCH protection over the short-term 
strategy of maximising economic expansion – which require extensive multilateral 
restrictions and are much more prone to free riding.268  As Downs and Trento,269 as well 
as Brown Weiss and Jacobsen,270 have each proposed therefore, perhaps we should 
understand compliance in its many complexities as including questions both of capacity 
 
262 Supra n. 122, Guérin; Favis, R.L., Manders, M. and Underwood, C., (2012), Introduction: Development 
of the Regional Capacity Building Programme on Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNESCO Bangkok 
(Bangkok).  
263 Supra n. 245, Sarid, at p. 249; Holmes, O., (2016), ‘Mystery as wrecks of three Dutch WWII ships vanish 
from Java seabed’, 16 November 2016, The Guardian, (at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/
16/three-dutch-second-world-war-shipwrecks-vanish-java-sea-indonesia; accessed 20 December 2018); 
Lamb, K., (2018), ‘Lost bones, a mass grave and war wrecks plundered off Indonesia’, 28 February 2018, 
The Guardian, (at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/28/bones-mass-grave-british-war-wrec
ks-java-indonesia; accessed 20 December 2018); Holmes, O., Ulmanu, M. and Roberts, S., (2017), ‘The 
world’s biggest grave robbery: Asia’s disappearing WWII shipwrecks’, 3 November 2017, The Guardian, 
(at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/nov/03/worlds-biggest-grave-robbery-asias-d
isappearing-ww2-shipwrecks; accessed: 20 December 2018). 
264 Supra n. 180, Firth. 
265 Supra n. 82, Williams. 
266 Supra n. 123, Maarleveld; Supra n. 82, Williams. 
267 Supra n. 18, Bodansky, at pp. 661-662. 
268 Supra n. 9, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 487; Supra n. 9, Barrett, at p. 6; Supra n. 75, Downs and 
Trento, at p. 20. 
269 Supra n. 75, Downs and Trento, at p. 32. 
270 Jacobson, H.K. and Brown Weiss, E., (1998), ‘Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage 
Countries’, in Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, 
E. Brown Weiss and H.K. Jacobson (Eds.), 511-554, MIT Press (Cambridge MA).   
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and rational bargaining.271  In other words, the emphasis on capacity building and 
education by the MOP and UNESCO is certainly likely to have positive long-term effects.  
However, it is unlikely to be sufficient to swiftly protect an endangered and non-
renewable resource, particularly when its protection will lose in the competition for other 
national economic objectives, for many decades to come. 
 
All of the evidence above confirms that the question of treaty membership and 
compliance once within the treaty will continue to be a question of net political gain. As 
Manders made clear in his response, ratification is a question of what states actually stand 
to gain by taking part.272  As he saw it, there were benefits for the Netherlands in ratifying, 
particularly on account of participation and leadership on matters of UCH policy and 
practice within the MOP and STAB, as well as the improved framework for bilateral 
cooperation.273  Both Manders and Guérin therefore recognised that effective compliance 
is a two-way issue and a matter of incentivising states.   As Guérin responded, as a state 
government you will always ‘invest in where you see your profit’ and ‘if you force the 
states to protect better the heritage you also have to show them what advantages there are 
in doing it.’274  As Brockman reported in 2016, the ambivalent response of the UK 
government to the issue of unregulated salvage and looting of the vast war graves left 
after the Battle of Jutland was ‘code for “It’s too difficult and expensive.”  The only 
exception to this policy of promising action while actually doing nothing appears to be if 
the Government begins to be subjected to some uncomfortable headlines in the press.’275  
Krumholz and Brennan similarly remarked in 2015 that when it comes to states deciding 
between UCH protection and other economic or political uses of resources, ‘it becomes a 
difficult proposition to suggest restricting or eliminating [other] uses to protect resources 
that are hidden from the public eye.’276   
 
Regardless of post-ratification support, therefore, and regardless of whether states are 
parties or not to the UNESCO or LOSC legal frameworks for protecting UCH, it appears 
likely that they will continue to weigh up the benefits of protection based on its relative 
economic or political gain to themselves qua independent sovereign states.  
 
271 Ibid, Jacobson and Brown Weiss; Supra n. 75, Downs and Trento, at p. 32. 
272 Supra n. 180, Manders. 
273 Supra n. 180, Manders. 
274 Supra n. 122, Guérin. 
275 Supra n. 187, Brockman. 
276 Krumholz, J.S. and Brennan, M.L., (2015), ‘Fishing for Common Ground: Investigations of the Impact 
of Trawling on Ancient Shipwreck Sites Uncovers a Potential for Management Synergy’, 61 Marine Policy 
127-133, at p. 128. 
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Unfortunately, as has been clearly demonstrated from evidence around the world, the 
global public good nature of environmental and cultural heritage protection therefore 
makes them an activity with a weak return-on-investment for national governments 
seeking political or economic gain. 
 
4. Conclusion: Difficulty Showing Net Political Gain from Protecting Heritage 
This chapter has provided evidence – both documentary and empirical through interviews 
with experts – that the pessimistic accounts of legal realists and of rational choice theory 
appear to be borne out by the reality.  While post-ratification capacity building and the 
enhanced opportunities for collaboration may provide some additional ‘carrot’ form of 
incentive for states to ratify the Convention, ultimately, the decision to ratify, as well as 
the more important day-to-day policy decisions relating to UCH management and 
protection, all remain a matter of state choice.  However, when making such decisions 
which impact upon the preservation of global values, sovereign states are concerned 
solely with serving their sovereign interests and are disinclined to invest in global public 
goods given their propensity to externalities, free riding and poor collective action.  
Furthermore, whether post-ratification support and encouragement is sufficient to protect 
immediately threatened, fragile and non-renewable resources, which continue to be 
destroyed or damaged throughout the world, appears doubtful. 
 
This drives forward the present search for new forms of governance that address the 
shortage of global public goods provided by traditional international law, as examined in 
Chapters 6 to 9.277  The reality appears to be a question of achieving sufficient collective 
action, such that the gains from free riding are outweighed by the collective gains from 
having a regulatory system which provides for more accurate and fair allocation of 
responsibility, compensation and coordination.  To address this routine shortfall in state 
motivation to protect UCH through consent-based law, therefore, there are perhaps three 
key strategies.   
 
The first is to continue the horizontal public international law paradigm.  However, as 
argued above and will be evidenced in Chapter 5, while this may eventually – through 
constructive dialogue and gradual patterns of conflict and contestation – bring the 
international order towards sufficient collective action on some specific issues, it has 
 
277 Supra n. 57, Cafaggi and Caron. 
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demonstrated itself as particularly poor at managing global public goods and at protecting 
natural and cultural heritage ex ante degradation and destruction. 
 
Second, is the development of more impactful treaties at a smaller – regional or 
subregional – level.  As is argued in Chapter 7, there are considerable collective gains to 
be made and a much lower threshold of state participation and compliance needed before 
states reach the critical mass of collective action required.  Such regional legislation can 
not only ensure more detailed rules on cooperation, collaboration and the more effective 
integration of regional actors, but it can even provide supranational, i.e., sovereignty-
constraining, controls.  As such, the misallocation between producers and consumers of 
UCH protection being better aligned, the weaknesses caused by regulatory fragmentation 
being resolved through harmonisation, and the expanded ability for shared regional 
enjoyment of protected UCH, all makes a more convincing case for the slight diminution 
in national output within regional frameworks.   
 
The final strategy is the expansion of the role of the transnational community within and 
without the state at multiple levels.  As is also explored across Chapters 6 to 9, this might 
additionally include the utilisation of private actors and resources through public-private 
partnerships, as well as the use of transnational community regulation, which can all 
alleviate the burden on governments, provide them with additional motivations or 












































International Law and the UNESCO Convention 
 
Chapter Abstract:  
This is the final chapter examining the critical challenges of relying on the national-
international paradigm to protect underwater cultural heritage (UCH), which follows 
from the evaluation of issues surrounding international cooperation and international 
compliance in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.  After first introducing international 
demands for a new approach to governing the ocean environment, this chapter explores 
the concepts and meanings of transnational law as a system promoting the growing use 
of actors and norms without the exclusive reliance on Westphalian sovereignty.  It then 
draws together some of the key traits of national sovereignty – absolutism, equality and 
territoriality – to provide an argument that the Westphalian (national-level) approach 
carries various weaknesses which make it an uncomfortable and ineffective system of 
regulation in the transnational ocean environment.  It argues that the poor protection of 
UCH within the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (UNESCO Convention)1 and within the UN 1982 Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (LOSC)2 is largely a product of this struggling Westphalian order.  This leads to 
Chapters 6 to 9 which then explore whether additional systems which expand above and 




1 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 2001, 
in force 2 January 2009), 2562 UNTS 1. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 397. 
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1. Addressing the Legal System; Not Just the Legal Rules 
The law of the sea is under strain.  Wherever one looks, whether it be ecosystem damage 
and biodiversity decimation,3 overfishing,4 seabed trawling,5 coral destruction,6 human 
rights abuses,7 human trafficking,8 piracy,9 smuggling,10 crime,11 wreck looting,12 noise 
 
3 UNESCO, (2016), ‘Facts and Figures on Marine Biodiversity’, UNESCO (Paris), (at: 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/ioc-oceans/focus-areas/rio-20-ocean/blueprint-for-the-
future-we-want/marine-biodiversity/facts-and-figures-on-marine-biodiversity/; accessed  2 January 2019). 
4 Food and Agricultural Organization, (2018), The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2018: 
Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals, Food and Agricultural Organization (Rome), (at: 
http://www.fao.org/3/I9540EN/i9540en.pdf; accessed  2 January 2019); Clover, C., (2005), The End Of The 
Line: How Overfishing Is Changing the World and What We Eat, Ebury Press (London); Serdy, A., (2016), 
The New Entrants Problem in International Fisheries Law, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge); 
Riddle, K.W., (2006), ‘Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: Is International Cooperation 
Contagious?’, 37 Ocean Development and International Law 265-297; Sumaila, U.R., Alder, J. and Keith, 
H., (2006), ‘Global Scope and Economics of Illegal Fishing’, 30(6) Marine Policy 696-703; Heller, P., 
(2017), The Whale Warriors: The Battle at the Bottom of the World to Save the Planet's Largest Mammals, 
Free Press (New York). 
5 WWF, (2007), Position Paper: Bottom Trawling, WWF International (Gland), (at: http://www.wwf.se/so
urce.php/1155231/WWF%20bottom%20trawling%20position%20statement%20Nov%202007.pdf; 
accessed  2 January 2019); Rijnsdorp, A. D., Bastardie, F., Bolam, S.G., Buhl-Mortensen, L., Eigaard, O.R., 
Hamon, K.G. and Hiddink, J.G.,  Hintzen, N.T., Ivanović, A., Kenny, A. and Laffargue, P., (2015), 
‘Towards a Framework for the Quantitative Assessment of Trawling Impact on the Seabed and Benthic 
Ecosystem’, 73(1) ICES Journal of Marine Science 127-138. 
6 Folke, C., (1999), ‘Ecological Goods and Services of Coral Reef Ecosystems’, 29(2) Ecological 
Economics 215-233; Mumby, P.J. and Steneck, R.S., (2008), ‘Coral Reef Management and Conservation 
in Light of Rapidly Evolving Ecological Paradigms’, 23(10) Trends in Ecology & Evolution 555-563. 
7 Human Rights at Sea, (2018), Human Rights at Sea Annual Report – Year Four: Global Delivery of 
Maritime Human Rights, Human Rights at Sea (Havant), (at: https://www.humanrightsatsea.org/wp-cont
ent/uploads/2018/10/HRAS-Annual-Report-2017-2018-Year-4.pdf; accessed  2 January 2019); Couper, 
A.D., (1999), Voyages of Abuse: Seafarers, Human Rights and International Shipping, Pluto Press 
(London). 
8 Gallagher, A.T. and David, F., (2016), The International Law of Migrant Smuggling, Cambridge 
University Press (Cambridge); Surtees, R., (2013), ‘Trapped at Sea: Using the Legal and Regulatory 
Framework to Prevent and Combat the Trafficking of Seafarers and Fishers’, 1(2) Groningen Journal of 
International Law 91-151; Mallia, P., (2010), Migrant Smuggling by Sea: Combating a Current Threat to 
Maritime Security Through the Creation of a Cooperative Framework, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden). 
9 Mejia, M.Q., Kojima, C. and Sawyer, M. (Eds.), (2016), Piracy at Sea, Springer (New York); Kraska, J., 
(2011), Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy, and Diplomacy at Sea, Praeger 
(Santa Barbara); Struett, M.J., Carlson, J.D. and Nance, M.T. (Eds.), (2014), Maritime Piracy and the 
Construction of Global Governance, Routledge (Abingdon). 
10 Delicato, V., (2010), Maritime Security and the Fight Against Drug Trafficking in the Mediterranean 
and Atlantic Approaches, Mediterranean Paper Series, September 2010, The German Marshall Fund of the 
United States (Washington DC); Fritch, C.R., (2009), ‘Drug Smuggling on the High Seas: Using 
International Legal Principles to Establish Jurisdiction Over the Illicit Narcotics Trade and the Ninth 
Circuit's Unnecessary Nexus Requirement’, 8(4) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 701-
721. 
11 E.D., Papastavridis, (2014), Crimes at Sea: A Law of the Sea Perspective, Brill (Leiden); Roach, J.A., 
(2004), ‘Initiatives to Enhance Maritime Security at Sea’, 28(1) Marine Policy 41-66; UNODC, (2013), 
Combating Transnational Organized Crime Committed at Sea: Issue Paper, United Nations Office for 
Drugs and Crime (Vienna) (at https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/GPTOC/Issue_Paper_-
_TOC_at_Sea.pdf; accessed  2 January 2019); Couper, A., Smith, H.D. and Ciceri, B., (2015), Fishers and 
Plunderers: Theft, Slavery and Violence at Sea, Pluto Press (London). 
12 See Chapter 1, Section 3. 
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pollution,13 land-based pollution,14 vessel-source pollution,15 health and safety failures,16 
or major maritime disasters;17 one can witness recurring deficiencies in regulatory 
oversight.18  Considering the ocean’s incalculable ecological, social, economic and 
cultural value, this increasing visibility of poor regulatory management has led to a recent 
proliferation of inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations dedicated to 
improving our protection of the seas, as well as to a growing number of international and 
 
13 Brown, E., (2015), ‘Marine Life Needs Protection from Noise Pollution’, 14  September 2015, Scientific 
American, (at: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/marine-life-needs-protection-from-noise-
pollution/; accessed 2 January 2019); Gillespie, A., (2011), ‘Noise Pollution, the Oceans, and the Limits of 
International Law’, 21(1) Yearbook of International Environmental Law 114–139; Doringa, H.M. and Oude 
Elferink, A.G., (2000), ‘Acoustic Pollution in the Oceans: The Search for Legal Standards’, 31(1-2) Ocean 
Development and International Law 151-182, at pp. 158-159; Scott, K., (2004), ‘International Regulation 
of Undersea Noise’, 53(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 287-324. 
14 Derraik, J.G.B., (2002), ‘The Pollution of the Marine Environment by Plastic Debris: A Review’, 44(9) 
Marine Pollution Bulletin 842-852; UNEP, (2006), Protecting Coastal and Marine Environments from 
Land-based Activities: A Guide for National Action,  United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi); 
GESAMP, (2001), Protecting the Ocean from Land-based Activities, Joint Group of Experts on the 
Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection, Reports and Studies No. 71, United Nations 
Environment Programme (Nairobi) (at: http://www.jodc.go.jp/info/ioc_doc/GESAMP/report71.pdf; 
accessed  2 January 2009); Tanaka, Y., (2006), ‘Regulation of Land-Based Marine Pollution in International 
Law: A Comparative Analysis between Global and Regional Legal Frameworks’, 66 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 535-574; STAP, (2011), Marine Debris as a Global 
Environmental Problem: Introducing a Solutions-Based Framework Focused on Plastic, Global 
Environment Facility (Washington DC), (at: http://www.stapgef.org/sites/default/files/stap/wp-content/up
loads/2013/05/Marine-Debris.pdf; accessed  2 January 2009). 
15 Weis, J.S., (2014), Marine Pollution: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press (Oxford); 
GESAMP, (2009), Pollution in the Open Oceans: A Review of Assessments and Related Studies, UNEP 
Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection, Reports and Studies 
No. 79, United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi), (at: http://www.gesamp.org/site/assets/
files/1261/pollution-in-the-open-oceans-a-review-of-assessments-and-related-studies-en.pdf; accessed  2 
January 2009). 
16 Lavelle, J. (Ed.), (2011), The Maritime Labour Convention 2006: International Labour Law Redefined, 
Routledge (Abingdon); Ek, Å., Runefors, M. and Borell, J., (2014), ‘Relationships Between Safety Culture 
Aspects – A Work Process to Enable Interpretation’, 44 Marine Policy 179-186; Hayashi, M., (2001), 
‘Toward the Elimination of Substandard Shipping: The Report of the International Commission on 
Shipping’, 16(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 501-507. 
17 Bejan, R., (2010), ‘Research Regarding the Causes of Disasters to Oil Tankers in Order to Enhance 
Maritime Safety’, 2(2) Maritime Transport & Navigation Journal 45-48; Lawson, C.T. and Weisbrod, R.E., 
(2005), ‘Ferry Transport: The Realm of Responsibility for Ferry Disasters in Developing Nations’, 8(4) 
Journal of Public Transportation 17-31; Vinogradov, S., (2013), ‘The Impact of the Deepwater Horizon: 
The Evolving International Legal Regime for Offshore Accidental Pollution Prevention, Preparedness, and 
Response’, 44(4) Ocean Development & International Law 335-362. 
18 For example, see Langewiesche, T., (2005), The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos and Crime, 
North Point Press (New York); D’Orso, M. and Danson, T., (2011), Oceana, Rodale Press (New York); 
Gjerde, K.M., Dotinga, H., Hart, S., Molenaar, E.J., Rayfuse, R. and Warner, R., (2008), Regulatory and 
Governance Gaps in the International Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine 
Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Papers online – 
Marine Series No. 1, IUCN (Gland) (at: https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_marine_paper_1_2.pdf; 
accessed 2 January 2019); Urbina, I., (2015), ‘The Outlaw Ocean – Series’, 21 July 2015, The New York 
Times, (at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/24/world/the-outlaw-ocean.html; accessed  2 
January 2019); Halpern, B.S., Walbridge, S., Selkoe, K.A., Kappel, C.V., Micheli, F., D’Agrosa, C., Bruno, 
J.F., Casey, K.S., Ebert, C., Fox, H.E., Fujita, R., Heinemann, D., Lenihan,  H.S.,  Madin, E.M.P., Perry, 
M.T., Selig, E.R., Spalding, M., Steneck, R., Watson, R., (2008), ‘A Global Map of Human Impact on 
Marine Ecosystems’, 319(5865) Science 948-952; Ramirez-Llodra, E., Tyler, P.A., Baker, M.C., Bergstad, 
O.A., Clark, M.R., Escobar, E., Levin, L.A., Menot, L., Rowden, A.A., Smith, C.R. and Van Dover C.L., 
(2011), ‘Man and the Last Great Wilderness: Human Impact on the Deep Sea’, 6(7) PLoS One 22588. 
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regional regimes, conferences, policy networks, and funds.  For example, a report 
published by an international committee of experts in 2001 submitted that, at the turn of 
the twentieth century, ‘the state of the world’s seas and oceans is deteriorating [and] most 
of the problems identified decades ago have not been resolved, and many are 
worsening’.19   
 
Things still have not changed today.  As Harrison said in 2017, ‘as the twentieth century 
progressed, the rapid industrialization of the oceans has meant that any lingering belief 
that the seas were “inexhaustible” gave way to a growing sense of crisis.  This trend has 
continued to the extent that, today, there are warning signs that the oceans are at tipping 
point, owing to the impacts of pollution and other environmental stresses caused by 
anthropogenic activity.’20  In 2015, Scott wrote that despite ‘many treaties relating to the 
marine environment [being] in place for half a century or more, the health of the oceans 
globally continues to be significantly degraded by human activities.’21  Similarly, in 2016, 
Sumaila et al referred to the ‘declining state of the world's oceans [which] has now been 
an item on the global agenda for many years, but the efforts of the international system at 
cooperation . . . have not delivered results strong enough to restore ocean health.’22 
 
This has led to calls from every corner of the international community to transform our 
approach to ocean management away from the traditional “zonal” system of ocean 
management, towards a system which is more integrated and inclusive.23  The 
development of such ‘Integrated Ocean Management’ (IOM) processes, in various forms, 
can be increasingly witnessed at each the local, national, regional and global scales.24  For 
example, as a region which is presently regarded as a leader in the development of 
effective marine policy, the European Union has worked towards the achievement of 
 
19 GESAMP, (2001), A Sea of Troubles, UNEP Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine 
Environmental Protection, Reports and Studies No. 70, United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi), 
(at: http://www.gesamp.org/site/assets/files/1250/a-sea-of-troubles-en.pdf; accessed 2 January 2019), at p. 
1. 
20 Harrison, J., (2017), Saving the Oceans Through Law: The International Legal Framework for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 1. 
21 Scott, K.N., (2015), ‘Integrated Oceans Management: A New Frontier in Marine Environmental 
Protection’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, D.R. Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, K.N. Scott 
and T. Stephens (Eds.), 463-490, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 463. 
22 Sumaila, U.R., Bellmann, C. and Tipping, A., (2016), ‘Fishing for the Future: An Overview of Challenges 
and Opportunities’, 69 Marine Policy 173-180, at pp. 173-174. 
23 See Chapter 6, Section 1. 
24 Ibid; Supra n. 21, Scott. 
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integration through its Integrated Maritime Policy,25 Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive,26 annual ‘Our Ocean’ and ‘European Maritime Day’ conferences,27 and focus 
on Blue Growth strategy.28  Increasingly, many other international governmental and non-
governmental organisations are also exploring the need for the new IOM paradigm, 
ranging from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature,29 the UN Food and 
Agricultural Organization,30 the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,31 
the World Wildlife Fund,32 UNESCO,33 and the Conference of the Parties under the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity.34  This and the following chapter will therefore 
explore the likely meaning of such an ‘integrated’ system, as well as further reasons why 
this new model of ocean governance is needed.   
 
It was already demonstrated in Chapter 3 that reliance upon hortatory commitments to 
‘cooperate’ in the protection of UCH is unlikely to lead to effective or meaningful 
obligations.  Similarly, in examining the challenges of international cooperation further, 
Chapter 4 also showed that various characteristics of UCH protection made it a global 
public good and thus prone to poor international compliance and the national 
prioritisation of economic development over the advancement of social and ecological 
 
25 European Commission, (2007), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - An Integrated 
Maritime Policy for the European Union, COM (2007) 574. 
26 Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a 
framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive), 164 Official Journal of the European Union 19-40. 
27 United Nations, (2017), ‘Our Ocean Conference’, UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 5 
October 2017, (at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?page=view&nr=1381&type=230&menu=2059; 
accessed  2 January 2019); European Commission, (2017), ‘European Maritime Day host cities 2020-2024 
announced’, Maritime Affairs, 26 June 2017 (Brussels), (at: https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/content/eu
ropean-maritime-day-host-cities-2020-2024-announced_en; accessed  2 January 2019). 
28 European Commission, (2012), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Blue Growth 
opportunities for marine and maritime sustainable growth, COM (2012) 494. 
29 Belfiore, S., Cicin-Sain, B. and Ehler, C. N. (Eds.), (2004), Incorporating Marine Protected Areas into 
Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management: Principles and Guidelines, IUCN (Gland), (at: https://portals.
iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/PDF-2004-001.pdf; accessed  2 January 2019). 
30 Torrie, M., (2016), Integrated Ocean Management - Fisheries, Oil, Gas, and Seabed Mining, FAO 
Globefish Research Programme, Vol. 122, United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (Rome), at: 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6048e.pdf; accessed 2 January 2019). 
31 NOAA, (2017), ‘Global Leadership in Integrated Management of the Ocean’, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (Maryland), (at: https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/GLIMO/welcome.html; 
accessed  2 January 2019). 
32 WWF, ‘Integrated Management: A Solution for a Crowded Sea’, World Wildlife Fund (Gland), (at: 
http://wwf.panda.org/knowledge_hub/where_we_work/baltic/solution/integrated_ocean_management/; 
accessed 2 January 2019). 
33 UNESCO, (2019), ‘One Planet, One Ocean’, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (Paris), (at: https://en.unesco.org/themes/one-planet-one-ocean; accessed  1 June 2019). 
34 Conference of the Parties for the Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Integrated Marine and Coastal 
Area Management (IMCAM)’, CBD Secretariat (Montreal), (at: https://www.cbd.int/marine/imcam.shtml; 
accessed 2 January 2019). 
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interests of the global community.  This chapter now takes these strands further to 
examine in further detail the weaknesses of the public international legal system in 
managing the transnational context of the ocean environment.  In particular, it argues that 
much of the failure of the legal system to effectively steward the oceans is closely 
interlinked with three characteristic traits of Westphalian sovereignty: sovereign 
absolutism, equality, and territoriality.  The chapter therefore leads to the argument, in 
Chapters 6 to 9, that a more ‘integrated’ model necessitates a greater regulatory role for 
the international community and the complementation of public international law with 
more transnational systems of law and governance.  This includes a new role for nation 
states within the global framework, as explored in Chapter 8 and in the concluding 
Chapter 10. 
 
Much of the literature that follows is focused on the international law governing the 
ocean’s natural environment as a whole spatial domain, as opposed to solely on UCH 
protection.  There are many reasons for this.  Principally, the protection of the ocean’s 
natural environment might as well be synonymous with the protection of the cultural 
environment.35  Indeed, UCH is also regularly referred to as the “historic environment” 
and is often treated as integrated with the whole landscape.36  Both the natural and cultural 
marine environment also suffer from identical pathologies to those unveiled in Chapter 
4, such as the leaking of non-excludable and non-rivalrous value to transnational and 
intergenerational communities.  As such, the growing body of research over the past few 
decades into failing marine environmental governance is well suited to now finally being 
transferred to an analysis in the context of UCH.  A transnational and integrated approach 
also naturally invites multivocality and interdiscplinarity, requiring the inclusion of all 
competing and concurring values in the governed space.37  Moreover, the lack of 
reference to UCH in much of this chapter arises from the simple fact that research in this 
 
35 Navrud, S. and Ready, R.C., (2002), ‘Why Value Cultural Heritage?’, in Valuing Cultural Heritage: 
Applying Environmental Valuation Techniques to Historic Buildings, Monuments and Artifacts, S. Navrud 
and R.C. Ready (Eds.), 3-9, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham), at p. 3; Francioni, F., (2008), The 1972 World 
Heritage Convention: A Commentary, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 5. 
36 Firth, A., (2014), UK Safeguarding of Underwater Cultural Heritage: Factual Background, Unpublished 
Briefing Paper for BA/HFF Steering Committee on UCH, Fjordr (Tisbury), Ref: 16200, (at: http://honor
frostfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Safeguarding-Underwater-Cultural-Heritage-in-the-
UK-Factual-Background-200314.pdf; accessed  2 January 2019), at p. 4. 
37 Blæsbjerg, M., Pawlak, J.F., Sørensen, T.K. and Vestergaard, O., (2009), Marine Spatial Planning in the 
Nordic Region - Principles, Perspectives and Opportunities, Nordic Council of Ministers (Copenhagen), 
(at: https://www.imr.no/filarkiv/2011/03/msp_nordic_region.pdf/en; accessed  2 January 2019), at p. 23; 
Gilliland, P.M. and Laffoley, D., (2008), ‘Key Elements and Steps in the Process of Developing Ecosystem-
Based Marine Spatial Planning’, 32 Marine Policy 787-796, at p. 795. 
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field has not yet linked IOM, as is being increasingly called for in the protection of the 
natural environment, to UCH protection. 
 
Section 2 will introduce the concept of transnational law as it stands in contrast to the 
Westphalian system of public international law, highlighting the worldwide movement to 
recognise and encourage law beyond the state, as well as the blurring of ‘public’ and 
‘private’ sources and systems of law.  Section 3 then critically examines the public 
international law system which has governed ocean management up to now, showing the 
various ways in which Westphalianism can be linked to many of the failures of ocean 
stewardship by humankind.  Section 4 continues by arguing that the UNESCO 
Convention suffers from the exact same pathologies and weaknesses, including 
ambiguity, limited inclusivity, fragmentation, and non-compliance.  This then sets the 
pathway to Chapters 6 to 9, which provide a potential solution for improving ocean 
governance – in the form of transnational governance effected through a multi-level frame 
– which could more effectively address the protection of UCH by bolstering the inter-
national system with supra-national and non-national systems. 
 
2. Introducing Transnational Law 
‘Westphalian sovereignty’ refers to our familiar system of inter-national law resolved 
during thirty years of negotiations over the Münster and Osnabrück treaties, concluded 
between numerous European nations in 1648, and effectively ending the European wars 
of religion – a point in history known as the ‘Peace of Westphalia’.38  Most recognise that 
‘Westphalianism’ was not necessarily created at this moment, having been organically 
developed over many centuries around the world, but that this is a convenient moment in 
time to identify its express invocation between European states.39  The effect, ultimately, 
was the formal legitimation of the nation state as exclusive legal authority for all matters 
territorially internal and to see nation states as all entirely equal and unitary for all external 
matters.40  A corollary to achieving temporary peace across Europe within this emergent 
multi-state system was the necessary demotion of the conceptual authority of the church 
and other power-aspiring non-state actors, including internal lords, provinces and 
 
38 Croxton, D., (1999), ‘The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty’, 21(3) The 
International History Review 569-591; Philpott, D., (2001), Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped 
Modern International Relations, Princeton University Press (Princeton), at pp. 73-150. 
39 Ibid, Croxton, at p. 570; Ruggie, J.G., (1983), ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: 
Toward a Neorealist Synthesis’, 35(2) World Politics 261-285, at pp. 275-276. 
40 Hinsley, F., (2009), Sovereignty, 2nd Edn, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge); Grimm, D., (2015), 
Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political Concept, Columbia University Press (New York). 
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religious factions.41  International governance between the 17th Century and 20th Century 
thus centred upon the construction of zonal political boundaries and the demarcation of 
sovereignty within territories, in which monolithic states possessed absolute 
independence to determine their own internal laws free from outside influence and 
interference.42  The construction of rigid political borders around states and depiction of 
states as entirely unitary and equal has, over the centuries, thus given birth to our modern 
system of “inter-national” law today, founded upon the principle of sovereign territorial 
independence and the conclusion of positive international treaties and resolving of 
customary norms between nations.43  Today, we remain firmly within this Westphalian 
system of international law and thinking.44 
 
National sovereignty has therefore been at the heart of our understanding of law and 
jurisprudence for several centuries, with most legal philosophers in this time having 
explicated law’s basis as being positively determined by a higher authority, whether 
through the canon of natural law, or as achieved functionally through the formal use of 
power.45  Even as recently as the 1960s, both Hart’s famous primary and secondary rules 
and Kelsen’s Grundnorm theories espoused that law’s ultimate source of power is derived 
 
41 Supra n. 38, Croxton; Supra n. 38, Philpott, at pp. 73-150. 
42 Kissinger, H., (2014), World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History, 
Penguin (London), at pp. 11-48; Djelic, M-L. and Sahlin, K., (2012), ‘Reordering the World: Transnational 
Regulatory Governance and its Challenges’, in The Oxford Handbook of Governance, D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), 
745-758, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 746. 
43 Johnson, J.T., (2014), Sovereignty: Moral and Historical Perspectives, Georgetown University Press 
(Washington DC), at p. 91; Supra n. 38, Croxton; Ibid, Kissinger; Cutler, A.C., (2001), ‘Critical Reflections 
on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organizations: A Crisis of Legitimacy’. 27(2) 
Review of International Studies 133-150; Gross, L., (1948), ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’, 42(1) 
American Journal of International Law 20-41, at pp. 40-41; c.f., Osiander, A., (2001), ‘Sovereignty, 
International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth’, 55(2) International Organization 251-287; Teschke, 
B., (2009), The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations, 2nd 
Edn, Verso Publishers (New York). 
44 Weiss, T.G. and Daws, S. (2008), ‘The United Nations: Continuity and Change’, in The Oxford Handbook 
on the United Nations, T.G Weiss and S. Daws (Eds.), 30-40, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 4; 
Jackson, J.H., (2010), ‘Sovereignty - Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’, 97(4) American 
Journal of International Law 782-802; Camilleri, J. and Falk, J., (1992), The End of Sovereignty?: The 
Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham); Halliday, T.C. and Shaffer, 
G.C., (2014), ‘Transnational Legal Orders’, in Transnational Legal Orders, T.C. Halliday and G. Shaffer 
(Eds.), 3-74, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at pp. 6 and 13; Fowler, M.R. and Bunck, J.M., 
(1995), Law, Power and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty, 
Pennsylvania State University Press (University Park). 
45 Expressed, for example, by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and Immanuel 
Kant.  See: Hobbes, T., (1651), Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth 
Ecclesiasticall and Civill, 2010 Reissue, I. Shapiro (Ed.), Yale University Press (New Haven); Penner, J. 
and Melissaris, E., (2012), McCoubrey & White's Textbook on Jurisprudence, 5th Edn, Oxford University 
Press (Oxford), at pp. 40-47; Locke, J., (1689), Two Treatises of Government, 2008 Reissue, Peter Laslett 
(Ed.), Cambridge University Press (Cambridge); Austin, J., (1832), The Province of Jurisdiction 
Determined, John Murray (London); Kant, I., (1797), The Metaphysics of Morals, 1996 Reissue, M. 
Gregory (Ed.), Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 25. 
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by its production through foundational law-making infrastructure, invariably found in the 
nation state.46  Such positivist accounts of law remain or have become, unconsciously at 
least, widely subscribed among people today: most of us do not believe that any law is 
‘law’ unless it is posited by a national government through judicial or legislative 
architecture.47  However, the multiple and ever-intensifying processes of globalisation 
over the past half century have triggered a revisit of the positivist and nationalist account.  
In an increasingly transnational world, there has been a global movement towards a more 
legally pluralist and sociological view, taking a broader view of law’s underlying quality 
as a norm.  Whether the identification of non-state law is achieved by Tamanaha’s 
Labelling System,48 Bogdandy’s Systems Theory,49 Teubner’s Autopoietic Theory,50 
Twining’s Levels Theory,51 or Calliess’s Running Code Theory,52 just as examples, the 
direction of recent thinking has been predominantly consonant: not all law does, nor 
should, originate from the nation state.  It can be written or unwritten, its sources can be 
local, communal, religious, supranational, or global, as well as being public, private or 
hybrid, and it can possess normativity on a spectrum between the extremities of hard and 
soft.53  In the globalisation context, such accounts of ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ open up 
the possibility that all of us can be subject to multiple legal obligations, many of which 
can originate within or without the domestic legal system of our state of residence.54  
 
46 Hart, H.L.A., (1961), The Concept of Law, Clarendon Law Series (Oxford); Kelsen, H., (1960), Pure 
Theory of Law, 2nd Edn, 2009 Reissue, M. Knight (Translator), The Lawbook Exchange (New York).  ‘A 
legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the purpose of regulating 
their conduct and providing the framework for social cooperation.’ (Rawls, J., (1971), A Theory of Justice, 
Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA), at p. 235). 
47 Dalhuisen, J.H., (2006), ‘Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International 
Commercial and Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria’, 24(1) Berkeley Journal of International 
Law 129-191, at p. 132; Goldring, J., (1998), ‘Globalisation, National Sovereignty and the Harmonisation 
of Laws’, 3(2-3) Uniform Law Review 435-452, at p. 440; Schultz, T., (2009), ‘Some Critical Comments 
on the Juridicity of Lex Mercatoria’, 10 Yearbook of Private International Law 667-711. 
48 Tamanaha, B.Z., (2000), ‘A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism’, 27(2) Journal of Law and 
Society 296-321. 
49 E.g., von Bogdandy A. and Dellavalle, S., (2013), ‘The Lex Mercatoria of Systems Theory: Localisation, 
Reconstruction and Criticism from a Public Law Perspective’, 4(1) Transnational Legal Theory 59-82. 
50 Teubner, G., (1997), Global Law Without a State, Dartmouth Publishing (London). 
51 Twining, W., (2009), General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective, Cambridge 
University Press (Cambridge), at pp. 362-375. 
52 Calliess, G-P., (2003), ‘Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation 
of Private Law’, 23(2) Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 185-216. 
53 Merry, S.E., (1988), ‘Legal Pluralism’, 22(5) Law & Society Review 869-896; von Benda-Beckman, F., 
(2002), ‘Who is Afraid of Legal Pluralism?’, 34(47) Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 37-82; 
Tamanaha, B.Z., Sage, C. and Woolcock, M. (Eds.), (2012), Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars 
and Practitioners in Dialogue, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge). 
54 Helfand, M.A., (2015), ‘Introduction’, in Negotiating State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of Global 
and Local Legal Pluralism, M.A. Helfand (Ed.), 1-14, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 2; 
Etty, T., Heyvaert, V., Carlarne, C., Farber, D., Lin, J. and Scott, J., (2014), ‘Pursuing Transnational Policy 
Change’, 3(2) Transnational Environmental Law 229-239, at p. 235; Krisch, N., (2010), Beyond 




Naturally, there remain traditionalists who dispute this perspective and, in some ways, 
the battle lines are presently drawn between the legal positivists, who maintain an account 
of law built upon ‘national’ sovereignty, and legal pluralists, who recognise and, in many 
cases actively seek to expand, additional laws ‘beyond the state’.55   
 
Certainly, the pluralist account has been very warmly welcomed in the globalised era.56  
Over the past half-century, this account has thus led to the contemporaneous development 
of an entirely new legal discourse in ‘Transnational Law’.57  Transnational law, as widely 
understood, seeks to comprehend and even encourage the complex configuration of legal 
rules and norms, both within and without the state.58   Its appeal lies in its comprehension 
of the pluralist account of a globalised world which recognises that numerous actors 
beyond the nation state can be a source of legal norms or the principal actors in a legal 
system.59  Whether its supranational regulation, global standards derived by non-state 
bodies, industry self-regulation, private dispute settlement, or community norms, 
transnationalists recognise that individuals are often subject to rules through a variety of 
compliance-inducing forces, whether positive, moral, communal, virtual, physical, 
 
55 Michaels, R. and Jansen, N., (2006), ‘Private Law Beyond The State? Europeanization, Globalization, 
Privatization’, 54(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 843-890, at p. 870; Caruso, D., (2006), ‘Private 
Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalisation’, (2006), 39(1) New York University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 1-74, at p. 70; Zumbansen, P., (2002), ‘Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial 
Arbitration and Transnational Law’, 8(3) European Law Journal 400-432, at p. 428; Cutler, A.C., (2003), 
Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law In The Global Economy, Cambridge 
University Press (Cambridge), at p. 60; Supra n. 50, Teubner, at p. 9; c.f., Agnew, J., (2017), Globalization 
and Sovereignty: Beyond the Territorial Trap, 2nd Edn, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (Lanham). 
56 Zumbansen, P., (2013), ‘Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority 
and Private Power’, 76(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 117-138; Michaels, R., (2007), ‘The True Lex 
Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State’, 14(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 447-469; Supra n. 51, 
Twining, at pp. 362-375; de Sousa Santos, B., (1995), Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and 
Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition, Routledge (Abingdon). 
57 Berman, P.S., (2015), ‘Non-State Lawmaking through the Lens of Global Legal Pluralism’ in Negotiating 
State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism, M.A. Helfand (Ed.), 15-40, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p.15; Maduro, M., Tuori, K. and Sankari, S. (Eds.), (2014), 
Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking, Cambridge University Press 
(Cambridge); Supra n. 44, Halliday and Shaffer. 
58 Ibid; Helfand, M.A. (Ed.), (2015), Negotiating State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of Global and 
Local Legal Pluralism, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge). 
59 Berman, P.S., (2016), ‘The Evolution of Global Legal Pluralism’, in Authority in Transnational Legal 
Theory: Theorising across Disciplines, R. Cotterrell and M. Del Mar (Eds.), 151-190, Edward Elgar 
(Cheltenham); von Daniels, D., (2010), The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective, Routledge 
(Abingdon); Cotterrell, R., (2012), ‘What is Transnational Law?’, 37(2) Law and Social Enquiry 500-524; 
Tuori, K., (2014), ‘Transnational Law: On Legal Hybrids and Legal Perspectivism’, in Transnational Law: 
Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking, M. Maduro, K. Tuori and S. Sankari, 11-58, Cambridge 
University Press (Cambridge), at pp. 23-26; Micklitz, H-W., (2014), ‘Rethinking the Public/Private 
Divide’,  in Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking, M. Maduro, K. Tuori and 
S. Sankari, 271-306, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at 273; Zumbansen, P., (2012), ‘Defining 
the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and Legal Pluralism’, 21(2) 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 305-336, at p. 308; Avbelj, M., (2018), The European 
Union under Transnational Law: A Pluralist Appraisal, Hart (Oxford). 
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internal, or natural.60  Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognise that international law still 
remains loyally state-centric: the vast majority of legal objects subscribe fully to the legal 
rules of a selected domestic legal system, whether by territorial situation, contractual 
choice or by imposition through private international law, and most actors rationalise 
themselves as so subject.61  As such, transnational law is more the witnessing of an 
emerging diversification and fragmentation in sources and subjects of law, rather than a 
persuasive account of the lex lata.62 
 
Transnational law’s appeal lies particularly in the romantic notion of finding overlapping 
international ‘communities’ or networks who subject themselves to a self-crafted legal 
system built around internal legal rules (self-defined or based on community custom) and 
external legal rules (state, supranational and global laws), replete with their own dedicated 
machinery for internal norm resolution or enforcement (including by negotiation, 
arbitration or adjudication).63  The most famous such global system is the supposed 
medieval lex mercatoria (‘merchant law’), which has arguably been recently revived into 
a ‘modern law merchant’, constituting an international system of commercial customs 
and usages, whether state or non-state in origin, to which transnational commercial actors 
subject themselves today.64  This is largely supported by the almost unquestioning 
recognition of legality of arbitration awards and the very high level of internal compliance 
with them,65 as well as new methods of internal coercion across the business 
community,66 with strong reputational, mutual obligation and internalisation mechanisms 
occasioning compliance67 and, in many instances, a recognition that the sovereign state 
 
60 Berman, P.S., (2009), ‘The New Legal Pluralism’, 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 225-242; 
Berman, P.S., (2007), ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, 80(6) Southern California Law Review 1155-1238, at pp. 
1157-1158; Berman, P.S., (2007), A Pluralist Approach to International Law’, 32(2) Yale Journal of 
International Law 301-330. 
61 Supra n. 47. 
62 E.g., Heyvaert, V., (2017), ‘The Transnationalization of Law: Rethinking Law through Transnational 
Environmental Regulation’, 6(2) Transnational Environmental Law 205-236; Sassen, S., (1996), Losing 
Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization, Columbia University Press (New York); Djelic, M-L. 
and Sahlin, K., (2012), ‘Reordering the World: Transnational Regulatory Governance and its Challenges’, 
in Oxford Handbook of Governance, D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), 745-758, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Koh, 
H.H., (2006), ‘Why Transnational Law Matters’, 24(4) Penn State International Law Review 745-754. 
63 See generally, supra n. 44, Halliday and Shaffer. 
64 E.g., Stone Sweet, A., (2006), ‘The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance’, 13(5) Journal 
of European Public Policy 627-646; Berger, K.P., (2000), ‘The New Law Merchant and the Global Market 
Place: A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law’, 3(4) International Arbitration Law Review 
91-102; Trakman, L.E., (1980), ‘The Evolution of the Law Merchant: Our Commercial Heritage’, 12(1) 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1-24; c.f., Drahozal, C.R., ‘Contracting out of National Law: An 
Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant’, 80(2) Notre Dame Law Review 523-552; Cuniberti, G., (2014), 
‘Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria’, 52(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369–434. 
65 Supra n. 56, Michaels, at p. 455. 
66 E.g., Hadfield, K., (2001), ‘Privatizing Commercial Law’, 24(1) Regulation 40-45, at p. 40. 
67 Supra n. 47, Dalhuisen, at p. 174; Michaels, R., (2005), ‘The Re-Statement of Non-State Law: The State, 
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has ‘acquiesced’ its role in deciding transnational commercial matters68 and readily 
recognises and enforces applications of non-state law.69  This picture of a transnational 
legal system, most romantically found in the commercial context, has also found 
expression in numerous other idealistic visions of global legal communities, such as the 
lex sportiva (‘sports law’),70 lex informatica (‘information law’ or cyber law),71 lex 
constructionis (‘construction law’),72 lex financiaria or argentaria (‘finance law’),73 lex 
petrolea (‘oil law’),74 and, interestingly for the present purposes, the lex maritima 
(‘maritime law’).75   
 
The lex maritima envisages that, long before nation states appropriated the law of the sea 
and transcribed it into domestic legislation, much maritime activity was self-governed by 
the maritime community themselves.76  It has been argued that the networking of mariners 
across continental ports in previous centuries necessitated the development of their own 
systems of rules and customs, which were often enforced internally or via available town 
councils, merchant courts and guild consuls.77  Indeed, it seems well accepted that prior 
to the imbedding of the Westphalian ideology from the 17th Century, much of the 
maritime community’s rules had been built out of widely shared codes and customary 
 
Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism’, 51(3) Wayne Law Review 1209-1260, at 
p. 1237. 
68 Supra n. 64, Stone Sweet, at p. 638; Supra n. 55, Michaels and Jansen, at p. 872; Carbonneau, T.E., 
(1997), Cases and Materials on Commercial Arbitration, Adams and Reese Legal Series, Volume 1, Juris 
Publishing (Hartington), at p. 293. 
69 Baron, G., (1999), ‘Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts Form a New 
Lex Mercatoria?’, 15(2) Arbitration International 115-130, at p. 126; Rivkin, D., (1993), ‘Enforceability 
of Arbitral Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria’, 9(1) Arbitration International 67-84; Shapiro, M. and Stone 
Sweet, A., (2002), On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 312. 
70 Siekmann, R.C.R. and Soek, J. (Eds.), (2012), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law?, TMC Asser Press (The 
Hague); Duval, A., (2013), ‘Lex Sportiva: A Playground for Transnational Law’, 19(6) European Law 
Journal 822-842. 
71 Mefford, A., (1997), ‘Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law on the Internet’, 5(1) Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 211-237 (1997); Reidenberg, J., (1998), ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of 
Information Policy Rules Through Technology’, 76(3) Texas Law Review 553-594. 
72 Molineau, C., (1997), ‘Moving Toward a Lex Mercatoria – A Lex Constructionis’, 14(1) Journal of 
International Arbitration 55-66. 
73 Riles, A., (2011), Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets, University 
of Chicago Press (Chicago).  
74 Martin, T., (2014), ‘Lex Petrolea in International Law’, in Dispute Resolution in the Energy Sector: A 
Practitioner's Handbook, R. King (Ed.), 95-108, Globe Law and Business (London); c.f., Daintith, T., 
(2017), ‘Against Lex Petrolea’, 10(1) Journal of World Energy Law & Business 1-13. 
75 Tetley, W., (2004), ‘The General Maritime Law – The Lex Maritima’, 20 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 105-146; Maurer, A., (2012), Lex Maritima: Grundzuge eines 
transnationalen Seehandelsrechts, Mohr Siebeck (Tübingen). 
76 Cordes, A., (2016), ‘Lex Maritima? Local, Regional, and Universal Maritime Law in the Middle Ages’, 
in The Routledge Handbook of Maritime Trade around Europe 1300–1600, W. Blockmans, M. Krom and 
J. Wubs-Mrozewicz (Eds.), 69-85, Routledge (Abingdon). 
77 Senior, W., (1952), ‘The History of Maritime Law’, 38(4) The Mariner's Mirror 260-275; Supra n. 64, 
Trakman; Supra n, 75, Tetley. 
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principles, such as the Lex Rhodia, Rôles d’Oléron, Laws of Wisby, and the Consolata 
del Mare.78  For example, one historian noted how maritime law was regarded as a 
universal and ‘common system of law’, given that ‘[t]here was . . . in those days nothing 
strange in laws that were not national’.79  Therefore, the extent to which these maritime 
codes actually formed a unified common law, in preference to local custom and decentred 
regulation, has for some time been a question of academic interest.  
 
However, more recent and detailed scholarship on the matter has put considerable doubt 
on whether such a common maritime law ever existed.80  Indeed, many have correctly 
pointed out that the dearth of social bonds and interdependencies between regional actors 
in the pre-globalisation age makes it inevitable that any efforts at unified laws across 
continents would have been undermined by divergent customs and interests.81  A great 
deal of academic commentary has therefore attempted to disprove the transnational 
account by disproving the historical account;82  when, in reality, the question is whether 
common codes or systems of community self-government between maritime stakeholders 
could be a positive addition to a patchwork of discrete national laws today, not whether 
it was commonplace in the pre-Westphalian era.  In other words, whether or not a 
common maritime law existed in the medieval period does not detract from this chapter’s 
central hypothesis that unified systems can carry normative advantages.  As Michaels has 
said, ‘whether there ever was a true lex mercatoria [is] relatively secondary.’83   
 
Along this more precise line of enquiry, the commentary is far more unanimous.  For 
example, a system of maritime community-led law should carry additional advantages of 
efficiency through utilisation of stakeholder resources, lower transaction costs, and strong 
compliance incentivisation.84  By penalisation, suspension or ostracism of community 
 
78 Hughes, R.M. (1920), Handbook of Admiralty Law, West Publishing Company (Eagan), at pp. 5-6; 
Frankot, E., (2007), ‘Medieval Maritime Law from Oléron to Wisby: Jurisdictions in the Law of the Sea’, 
in Communities in European History: Representations, Jurisdictions, Conflicts, Pan-Montojo, J. and 
Pedersen, F. (Eds.),151-172, Pisa University Press (Pisa). 
79 Supra n. 77, Senior, at pp. 260-261. 
80 Frankot, E., (2012), Of Laws of Ships and Shipmen: Medieval Maritime Law and its Practice in Urban 
Northern Europe, Edinburgh University Press (Edinburgh); Supra n. 76, Cordes; Kadens, E., (2012), ‘The 
Myth of the Customary Law Merchant’, 90(5) Texas Law Review 1153-1206; Sachs, S.E., (2006), ‘From 
St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval Law Merchant’, 21(5) American University 
International Law Review 685-812. 
81 E.g., Supra n. 64, Trakman, at pp. 20-21; Kadens, E., (2004), ‘Order within Law, Variety within Custom: 
The Character of the Medieval Merchant Law’, 5(1) Chicago Journal of International Law 39-66. 
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4(2) Arbitration International 86-119. 
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members, it would also be possible to effectively punish rule-breakers and to improve 
trade access by reputational mechanisms, trust-building and clearing houses.85  
Furthermore, there is an argument that such communities of mariners would hold greater 
esteem towards legal rules which were crafted and enforced by and amongst themselves.86  
In other words, by eschewing the strict role of the nation state, a ‘transnational’ legal 
system has a greater capacity to handle the complex, reflexive and multi-level interactions 
in the globalised or transnational context.  There is much more that could be said on the 
concept, meaning, existence and true efficacy of a historic and medieval lex maritima, 
along with theories of a universal ius gentium.87  However, such a historiographical foray 
is, for the reasons noted, unfortunately beyond the objectives of this study. 
 
Given that transnational law and governance has expanded into a vast field of 
international academic study, a detailed engagement in its various definitions, debates 
and themes is also unfortunately beyond the focus of this chapter.88  Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting the early definition provided by Philip Jessup in his clairvoyant introduction 
to the subject in 1956, which still commands an impressive level of subscription among 
thinkers today.89  Here the incipient subject of transnational law was defined as ‘all law 
which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.  Both public and 
 
Law’, 53(3) University of Toronto Law Journal 265-304; De Ly, F., (2001), ‘Lex Mercatoria (New Law 
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Global Business Transactions, R. Appelbaum, W.L.F. Felstiner and V. Gessner (Eds.), 159-188, Hart 
(Oxford); Basedow, J., (2007), ‘Lex Mercatoria and the Private International Law of Contracts in Economic 
Perspective’, 12(4) Uniform Law Review 697-714; Greif, A., (2006), Institutions and the Path to the 
Modern Economy: Lessons from the Medieval Trade, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge); Cooter, 
R.D., (1996), ‘Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the 
New Law Merchant’, 144(5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1643-1696. 
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Mrozewicz and S. Jenks (Eds.), 1-25, Brill (Leiden); Masten, S.E. and Prüfer, J., (2014), ‘On the Evolution 
of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts’, 43(2) Journal of Legal Studies 359-400. 
86  See Chapter 9, Section 2. 
87 E.g., Sherman, G.E., (1918), ‘Jus Gentium and International Law’, 12(1) American Journal of 
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(2012), ‘What Is Transnational Law?’, 37(2) Law & Social Inquiry 500-524, at p. 501; Zumbansen, P., 
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Waibel (Eds.), 93-107, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 98. 
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private international law are included, as well as other rules which do not wholly fit into 
such standard categories.’90   This definition thus exemplifies the potential vastness of the 
field.  More precisely, however, this study will adopt perhaps the most common 
understanding of transnational law, seeing it as a global legal system which recognises 
and promotes all legal norms, of public, private and hybrid origin, and varying between 
hard and soft, which apply to the multiplicity of actors interacting across and between 
multiple governance levels (local, national, regional and global).  In other words, 
transnational governance emphasises the multi-faceted, multiple-level and multiple-
stakeholder nature of global challenges and seeks to look beyond a merely Westphalian, 
or “inter-national”, perspective of global regulation and order. 
 
The traditional account of international law has hence created an unfortunately limited 
dualistic account of law; between public international law which covers agreements 
between states; and municipal law, covering national law within states.91  To compound 
this duality, lawyers and scholars tend to be neatly divided into those who specialise in 
one enclosed field or the other.92  This has arguably resulted in the neglect of a growing 
number of legal norms outside multilateral treaties and national law which carry 
normativity without sole reliance on state power, such as: industry self-regulation and 
standards; supranational law; standards and rules developed by international 
governmental, non-governmental or epistemic bodies; cooperation in law development 
and enforcement between public and private partners; and other local, religious, or global 
standards; and all forms of ‘governance’, hard or soft.  Through internal enforcement 
mechanisms, such as peer pressure, media scrutiny, economic sanctions, loss of trade 
access, diminution in consumer demand, and loss of network access, it may also be 
possible to drive high levels of direct compliance by stakeholders with transnational rules 
such as through industry standards, certification schemes, internal adjudicative processes, 
community agreed rules, or other non-state derived laws.  Nation states can also loan their 
domestic enforcement architecture to external private, regional or global legal systems, 
in order to bolster the external network’s internal power of enforcement.93   
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Transnational law thus grapples with the: transition from global ‘government’ to 
‘governance’;94 ongoing fragmentation of international law;95 intensifying processes of 
globalisation;96 increased role of non-state actors in the administration of global public 
governance;97 blurring between private and public stakeholders, and public and private 
law, in the transboundary context;98 growing conceptual uncoupling of states from 
monolithic units into complex administrative agents;99 growing role of transboundary 
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Transformation of International Law’, 33(2) New York University of International Law 527-560; Spiro, 
P.J., (1997), ‘New Players on the International Stage’, 2 Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium 19-36; 
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Law: Why We Need a New Basic Course for the International Curriculum’, 22(3) Penn State International 
Law Review 397-415, at pp. 402-408. 
99 Osofsky, H.M., (2012), ‘The Creation of the International Law of Climate Change: Complexities of Sub-
State Actors’, in Non-State Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes: From the Margins, C.M. Bailliet 
(Ed.), 179-199, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 190; Supra n. 57, Berman, at p. 20; 
Schreuer, C., (1993), ‘The Warning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International 
Law’, 4(4) European Journal of International Law 447-471, at p. 450; Frug, G.E. and Barron, D.J., (2006), 
‘International Local Government Law’, 38(1) The Urban Lawyer 1-62. 
217 
 
normative and policy networks;100 postcolonial recognition of incongruity between 
indigenous or traditional laws with centralised state authority;101 growing use of 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, expert opinion and other private mechanisms of 
dispute resolution in transnational settings; increasing demands and uses for regulatory 
harmonisation;102 growing interconnectedness of global society enabling decisions in one 
state to impact on other states’ internal interests;103 and the generally observed recession 
in the role of the nation state, as traditionally understood, in resolving cross-border 
challenges.104 
 
While accounts differ on whether transnational law is a merely positive subject 
(determining what is) or a normative subject (determining what should be), it in fact must 
be right to accept its inherently normative objects.105  Indeed, its popularity as a field of 
study is largely driven by displeasure with the slow, expensive, complex, inconsistent and 
unpredictable system of international law which exists under public and private inter-
national law (see infra Section 3).  Furthermore, as was explored in Chapter 4 and is 
argued below, any legal system built purely around Westphalianism and the equality of 
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states is prone to defective regulation and low compliance for global public goods.  In 
other words, any academic analysis which seeks to encourage law’s development outside 
of the traditional framework of international law is inherently driven towards the 
betterment of global governance.  Its normative aspirations are to explore the role of 
regulatory harmonisation, whether through traditional or non-traditional architecture, or 
top-down or bottom-up processes, which can ensure consistent, transferable, enforceable 
and widely observed norms across national boundaries, so as to prevent free riding or 
races to the bottom, and to facilitate cross-border coordination and integration.  From 
another perspective, transnational law recognises the increasing stratification of 
transboundary regimes across multiple ‘layers’, ranging through global, regional, national 
and local.106  For example, Halliday and Shaffer suggest that recursive interactions take 
place between these multiple levels of regulation, which in turn drives their development 
through top-down, bottom-up and side-to-side processes of norm contestation, 
harmonisation and cross-fertilisation.107  Normatively, therefore, we can enhance 
international law by improving the coordination and productive interoperation across 
these levels.108   
 
Transnational law also incorporates the growing role of private and semi-private actors 
in the administration of public tasks,109 as well as the ability of stakeholders to self-
organise and operate in the ‘shadow of the law’.110  By going beyond a monolithic view 
of sovereign states, it also sees that courts, agencies and other actors within states may be 
empowered to protect external interests, in a manner against their own state’s interests.111  
It also recognises the valuable role of community norms and soft law in international 
governance.112  What is more, given this recognition of normative variation across legal 
 
106 See Chapter 6, Section 1. 
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and social norms, it naturally possesses a realist’s scepticism of law as posited.  Indeed, 
as Chapter 4 and the following section demonstrate, just because international law may 
be written down in treaties or implemented into statute books, under a rationalist and thick 
realist lens it can often still carry weak obligatory force, legitimacy, compliance pull or 
auxiliary enforcement, diminishing its true normative traction among stakeholders.113  
Transnational law therefore looks beyond international ‘law as written’ and takes, as its 
point of exit, a sociolegal account of ‘law in action’.114  With the further consequence 
that, from a transnational perspective, the fields of ‘law’ and ‘governance’ become 
heavily intertwined.115  As will be shown, such a critical view of positive law is therefore 
welcome in the ocean where, on account of its paradigmatic transnationality, formal 
“legal” norms have been routinely flouted or under-enforced. 
 
3. Weaknesses of the International Law of the Sea 
As Chapter 6 explores further in its introduction to ‘Integrated Ocean Management’, it 
has increasingly become the system of international law, rather than the content of the 
laws themselves, which has become a central focus for resolving the failing system of 
ocean stewardship.  However, while law of the sea scholars have made ad hoc references 
to the issues of zonality, territorial sovereignty and state compliance, it has been 
remarkably rare to find commentators on the law of the sea locating the blame on the 
Westphalian system of inter-state law.116  Instead, as is briefly examined in Section 4, too 
much focus has been unfairly placed squarely upon flag states.  This section proposes that 
the nation state-centred focus of the ocean’s legal system is particularly culpable for 
humankind’s poor record, thus far, in regulating the ocean.  In particular, it suggests that 
three integral and interlinked manifestations of Westphalian sovereignty – sovereign 
absolutism, sovereign equality and territorial sovereignty – can be found as essential 
weaknesses in our current law of the sea.  As such, it is not flag states qua flag regulators 
which are necessarily at fault; but flag states qua rivalrous and self-interested sovereign 
states. 
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(a) Sovereign Absolutism 
Sovereign absolutism refers to the unrestricted authority of states to assume absolute rule 
over their own subjects.  It regards nation states as entirely unitary systems, wherein 
everything which relates to regulatory governance of a nation’s citizens is entirely under 
the self-determination of a discrete and centralised authority.117  In the maritime context, 
this external sovereignty has manifested itself particularly by nation states freely deciding 
whether or not to enter into international treaties,118 with the end result that negotiations 
habitually lead to diluted, ambiguous and hortatory commitments between states.119  
What is more, assuming that recalcitrant states even agree to enter into the resulting treaty, 
they still possess complete discretion as to how they interpret the treaty’s meaning, or 
implement its terms into domestic legislation and ensure its enforcement against their 
own citizenry.120  As was explored in Chapter 4, however, for many global public goods, 
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such as the protection of the ocean environment, states often have more to gain 
individually and less to lose by weak compliance.121 
 
Although rarely linked, these manifestations of sovereign absolutism are one of the 
principal criticisms of the present model of ocean management.  First, the majority of 
international treaties relating to ocean management suffer from the unfortunate trade-off 
between invoking strong commitments and the need for widespread ratification.122  A 
good example is the UN Law of the Sea Convention itself which, although a remarkable 
achievement in terms of comprehensive and consensus-based treaty making, did not 
receive support and ratification from key maritime powers until 1994, once an 
implementation agreement (in effect being a rewrite of Part XI) was concluded to neuter 
the original vision of fairly sharing the resources of the deep seabed.123  Formal treaties 
also, therefore, end up with weak and precatory language, such as requiring states to 
‘cooperate’124 or that they ‘should’ follow a course of action.125  Often, the only way to 
get states to enter into international commitments is by the use of hollow language or by 
the development of international “soft law”.126  Naturally, however, such rules have 
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numerous difficulties, including weaknesses in enforceability and the lack of vigour in 
compliance.127  Even through a contructivist lens which sees the gradual hardening of 
norms by facilitated learning and coordination,128 compliance can be weak for extended 
periods of time before powerful voices are able to steer such norm producing processes.129 
 
Second, it is also the ability of states to hold treaty negotiations to ransom which drives 
forward the hegemonic and politicised nature of ocean law.  It is not coincidental that the 
most powerful maritime nations tend to espouse legal rules most closely aligned with 
international custom.130  Such multilaterally defined laws usually favour those nations 
found higher in the pecking order.  The excessive reliance upon flag state enforcement 
has suited the most powerful flag states (see infra), just as a ‘first-come-first-served’ 
system of managing resources in the high seas has suited the most industrialised 
nations.131  The sudden expansion of coastal state claims in the aftermath of World War 
II makes much more sense when one considers that the United States, United Kingdom, 
Russia, France, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are in the worldwide Top 10 
of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) size.132  The subsequent conclusion of an international 
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convention which permits these states to exclusively extract the wealth of resources in 
hundreds of miles offshore, but with little meaningful legal responsibility to steward the 
protection of their EEZ’s natural environment, is therefore perhaps unsurprising.  As 
Shaffer says, international law has ‘failed to constrain power when power chose to belittle 
and ignore it, and it served to legitimize power when power deigned to deploy it.’133  Seen 
in this light, the burgeoning naval strength of China in the South-West Pacific and their 
growing friction with the LOSC and the rule of law, is as unsurprising as it is 
predictable.134   
 
An essential result of this politicisation of the law of the sea and of the freedom of states 
to reject or dilute international agreements is the lacking ability to compel or coerce states 
into assuming additional obligations or burdens.135  This consent-based model, as 
introduced throughout Chapters 3 and 4, allows for commitments between states which 
maximise the opportunity to ‘externalise’ losses and minimise economic risks from 
ocean-based activities.  The most visible example is the continual reinvocation of the 
system of flag state enforcement.  This system for regulating ocean stakeholders – relying 
on the exclusive enforcement of a flag state’s national legal rules within its domestic 
courts – provides a poor system of ocean supervision and accountability (although see 
subsection (b) below).136  Given the deficient enforcement of the ‘genuine link’ 
requirement (also see below) and the fact that most flag states are distant from and 
indifferent to the true activities of vessels bearing their flag, many argue that sole reliance 
upon flag state enforcement is a formula for failure.137  Indeed, many “flags-of-
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convenience” specialise in maximising the internalisation of financial gains and the 
externalisation of environmental or health and safety harms.138 
 
Turning to the other manifestation of sovereign absolutism, being the complete freedom 
of states to interpret, implement and enforce resulting treaties, it is not only that such 
commitments between states are weak in compliance pull, but that international 
agreements are deliberately vague and ambiguous.139  Examples abound in the maritime 
context, but some well-known examples include phrases such as ‘maximum sustainable 
yield’ under Article 119 of the LOSC and Article 5 of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement140 and ‘purposes of scientific research’ under the 1946 International 
Convention on the Regulation of Whaling.141  Such equivocal phrases are intentionally 
included to provide sufficient latitude in self-interpretation and enforcement, so as to 
incentivise objecting or free riding states to join the treaty regimes.  While “constructive 
ambiguity” is the phrase often given to such phrases, an equally valid term could be 
“destructive ambiguity”, given that such well-intentioned words are habitually flouted 
and interpreted in favour of self-interest in a manner destructive to the global 
community.142   
 
This unrestricted freedom of states to interpret, implement and enforce the laws governing 
their citizens is at the heart of the struggling system of ocean stewardship.  Its weakness 
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is perhaps most vividly manifested in the unconditional freedom of states to self-interpret 
and enforce the ‘genuine link’ requirement for registering vessels under Article 91 of the 
LOSC.143  As flag states assume the central responsibility for managing offshore 
operations, it is vital that those operations possess a meaningful relationship with the 
supervising flag state and, more so, that they are resident within or hold identifiable assets 
in that country against which sanctions can be enforced.  Unfortunately, open registry 
states (i.e., states providing flags-of-convenience), are almost entirely free to self-
interpret the genuine link requirement according to their own standards.144  Ironically, 
international efforts to close this critical loophole through the United Nations 1986 
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships failed given that the intended 
addressees – by ultimately using this very same freedom to act autonomously – were free 
to simply reject the treaty.145  In 1999, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) had the opportunity revisit this loophole in ocean governance in the M/V Saiga 
(No. 2) case.146  Unfortunately, the Tribunal held that the strength of a genuine link 
between vessel and flag state is not a matter which can be contested by others (outside 
the flag state itself), or a question of the quality of state regulatory oversight, but purely 
an administrative question of whether the flag state has been formally appointed as the 
registered flag state.147   
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This failure of unencumbered internal sovereignty goes much further, for example, by 
enabling offshore tax havens, money laundering, asset-moving, forum shopping and the 
creation of impenetrably complex multiple-front company structures across multiple 
jurisdictions.148  Thus, the freedom of states to craft their own regulations fails in a system 
which allows ocean stakeholders – i.e., legal or natural persons of a truly transnational 
quality – to freely select in which jurisdiction to hide assets, register front companies, 
hear foreign claims, align their environmental standards, access markets, and pay taxes.149  
What is more, following the conclusion of an international treaty, each national legal 
system will be free to interpret and implement their commitments across all sectors in an 
endless variety of ways, creating a complex ‘horrendogram’ of multiple overlapping and 
conflicting policies, making it even more challenging to locate norms and ensure their 
observance.150  Thus, the intensive fragmentation of policy does not just create great 
uncertainty of ocean law, but the wide berth for different interpretations also creates wide 
space for indifferent implementation.151 
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The freedom to self-interpret and self-enforce leads to the under-enforcement of any 
commitments negatively impacting on economic activity for internal citizens; often being 
the same agreements which are in need of more stringent international compliance.152  
Because international commitments are arranged horizontally between political 
sovereigns, their subsequent enforcement relies on a complex, costly and arguably 
cumbersome system of inter-state bilateral and diplomatic enforcement: in other words, 
an identifiably ‘injured’ state needs to invest valued political resources in direct 
enforcement against an evidentially ‘culpable’ state.153  Not only is there an indirect form 
of accountability, but all transnational ocean users must petition their own nation state to 
take on their litigative mantle, creating a complex, expensive and indirect route between 
two “foreign” stakeholders (e.g., Stakeholder A < > State A < > State B < > Stakeholder 
B).154  Nollkaemper gives the example of fishermen in the North Sea who brought a claim 
against the German government alleging that a permit authorising a factory to dump acid 
in the North Sea, which killed and deformed many fish stocks which they relied on, was 
in breach of the London Convention155 and the Convention for the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, ratified by Germany.156  Although there 
was clear evidence of contravention with these agreements, the Federal Administrative 
Court of Hamburg was able to reject the claim on the basis that these international 
agreements were between states and did not found private rights.157 
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Furthermore, after State B has disputed the jurisdiction of the claim, the horizontal nature 
of sovereign equal state relations effectively minimises available sanctions and further 
neutralises the effectiveness of the adjudicatory process (see also subsection (b) below).  
This emphasis on state interests and state responsibility, providing freedom to discount 
the external interests of the international community or the internal interests of one’s 
national community, also leads to a problematic mismatch in the allocation of governance 
authority and, often, to introverted and inconsiderate decision-making in areas with 
transnational impacts.158  Certainly, there are movements in the right direction, towards 
new,159 cosmopolitan,160 interdependent,161 relational,162 responsible163 post-
Westphalian,164 and contingent or conditional forms of sovereignty;165 but these 
 
158 Falk, R.A., (1995), On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Pennsylvania State 
University Press (University Park); Dryzek, J.S., (1999), ‘Transnational Democracy’, 7(1) Journal of 
Political Philosophy 30-51; Supra n. 43, Cutler; Benvenisti, E., (2013), ‘Sovereigns as Trustees of 
Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders’, 107(2) American Journal of 
International Law 295-333; Scholte, J.A., (2000), Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2nd Edn, Palgrave 
Macmillan (London), at pp. 348-381; Low, M., (1997), ‘Representation Unbound: Globalization and 
Democracy’, in Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local, K.R. Cox (Ed.), 240-280, 
Guilford Press (New York); Held, D., (2000), ‘The Changing Contours of Political Community: Rethinking 
Democracy in the Context of Globalization’, in Global Democracy: Key Debates, B. Holden (Ed.), 17-31, 
Routledge (Abingdon); Held, D. and Koenig-Archibugi, M. (Eds.), (2005), Global Governance and Public 
Accountability, Blackwell (Oxford). 
159 Supra n. 128, Chayes and Chayes; Lake, D.A., (2003), ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, 
5(3) International Studies Review 303-323. 
160 Adelman, S., (2011), ‘Cosmopolitan Sovereignty’, C.M. Bailliet and K.F. Aas (Eds), 11-28, Routledge 
(Abingdon); Held, D., (2002), ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty’, 8(1) Legal 
Theory 1-44; Beck. U., (2006), The Cosmopolitan Vision, Polity Press (Cambridge). 
161 Perrez, F.X., (2000), Cooperative Sovereignty: From Independence to Interdependence in the Structure 
of International Environmental Law, Brill (Leiden); Ţuţuianu, S.U., (2012), Towards Global Justice: 
Sovereignty in an Interdependent World, Springer (New York); Diehl, P.F. (Ed.), (2005), The Politics of 
Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World, 3rd Edn, Lynne Rienner 
(Boulder); Schrijver, N., (1997), Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge). 
162 Stacy, H., (2003), ‘Relational Sovereignty’, 55(5) Stanford Law Review 2029-2060; Criddle, E.J., 
(2012), ‘Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational Theory’, 87(3) Notre Dame Law Review 1073-
1112. 
163 Deng F.M., Kimaro S., Lyons T., Rothchild D. and Zartman D., (1996), Sovereignty as Responsibility: 
Conflict Management in Africa, Brookings Institution Press (Washington DC); Bellamy A.J, (2009) 
Responsibility to Protect, Polity Press (Cambridge); Glenville, L., (2013), ‘The Myth of “Traditional” 
Sovereignty’, 57(1) International Studies Quarterly 79-90. 
164 Jacobsen, T., Sampford C. and Thukur, R., (Eds.), (2008), Re-Envisioning Sovereignty: The End of 
Westphalia?, Ashgate Publishing (Farnham); Engel, E.A., (2004), ‘The Transformation of the International 
Legal System: The Post-Westphalian Legal Order’, 23(1) Quinnipiac Law Review 23-46; Lansford, T., 
(2000), ‘Post-Westphalian Europe? Sovereignty and the Modern Nation State’, 37(1) International Studies 
1-15; Dryzek, J.S., (2012), ‘Global Civil Society: The Progress of Post-Westphalian Politics’, 15 Annual 
Review of Political Science 101-119. 
165 Elden, S., (2006), ‘Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders’, 26(1) SAIS 
Review of International Affairs 11-24; Mathieu, X., (2018), ‘Sovereign Myths in International Relations: 
Sovereignty as Equality and the Reproduction of Eurocentric Blindness’, Journal of International Political 
Theory (Forthcoming); Dietsch, P., (2011), ‘Rethinking Sovereignty in International Fiscal Policy’, 37(5) 
Review of International Studies 2107-2120; Knell, K.E., (2018), ‘A Doctrine of Contingent Sovereignty’, 
62(2) Orbis 313-334. 
229 
 
painstaking developments are perhaps better seen as a (very) slowly emerging byproduct 
of globalisation and gradual universal integration.166  They do not, therefore, excuse 
traditional norms of non-intervention and firm sovereign boundaries as culprits for our 
presently failing global environmental stewardship.  Most palpably, they tend to represent 
idealised or aspirational concepts of international relations, rather than truly depicting the 
allocation of legal authority.  What is more, as discussed in Chapter 4, they are more a 
gradual process of states reacting to political crises, routinely after-the-event and 
following catastrophic destruction, as a result of the ensuing media coverage and political 
lobbying.  The Westphalian expectation of exclusivity of national jurisdiction, along with 
its intense distrust of systems of shared responsibility, also therefore forces the hand of 
law of the sea and its arbiters to towards maintaining the status quo.167   
 
Just as critically, it is this stringent doctrine of sovereign absolutism which promotes the 
widespread norm of non-interference.168  Jackson once went so far as to describe non-
intervention as a grundnorm of Westphalian sovereignty169 and, certainly, the feature that 
particularly provides our oceans with an aura of lawlessness is the customary norm that 
flagrant rule-breakers can only be interdicted under very narrow circumstances.170  While 
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in the EEZ the number of circumstances under which a coastal state can intercept or 
regulate non-state vessels is somewhat greater than on the High Seas, it is still limited to 
specific and discrete conflicts with the coastal state’s economic interests, thus leaving out 
many wider security issues such as military operations, organised crime and 
environmental crime, as well as being narrowed prescriptively to agreed international 
rules, such as those negotiated by the IMO.171  This guarding of flagged vessels roaming 
the oceans from any interference is not the underlying notion of the Mare Liberum, as 
frequently misunderstood,172 but is a wholly Westphalianist idea which understands all 
citizens as being governed exclusively by their own national governments, with no other 
nation or institution permitted to intervene or share supervision.173  This system not only 
results in flag states undertaking regulatory “supervision” from jurisdictions with no 
practical connection to activities and located thousands of miles away, but also permits 
them wide latitude in the design and enforcement of the standards against which their 
fleet – bringing a vital source of income to that state – are monitored.  Countless reports 
of under-enforcement and poor supervision by flag states abound.174  So defective is the 
resulting system of flag state supervision that criminal oceangoing vessels have been 
 
171 Ibid, Klein, at pp. 315-316; McClaughlin, R., (2016), ‘Authorizations for Maritime Law Enforcement 
Operations’, 98(902) International Review of the Red Cross 465-490, at pp. 478-479; Bardin, A., (2002), 
‘Coastal State's Jurisdiction over Foreign Vessels’, 14(1) Pace International Law Review 27-76; Galdorisi, 
G.V. and Kaufman, A.G., (2002), ‘Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Preventing 
Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict, 32(2) California Western International Law Journal 253-302; c.f., Van 
Dyke, J.M., (2005), ‘The Disappearing Right to Navigational Freedom in the Exclusive Economic Zone’, 
29(2) Marine Policy 107-121; Andreone, G., (2015), ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone’, in The Oxford 
Handbook on the Law of the Sea, D.R. Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, K.N. Scott and T. Stephens (Eds.), 
159-180, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 176-177. 
172 Pomeroy, R.S., (1993), ‘Clearing up Some Misconceptions: Open Access vs. Common Property’, 16(1) 
Naga 40-41; Berkes, F., (1994), ‘Property Rights and Coastal Fisheries’, in Community Management and 
Common Property of Coastal Fisheries in Asia and the Pacific: Concepts, Methods and Experiences, R.S. 
Pomeroy (Ed.), 51-62, International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (Manila), at p. 54; 
Bromley, D.W., (1992), ‘The Commons, Property, and Common-Property Regimes’, in Making the 
Commons Work: Theory, Practice & Policy, D.W. Bromley (Ed.), 3-16, Institute for Contemporary Studies 
(San Francisco), at p. 4 
173 Supra n. 168. 
174 Supra n. 149; Human Rights at Sea, (2018), Flag States and Human Rights: A Study On Flag State 
Practice In Monitoring, Reporting And Enforcing Human Rights Obligations On Board Vessels, University 
of Bristol Human Rights Implementation Centre in association with Human Rights at Sea (Havant), (at: 
https://www.humanrightsatsea.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/HRAS_Bristol_University_First_Flag_State_Human_Rights_Report_July_
20181.pdf: accessed 2 January 2019); DeSombre, E.R., (2006), Flagging Standards: Globalization and 
Environmental, Safety, and Labor Regulations at Sea, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA); Anderson, H.E., 
(1996), ‘The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics, and Alternatives’, 21(1) 
Tulane Maritime Law Journal 139-170; Supra n. 148, Miller and Sumaila; Toh, R.S. and Phang, S-Y., 
(1993), ‘Quasi-Flag of Convenience Shipping: The Wave of the Future’, 33(2) Transportation Journal 31-
39; Supra n. 121, High Seas Task Force, at pp. 52-53. 
231 
 
referred to as ‘neglectful’,175 ‘outlaws’,176 ‘lawless’,177 ‘mobile pockets of 
sovereignty’,178 ‘sovereign islands’,179 ‘delinquent’,180 ‘a law unto themselves’181 and 
where, given strong links between organised crime and poor flag state supervision, rogue 
vessels have been synonymised with piracy.182   
 
(b) Sovereign Equality 
Like sovereign absolutism, sovereign equality also holds that all states are self-governing 
and unitary.  However, it is more concerned with the obstinately horizontal nature of state 
relations.183  As an important principle for preventing a world ordered by military or 
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economic power, the equal treatment of states accords identical legal rights and 
responsibilities to each state.184  In reality, however, it is the strict interpretation of 
sovereign equality and the routine treatment of all states as equals which further 
propagates the consent-based order of international law, removing any hierarchy of 
authority and, with it, any capacity to compel or coerce states into producing global public 
goods.185  Indeed, states have equality of responsibilities, opportunities and rights to self-
governance, despite actual asymmetries in effective responsibility, opportunity, or 
capacity.186  Ironically, it has therefore been found to derail distributive justice and sustain 
illiberal democracies through the permitting of all nations to receive equal authority, even 
if their internal systems are corrupt or harmful to social and environmental interests.187   
 
The resulting horizontalism, while it is intended to minimise anarchy and hegemony, still 
results in ineffective powers of enforcement and ensures that international law is built 
around the same power politics and is habitually undermined by its realist limitations.188  
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The continued refusal of Japan to follow the rulings of the International Whaling 
Commission,189 the refusal by the Russian Federation to recognise the compulsory 
jurisdiction and ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Arctic Sunrise case in 
2015,190 and the similar refusal of China to recognise the arbitration panel’s compulsory 
jurisdiction and ruling 2016, in which it rejected their amassing territorial claims in the 
South China Sea,191 are all notorious examples of this freedom of the system’s sole 
intended objects to reject unfavourable interpretations of the law.  The requirement of 
equality also opens the space for conflict over the potential hierarchisation of international 
norms,192 thus potentially bulwarking defences against anything beyond a narrow 
interpretation of peremptory or erga omnes norms intended to provide for universal 
responsibility.  In its external manifestation, as with absolutism discussed above, this 
equality also gives states the power to ritually contest the jurisdiction, or worse, 
legitimacy, of external institutional processes.193  As a result, they also habitually prefer 
to avoid politically transparent and expensive adjudicatory processes and resolve matters 
through drawn out and obstacle-riven diplomatic channels.194  This not only breeds 
uncertainty and indecision, but reduces the opportunities to clarify or develop 
international legal jurisprudence.195  This then becomes compounded by the narrow focus 
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of states upon economic or political interests when justifying the pursuit of international 
claims, which further limits the opportunity for hearing and advancing the rules of 
responsibility for producing global goods, such as protecting the international 
environment.196 
 
It could also be said that this notion of ‘inter-national’ relations promotes a system of 
constant competition between states.  An inalienable right to undertake a course of action 
free from interference in one state permits that state to freely produce externalities, which 
can only be absorbed by another state.  As was explored in Chapter 4, given the harmful 
interoperation of free riding and Prisoner’s Dilemma, states operating as equal bargaining 
agents usually treat international relations as a zero or negative sum game, wherein selfish 
decision-making can still be rewarded; and altruism – causing short-term socioeconomic 
loss to one’s own citizens – risks punishment.197  A system of inter-national relations, in 
which states can, consciously or unconsciously, externalise losses and maximise gains, 
provides the perfect environment for regulatory ‘races to the bottom’, wherein states are 
forced to compete for limited available resources.198  It also locks states into zero-sum 
games where they fear that a strategy of abatement, such as from the presently 
unsustainable subsidisation of industrial-scale fishing, will lead to considerable economic 
losses for them in exchange for gains to free riders.199  In other words, the Westphalian 
system is built entirely around a false belief of “independence”, while a globalised and 
transnational world can only ever be “interdependent”.   
 
The drive to attract ship registrations, processing fees, company registrations and legal 
fees incentivises states in a competition to offer flags or ports of convenience.200  The 
more that a state can externalise losses, such as ensuring that environmental degradation 
takes place overseas or that foreign citizens are unable to pursue economic claims against 
its nationals, the more it can profit.  States locked in this competition for maritime 
business are all treated as equals, regardless of whether they actually possess the 
necessary resources, expertise or regulatory infrastructure to properly supervise their 
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flagged vessels or enforce legislation – which, in the majority of cases, they do not.201  
Under-enforcement and turning a blind eye therefore become the norm for popular ports 
and flag state regulators.202  As discussed in Chapter 4, states locked in such negative 
spirals will find it immensely difficult to break out of destructive patterns within a 
consent-based legal system.  Only through hundreds of ongoing interactions can actors 
‘repeat games’, thus building up trust and goodwill so as to enable them to agree 
normatively effective rules or better systems of enforcement.  Nevertheless, while each 
state has the equal and unrestricted freedom to externalise losses – particularly by 
avoiding ‘unequal’ regulatory oversight from a higher order or a collective of foreign 
states – the temptation to free ride or pull out from efforts at regulatory integration can 
continue to undermine collaborative efforts, particularly where states lack true political 
or economic incentives to constrain their own sovereign freedom. 
 
These harmful effects of horizontalism are pervasive, even between politically friendly 
nations.  For example, regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) were 
specifically intended to remove comparative trade-offs between states in a regional 
context and to ensure coordination and the collective raising of regional standards but, 
even here, inter-national competition and pathologies of free riding can be witnessed just 
as strongly.203  For example, Rothwell highlights how between regional neighbours the 
achievement of effective cooperation is still entirely contingent on the ‘overall political 
relationship between the States concerned, cultural and socio-economic divergences, the 
presence or absence of pervasive territorial or maritime disputes, the significance 
accorded to and prioritizing of oceans management by individual States, the effective 
implementation of regional instruments by individual States, the nature and extent of sea-
based activities and financial resources and capacity.’204  Indeed, the rejection by UK 
voters of regionally integrated collective gains in the 2016 Brexit referendum 
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demonstrates just how vividly much of society still perceive their entitlement to self-
government and self-advancement under the veil of national sovereignty, even after the 
production of collective gains between “politically friendly” nations.205 
 
(c) Sovereign Territoriality 
Territorial sovereignty – the idea of segregated “zones” upon ocean space – is another 
symptom of Westphalianism which has already been recognised as a key regulatory 
weakness in ocean governance.206  It is also possible, as with the other two characteristics 
of sovereignty, to see territoriality as overlapping and interlinked with the other traits.  
For example, through sovereign equality, all states demand reciprocal rights to any 
claimed resources in the ocean, which ultimately leads to a global allocation of resource 
zones.  Similarly, through sovereign absolutism, there is a necessary presumption that at 
least one state must be positioned to assume regulatory jurisdiction over each subject 
matter, with the result that all states have carved up the entirety of the ocean in pursuit of 
a fair allocation of juridical responsibility for every factual circumstance.  While this 
zonal approach has grown predominantly by creeping unilateral claims to offshore 
resources, it has also been viewed as a strategic opportunity to propertise the ocean bed, 
with the hope that coastal states will internalise environmental degradation and so guard 
“their” environmental assets in offshore regions.207  However, this strategy ultimately 
failed given that states could now focus on exploiting their newly acquired resources in 
these distant offshore spaces, while simply treating the protection of the environment “out 
there” as an externality.208   
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The global patchwork of maritime zones which results from this inter-state territoriality 
has created hundreds of diverse regulatory systems, which are cut off and distinct from 
neighbouring zones.209  The further result is that interactions between transnational actors 
– who move casually and fluidly across the entire ocean space – must necessarily take 
place through challenged “inter-national” lines,210 also leading to shopping between 
enforcement agencies and regulatory systems.211  Ocean ecosystems (including humans 
as a part of them) therefore witness constant regulatory gaps and overlaps, despite taking 
little notice practically of artificially constructed political borders.212  Perhaps the biggest 
driving force behind the development of transnational law, in other fields, has been the 
desire to surpass the cost, complexity, unpredictability, apprehension and inefficiency 
associated with private international law.213  Unless a cross-border claim is particularly 
strong, and carries a significant pay-off, it is rarely worth the risk and cost of pursuing.214  
This failure of law between borders is then further compounded by the near-phantom 
legal nature of many maritime actors, who operate within multiple-front and multiple-
national companies;215 the lack of transparency of national actors and agencies, whose 
efforts to produce global goods can be safely shrouded in hortatory language; and the use 
of a complex system of multifarious national legal systems which are randomly allocated 
by technocratic and idiosyncratic conflict of law rules. 
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Furthermore, given the absolute freedom of states to self-regulate and reject foreign 
interference, the use of civil liability regimes – aiming to facilitate cross-border 
enforcement by harmonisation and reciprocation – also fail on account of their ritual 
rejection or wholesale dilution.216  The outcome is that ocean stakeholders can avoid the 
force of private liability between overseas actors.  Furthermore, as highlighted earlier, 
transnational stakeholders must also rely on foreign states to implement effective public 
and private legislation, and have no path to appeal to foreign governments for deficient 
regulation and enforcement.217  The result is a significant detachment and disassociation 
of regulatory actors from the regulatory systems under which they find themselves; and 
the disassociation of those regulatory systems from the actors.   
 
In the ocean, therefore, the cut-offs between regulatory systems propagates a ‘Not-In-
My-Backyard’ (“NIMBY”) attitude, wherein regulators naturally emphasise protection 
over internal interests and disregard external matters.218  Perhaps most fundamentally of 
all, the artificial fragmentation of ocean space into pockets of national interest prevents 
an efficient integration of capacities.  As such, considerable security resources, data, 
equipment, skills and rules needed to achieve effective ocean management and protection 
are habitually and inefficiently duplicated side-by-side; rather than harmonised together 
in effective and coordinated regional systems between all actors and agencies.219  Thus, 
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even if states work together to achieve collective action, the underlying belief system built 
around exclusive sovereign “rights” and “ownership” in each maritime zone continues to 
undermine any sense of joint and several responsibility.   This is at the heart of demands 
for a more integrated, regionally-coordinated and ecosystems-oriented model of ocean 
governance – as explored further in Chapters 6 to 9. 
 
(d) The Fault of “Flag” States or Flag “States”? 
When levelling criticisms against the failing law of the sea, the majority of international 
law commentators have centred their aim upon the excessive reliance on flag state 
jurisdiction.  As a result, for many years, and more so in recent decades, authors have 
argued for greater prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction from coastal and port states 
in order to overcome the weaknesses of distant flag state regulation.220  This certainly 
does provide a number of considerable improvements on the present model, for example, 
by putting much greater pressure upon flag states to raise their standards in order to 
maintain access for their fleets to certain ports.221  However, it is worth acknowledging 
that coastal and port states also suffer from the exact same symptoms of Westphalian 
 
Cooperation’, in Southeast Asian Affairs, 36-58, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute (Singapore); Bateman, S., 
(2011), ‘Solving the “Wicked Problems” of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?’, 
33(1) Contemporary Southeast Asia 1-28. 
220 Rayfuse, R., (2015), ‘The Role of Port States’, in Routledge Handbook of Maritime Regulation and 
Enforcement, R. Warner and S. Kaye (Eds.), 71-85, Routledge (Abingdon); Bautista, L., (2015), ‘The Role 
of Coastal States’, in Routledge Handbook of Maritime Regulation and Enforcement, R. Warner and S. 
Kaye (Eds.), 59-70, Routledge (Abingdon); Rayfuse, R., (2004), Non-Flag State Enforcement in High Seas 
Fisheries, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden); König, D., (2002), ‘The Enforcement of the International Law of the 
Sea by Coastal and Port States’, 62 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1-15; 
Marten, B., (2014), Port State Jurisdiction and the Regulation of International Merchant Shipping, Springer 
(New York); Özçayır, Z.O., (2015), Port State Control, 2nd Edn, Routledge (Abingdon); Pamborides, G., 
(1999), International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement, Brill (Leiden); Anderson, D., (2002), 
‘The Effect of Port State Control on Substandard Shipping’, 125 Maritime Studies 20-25; Sage-Fuller, B., 
(2018), ‘The Greening of Ports’, in Handbook on Marine Environment Protection: Science, Impacts and 
Sustainable Management, M. Salomon and T. Markus (Eds.), 793-809, Springer (New York); Molenaar, 
E.J., (2015), ‘Port and Coastal States’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, D.R. Rothwell, A.G. 
Oude Elferink, K.N. Scott and T. Stephens (Eds.), 280-303, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Molenaar, 
E.J., (1998), Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution, Kluwer Law International (Alphen); 
Molenaar, E.J., (2006), ‘Port State Jurisdiction: Towards Mandatory and Comprehensive Use’, in The Law 
of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, D. Freestone, R.A. Barnes and D. Ong (Eds.), 192-209, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford); Johnson, L., (2004), Coastal State Regulation of International Shipping, Oceana 
TM (New York); Klein, N., (2011), Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford), at pp. 318-319; Supra n. 137, Zwinge; Supra n. 136, Mansell, at pp. 219-237; Coghlin, T., (2005), 
‘Tightening the Screw on Substandard Shipping’, 2005(3) Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
316-326; Clarke, A., (1994), ‘Port State Control or Substandard Ships: Who is to Blame? What is the 
Cure?’, 1994(2) Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 202-209. 
221 Vorbach, J.E., (2001), ‘The Vital Role of Non-Flag State Actors in the Pursuit of Safer Shipping’, 32(1) 
Ocean Development and International Law 27-42; Van Leeuwen, J., (2010), Who Greens the Waves? 
Changing Authority in the Environmental Governance of Shipping and Offshore Oil and Gas Production, 
Wageningen Academic Publishers (Wageningen); Hare, J., ‘Port State Control: Strong Medicine to Cure a 
Sick Industry’, 26(3) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 571-594; Supra n. 188, 
Jillions, at pp. 444-445. 
240 
 
sovereignty, such as inter-state competition, races to the bottom and the exclusive 
freedom to externalise global responsibility.222  Indeed, the emphasis on internal interests 
rather than the collective interests of humankind means that public laws governing port 
and coastguard authorities usually emphasise criminal activities of national interest, such 
as inward smuggling, market distortion, and migrant trafficking, above distant 
environmental concerns.223  As the Task Force on IUU Fishing on the High Seas reported, 
not only are domestic enforcement agencies unaware of the true global costs, but any 
public expenditure by any state on criminal prosecution for activities having an impact 
beyond national jurisdiction are not recouped.224  Other practical factors also make non-
flag states uncomfortable regulators, such as the physical challenges of interdiction and 
inspection, the difficulty with surveillance, and the pressure to avoid additional delays 
and disruption in port.225   
 
For the very same reasons, market and transit states also make uncomfortable and highly 
ineffective regulators.226  What is more, particularly on account of processing supply 
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chain and transhipment practices, it is difficult to isolate imports which breach 
environmental standards.227  They also have considerable difficulty regulating resulting 
grey or black markets and are at constant risk of falling foul of trade protectionism 
rules.228  Home states, who have jurisdiction over their own nationals when visiting home, 
are also too distanced from the specific activities and are unsuitable prosecutorial 
enforcers or receptors of incriminating evidence.229  Indeed, in recent unverified reports 
of looting from the Battle of Jutland wrecks by converted trawlers in the North Sea, it 
appears that numerous port, coastal and flag states are implicated, but none have shown 
a willingness to fully invest in the security of wrecks more strongly valued by Britain and 
Germany.230  Even in their position as a home state, the British authorities do not appear 
to have prosecuted a UK national reported to have been involved in the illicit activities.231 
 
Critically, therefore, none of these states – whether flag, port, coastal, market, transit, or 
national – can avoid the same weaknesses of national sovereignty.  They can commonly 
refuse consent to any international law which does not provide them, and only them, with 
a political gain on balance.  They thus demand considerable incentivisation to invest 
financial and political resource in the sanctioning of their own citizens or in restricting 
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their own economic activity in deference to external interests.232   Furthermore, even if 
they did accept maximal jurisdictional responsibility, they would still stand to gain from 
competing in the provision of lax regulation and apathetic enforcement.  Understood in 
this perspective, it has been the sovereign freedom of deficient flag state systems to profit 
from lax regulation, rather than the use of flag state systems, which is at the heart of the 
legal system’s underlying weakness.  Certainly, increased regulation across all the 
governance nodes would significantly notch up standards in specific areas and force flag 
states to join collective standards arrangements, but the underlying fault lies in the 
inability to coerce states, flag or otherwise, to modify their behaviour in a manner against 
their own interests, as well as prohibiting states from externalising global ‘losses’; not in 
the use of flag state regulation per se.  As Englender et al recently hinted, ‘neither 
traditional means of enforcement nor a major reform of the principle of flag State 
jurisdiction seem to represent genuine options to tackle the problems surrounding the 
issue of compliance with international obligations’.233  
 
4. The Weaknesses of International Law and the UNESCO Convention 
Notwithstanding all of the above weaknesses of public international legal regulation, once 
it came to negotiations over the UNESCO Convention, the positive aspirations to affix 
meaningful jurisdictional rights and obligations within the original 1994 Buenos Aires 
Draft of the treaty were simply moulded and contorted to fit entirely within the 
Westphalian framework propagated by the LOSC.234  It is thus possible to see these very 
same weaknesses transmuted into the Convention’s framework, with its essence being a 
settlement reached between self-interested sovereign negotiators, with all the lowest 
common denominator issues, destructive ambiguities, reliance upon exclusive rights, and 
collectively agreed strong limits on the establishment of international liability.  This has 
also resulted in weaknesses with compliance and implementation by exclusive 
sovereigns, as explored in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
 
232 See Chapter 4. 
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Going further than the core issue of state compliance, there are numerous other areas 
where the UNESCO Convention rattles apart on its Westphalian foundations.  For 
example, beyond its tokenistic reference to the interests of NGOs and non-state actors in 
the Preamble, the UNESCO Convention provides no avenue for non-state actors to 
establish their interests or become any form of subject of global law protecting UCH.235  
Instead, the interests of the actual stakeholders who impact on UCH, or who actually 
value UCH, are only to be indirectly supervised through the medium of unchecked 
national regulation.  If two transnational stakeholders need to resolve conflicting interests 
or develop common solutions relating to UCH protection, they have no legal rules or 
framework to facilitate them, other than negotiations outside of the law or by reliance on 
diplomatic channels between uninterested states.236  The entire system is furthermore 
predicated upon a strict observance of territoriality and boundaries, with laws and rights 
completely transforming as you move between zones.  This creates a global web of 
disconnected regulatory nodes which are incredibly prone to exploitation by mere 
movement between systems.237  For example, while the public interest and conservation 
challenges facing the two wreck sites of the RMS Titanic and RMS Lusitania are largely 
similar, they are situated in completely divergent legal systems by total happenstance.238  
Similarly, UCH which is owned or ‘linked’ to other states, often falls to be regulated 
under the legal system of an entirely disconnected and often apathetic coastal state.239   
 
UCH therefore has the very same systemic issues of being undermined by shopping 
between ports or flags of convenience (or non-compliance) by transnational actors, where 
there is no accountability for ineffective domestic legislation or for the under-provision 
of public expenditure in the surveillance, policing, evidence-gathering, enforcement, or 
punishment of defectors.240  Indeed, as Blake has said of the UNESCO Convention in 
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2015, its ‘main weakness is that it can be very difficult to enforce nationality jurisdiction 
from a great distance while flag State jurisdiction is notoriously poorly applied.’241  
Kowalski also points to the practical challenges of interdicting vessels and enforcing 
UCH protection in the maritime environment.242  It is also common to find that looting of 
UCH has been linked to vessels registered under a flag-of-convenience or brought to the 
black market through a chain of poorly supervised vessels, ports, citizens and markets.243  
In many senses, therefore, the United States – with its pro-commerce outlook on UCH 
management – has also operated as a port-of-convenience, lowering standards 
elsewhere.244  Furthermore, upon further investigation, the very same connections can 
often be found between transnational organised crime and UCH looting.245  
 
The Convention also demonstrates the same issues of diluted and vacuous language, 
providing intentionally far-ranging latitude in interpretation and permitting behaviours to 
continue among non-compliant and low-compliant states.246  Examples of such grey terms 
lacking normative efficacy are peppered throughout the Convention.  Much of this 
vagueness is the result of an indolent and unimaginative repetition of parts of the LOSC, 
even when those rules which were emulated have already been criticised for being 
ambiguous or ill-conceived.  For example, there is a regular reference to the need to work 
with states possessing a ‘verifiable link, especially a cultural, historical or archaeological 
link, to the underwater cultural heritage concerned.’247  This wording has been largely 
adopted from Article 149 of the LOSC, despite having previously been subject to 
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extensive criticism for lack of clarity.248  Articles 3 and 10(2) both also intentionally 
invoke the status quo of the LOSC regime, despite the criticism it has received for failing 
to adequately address UCH.249  What is more, the extension of LOSC Article 303(2) on 
the regulation of UCH in the contiguous zone through Article 8 of the UNESCO 
Convention has also been subject to subsequent critique, with questions over the precise 
meaning of Articles 8 and 303 when both interoperating.250 
 
Issues were also raised in Chapter 2 about interpretative uncertainties surrounding Article 
4 on ‘commercial exploitation’ of UCH; as well as an examination in Chapter 3 of the 
normative force of the ‘duty to cooperate’ throughout the Convention.  While Article 2(8) 
on the potential perpetuation of sovereign immunity over sunken state vessels is perhaps 
the best that could be achieved in the circumstances,251 the precise meaning and 
boundaries of rights and duties is also open to much debate and potential future conflict.252  
The disjunction between the costs enjoyed and benefits absorbed by states, in 
combination with ‘liability-avoidance’ permitted by sovereign equality, has very clearly 
been observed in the UNESCO Convention by propagating the LOSC system of excessive 
state rights to natural resources, but including little concomitant state responsibility for 
the surrounding environment under the ambiguous and  practically meaningless 
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Furthermore, the obsessive focus with using artificial maritime boundaries in the 
governance of UCH, themselves the unfortunate result of years of political wrangling and 
legal posturing, forms another uninspired reinvocation of the Westphalian approach.254  
This recreates the same contests built around territoriality and exclusivity.255  As 
Dromgoole concedes, with a pessimistic hint about the actual influence that states have 
in achieving meaningful collective action, ‘the negotiators recognised that attempting to 
regulate the multitude of activities that take place in the marine zone would be a complex 
and ambitious task, and one well beyond the remit of a UNESCO-sponsored treaty.’256  
In so many words, it is so difficult to compel independent sovereigns to conform with 
rules imposing broad obligations to protect UCH from incidental threats, that negotiating 
states were content to prevent the creation of any such meaningful duties.  
 
5. Concluding Thoughts: Recurrent Gaps in the Legal System Protecting the 
(Historic) Marine Environment 
All of the findings across Chapters 3 to 5 have suggested that a solely Westphalian 
framework for governing the ocean’s historic environment carries an endemic recurrence 
of ‘gaps’.  First, we witness recurrent knowledge gaps.  This relates to the lack of 
communication between stakeholders and regulators, meaning that local or private actor 
knowledge or interests have not been effectively incorporated within regulatory decision-
making.257  It also refers to the lack of informed decision-making by market actors;258 the 
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lack of data exchange, resource-pooling and surveillance cooperation between regulators 
and enforcement agencies;259 the lack of accurate scientific data;260 and to the need for 
marine stakeholders to effectively cooperate and communicate regarding each other’s 
relative activities, resources, and interests.261  Second, the geographical gaps inherent in 
ocean governance are widely known.  Explored in detail when considering the issues with 
zonality, the fragmented and patchwork nature of ocean management is a familiar 
opprobrium.  Not only does this refer to the weakness and inefficiency of completely 
segregated regulation,262 but also to the fluid movement of persons, species and other 
objects between political borders,263 the lack of regulatory regimes in many regions 
around the world,264 and the failure of multi-level coordination and cooperation between 
regulatory systems.265   
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Closely interrelated, but less obvious, are the prevalent regulatory, incentive, normative 
and compliance gaps in transnational ocean management.  Regulatory gaps occur where 
legislation or regulatory processes are lagging or suffer from poor coordination.  For 
example, there is a particular concern with divided schemes of regulation, where 
disconnected organisations and actors operate within regulatory siloes.266  There is also 
regular criticism of the lack of coordination and regulatory cooperation between 
international organisations, regulators, national legislatures and enforcement agencies.267  
What is more, we witness a languid pace of regulation, especially when it is negotiated 
through political inter-state bargaining processes, which fail to keep pace with constantly 
shifting and intensifying human activities in the ocean or with new threats and 
opportunities.268   Normative gaps also relate to deficiencies of accountability and to the 
widespread lack of mandatory compliance-inducing obligations, with a recurring reliance 
upon ambiguous language or hortatory commitments, including within unenforceable 
rules or industry self-regulation.269   
 
Compliance gaps refers to the issue of compliance by states with their international 
commitments and with the poor level of implementation and enforcement by national 
regulators when dealing with externally valued public goods.270  It also refers to the lack 
of compliance by stakeholders with national law, as they freely select between or distance 
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themselves from traditional regulatory structures.271  Closely related to normative and 
compliance gaps, thus, are the incentive gaps which acknowledge the gap between a 
desired regulatory object and the incentive on the part of political actors to comply.  As 
was explored in Chapter 4, only by enabling consensus-made law to actually reign over 
consent-based self-enforcement, along with the eradication of horizontalism by the 
building of more powerful enforcement mechanisms, can regulators be incentivised to 
fully invest in much-needed cooperation and to break down the harmful interoperation of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and free riding.  The consent-based, horizontal and zonal system of 
public international law has thus weakened the effectiveness of ocean management for so 
long that now that what is needed is an entirely new approach to ocean law and 
governance.  This new transnational and integrated approach will be explored further in 
Chapters 6 to 10, where a proposal is made to expand multilateral, supranational and 
pluralistic regulation at the global, regional, local, and transnational scales. 
 
However, while this yearning for a new governance paradigm has been recently emerging 
in reference to the natural environment, there is still no research reviewing the protection 
of UCH from this critical perspective of the legal system, rather than the legal rules.  
While some writers on UCH law have noted the likely need for regional solutions,272 as 
well as made routine statements about the need for better integration of non-state 
actors,273 there is still a lack of detailed research committed toward understanding the 
benefits or the means to achieve these objectives.  For example, in 2013, Risvas set out 
to evaluate the issues with states merely relying on a commitment to cooperate within the 
UNESCO Convention.274  Although he made several important points, including the need 
for better regional agreements, he did not examine alternative governance structures 
beyond the LOSC framework and instead focused solutions upon further multilateral 
treatymaking or even the development of customary rules of international law.275  This is 
perhaps unsurprising given that he indicates, within a contemporaneous article, his 
admiration for the ‘much-celebrated Westphalian international legal order.’276  
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Perhaps the best progress in this regard was reached, in 2017, by a PhD student who 
published a brief article in the Berkeley Journal of International Law which at last showed 
some nascent awareness of the need to look beyond positive law.  Although the actual 
focus of the paper was on a standard and legalistic review of the UNESCO Convention’s 
application in some example contexts, it did mention some governance matters such as 
the growing role for transnational NGOs and the potential of regional regimes.277  
Nevertheless, a critical examination of the public international law model, and a detailed 
analysis of what such a post-Westphalian approach might entail, has not yet been 
achieved.  For example, in her leading book on the international law of UCH protection, 
Dromgoole suggests that the Convention ‘takes an internationalist, rather than nationalist, 
approach to the UCH resource’.278  Similarly, in 2006, she said that ‘UCH is already 
reaping the benefits of the modern trend towards an “holistic” approach to the marine 
environment.’279  However, the findings from this study would suggest that both of these 
statements do not uncover the situation accurately: it could in fact be argued that the 
UNESCO Convention takes a characteristically nationalistic, un-holistic and politically 
fragmented approach to the global governance of UCH protection. 
 
As a result, Chapters 6 to 10 now proceed to draw out a more integrated, transnational 
and multi-level approach which could enhance the level of protection for UCH, by 
making use of additional systems of protection beyond the inter-national paradigm.  This 
carries forward the theories and concepts of transnational law, as explored in Section 2 
above, and demonstrates that such an approach should be inclusive of other governance 
levels and multiple stakeholders beyond the state.  In order to construct such an inclusive 
and integrated approach, it will propose the enhanced use of a multi-level governance 
frame to understand transnational polity networks arranged across the global, regional, 
national and community levels.  It is these chapters which move beyond a critique of the 
current framework and explore, particularly through the empirical evidence obtained 
during this study, the possible solutions to overcoming our dogmatic reliance on national 
absolutism, equality and territoriality. 
 
 
277 Sarid, E., (2017), ‘International Underwater Cultural Heritage Governance: Past Doubts and Current 
Challenges’, 35(2) Berkeley Journal of International Law 219-261. 
278 Supra n. 243, Dromgoole, at pp. 371-372. 
279 Dromgoole, S., (2006), ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: 
National Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), xxvii-xxxviii, 




A Global Governance Approach to the Protection of Underwater 
Cultural Heritage 
 
Chapter Abstract:  
Having explored the many weaknesses with the present system of international law in 
protecting underwater cultural heritage (UCH) – including issues of international 
cooperation, vague and abstruse rules, under-compliance, collective action weaknesses 
over global public good production, and pervasive fragmentation and discord – the 
following chapter now introduces the potential solution of ‘multi-level governance’ 
explored through Chapters 6 to 10, i.e., governance which encourages the vertical 
allocation of transnational regulation across the global-regional-national-community 
levels.  The chapter first explores the relationship between ‘integrated ocean 
management’, ‘multi-level governance’ and ‘global governance’ with the search for 
solutions to fragmentation and gaps present within ocean governance models.  It then 
examines the first ‘level’ in a multi-level governance framework, by assessing whether 
the provision of detailed normative co-regulatory regimes and the empowerment and 
enhanced role of non-state actors and hybrids at the ‘global’ level could enhance the 
protection of UCH beyond the strictly national-level paradigm.  The chapters that follow 
then explore the regional-level (Chapter 7), national-level (Chapter 8) and local 
community-level (Chapter 9) respectively. 
 
1. Integrated, Transnational and Multi-Level Perspectives of Governance 
(a) Post-Westphalian Perspectives of Global Underwater Cultural Heritage Protection 
Having highlighted the numerous weaknesses of the public international law system in 
Chapters 3 to 5, as enforced through the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of 
the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO Convention)1 and the UN 1982 Convention 
of the Law of the Sea (LOSC),2 Chapters 6 to 9 now evaluate whether a multi-level 
governance approach – recognising law beyond the state at different governance ‘levels’, 
i.e., global, regional, and community levels – could provide additional protections and 
 
1 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 2001, 
in force 2 January 2009), 2562 UNTS 1. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 397. 
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norms which drive forward the quality of the international system protecting UCH.  In 
effect, as this section proceeds to demonstrate, one can understand the multi-level 
approach as effectively taking the ‘transnational’ approach, as introduced in Chapter 5, 
as well as an ‘integrated’ approach, as increasingly called for in marine governance 
circles.  It demonstrates that, given UCH’s characterisation as a prototypically 
transnational concern in a transnational context, it is better suited to a form of global 
protection which has further expanded ‘vertically’, up and down the governance scales; 
as opposed to restricting governance to the ‘horizontal’ level, purely between sovereign 
nations.   
 
The following chapters therefore evaluate the possibility of taking a more transnational 
governance approach to protecting UCH by examining each of these governance ‘levels’ 
in turn, looking at the global level (Chapter 6), regional level (Chapter 7), national level 
(Chapter 8), and community level (Chapter 9).  In each case, the chapters will introduce 
some theories and previous empirical studies which demonstrate the efficacy of 
governance being utilised at each level, before then proceeding to incorporate and assess 
these theories in the context of UCH protection, relying on this study’s own empirical 
findings, interviews and literature study.  Each of the chapters provide evidence that the 
global protection of UCH could be advanced further by moving beyond a strictly 
‘nationalist’ paradigm and recognising that communities, organisations, rules, and 
systems – operating at the global, regional and local spatial scales – could all provide a 
valuable form of additional protection.   
 
It is shown that such approaches could help ameliorate many of the issues identified 
throughout Chapters 3 to 5 relating to poor international compliance, consent-based law, 
and collective action failure in the production of goods with positive externalities.  In 
looking at the national level, Chapter 8 also naturally explores how the traditional frame 
of national and international law, as critiqued in these earlier chapters, will continue to be 
essential in an effective multi-level framework.  Instead, it is argued, the national level 
should now interact in a complementary and harmonious duality with ‘law beyond the 
state’.  As Firth said in interview, ‘I think the idea of having a multiple-layered approach 
is a good one.’3  Referring to his own thesis chapter on ‘Nationalism and Post-
Nationalism’, in his book on Managing Archaeology Underwater, he explains how his 
own research had discovered how ‘you can actually anticipate different models of 
 
3 Firth, A., (2018), Interview with Antony Firth, 15 March 2018, Transcript on File. 
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managing marine archaeology which are not so reliant on the nation state’, including at 
the subnational and at the European level.4   
 
The chapter which follows first argues that there is an uncoincidental link between calls 
to take a more “integrated” approach to managing the marine environment with the 
theories and concepts of transnational law, which was introduced in Chapter 5.  Following 
this, Section 2 goes on to examine some of the rules and actors which could enhance the 
protection of UCH at a ‘global’ level.  This sets the scene for Chapter 7, which undertakes 
an important assessment of some key advantages of adopting further regulation at the 
‘regional’ level. 
 
(b) Widespread Calls for a New “Integrated” Approach to Governing the Marine 
Environment 
The weaknesses of the ocean’s legal system rather than its legal rules, as highlighted 
across Chapters 3 to 5, has increasingly become a central focus of the international 
community.  For example, throughout detailed studies between 2010 and 2015 by the Ad 
Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation 
and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National 
Jurisdiction (‘BBNJ Working Group’), concern was continually expressed at the 
inevitably poor implementation or the likely dilution of any resulting commitments 
between states, rather than the content of any agreed rules.5  As a result, the BBNJ 
Working Group urged the need for better cooperation and coordination between ‘all 
sectors and all levels’, conceding that ‘a global universal governance structure remained 
the best way to promote sustainable marine biodiversity beyond areas of national 
jurisdiction.’6   
 
This pessimistic allusion to the present system of law – highlighting concern for 
compliance, implementation and enforcement of international agreements, or with 
 
4 Supra n. 3, Firth; Firth, A., (2002), Managing Archaeology Underwater: A Theoretical, Historical and 
Comparative Perspective on Society and its Submerged Past, BAR Publishing (Oxford), at pp. 79-100. 
5 E.g., UN General Assembly, (2008), Letter dated 15 May 2008 from the Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc 
Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of 
marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction addressed to the President of the General 
Assembly, 16 May 2008, Sixty-Third Session, UN Doc. A/63/79, at para. 47; UN General Assembly, 
(2015), Letter dated 13 February 2015 from the Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working 
Group to the President of the General Assembly, 13 February 2015, Sixty-Ninth Session, UN Doc. 
A/69/780, at para. 13. 
6 Ibid, 2015 Letter from Working Group to UNGA President, at para. 12. 
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pervasive regulatory, normative or geographical gaps – has also become increasingly 
visible in leading academic commentary.  For example, Vousden stated in 2015 that 
‘many leading experts on high seas and ocean governance are now convinced that . . . 
there is now an urgent need for a transformation to a more suitable legal regime which is 
more cross-sectoral and integrated in its management approaches and strategies.’7  In the 
same year, Warner also said that international discussions ‘have demonstrated that a more 
integrated legal and institutional structure rather than the current patchwork of hard and 
soft law provisions and disparate institutions is needed’.8  In 2013, Freestone said that 
‘virtually all are in agreement . . . that we need far more effective means of enforcing 
compliance with the norms and structures that we have.’9  In 2015, Guilfoyle highlighted 
that ‘the problem is usually less with the substantive law than with State capacity to 
implement it’.10  In 2015, Scott wrote that among ‘all levels of oceans governance – 
national, regional, and global – it is now recognized that fragmented and sector-based 
management “is a major contributor to deteriorating ocean health”.’11   
 
Similarly, in 1999, a former Secretary-General of the IMO said that the organisation had 
concluded that it did ‘not need more treaties and more regulations[, but instead that] focus 
should be placed on achieving uniform implementation of IMO global standards that are 
already on the books’.12  In 2012, Jillions wrote that ‘the real gap is not in the enforcement 
regime of UNCLOS, but . . . in the wider constitutional enforcement regime for the most 
 
7 Vousden, D., (2015), ‘Large Marine Ecosystems and Associated New Approaches to Regional, 
Transboundary and ‘High Seas’ Management’, in Research Handbook on International Marine 
Environmental Law, R. Rayfuse (Ed.), 385-410, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham), at p. 390; Rayfuse, R. and 
Warner, R., (2008), ‘Securing a Sustainable Future for the Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction: The Legal 
Basis for an Integrated Cross-Sectoral Regime for High Seas Governance for the 21st Century’, 23(3) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 399-422. 
8 Warner, R.M., (2015), ‘Conserving Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Co-
Evolution and Interaction with the Law of the Sea’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, D.R. 
Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, K.N. Scott and T. Stephens (Eds.), 752-776, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford), at p. 775. 
9 Freestone, D., (2013), ‘The Law of the Sea Convention at 30: Successes, Challenges and New Agendas’, 
in The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention at 30: Successes, Challenges and New Agendas, D. Freestone (Ed.), 
1-8, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 8. 
10 Guilfoyle, D., (2015), ‘The High Seas’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, D.R. Rothwell, 
A.G. Oude Elferink, K.N. Scott and T. Stephens (Eds.), 203-225, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 
224. 
11 Scott, K.N., (2015), ‘Integrated Oceans Management: A New Frontier in Marine Environmental 
Protection’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, D.R. Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, K.N. Scott 
and T. Stephens (Eds.), 463-490, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 488-489 (internal quote: 
Ekstrom, J. A., Young, O. R., Gaines, S. D., Gordon, M. and McCay, B. J., (2009), ‘A Tool to Navigate 
Overlaps in Fragmented Ocean Governance’ 33(3) Marine Policy 532-535, at p. 532). 
12 O’Neil, W., (1999), ‘Welcoming Remarks’, in Current Maritime Issues and the International Maritime 
Organization, M.H. Nordquist and J.N. Moore (Eds.), 3-6, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 4. 
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important . . . rules of international law.’13  In 2014, Visbeck et al suggested that ocean 
governance has failed ‘due to the basic structures set out under international law.’14  In 
2015, Kirk concisely expressed that the ‘need for a holistic approach to ocean governance 
has gained widespread acceptance and warrants little debate.’15  Similarly, Altvater said 
during interview that ‘we simply should implement what we have and we don't do it, we 
are too lax on that, we’re not really strict.’16  In other words, it is not necessarily the 
posited law contained in inter-state treaties which needs reform, but the ocean’s legal 
system itself. 
 
In response to these systemic gaps within the present system of international law, as were 
explored in detail throughout Chapters 3 to 5, there are widespread calls for an approach 
built around greater ‘integration’ or for ‘Integrated Ocean Management’ (IOM).17  For 
example, Agenda 21, which was adopted at the famed 1992 UN Rio Conference on 
Environment and Development, declared in its Chapter 17 that the ocean ‘forms an 
integrated whole’ and requires new regulatory approaches which are ‘integrated in 
content’.18  Similarly, in 2001, a UN General Assembly Resolution also regarded 
‘[c]apacity-building, regional cooperation and coordination, and integrated ocean 
management, as important cross-cutting issues to ocean affairs.’19  In 2002, the UN Open-
Ended Informal Consultative Process declared that an ‘integrated, interdisciplinary, 
interzonal and ecosystem-based approach to oceans management . . . is not just desirable, 
it is essential.’20  The need to take an integrated, multidisciplinary, and multi-sectoral 
 
13 Jillions, A., (2012), ‘Commanding the Commons: Constitutional Enforcement and the Law of the Sea’, 
1(3) Global Constitutionalism 429-454, at p. 21. 
14 Visbeck, M., Kronfeld-Goharani, U., Neumann, B., Rickels, W., Schmidt, J., van Doorn, E., Matz-Lück, 
N. and Proelss, A., (2014), ‘A Sustainable Development Goal for the Ocean and Coasts: Global Ocean 
Challenges Benefit from Regional Initiatives Supporting Globally Coordinated Solutions’, 49 Marine 
Policy 87-89, at p. 87. 
15 Kirk, E.A., (2015), ‘The Ecosystem Approach and the Search for An Objective and Content for the 
Concept of Holistic Ocean Governance’, 46(1) Ocean Development & International Law 33-49, at p. 33. 
16 Altvater, S., (2018), Interview with Susanne Altvater, 17 May 2018, Transcript on File. 
17 Although various different phrases have been used over the years, often with different emphases, the 
term “Integrated Ocean Management” has become quite widely adopted (e.g., Jakobsen, I.U., (2013), ‘The 
Adequacy of the Law of the Sea and International Environmental Law to the Marine Arctic: Integrated 
Ocean Management and Shipping’, 22(1) Michigan State International Law Review 291-320, at pp. 297-
298). 
18 UN General Assembly, (1992), Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, Forty-
Sixth Session, 12 August 1992, UN Doc. A/Conf.151/26; Naeve, H. and Garcia, S.M., (1995), ‘The United 
Nations System Responds to Agenda 21.17: Oceans’, 29(1-3) Ocean and Coastal Management 23-33. 
19 UN General Assembly, (2001), Resolution Adopted by the UN General Assembly: 56/12. Oceans and the 
law of the sea, 13 December 2001, Fifty-Sixth Session, UN Doc. A/RES/56/12, at para 48. 
20 UN General Assembly, (2002), Report on the work of the United Nations Open-ended Informal 
Consultative Process established by the General Assembly in its resolution 54/33 in order to facilitate the 
annual review by the Assembly of developments in ocean affairs at its third meeting – Letter dated 20 May 
2002 from the Co-Chairpersons of the Consultative Process addressed to the President of the General 
Assembly, 2 July 2002, Fifty-Seventh Session, UN Doc. A/57/80, at para.4. 
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approach to ocean management was further confirmed again at the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development and, in 2012, at the Rio + 20 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development.21  Another UN General Assembly Resolution in 2005 also declared that 
‘the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole 
through an integrated, interdisciplinary and intersectoral approach’, stressing ‘the need to 
improve cooperation and coordination at national, regional and global levels [and] 
promoting the implementation [of] integrated ocean management’.22 
 
It is not just global institutions and accords relaying this message, but academics have 
also been consonant.  For example, in 2008, Tanaka wrote how ‘international documents 
tend to stress the importance of a holistic approach by referring to . . . “integrated ocean 
management”.’23  In 2012, Barnes told us that ‘integration is an essential feature of the 
law of the sea.’24  In 2014, Druel and Gjerde said protection of the marine environment 
should be ‘effectively dealt with in an integrated manner across an interconnected 
ocean.’25  In 2015, Scott said IOM had ‘been widely endorsed – in theory if not in practice 
– at national, regional, and global levels.’26  Then in 2016, just as unequivocally, Wright 
et al said that ‘[m]any States, scientific experts and civil society groups have . . . 
repeatedly highlighted the need for integrated ocean governance.’27   
 
Yet, despite its central placement on the global agenda, the precise meaning, content and 
envisioned structure of this new integrated approach to ocean management remains 
remarkably underexamined.28  Under the pressures of globalisation, it appears that IOM 
 
21 United Nations, (2002), Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development Johannesburg, South 
Africa, 26 August – 4 September 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20, at para. 30; United Nations, (2012), 
Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 20-22 June 
2012, UN Doc. A/CONF.216/16, at paras. 158 and 161. 
22 UN General Assembly, (2006), Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 2005: 
60/30. Oceans and the law of the sea, 8 March 2006, Sixtieth-Session, UN Doc. A/RES/60/30, at Preamble. 
23 Tanaka, Y., (2008), A Dual Approach to Ocean Governance: The Cases of Zonal and Integrated 
Management of the Laws of the Sea, Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 16. 
24 Barnes, R., (2012), ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and the Integrated Regulation of the Oceans’, 27(4) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 859-866, at p. 859 (emphasis added). 
25 Druel, E. and Gjerde, K.M., (2014), ‘Sustaining Marine Life Beyond Boundaries: Options for an 
Implementing Agreement for Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’, 49 Marine Policy 90-97, at p. 91. 
26 Supra n. 11, Scott, at p. 464. 
27 Wright, G., Rochette, J., Blom, L., Currie, D., Durussel, C., Gjerde, K. and Unger, S., (2016), High Seas 
Fisheries: What Role for a New International Binding Instrument?, Study No. 3/2016, IDDRI (Paris), (at: 
https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/import/publications/st0316_gw-et-al._fisheries-bbnj.pdf; 
accessed: 4 January 2019), at p. 9. 
28 ‘[T]he concept . . . remains obscure in international law. Indeed, it appears that international instruments 
tend to use the term loosely.’ (Supra n. 23, Tanaka, at p. 17); ‘Despite the endorsement and, in many cases, 
adoption and application of IOM by national, regional, and global institutions a definitive definition of the 
concept remains elusive.’ (Supra n. 11, Scott, at p. 466); ‘There are many different formulations and 
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is primarily focused on the holistic management of the ocean as one large interdependent 
and truly transnational ecosystem.29  By understanding the placement of humans as an 
integral aspect of this interconnected ocean network, many writers liken IOM to an 
‘ecosystems-based approach’; which would, in essence, require all decision-making and 
management to derive from a highly relational (interdependent) and cumulative 
understanding of marine activities upon the long-term interests of all stakeholders.30   
 
Some go so far as to view IOM and ecosystems-based management as interchangeable 
terms.31  By contrast, Oanta viewed IOM as necessitating end-to-end regulation which 
improves cohesion and harmony across the regulatory framework.32  Most also concur 
that IOM’s meaning is rarely fixed but is, in fact, highly context-dependent.33  It is 
therefore perhaps best characterised as a growing collection of principles and processes 
which can be called upon depending on the specific context, challenges and circumstances 
in focus.34  Scott, for example, draws upon various environmental principles and marine 
planning processes being used in various regions and nations across the world.35  
Similarly, Kirk argues that an approach is needed which ‘combines both principle and 
process’, although she only really draws upon a narrow set of environmental principles 
which merely comprise an ecosystems-based approach.36   
 
Yet, a brief review across the literature field would suggest that IOM perhaps contains a 
number of general environmental principles, such as sustainable development, 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity, ecosystem services, common but 
differentiated responsibilities, access and benefit sharing, precautionary management, 
and the polluter pays principle.  As well as other more general principles such as public 
 
definitions and many denominations applied in different instruments and documents’ (supra n. 17, 
Jakobsen, at p. 297). 
29 E.g., Barnes, R.A., Freestone, D. and Ong, D.M., (2006), ‘The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects’, 
in The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, D. Freestone, R.A. Barnes and D.M. Ong (Eds.), 1-27, 
Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 3; UN General Assembly, (2006), Oceans and the law of the sea: 
Report of the Secretary-General, 9 March 2006, Sixty-First Session, UN Doc. A/61/63, at para. 136. 
30 Supra n. 17, Jakobsen, at pp. 293-296; Supra n. 15, Kirk; Jay, S., (2012), ‘Marine Space: Manoeuvring 
Towards a Relational Understanding’,14(1) Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 81-96; Supra n. 
11, Scott, at p. 465; Supra n. 23, Tanaka, at p. 18. 
31 Torrie, M., (2016), Integrated Ocean Management - Fisheries, Oil, Gas, and Seabed Mining, FAO 
Globefish Research Programme, Vol. 122, United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (Rome), 
(at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6048e.pdf; accessed 2 January 2019), at p. 1. 
32 Oanta, G.A. (2014), ‘Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment as a Goal for Achieving 
Sustainable Development on the Rio+20 Agenda’, 16 International Community Law Review 214-235, at p. 
226. 
33 Supra n. 11, Scott, at pp. 466-467. 
34 Supra n. 11, Scott; Supra n. 15, Kirk. 
35 Supra n. 11, Scott. 
36 Supra n. 15, Kirk. 
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participation, transparency, and accountability.  In addition to these principles, numerous 
governance processes can be utilised in order to achieve better integration, such as marine 
spatial planning, marine protected areas, environmental impact assessments, integrated 
coastal zone management, co-management, and various collaborative models of 
governance.   
 
Finally, many authors also understand IOM as serving to bridge the specific ‘gaps’ in 
ocean governance, which arise under the LOSC framework.  Barnes’s approach, for 
example, classified IOM as providing normative, spatial, sectoral, temporal, disciplinary 
and user integration.37  Similarly, the BBNJ Working Group viewed IOM as bridging 
regulation, implementation, governance, coordination and information sharing gaps.38  
Further, although Tanaka broke IOM down into ecological, normative and 
implementation integration vectors, it can be seen that his definition of these was 
narrowly focused upon institutional or agency coordination and, thus, largely excluded 
the various gaps arising when looking more closely at the vital stakeholder level.39   
 
In other words, at the heart of all of these theories, as well as the numerous principles and 
processes highlighted, is a consistent theme of stakeholder inclusivity, with a concomitant 
search for adaptive and efficient systems of multi-level regime-building – across global, 
regional, national, and local levels – to coordinate this expanded corpus of non-state 
actors and transnational institutions.  This account of IOM accords, for example, with 
Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s renowned 1998 visionary monograph, ‘The Oceanic Circle: 
Governing the Seas as a Global Resource’, which promoted a new approach to ocean 
governance in the light of failures under the international sovereignty model.40  Both 
Borgese and Arvid Pardo now perhaps deserve greater posthumous recognition for both 
of their clairvoyant appeals for a more equitable and community-centred approach, 
necessitating the inclusion of all humankind at the centre of ocean management and 
focusing maritime sovereignty under a functional lens.41  The same recognition could 
 
37 Supra n. 24, Barnes, at pp. 860-862. 
38 UN General Assembly, (2012), Letter dated 8 June 2012 from the Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly, 13 June 2012, Sixty-Seventh Session, 
UN Doc. A/67/95, at paras. 34 and 42. 
39 Supra n. 23, Tanaka, at pp. 18-21. 
40 Borgese, E.M., (1998), The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource, United Nations 
University Press (New York). 
41 E.g., Ibid; Pardo, A., (1983), ‘An Opportunity Lost’, in Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy Dilemma, B.H. 
Oxman, D.C. Caron and C.L.O. Buderi (Eds.), 13-26, ICS Press (San Francisco); Pardo, A., (1984), ‘The 
Law of the Sea: Its Past and Its Future’, 63(1) Oregon Law Review 7-17; Pardo, A. and Borgese, E.M., 
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perhaps also be attributed to Allott’s thesis on the Mare Nostrum (‘Our Sea’) in 1992, 
which similarly attempted to make a case for a human-centred and post-Westphalian 
approach to ocean governance.42  As Barnes, Freestone and Ong said in 2006, perhaps 
with some hope, there has been a ‘decline in [the] vigour’ of positivism in the 
international law of the sea today, which has begun seeking ‘the existence of an 
international community rather than a society of independent States’.43   
 
(c) “Integrated” Ocean Governance as Another Word for “Transnational” Governance 
The present system of international law – built around horizontal state bargaining, 
reactive consent-based mechanisms and reliance on enforcement by domestic agencies – 
has been shown in Chapters 3 to 5 to be one of the key culprits for the law of the sea’s 
deficiency, inefficiency, zero-sum competition effects, and propensity for races to the 
bottom.44   While commentators have perhaps occasionally noted the transnational nature 
of the oceans,45 where solutions are needed which provide for regulatory consistency and 
which capture transnational activity from end-to-end,46 there has been a noticeable dearth 
of literature in the law of the sea field making the link between transnational law, as a 
broad discipline and field of study (as introduced in Chapter 5) with the coveted principles 
and processes of IOM, as highlighted above.47  Given that the same weaknesses of the 
international law of the sea which are universally lamented are nearly identical to those 
that the transnational legal discipline seeks to address – in particular emphasising the 
expanded role of supranational and non-state systems and actors operating more fluidly 
at transnational scales – this is both surprising and regretful.  This is more so given that, 
in its normative guise, transnational law seeks to achieve a multiple-level, holistic and 
inclusive system of law in response to global regulatory challenges.  As such, any 
 
(1975), The New International Economic Order and the Law of the Sea: A Projection, International Ocean 
Institute (Malta). 
42 Allott, P., (1992), ‘Mare Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea’, 86(4) American Journal of 
International Law 764-787 
43 Supra n. 29, Barnes, Freestone and Ong, at p. 13. 
44 See Chapters 3 to 5. Bederman, D.J., (2008), Globalization and International Law, Palgrave Macmillan 
(London), at p. 168. 
45 E.g., Cartner, J.A.C., Fiske, R. and Leiter, T., (2009), The International Law of the Shipmaster, Routledge 
(Abingdon), at pp. 24-25 (‘The shipmaster works mostly under transnational maritime law.’ (Emphasis 
added)). 
46 Supra n. 32, Oanta, at pp. 221 and 226; Le Gallic, B., (2008), ‘The Use of Trade Measures Against Illicit 
Fishing: Economic and Legal Considerations’, 64(4) Ecological Economics 858-866, at p. 858; High Seas 
Task Force, “net to supermarket”. 
47 For example, in January 2019, a Google search by the author for “transnational law of the sea” returns 
zero results; whereas “transnational human rights” returns 74,500 results, “transnational environmental 
law” returns 37,400 results, “transnational criminal law” returns 178,000 results, and even “transnational 
family law” returns 3,400 results. 
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proposed model of IOM should, by necessity, incorporate the theories, processes and 
approaches of transnational law and governance. 
 
In all cases, as noted, one can find that stakeholder participation – and the capacity of 
ocean users at all levels both within and without the state to effectively and productively 
communicate, cooperate, coordinate, and collaborate – as is at the heart of the IOM 
approach.  For example, even under those headings which are discernibly regulatory in 
focus, such as the need for normative frameworks which cross political boundaries, the 
underlying rationale is addressing the conflicting and overlapping interests of multi-level 
communities, which are presently inadequately served by a fragmented zonal system.48  
Barnes therefore rightly summarises that a ‘truly integrated approach’ would empower 
stakeholders to be engaged in the regulation process.49  However, he also rightly conceded 
that, while the LOSC recognises the importance of stakeholder inclusion, its state-to-state 
focus means that ‘it lacks the institutional capacity to accommodate a wider range of 
participants and to structure their input into the management of ocean space.’50   
 
(d) Transnational Governance as Multi-Level Governance 
It is possible to detect the same common theme throughout all social scientific research 
fields which seek to improve upon the presently beleaguered model of Westphalian law, 
being that of considerably enhanced stakeholder participation throughout the wider 
governance structure.51  Research and theories aimed at increasing public participation 
have therefore proliferated in recent years, with the principle of civil society inclusivity 
being seen by some as a revolutionary movement.52  Environmental public participation 
 
48 See Chapters 5 and 9. 
49 Supra n. 24, Barnes, at p. 862. 
50 Supra n. 24, Barnes, at p. 862. 
51 Macdonald, T., (2008), Global Stakeholder Democracy: Power and Representation Beyond Liberal 
States, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Commission on Global Governance, (1995), Our Global 
Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Oxford University Press (Oxford); 
Commission on Global Governance, (1999), The Millennium Year and the Reform Process, Commission 
on Global Governance (London); Boutros‐Ghali, B. and United Nations (1996), An Agenda for 
Democratization, United Nations (New York); Ebbesson, J., (2008), ‘Public Participation’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law, D. Bodansky J. Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 681-703, 
Oxford University Press (Oxford); Coenen, F., Huitema, D. and O'Toole, L. (Eds.), (1998), Participation 
and the Quality of Environmental Decision Making, Springer (New York); Gemmill, B. and Bamidele-Izu, 
A., (2002), ‘The Role of NGOs and Civil Society in Global Environmental Governance’, in Global 
Environmental Governance: Options and Opportunities, D.C. Esty and M.H. Ivanova, 77-100, Yale School 
of Forestry & Environmental Studies (New Haven). 
52 Raustiala, K., (1997), ‘The ‘Participatory Revolution’ in International Environmental Law’, 21(2) 
Harvard Environmental Law Review 537-586; Woodward, B.K., (2010), Global Civil Society in 
International Lawmaking and Global Governance, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden); Ebbesson, J., (1997), ‘The 
Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law’, 8 Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law 51-97; Sand once described the 1992 Rio Conference as a ‘participatory revolution’, 
261 
 
can range from small-scale local resource management, right up to the representation of 
global communities and interest groups at international fora.53  It can also come in many 
forms, from a simple requirement to improve public information and transparency of 
decisionmakers, to consultations of affected individuals and communities in the 
development of new legislation, up to full-scale regulatory management of public goods 
by private actors.54  There are also many representative forms of the global demos, such 
as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including charities, advocacy networks and 
interest groups all operating at the national, regional and global levels; corporations and 
other enterprises, also operating at or across the local, national, regional and global scales; 
epistemic (or ‘expert’) communities and standards bodies, across all levels; as well as all 
communities and individual humans themselves.55   
 
As a result, it has also become apparent that multi-level governance (MLG), i.e., 
governance which is understood as interlinking and overlapping regimes at different 
spatial ‘levels’ or scales – global, regional, national, and community – should provide 
both the descriptive and normative frame in which to understand the coveted stakeholder-
inclusive model.  Not only does MLG provide an appealing vision for a simple response 
to the complex challenge of transnational governance and provide substance to the idea 
of multi-stakeholderisation, but also helps clarify the role and function of the state and 
the role of non-state actors in the governance framework.56  In fact, a multi-stakeholder 
approach naturally calls for a multi-level approach given that most actors ‘beyond the 
 
where having ‘more than 1,400 non-governmental organizations registered as observers and 8,000 at the 
parallel Global Forum . . . prepared the ground not only for subsequent reforms in UN accreditation rules . 
. . but also for the public-private partnerships eventually formalized at the 2002 Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development.’ (Sand, P.H., (2008), ‘The Evolution of International Environmental 
Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, D. Bodansky J. Brunnée and E. Hey 
(Eds.), 29-43, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 40-41); ‘The literature on participation in 
environmental decision-making is vast, crossing various disciplines’ (Pieraccini, M., (2015), ‘Rethinking 
Participation in Environmental Decision-Making: Epistemologies of Marine Conservation in South-East 
England’, 27(1) Journal of Environmental Law 45-67, at p. 47). 
53 Aloni, C., Daminabo, I., Alexander, B.C. and Bakpo, M.T., (2015), ‘The Importance of Stakeholders 
Involvement in Environmental Impact Assessment’, 5(5) Resources and Environment 146-151, at pp. 148-
149; UNDP, (2016), Promoting Sustainable Development Through More Effective Civil Society 
Participation in Environmental Governance: A Selection of Country Case Studies from the EU-NGOs 
Project, United Nations Development Programme (New York), at p. 8. 
54 Supra nn. 51-53; For example, Bederman helpfully distinguishes between two types of stakeholder 
participation, being direct democracy and participation based on ‘delegatory paradigms (based on principal-
agent theories and the practices of representative republics)’ (supra n. 44, Bederman, at p. 172). 
55 Bodansky, D., Brunnée J. and Hey, E., (2008), ‘International Environmental Law: Mapping the Field’, 
in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, D. Bodansky J. Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 
1-28, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 16-17. 
56 Supra n. 51, Macdonald, at pp. 32-34; Connelly, C., (2012), Multi-Stakeholder Decision-Making: A 
Guidebook for Establishing a Multi-Stakeholder Decision-Making Process to Support Green, Low-
Emission and Climate-Resilient Development Strategies, United Nations Development Programme (New 
York), at p. 3. 
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state’ are characteristically found above or below the national level.57  It appears clear 
that such a multi-level approach is sought in the attainment of integrated governance.  
Indeed, the IUCN Draft International Covenant, Rio Declaration, and Agenda 21 each 
call unequivocally for ‘action at all levels’ – international, regional, national and local – 
in order to effectively achieve sustainable development.58  MLG therefore becomes a 
necessary byproduct of the worldwide search for governance beyond government.   
 
Having started life in the early 1990s as a theme to political studies of Europeanisation 
following the Maastricht Treaty,59 MLG has spent much of its life as a descriptive 
‘analytic frame’ for understanding the multi-level policy constellations (supranational – 
national – subnational) within the European Union.60  As a result, it was often compared 
with liberal intergovernmentalism as an explanation for the origins of EU policy.61  Over 
time, despite MLG being ‘interpreted in several ways and remain[ing] a rather fluid 
theoretical basis for empirical research’,62 it is becoming increasingly adopted as a 
normatively preferable approach to governing transboundary challenges.63  MLG is 
 
57 E.g., Breslin, S. and Nesadurai, H.E.S., ‘Who Governs and How? Non-State Actors and Transnational 
Governance in Southeast Asia’, 48(2) Journal of Contemporary Asia 187-203. 
58 IUCN Environmental Law Programme, (2010), Draft International Covenant on Environment and 
Development, 4th Edn, Prepared in cooperation with the International Council of Environmental Law, IUCN 
(Gland); Supra n. 18, United Nations, ‘Agenda 21’, Art. 8.3; According to the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, ‘environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all 
concerned citizens, at the relevant levels’ (UN General Assembly, (1992), Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, 12 August 1992, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (adopted 
13 June 1992), UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26, at Principle 10); Houghton, K., (2014), ‘Identifying New 
Pathways For Ocean Governance: The Role of Legal Principles in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’, 49 
Marine Policy 118-126, at p. 122 (‘These instruments call univocally for “action at all levels” – 
international, regional, national and local – to achieve sustainable development, directly resonating with 
the cooperation clause in Article 197 UNCLOS, which opens the treaty for multi-level governance 
approaches through regional institutions.’). 
59 See Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., (2001), Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers (Lanham); Marks, G., (1993), ‘Structural Policy and Multi-Level Governance in the 
EC’, in The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond, A. Cafruny and G. 
Rosenthal (Eds.), 391-411, Lynne Rienner (Boulder). 
60 Marks, G. and Hooghe, L., (2004), ‘Contrasting Visions of Multi-Level Governance’, in Multi-level 
Governance, I. Bache and M. Flinders (Eds.), 15-30, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Piattoni, S., (2009), 
‘Multi-Level Governance: A Historical and Conceptual Analysis’, 31(2) European Integration 163-180; 
Stephenson, P., (2013), ‘Twenty Years of Multi-Level Governance: Where Does It Come From? What Is 
It? Where Is It Going?’, 20(6) Journal of European Public Policy 817-837. 
61 Fairbrass, J. and Jordan, A., (2004), ‘Multi-Level Governance and Environmental Policy’, in Multi-level 
Governance, I. Bache and M. Flinders (Eds.), 147-164, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 152-153. 
62 Eckerberg, K. and Joas, M., (2004), ‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance: A Concept Under Stress?’, 
9(5) Local Environment 405-412, at p. 411. 
63 Kelly, G.H., (2012), ‘Surveying Emissions Trading Through a Multi-Level Governance Lens’, in 
International Environmental Law: Contemporary Concerns and Challenges: Papers Presented at the First 
Contemporary Challenges of International Environmental Law Conference, Ljubljana, June 28-29, 2012, 
V. Sancin (Ed.),  329-358, GV Založba (Ljubljana), at p. 358; Weibust, I. and Meadowcroft, J., (2014), 
Multilevel Environmental Governance Managing Water and Climate Change in Europe and North 
America, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham); c.f., Paavola, J., (2015), ‘Multi‐Level Environmental Governance: 
Exploring the Economic Explanations’, 26(3) Environmental Policy and Governance 143-154. 
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therefore closely intertwined with the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ and the proviso that 
governance should occur at the lowest possible level at which it is effective.64  Vitally, 
for those issues for which decision-making can cause underspills and overspills, including 
global public goods such as the protection of UCH, there is a need for a higher 
supranational level to coordinate and arbitrate between national governments in order to 
prevent regulatory races to the bottom and free rider effects.65  For issues which can be 
effectively managed at decentralised levels, such as the management of heritage by 
coastal communities, the role of higher governance levels is more focused on the 
provision of the necessary tools, resources, rules and supervision needed to enable the 
subnational or community levels to act autonomously and effectively.66   
 
Indeed, as explored in Chapters 4 and 5, protecting UCH produces spillover 
characteristics by the radiation of abstract values lost as externalities, which results in 
underproduction by nation states when determining their level of good production.  MLG 
can therefore resolve these collective action failures by integrating states into regimes or 
processes which delegate decision-making authority and accountability to more suitable 
levels, such as through regional or global regimes, only in those specific areas where 
international law is failing to produce the public goods.67  It also permits states to pass 
technical management and administrative responsibility for global goods onto more 
 
64 Begg, D.K.H., Wyplosz, C., Venables, A.J., Edwards, J., Sinn, H-W., Danthine, J-P., Grilli, V., Neven, 
D.J., Seabright, P. and Cremer, J., (1993), Making Sense of Subsidiarity: How Much Centralization for 
Europe?, Centre for Economic Policy Research (London); Van Kersbergen, K. and Verbeek, B., (2004), 
‘Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance in the European Union’, 2(2) Comparative European Politics 
142–162; Bryant, R.C., (1995), International Coordination of National Stabilization Policies, Brookings 
Institution (Washington DC), at p. 31; Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M., (1999), ‘Global Public Goods: 
Concepts, Policies and Strategies’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, 
I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 450-507, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 477. 
65 Van den Bergh, R., (2010), ‘Private Law in a Globalising World: Economic Criteria for Choosing the 
Optimal Regulatory Level in a Multi-Level Government System’, in Globalization and Private Law: The 
Way Forward, M. Faure and A. van der Walt (Eds.), 57-96, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham); Wälti, S., (2010), 
‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance’, in Handbook on Multi-Level Governance, H. Enderlein, S. Wälti 
and M. Zürn (Eds.), 411-422, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham), at p. 416; Hilson, C., (2000), Regulating 
Pollution: A UK and EC Perspective, Hart (Oxford), at pp. 29-48; Hilson, C., (2018), ‘The Impact of Brexit 
on the Environment: Exploring the Dynamics of a Complex Relationship’, 7(1) Transnational 
Environmental Law 89-113; at pp. 106-108; c.f., Scharpf, F.W., (1997), ‘Introduction: The Problem-
Solving Capacity of Multi-Level Governance’, 4(4) Journal of European Public Policy 520-538, at pp. 
521-523. 
66 UNDP, (2004), Decentralised Governance for Development: A Combined Practice Note on 
Decentralisation, Local Governance and Urban/Rural Development, United Nations Development 
Programme (New York); Charbit, C., (2011), ‘Governance of Public Policies in Decentralised Contexts: 
The Multi-level Approach’, OECD Regional Development Working Papers, No. 2011/04, OECD 
Publishing (Paris). 
67 Carlarne, C. and Farber, D., (2012), ‘Law Beyond Borders: Transnational Responses to Global 
Environmental Issues’, 1(1) Transnational Environmental Law 13-21, at pp. 20-21; Supra n. 65, Wälti , at 
pp. 411-412; Bodansky, D., (2012), ‘What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and 
Legitimacy’ 23(3) European Journal of International Law 651-668, at p. 655. 
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appropriate external agents and non-state actors,68 or even to pass the blame for stringent 
social and environmental policies.69  Furthermore, this externalisation of responsibility 
can actually enhance, rather than diminish, the capacity of civil society to coordinate and 
press for policies.70   
 
The growing potential of MLG as an approach to managing most of the world’s problems 
is difficult to understate.  Its twin capacities of managing threatening crises and 
international challenges growing in severity under globalisation, while at the same time 
protecting and empowering disenfranchised local communities, make the strategic 
deployment of ‘glocalism’ (globalism and localism) a possible solution for managing the 
growing ‘fragmegration’ (fragmentation and integration) of a globalised world.71  Of 
course, such debates on the need for balancing centralisation and decentralisation across 
multiple policy levels are not new.  As Dunoff said in 2008, it ‘is not possible to do justice 
to these rich literatures [which include] writings on federalism, de-centralization, 
European integration, globalization, and regional and multilateral regimes.’72 
 
MLG is thus becoming recognised as an approach to global challenges, such as the 
protection of the natural environment73 and, appositely, cultural heritage.74  For example, 
 
68 Drezner, D.W., (2004), ‘The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In’, 119(3) 
Political Science Quarterly 477-498, at p. 483; Drezner, D.W., (2007), All Politics Is Global: Explaining 
International Regulatory Regimes, Princeton University Press (Princeton). 
69 Supra n. 65, Wälti, at p. 414. 
70 Supra n. 65, Wälti, at p. 418-419; Dunoff, J.L., (2008), ‘Levels of Environmental Governance’, in The 
Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, D. Bodansky J. Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 85-
106, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 97; Matz-Lück, N. and Fuchs, J., (2014), ‘The Impact of 
OSPAR on Protected Area Management Beyond National Jurisdiction: Effective Regional Cooperation of 
a Network of Paper Parks?’, 49 Marine Policy 155-166, at p. 163. 
71 Swyngedouw, E., (2004), ‘Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? Networks, Territories and Rescaling’, 17(1) 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25-48; Rosenau, J., (2000), ‘The Governance of Fragmegration: 
Neither a World Republic nor a Global Interstate System’, 53(5) Studia Diplomatica 15-40. 
72 Supra n. 70, Dunoff, at p. 86.  See, e.g., Furniss, N., (1974), ‘The Practical Significance of 
Decentralization’, 36(4) Journal of Politics 958-982; Faguet, J., (2014), ‘Decentralization and 
Governance’, 53 World Development 2-13; Grendle, M.S., (2007), Going Local: Decentralization, 
Democratization, and the Promise of Good Governance, Princeton University Press (Princeton). 
73 Supra n. 65, Wälti; Supra n. 70, Dunoff; Keohane, R.O. and Victor, D.G., (2011), ‘The Regime Complex 
for Climate Change’, 9(1) Perspectives on Politics 7-23; Bernauer, T. and Schaffer, L.M., (2012), ‘Climate 
Change Governance’, in The Oxford Handbook of Governance, D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), 441-456, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford); Breton, A., Brosio, G., Dalmazzone, S. and Garrone, G. (Eds.), (2007), 
Environmental Governance and Decentralisation, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham); Supra n. 61, Fairbrass and 
Jordan; Supra n. 67, Carlarne and Farber, at p. 18; Burris, S., Kempa, M. and Shearing, C., (2008), ‘Changes 
in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship’, 4(1) Akron Law Review 1-66; 
Rauschmayer, F., Paavola, J. and Wittmer, H., (2009), ‘European Governance of Natural Resources and 
Participation in a Multi-Level Context: An Editorial’, 19(3) Environmental Policy and Governance 141–
147. 
74 Vadi, V., (2014), ‘Public Goods, Foreign Investments and the International Protection of Cultural 
Heritage’, in International Law for Common Goods: Normative Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture 
and Nature, F. Lenzerini and A.F. Vrdoljak (Eds.), 231-248, Hart (Oxford), at p. 232. 
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in terms of sustainably managing global fish stocks, while certain epistemic communities 
(e.g., International Council for the Exploration of the Sea or International Union on the 
Conservation of Nature),75 standards bodies (e.g., Marine Stewardship Council or the UN 
Food and Agricultural Organization),76 or advocacy NGOs (e.g., Oceana, Greenpeace or 
the World Wildlife Fund)77 are more efficiently organised by providing data, technical 
rules, standards, schemes and political pressure at a global level; it would make sense for 
local communities to develop their own systems for preventing or recycling bycatch or 
allocating fishing zones between local stakeholders, through the use of the 
recommendations, tools and resources which are provided from higher levels.78  
Importantly, therefore, higher ‘levels’ can be used to overcome the accepted limitations 
of national enforcement, by encouraging or sidestepping state-level implementation.79 
 
An efficient system of MLG would therefore handle the complexity and polycentricity of 
different governance polities, with numerous public, private and hybrid actors operating 
at different levels and playing different roles depending on the precise issue in question.80  
To be effective, MLG must also use an appropriate mix of centralisation and 
decentralisation, to permit autonomous and meaningful community self-governance at 
the right levels.81  In addition, by compartmentalising different issues into different scales, 
it thus moves towards a more heterarchical or ‘network-like’ system of governance and 
away from the exclusive reliance on hierarchised systems of central government.82  The 
 
75 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (‘ICES’), (at: http://www.ices.dk; accessed 5 January 
2019); International Union for Conservation of Nature (‘IUCN’), (at: http://www.iucn.org; accessed 5 
January 2019). 
76 Marine Stewardship Council, (at: http://www.msc.org; accessed: 5 January 2019); Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (‘FAO’), (at: http://www.fao.org/home/en/; accessed: 5 January 2019). 
77 Oceana, (at: https://oceana.org/; accessed 5 January 2019); Greenpeace, (at: http://www.greenpeace.org; 
accessed: 5 January 2019; World Wildlife Fund (‘WWF’), (at: http://www.wwf.org; accessed: 5 January 
2019). 
78 Berkes, F., (1986), ‘Local-Level Management and the Commons Problem: A Comparative Study of 
Turkish Coastal Fisheries’, 10(3) Marine Policy 215-229; Linke, S. and Bruckmeier, K., (2015), ‘Co-
Management in Fisheries – Experiences and Changing Approaches in Europe’, 104 Ocean and Coastal 
Management 170-181. 
79 Gunningham, N., (2012), ‘Confronting the Challenge of Energy Governance’, 1(1) Transnational 
Environmental Law 119-135, at pp. 119-121; Haas, P.M., (2015), Epistemic Communities, Constructivism, 
and International Environmental Politics, Routledge (Abingdon). 
80 Supra n. 70, Dunoff; Rhodes, R.A.W., (1996), ‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’, 
44(4) Political Studies 652-667. 
81 Supra n. 70, Dunoff, at pp. 88-100. 
82 Jordan, A. and Schout, A., (2006), The Coordination of the European Union: Exploring the Capacities 
of Networked Governance, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Warleigh-Lack, A., (2008), ‘The EU, 
ASEAN and APEC in Comparative Perspective’, in Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux, P. Murray (Ed.), 
23-41, Palgrave Macmillan (London); Andonova, L.B., Betsill, M.M. and Bulkeley, H., (2009), 
‘Transnational Climate Governance’, 9(2) Global Environmental Politics 52-73, at pp. 56-57; c.f., 
Slaughter, A-M. and Hale, T., (2010), ‘Transgovernmental Networks and Multi-Level Governance’, in 




resulting governance system is thus ‘co-regulatory’ and based on the twin management 
functions of public actors and non-state actors.  More ambitiously, one could attempt to 
view the resulting governance structure as a form of ‘collaborative governance’, i.e., 
based on the collective preference management of multiple (public and private) 
stakeholders who each seek to cooperate, coordinate and collaborate across numerous 
issue fields.83  Viewing MLG in its polycentric form as network governance or 
collaborative governance would be in recognition of national governments and agencies 
representing ‘nodes’ – albeit, as argued in Chapters 8 and 10 – vitally important nodes in 
the wider governance network. 
 
MLG is thus understood as the vital provision of polycentric coordination within 
Transnational Environmental Governance, given that the latter field is ‘concerned with 
the migration and impact of legal norms, rules and models across borders.’84  As 
Campbell et al suggested in 2016, an ‘explanation for failed oceans governance is scalar 
mismatch; that is, a governance intervention . . . not well matched to the ecological scale 
of the feature or process being governed […].  The concern for scalar mismatch fuels 
support for governance at global or regional scales and coordination among scales.’85  
However, rather than merely viewing MLG as the realignment of scalar mismatch 
between ecosystems and governance systems; the following chapters go much further by 
exploring broader normative arguments in favour of complete regulation and regime-
building at each the global, regional, and community levels, above and beyond the mere 
ecosystems perspective, in order to enhance the protection of UCH.   
 
 
83 Ansell, C. and Gash, A., (2008), ‘Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice’, 18(4) Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory 543-571; Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T. and Balogh, S., (2012), 
‘An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance’, 22(1) Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 1-29. 
84 Shaffer, G.C. and Bodansky, D., (2012), ‘Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law’, 1(1) 
Transnational Environmental Law 31-41, at p. 31; Lin, J. and Scott, J., (2012), ‘Looking Beyond the 
International: Key Themes and Approaches of Transnational Environmental Law’, 1(1) Transnational 
Environmental Law 23-29, at p. 24. 
85 Campbell, L.M., Gray, N.J., Fairbanks, L., Silver, J.J., Gruby, R.L., Dubik, B.A. and Basurto, X., (2016), 
‘Global Oceans Governance: New and Emerging Issues’, 41 Annual Review of Environment and Resources 
517-543, at p. 522.  See also Berkes F., (2006), ‘From Community-Based Resource Management to 
Complex Systems: The Scale Issue and Marine Commons’, 11(1) Ecology and Society 45-59; Gray, N.J., 
Gruby, R.L. and Campbell L.M., (2014), ‘Boundary Objects and Global Consensus: Scalar Narratives of 




2. Global-Level Governance 
(a) The Vastness of Global Governance Discourse 
It must be emphasised that the term ‘global governance’ encapsulates an impossibly vast 
topic where it is increasingly difficult for any devoted researcher to keep a handle on the 
wider debates, themes and permutations.  As Kacowicz has said, ‘there is a great 
confusion in the [International Relations] literature regarding the possible meanings, 
dynamics, and scope of global governance.’86  Therefore, the detailed debates within this 
subject are beyond the aims of this study, which only seeks to examine whether global 
governance may be of relevance to the global protection of UCH and to make a cursory 
introduction of global governance theory to UCH protection.  Indeed, the phrase “global 
governance” itself in fact captures all activities of state and non-state actors across the 
entire multi-level framework – including governance activities at the global, regional, 
national and local levels.87  Nevertheless, this particular section will focus more broadly 
only on the global level within this literature and the additional advantages which might 
be available by expanding the role of non-state actors across a global network, given that 
the other three levels are subsequently evaluated in the chapters that follow. 
 
With the phrase often credited to the research of James Rosenau in 1992,88 coinciding 
with the establishment of the United Nations Commission on Global Governance 
(UNCGG) in the early 1990s,89 global governance has been referred to as ‘ubiquitous’,90 
‘notoriously slippery’,91 ‘vast’,92 and ‘ambiguous and ill-defined’.93  As Barnett and 
Duvall said in 2004, the ‘idea of global governance has attained near-celebrity status.  In 
little more than a decade the concept has gone from the ranks of the unknown to one of 
the central orienting themes in the practice and study of international affairs’.94  This 
 
86 Kacowicz, A.M., (2012), ‘Global Governance, International Order, and World Order’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Governance, D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), 686-698, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 687. 
87 Zürn, M., (2012), ‘Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance, D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), 730-774, Oxford University Press (Oxford);  Ibid, Kacowicz, at p. 690; 
Rosenau, J., (1995), ‘Governance in the Twenty First Century’, 1(1) Global Governance 13-43, at p. 13; 
Weiss, T.G. and Wilkinson, R., (2014), ‘Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority, Power, 
Change’, 58(1) International Studies Quarterly 207-215, at p. 207. 
88 Rosenau, J., (1992), ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics’, in Governance Without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics, J. N. Rosenau and E. Czempiel (Eds.), Cambridge 
University Press (Cambridge), 1-29. 
89 Supra n. 51, Commission on Global Governance, ‘Our Global Neighbourhood’. 
90 Supra n. 87, Weiss and Wilkinson, at p. 207. 
91 Supra n. 87, Weiss and Wilkinson, at p. 207. 
92 Davis, J.W., (2012), ‘A Critical View of Global Governance’, 18(2) Swiss Political Science Review 272-
286, at p. 282. 
93 Supra n. 86, Kacowicz, at p. 687. 
94 Barnett, M. and Duvall, R., (2004), ‘Power in Global Governance’, in Power in Global Governance, M. 
Barnett and R. Duvall (Eds.), 1-32, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 1.   
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popularity has continued such that any search for the subject now would yield an 
impenetrably large number of results.95  Rosenau viewed global governance as analysing 
the move from world order by governments (in inter-national relations), towards 
“governance”, ‘which occurs on a global scale through both the co-ordination of states 
and the activities of a vast array of rule systems . . . that function outside normal national 
jurisdictions.’96  In other words, global governance refers to ‘the entirety of regulations 
put forward with reference to solving specific denationalized and deregionalized 
problems or providing transnational common goods’.97  Remarkably, as was found with 
the subject of transnational law, while there is research covering ‘ocean governance’ or 
‘global ocean governance’,98 there still seems to be some disconnect between this vast 
social sciences discourse, appraising all elements of world order beyond trite inter-state 
processes, with the wider search for an ‘integrated’ approach to ocean management.99 
 
Given the enormity of the subject and its interdisciplinary propensity, it is perhaps more 
common to see global governance in a highly analytical or descriptive sense,100 rather 
than a normative sense.  Nevertheless, many readily accept that it has considerable 
normative appeal in addressing all transnational contexts given their vulnerability to free 
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Globalizing World, Brookings Institution Press (Washington DC); O’Brien, R., Goetz, A., Scholte, J.A. 
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Governance, 2nd Edn, Routledge (Abingdon). 
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riding, jurisdictional shopping, and poor state compliance.101  It is hence entwined with 
the subject of global public goods as explored in Chapter 4 and the weaknesses of 
Westphalian sovereignty as explored in Chapter 5.102  In this normative guise, global 
governance seeks to improve the coordination of the patchwork of public, private and 
hybrid actors having a regulatory influence upon transnational activities, with the 
potential for enhanced transnational democratisation, accountability, scrutiny, accuracy, 
and efficacy in global policy decision-making.103  Where cooperation or regulation is 
failing between sovereign states, it recognises that non-state actors – such as non-
governmental organisations, multinational corporations, public-private partnerships, 
transnational networks, epistemic communities, subnational actors, global, regional and 
local adjudicators and standards bodies, and stakeholder communities themselves – might 
possess the resources, expertise, incentive, capacity or technical knowledge to compel 
states or stakeholders towards the better production of global public goods.104  In sum, 
the strategic utilisation of all potential global ‘governors’, in addition to state actors, can 
help to plug the gaps of production in inter-national processes and achieve ‘multi-
stakeholder’ solutions.  As noted, such governors can also operate and often do so more 
effectively at regional, national and local scales.  However, the focus for this chapter is 
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Transnational Law 501-578; Supra n. 79, Gunningham, at p. 133; Bevir, M. and Hall, I., (2011), ‘Global 
Governance’, in The SAGE Handbook on Governance, M. Bevir (Ed.), 352-365, Sage Publications 
(Thousand Oaks), at p. 355; Supra n. 87, Weiss and Wilkinson, at p. 208. 
102 Supra n. 99, Avant, Finnemore and Sell, at p. 7; Mueller, M., (2018), ‘Making the World Great Again: 
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Working Paper Series, 2018/5, UCL Global Governance Institute (London). 
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(b) Global-Level Governance and Underwater Cultural Heritage  
A great deal could be said on the global governance of UCH protection, with an analysis 
of the multifarious public and private actors, regimes, and institutions which play a part 
in the governance framework for UCH.  Such an analysis could not only explore the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of utilising such global governors both 
beyond and including national governments, but could also provide case-specific 
recommendations on the advantages of expanding the role of such non-state actors and 
legal processes.  Unfortunately, however, such an expansive and detailed analysis is 
beyond the present focus, which is only intended to briefly introduce the subjects and 
concept-test the potential to enhance protection of UCH, by pointing to examples.  While 
theories and methodologies approaching global governance vary, the main roles and 
functions of global governors have often been separated by academics into four main 
categories which will be relied on here: setting agendas and creating issues; making rules; 
implementation and enforcement; and evaluating, monitoring and adjudicating 
outcomes.105   
 
i. Agenda setting 
In terms of agenda setting, various NGOs and epistemic communities will have far greater 
technical knowledge, awareness of governance priorities, and an ability to more 
accurately represent the interests of civil society, including future generations.106  For 
clarity, ‘epistemic community’ is a term which has come to encapsulate the global 
technical, scientific, and research community who have a more practical role in 
environmental governance.107  Similarly, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), are 
often private and semi-private organisations and associations – which can be comprised 
of many stakeholders, including members of civil society, technical experts, academics, 
researchers, corporations, interest groups, associations, strategic staff, or even public 
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regulators and state representatives (in hybrid organisations) – who are playing an 
increasingly essential function in global governance.108   
 
Given that much of the global impetus for the protection of UCH originally came from 
the archaeological and academic community, this community is particularly vocal and 
visible in the UCH global governance context.  As Leshikar-Denton says, the ‘world 
community of cultural and legal specialists in protection, research, and management of 
UCH, whose mandate is essentially the spirit of the 2001 Convention, have steadily 
contributed to its development, and continue to have an important role in its evolving 
success.’109  In particular, one of the fundamental actors propelling the UNESCO 
Convention negotiations was the International Commission for Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (ICUCH), as a specialised arm of the International Council for Monuments and 
Sites (ICOMOS), as well as the International Law Association (ILA) and International 
Council of Museums (ICOM), all being NGOs or public-private hybrids.110  By 
combining scientific, technical, and academic experts, with policymakers and diplomats, 
ICUCH in particular was able to wield considerable power to steer the international 
agenda and establish a feasibility study under the auspices of UNESCO.111 
 
Another member of the epistemic community which can also have an input on agenda-
setting is the Scientific and Technical Advisory Board (STAB), as instituted under Article 
23 of the UNESCO Convention, to ‘appropriately assist the Meeting of States Parties in 
questions of a scientific or technical nature regarding the implementation of the Rules.’112  
 
108 Supra n. 106, Lewis and Kanji; Werker, E. and Ahmed, F.Z., (2008), ‘What Do Nongovernmental 
Organizations Do?’, 22(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 73-92; Charnovitz, S., (1997), ‘Two Centuries 
of Participation: NGOs and International Governance’, 18(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 183-
286, at pp. 185-188; ‘Heritage specialists may be employed in government, academia, museums, or the 
private sector, but much of their assistance has also been contributed through their collective voluntary 
work in international, regional, and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs).’ (Leshikar-Denton, 
M.E., (2010), ‘Cooperation is the Key: We Can Protect the Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 5(2) Journal of 
Maritime Archaeology 85-95 at p. 89). 
109 Ibid, Leshikar-Denton, at p. 89. 
110 Maarleveld, T.J., (2007), ‘The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage: Origin and Consequences’, in Havets Kulturarv: de nordiske maritime museers arbejdsmøde i 
Torshavn, M. Hahn-Pedersen (Ed.), 9-32, Fiskeri- og Søfartsmuseet (Esbjerg), at pp. 23-24; Grenier, R., 
(2006), ‘Introduction: Mankind, and at Times Nature, are the True Risks to Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 
in Heritage at Risk Special Edition – Underwater Cultural Heritage at Risk: Managing Natural and Human 
Impacts, R. Grenier, D. Nutley and I. and Cochran (Eds.), x-xi, ICOMOS (Paris), at p. x; O’Keefe, P.J., 
(2014), Shipwrecked Heritage: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural 
Heritage, 2nd Edn, Institute of Art and Law (Builth Wells); Henderson, G., (2014), ‘The Reasons for the 
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Papers from the 2013 AIMA Conference Workshop, G. Henderson and A. Viduka (Eds.), 9-11, Australasian 
Institute for Maritime Archaeology (Adelaide), at pp. 10-11. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 23(5). 
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While this enables the Meeting of States Parties (MOP) to be informed of the latest 
scientific data and of essential priorities from a technical perspective, the 
intergovernmental foundation of the Convention means that it is the state representatives 
and diplomats, within the MOP, who assume the overall decision-making and agenda-
setting role for the UNESCO Convention.113  Similarly, while the STAB is intended to 
provide epistemic leadership and expertise, as well as keep all activities in conformance 
with archaeological standards,114 it is a public-private hybrid which comprises scientists 
sent by state governments.115  Yet, in defence of this, Guérin responded that ‘they have 
to be good scientists, they cannot just be a delegate.’116  She adds that, ‘of course, non-
state parties can . . . come to the meetings of states parties and to the STAB meetings to 
be there as observers, to encourage them to join.’117  However, whether this provides an 
opportunity for non-political actors to actually steer the agenda, rather than merely 
observe inter-state bargaining, is another matter.  For example, while the MOP have 
introduced a process for accrediting NGOs who can attend proceedings and even 
contribute,118 it seems that these NGOs are only involved in agenda setting to the extent 
that they are consulted by the STAB and MOP.119   
 
However, outside of UNESCO, it is possible to witness these same NGOs and epistemic 
actors playing a much more significant role in global agenda setting, such as by convening 
conferences and meetings, applying political pressure and lobbying on governments, 
engaging with media and civil society, and disseminating research on the condition and 
need for protection of UCH.120  For example, the Society for Historical Archaeology and 
the Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology have been credited for stimulating 
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116 Supra n. 113, Guérin. 
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119 UNESCO, (2015), Statutes of the Scientific and Technical Advisory Body to the Meeting of States Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Modified at the Fifth Session of 
the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on 28/29 April 2015 in Paris, UN Doc. 
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water-cultural-heritage/partners/accredited-ngos; accessed: 5 January 2019). 
273 
 
action in the United States towards the better protection of the Titanic wreck, as well as 
with applying pressure on the United States to observe the principles of the UNESCO 
Rules.121  Agenda setting can also be in the form of either private contractors or public 
agencies, who can provide advocacy on behalf of UCH, perhaps during environmental 
impact evaluations, as amicus curiae submissions in legal cases, or in a role supporting 
government.122  Taking into account findings in Chapters 3 to 5, all of this can provide a 
vital engine of political steering and ensures that governmental processes are better 
guided by the concerns of civil society and the UCH conservation community.  As 
Chapter 4 explored in detail, any political pressure upon sovereign states remains 
relatively limited in effect, except to the extent that states will gain political or economic 
currency.  Therefore, the more that these organisations can educate, inform, assemble and 
empower global civil society with regard to UCH protection and its values, the greater 
political currency which can be obtained by nation states proactively sacrificing energy 
and resources to address such vocalised concerns. 
 
A key challenge therefore is improving the funding, power, voice, reach and influence of 
such organisations.123  Naturally, this will also always be tempered by a concomitant need 
to maximise their actual and perceived authority, legitimacy or political influence, such 
as enhancing transparency and democratisation, or perhaps by efficiently centralising the 
disparate NGOs and institutions into more powerful and influential global networks or 
associated bodies.124  Just as an example of where NGOs and epistemic actors could 
become more effective in the protection of UCH is the now-quiet ICUCH which could 
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perhaps be better funded and expanded as an influential public-private hybrid.  A very 
suitable model, in comparison with the natural environmental agenda, could be that of the 
globally influential International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), which is 
highly effective at steering the global agenda, producing reports and recommendations 
for local, national and regional governors, as well as developing a global categorisation 
system for the endangerment of different species.125  This could perhaps be modelled in 
the UCH context by producing an equivalent list of endangered UCH and steering 
international cooperation towards the most significant and yet threatened sites.   
 
In other words, therefore, the task of steering global UCH policy appears to have become 
increasingly subsumed by the MOP, STAB and Secretariat under the UNESCO 
Convention, even though NGOs and epistemic actors are likely to be more effective at 
steering developments.  For many, however, given the organised and democratic nature 
of national systems, their anchoring role above all other forms of decentralised 
governance is justified.  As Guérin said, ‘it’s a good thing that the Convention is . . . at 
the centre of it all.  [This can be compared to] other cases where you have several 
international organisations fighting for education or stuff like that.  So, the 2001 
Convention is quite rare in that it's only the 2001 Convention.’126  Yet, while it is true that 
having a centralised global institution providing overarching governance can enhance  
coordination and prevent fragmentation across all the other levels, the findings with 
regard to the weaknesses of inter-state processes across Chapters 3 to 5, as well as state 
compliance in Chapter 4, would raise a particular concern if global agenda steering and 
overall control remained exclusively the remit of governmental delegates.  As such, it 
will be important to also ensure that other non-state actors (NGOs, epistemic actors, 
private actors, researchers, civil society advocates) possess additional opportunities for 
transnational influence and agenda steering outside of this inter-state framework.127 
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Another key function of transnational governors within the global political framework is 
the development of new substantive and procedural rules.  Such rules can be in the form 
of ‘soft law’ or private standard setting,128 such as codes of conduct governing offshore 
activities or interaction with UCH, or those steering the purchasing policies of 
museums.129  Indeed, as is often under-appreciated, an important force behind the 
enhanced protection of UCH over the past few decades has been the increasingly 
influential codes of ethical conduct within the museum community which have driven a 
sea change in reducing the acquisition of illicit cultural artefacts.130  This is one area 
where soft law and privately developed norms have proven particularly effective.131  It is 
also worth acknowledging the role of soft law and codes of conduct protecting marine 
cultural heritage in each state as well.  In the United Kingdom, for example, you have soft 
law like the Code of Seabed Development which was drafted by the Joint Nautical 
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Archaeology Policy Committee132 and the Protect Our Wrecks guidelines promoted by 
the British Sub Aqua Club.133 
 
It is also common for non-state actors to have an input on the development of new national 
or international laws.  A good example in the context of UCH being the Annexed Rules, 
which started life as the ICOMOS Charter drafted by archaeology experts within ICUCH, 
before becoming adopted in the Annex of the UNESCO Convention.134  As the Rules 
themselves prove, the use of non-state actors in the development of legal rules can be 
particularly effective for a number of reasons.  For example, they can be quicker to create 
and the use of technical experts or stakeholders in their development can ensure that they 
are more practicable and suitable for application ‘on the ground’.135  Furthermore, the 
rules are capable of attracting better compliance and even legitimacy, if originating from 
those perceived to have a technical knowledge or expertise on the subject.136   
 
Of course, the counter-argument runs that national (and international) law must have its 
ultimate source in the state, as a democratically appointed governor responsible for 
balancing all competing interests.137  Nevertheless, the interoperation between the two 
can still create particularly effective law, or ‘co-regulation’.138  Indeed, it is also 
imminently possible for rules to start out as social customs, community norms, or 
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Social Responsibility’, 33(2) Academy of Management Review 404-424, at pp. 411-412; Bernstein, S. and 
Cashore, B., (2004), ‘Non-State Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a 
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Environment and Social Governance, J.J. Kirton and M.J. Trebilcock (Eds.), 33-63, Routledge (Abingdon). 
137 See Chapter 8.  Raz, J., (1979), The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Clarendon Press 
(Wotton-under-Edge); Wheatley, S., (2010), The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law, Hart 
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138 See Chapter 9, Section 3 and Chapter 10. 
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transnational policies, before being absorbed by effective bottom-up processes into better 
quality higher-level legal norms.139  Another crucial NGO in the genesis of the UNESCO 
Convention was the global non-profit NGO, the ILA, which carried the mantle forward 
from ICUCH to establish negotiations over a proposed new Convention at UNESCO and 
drafted the first effort of the Convention.140  Not only has the ILA played a key role in 
the initial formulation of rules, therefore, but it has also played a vital agenda steering 
role as well. 
 
While there is no overarching global regulatory regime for UCH, beyond 
intergovernmental treaties such as the LOSC and UNESCO Convention, there are other 
global regimes providing additional rulemaking which offer some indirect protection.  For 
example, a number of powerful multilateral and near-global environmental agreements 
might also indirectly protect UCH, such as the World Heritage Convention.141  As raised 
in Chapter 4, while the World Heritage Convention is also an inter-state treaty, it 
possesses considerable internal compliance pull by the incentive to secure tourism at 
listed sites.142  UCH may also be found within marine protected areas where management 
rules are modelled on guidelines from the IUCN, World Wildlife Fund, Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development, United Nations Food and Agricultural 
Organization, or under the Convention on Biological Diversity.143   
 
 
139 Levit, J.K., (2005), ‘A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade 
Finance Instruments’, 30(1) Yale Journal of International Law 125-209; Sabel, C.F. and Victor, D.G., 
(2017), ‘Governing Global Problems Under Uncertainty: Making Bottom-Up Climate Policy Work’, 144(1) 
Climatic Change 15-27. 
140 O’Keefe, P.J., (1996), ‘Protecting the Underwater Cultural Heritage: The International Law Association 
Draft Convention’, 20(4) Marine Policy 297-307.  
141 The SS President Coolidge is the only shipwreck site to be added to World Heritage Tentative List 
(UNESCO World Heritage Tentative List, ‘The President Coolidge’, (at http://whc.unesco.org/en/tent
ativelists/1972/; accessed 6 January 2019).  However, the Red Bay Basque Whaling Station ‘includes … 
underwater remains of vessels and whale bone deposits’ (UNESCO World Heritage List, ‘Red Bay Basque 
Whaling Station’, (at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1412; accessed 6 January 2019)) and the Gros Morne 
National Park features the wreckage of the SS Ethie (UNESCO World Heritage List, ‘Gros Morne National 
Park’, (at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/419; accessed: 6 January 2019)). 
142 Goodwin, E.J., (2009), ‘The World Heritage Convention, the Environment, and Compliance’, 20(2) 
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 157-198. 
143 E.g., Kelleher, G., (1999), Guidelines for Marine Protected Areas, International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (Gland); Reuchlin-Hugenholtz, E. and McKenzie, E., (2015), Marine Protected 
Areas: Smart Investments in Ocean Health, WWF (Gland); Westlund, L., Charles, A., Garcia S. and 
Sanders, J. (Eds.), (2017), ‘Marine Protected Areas: Interactions with Fishery Livelihoods and Food 
Security’, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper, No. 603, FAO (Rome); OECD, (2017), Marine 
Protected Areas: Economics, Management and Effective Policy Mixes, OECD Publishing (Paris); 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, (2004), Decision Adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Seventh Meeting, VII/5. Marine 




Private laws propounded by the International Maritime Organization and Comité 
Maritime International relating to issues such as shipping safety, pollution, salvage, and 
navigation, could also carry indirect benefits for UCH.144  There is also the 
intergovernmental International Seabed Authority (ISA), instituted under Part XI of the 
LOSC to oversee deep seabed mining in the Area in accordance with that Convention, 
which is likely to have an indirect rulemaking role to play over affected UCH in the 
Area.145  Non-state actors can also play a crucial role in assisting states with improving 
their laws by facilitating cross-fertilisation through dialogue, comparative studies and a 
network of rules and best practices.  However, this is a role which has perhaps not really 
been taken by non-state actors in the context of UCH yet.  As O’Keefe has said:  
 
‘At the present moment there is no body which collects information on 
legal developments […]. There is very little sharing of information on this 
among States.  One reason is that most legal developments are related to 
municipal law and there has been little contact between lawyers from 
different States and legal systems.  The need for shared information has 
not been considered a priority’.146 
 
In reality, however, as is the principal argument of this study, there is currently too much 
emphasis on the interests of sovereign states, rather than the interests of the global 
community and future generations, with regard to global public goods, such as UCH.  Any 
international legal rulemaking processes which has so far been used to protect UCH have 
often been curtailed, blunted and even rejected by national governments, who have a 
tendency to prefer ambiguous rules which can be implemented autonomously and ad hoc, 
with minimal external interference.147  To many, this grip on the key lawmaking process 
is not just more accountable and democratically legitimate, or more familiar and easier to 
understand, but is the result of the state’s exclusive right to govern and have a monopoly 
on the public’s use of force.148  However, as has been argued in Chapters 3 to 5, this 
exclusive sovereignty over UCH law by states is at risk of, at various times, becoming 
 
144 As an example, the IMO’s International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks (Nairobi Convention) 
contains rules on reporting potentially hazardous wrecks discovered by maritime operators (The Nairobi 
International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, (adopted 18 May 2007 (Nairobi); in force 14 April 
2015), Cm 8243). 
145 Supra n. 104, Dromgoole, at p. 263; Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Arts. 11 and 12; Supra n. 2, 
LOSC, at Part XI. 
146 Supra n. 110, O’Keefe, at p. 92. 
147 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
148 Supra n. 137; See Chapters 5 and 8. 
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counter-productive.  As such, workarounds can and do exist, for example: regional and 
global institutions with a greater capacity to create, resolve and enforce directly applicable 
norms in courts possessing normative or enforcement power in lieu of states; or systems 
which permit affected transnational communities to craft, interpret and apply the legal 
rules impacting them from across the transnational space; or systems possessing 
supranational adjudication and enforcement, which can override sovereign individual 
preference-setting.149 
 
A further argument against such non-state rulemaking, in addition to the obvious and 
ever-present concerns of democratic legitimacy and accountability as noted above, might 
be the nation state’s better connection with the issue at hand and with the social and legal 
context, as well as actors involved.150  Although, arguably, not only can states be equally, 
if not more, disassociated from local contexts and interests, but it is important to recognise 
that ‘global’ rules are only intended to arise in specific situations where state action is 
defective from a global or regional perspective.151  Transnational governance is thus 
designed to ensure responsibility and accountability of actors having a transnational 
impact who can, at present, disregard globally or regionally agreed rules and standards, 
while shielded by defective domestic law or inaccessible private international law.  As a 
result, Chapter 8 revisits some of these arguments in favour of maintaining the national-
international legal architecture, particularly in those areas with little transboundary 
spillover, as well as highlighting those areas where the inter-national architecture needs 
bolstering by global, regional, transnational and local regulatory networks. 
 
iii. Implementation and enforcement 
The principal form of ‘implementation’ in the context of international UCH protection is 
the transplantation by national governments of international agreements, such as the 
LOSC or the UNESCO Convention, or regional treaties such as the Valletta Convention, 
into domestic law.152  This includes private law harmonisation treaties such as the IMO 
 
149 See Chapter 7 (on regional-level governance) and Chapter 9 (on community-level governance). 
150 Broude, T. and Shany, Y., (2008), ‘Introduction’, in The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International 
Law Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity, T. Broude and Y. Shany (Eds.), 1-16, Hart 
(Oxford), at p. 5; Helfer, L.R. and Slaughter, A., (1997), ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication Source’, 107(2) The Yale Law Journal 273-391, at pp. 335-336. 
151 Supra nn. 64 and 66; Davies, G., (2008), ‘Subsidiarity as a Method of Policy Centralisation’, in The 
Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and 
Subsidiarity, T. Broude and Y. Shany (Eds.), 79-98, Hart (Oxford). 
152 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised), (adopted 16 January 
1992 (Valletta), in force 25 May 1995), Council of Europe, ETS No. 143. 
280 
 
1989 Salvage Convention,153 as well as bilateral agreements and MOUs between states 
relating to UCH.154  In the case of UCH, there is no significant supranational or non-state 
legislation which can override this domestic-level implementation and enforcement.  
Nevertheless, for transnational standards or soft law which impact across maritime and 
industry sectors, such as guidelines or codes of conduct, there is inevitably going to be 
stakeholder-level implementation and enforcement.155  Unfortunately, the profit-
orientation of most industries using such codes to minimise their impacts on UCH, as 
well as their ‘soft’ legal nature and lack of oversight by external actors, means that 
internal compliance cannot be guaranteed.156   
 
Different states may also delegate implementation of rules to subnational actors, public-
private agencies or, rarely, to stakeholder communities themselves, in order of decreasing 
regularity.  Greater decentralised responsibility for UCH also occurs in federalised and 
regionalised national polities.157 Non-state actors can also play a role in guiding states in 
the implementation of global UCH law.  For example, most of the reports written for 
national governments on the role and impact of the Convention, as well as UNESCO’s 
implementation manual for the Annexed Rules, utilise the expertise of the underwater 
archaeology community and NGOs.158  As Maes responds, effective collaboration 
between ‘governments, governmental agencies and scientists’ is key in providing the 
level of implementation needed to address UCH protection.159   
 
Non-state actors are not just capable of having some role in implementation, but can also 
play a role in enforcement.  For example, by attaching certain private rights to individuals 
– such as property and personal rights – it is possible for a state’s nationals to enforce any 
private interests in UCH in national courts, which may include its protection from theft, 
damage or interference.160  Similarly, national citizens, local communities, and NGOs – 
 
153 International Convention on Salvage, (adopted 28 April 1989 (London), in force 14 July 1996), 1953 
UNTS 165. 
154 See Chapter 4, Section 3; Manders, M., (2018), Interview with Martijn Manders, 15 February 2018, 
Transcript on File. 
155 See supra n. 129. 
156 See Chapter 4, Section 3. 
157 E.g., Much UCH law in Germany, Spain and Italy is devolved to the various internal regions (e.g., supra 
n. 154, Manders).  See Chapter 9. 
158 See Maarleveld, T. J., Guérin, U. and Egger, B. (Eds.), (2013), Manual for Activities Directed at 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: Guidelines to the Annex of the UNESCO 2001 Convention, UNESCO 
(Paris). 
159 Maes, F., (2018), Written Response of Frank Maes, 16 March 2018, Filed with Author; Supra n. 108, 
Leshikar-Denton, at pp. 89-93. 
160 Francioni, F., (2011), ‘The Human Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction’, 
22(1) European Journal of International Law 9-16, at pp. 9-10. 
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while not enforcing private rights – may provide indirect enforcement by representing the 
interests of UCH during court or public hearings, or within environmental impact 
assessments and consultations on proposed projects.  Again, however, the legal rules 
devised to empower stakeholders through such procedures remain under the direction of 
the nation state and so are quite likely to consciously or unconsciously limit the actual 
impact of any non-state actors who oppose the short-term economic interests of their 
governments.161  In fact, given its often ambiguous provenience, it is rare to find in situ 
UCH which is wholly owned by a private individual who can enforce any rights to see it 
protected.162  Nevertheless, cases do exist of local communities sharing in the ownership 
of UCH.163  Although, given that a core aim of the recent UNESCO Convention was to 
address a global trend for commercialising UCH, it is still common to find private rights 
over UCH which relate to its private salvage or ex situ propertisation. 
 
Another common international commitment for states and non-state actors regarding 
global public goods, although often couched in hortatory language, is an agreement to 
support capacity building for under-developed regions who could benefit from resources, 
skills, training, and leadership in resolving collective action challenges.164  This lack of 
capacity for under-developed regions is perhaps the most critical issue in terms of 
ensuring proper compliance with treaties in these regions, where poor infrastructure and 
under-resourced public agencies often struggle to achieve effective implementation and 
enforcement.165  For example, MacKintosh’s 2018 doctoral study into the implementation 
of the UNESCO Convention across the Adriatic Sea found that a major factor behind poor 
 
161 See Martin, J.B. and Gane, T., (2019), ‘Weaknesses in the Law Protecting the United Kingdom’s 
Remarkable Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Call for Modernisation and Reform’, Journal of Maritime 
Archaeology (Forthcoming).  See Chapters 4 and 9. 
162 An example of in situ heritage owned by a private owner, for example, is the RMS Lusitania (see Martin, 
J.B., (2018), ‘Protecting Outstanding Underwater Cultural Heritage through the World Heritage 
Convention: The Titanic and Lusitania as World Heritage Sites’, 33(1) International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 116-165, at pp. 144-145). 
163 See Chapter 9. 
164 Gündling, L., and Navid, D., (1996), ‘Compliance Assistance in International Environmental Law: 
Capacity-Building through Finance and Technology Transfer’, 56(3-4) Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 796-809; Potter, C. and Brough, R., (2004), ‘Systemic Capacity 
Building: A Hierarchy of Needs’, 19(5) Health Policy and Planning 336–347; UNDP, (2009), Supporting 
Capacity Building: The UNDP Approach, United Nations Development Programme (New York). 
165 Brown Weiss, E. and Jacobson, H.K. (Eds.), (1998), Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance 
with International Environmental Accords, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA); Levy, M.A., Keohane R.O. and 
Haas, P.M., (1993), ‘Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions’, in 
Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, P.M. Haas, R.O. 
Keohane and M.A. Levy (Eds.), 397-416, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA), at p. 404; Supra n. 154, Manders; 
Supra n. 113, Guérin. 
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implementation was a lack of state resources.166  Consequently, in order to improve the 
achievement of the capacity building commitments under UNESCO Convention Articles 
19 and 21, for example, the MOP and Secretariat have created the UNITWIN network to 
improve research collaboration and the networking of skills and resources among 
universities within states parties.167   
 
It is towards these important commitments – the provision of research collaboration, skills 
training, and capacity building – that non-state actors can be seen as particularly active in 
the implementation of the UNESCO Convention.  As Guérin highlighted in interview, the 
Secretariat and MOP see an essential part of their role as being the coordination and 
encouragement of such transnational networking and capacity building among 
stakeholders.168  This particularly involves sending the STAB to those regions, to provide 
support and expertise.169  Unfortunately, despite the positive long-term changes resulting 
from this enhanced education and assistance, the funding available for such ground-up 
development is still limited to ad hoc training of targeted communities, with most nations 
still lacking the wider public infrastructure needed for meaningful implementation and 
enforcement.170   
 
It is also important to consider the role of other global governors and non-state actors in 
providing additional enforcement powers through traditional judicial apparatus within 
national and international law.  Here it is possible to find intergovernmental tribunals and 
courts which might be eventually implicated in the adjudication and consequent 
enforcement of inter-state law, such as the International Court of Justice, the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and ad hoc 
arbitration.171  The ISA is another intergovernmental organisation overseeing the 
implementation and enforcement of international commitments relating to the Area which 
could impact UCH.172  However, there is little in the way of a global supranational court 
 
166 Mackintosh, R., (2018), MacKintosh, R.F., (2018), The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of 
the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Implementation and Effectiveness, University of 
Southampton, Doctoral Thesis. 
167 UNESCO, (2013), Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Meeting of States 
Parties: Information Document INF.1 Secretariat Report, 8 February 2013 (Paris), UN Doc. 
UCH/13/4.MSP/220/INF.1 REV2, at s. 8. 
168 Supra n. 113, Guérin. 
169 Supra n. 113, Guérin. 
170 Supra n. 154, Manders; Williams, M., (2018), Interview with Mike Williams, 18 June 2018, Transcript 
on File. 
171 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 25; Supra n. 2, LOSC, Art. 287. 
172 Supra n. 145. 
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or enforcement body, such as a World Environment Organization, which could oversee 
implementation or engage in enforcement activities for cultural heritage protection.173   
 
Perhaps most critical of all in terms of non-state actor enforcement, is the emerging 
consensus among many scholars that domestic constitutional norms – such as the rule of 
law, separation of powers, human rights, democracy and solidarity – are transmigrating 
to the global level, thus providing a counterforce to sovereign supremacy.174  This 
potential constitutionalisation of international law has been welcomed by many 
environmental law scholars, who see a particular potential for enhanced state 
accountability in the observation of environmental and cultural rights of the international 
community.175  However, the difficulty with such a political system of legitimisation is 
immediately obvious: when it eventually comes to enforcement within the domestic legal 
context, states will continue to determine the extent to which such constitutional norms 
even exist or, more importantly, the extent to which they should override their sovereign 
constitutions.176  In the human rights context, this can be significantly ameliorated by 
supranational courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) or Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR).  However, there remain serious concerns 
with achieving compliance by sovereign states under such “supranational” courts, given 
that they remain framed within the hardened dualist conception of international law which 
 
173 See Chapter 3, Section 2(c). 
174 Klabbers, J., Peters, A. and Ulfstein, G., (2011), The Constitutionalization of International Law, 2nd Edn, 
Oxford University Press (Oxford); Peters, A., (2012), ‘Are We Moving Towards Constitutionalization of 
the World Community?’, in Realizing Utopia - The Future of International Law, A. Cassese (Ed.), 118-
135, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Lang, A.F. and Wiener, A. (Eds.), (2017), Handbook on Global 
Constitutionalism, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham); Belov, M. (Ed.), (2018), Global Constitutionalism and Its 
Challenges to Westphalian Constitutional Law, Hart Publishing (Oxford); Peters, A., (2009), ‘The Merits 
of Global Constitutionalism’, 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 397-412. 
175 Kotzé, L., (2019), ‘A Global Environmental Constitution for the Anthropocene?’, 8(1) Transnational 
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Governance Challenges, Environmental Law Institute (Washington DC); Bosselmann, K., (2015), ‘Global 
Environmental Constitutionalism: Mapping the Terrain’, 21(2) Widener Law Review 171-186; May, J.R. 
and Daly, E., (2014), Global Environmental Constitutionalism, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge); 
Boyle, A., (2006), ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’, 18(3) Fordham 
Environmental Law Review 471-511. 
176 Nagel, T., (2005), ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, 33(2) Philosophy & Public Affairs 113-147; 
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Perspective, Springer (New York); Nardin, T., (2011), ‘Justice and Authority in the Global Order’, 37(5) 
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shields nation states from ‘external’ enforcement.177  Another fundamental difficulty with 
relying on human rights courts to protect cultural and environmental interests is that it is 
far too difficult to locate peremptory norms, beyond perhaps those of clear contra bonos 
mores or jus cogens,178 which place universal jurisdiction in humankind and actual 
responsibility and accountability upon all states for such complex collective action 
problems.179   
 
The rich literature exploring the potential for erga omnes (‘towards all’) norms, perhaps 
arising in the context of ‘common concerns of humankind’, such as in the protection of 
the cultural and natural environment, is unfortunately beyond the space and scope of this 
study.180  However, it is worth pointing to a recent and illustrative case in the context of 
this study, which evidences the obvious difficulties with locating such sovereignty-
constraining norms.  In Ahunbay and Others v. Turkey (2019), the ECHR heard an appeal 
from a team of archaeologists who campaigned to prevent the construction of the Ilisu 
dam which would flood and cause significant destruction of much of the Hasankeyf 
archaeological site in Batman (Turkey), as well as irreparably harming the surrounding 
 
177 Fikfak, V., (2018), ‘Changing State Behaviour: Damages before the European Court of Human Rights’, 
29(4) European Journal of International Law 1091-1125; Hathaway, O., (2002), ‘Do Human Rights 
Treaties Make a Difference?’, 111(8) Yale Law Journal 1935-2042; Posner, E.A. and Yoo, J.C., (2005), 
‘Judicial Independence in International Tribunals’, 93(1) California Law Review 1-74; Hawkins, D. and 
Wade, J., (2010), ‘Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and Inter-American Courts of 
Human Rights’, 6(1) Journal of International Law and International Relations 35-86; Cassel, D., (2001), 
‘Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?’, 1(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 
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Court of Human Rights and Domestic Policy Change’, 20(4) European Journal of International Relations 
1100-1123; Huneeus, A., (2011), ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's 
Struggle to Enforce Human Rights’, 44(3) Cornell International Law Journal 493-534; Bradley, C.A., 
(1999), ‘Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception’, 51(3) Stanford Law Review 
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ecology and landscape.181   They appealed relying on the European Convention’s right to 
respect for private life (Article 8) and the right to education (Article 2 of Protocol No. 
1),182 making a compelling case that destruction of cultural heritage in this manner by 
Turkey would be an act contrary humanity’s right to education and enjoyment of such 
cultural heritage.  In its judgment, the ECHR tried to speak positively about some 
potential future uses for human rights courts in supporting environmental concerns; but 
had to concede that they could not find any emerging consensus of such customary rules 
across European states.  Instead, they merely reiterated the well-known potential for 
human rights to respond to the cultural interests of minority and indigenous communities 
and, in effect, affirming that human rights provide little authority to moderate state 
freedom to adjudge such cultural or environmental matters autonomously. 
 
The emerging picture of constitutional norms potentially migrating into the international 
and transnational sphere is thus not a significant development in international 
environmental law and must be understood as a very slow, tedious and unreliable path to 
imminent environmental and cultural protection.  It certainly does not provide any form 
of panacea or remedy to the issues raised in Chapters 3 to 5.  Much of humankind’s 
interests in preserving cultural and environmental values therefore continues to be 
represented in global law in either domestic or transnational settings, as explored 
elsewhere in this study.  Nevertheless, as shown above, non-state actors, NGOs and global 
governors are still capable of playing an increasingly essential part in enforcing a growing 
body of rules, both with and without international law. 
 
iv. Evaluating and monitoring outcomes 
A variety of non-state actors should also play an increased role with regard to the ongoing 
monitoring and evaluation of all such regulatory and governance systems.183  For 
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example, although national governments are responsible for implementing commitments 
under the LOSC and UNESCO Convention, a valuable role is played by NGOs, epistemic 
actors, and civil society in applying political pressure on states to join such regimes or to 
keep up their end of the bargain by implementing and enforcing meaningful legislation.184  
As Maes noted in his response, the Expert Workshop held at Ghent University in 2015 
under the SeArch project – which brought together UCH experts and government 
delegates in North-Western Europe – was likely to have played some beneficial role in 
encouraging the Netherlands and Germany to recently declare their intention to ratify the 
UNESCO Convention.185  Similarly, Peeters responded noting his belief that the North 
Sea Prehistory Research and Management Framework, led by himself and other 
academic collaborators across the North Sea, ‘set the stage for serious involvement’ of 
national agencies in responding to the challenges for UCH across the sea basin.186  These 
same private actors also play a vital role in the ongoing research and public dissemination 
of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats relating to current UCH protection 
efforts.187  Similarly, academic researchers, norm entrepreneurs, and technological 
innovators can create new ideas and approaches to enhance UCH protection or provide 
critical scrutiny of current management regimes.188   
 
However, what appears to be missing from the UNESCO framework for the protection 
of UCH is a system for monitoring state compliance within an ongoing ‘Implementation 
Review’.189  Implementation or compliance review processes – providing an opportunity 
for states parties to closely monitor one another’s implementation of treaty commitments 
 
184 See e.g., JNAPC, (2011), Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage in International Waters Adjacent 
to the UK, Proceedings of the JNAPC 21st Anniversary Seminar, Burlington House, November 2010, R.A. 
Yorke (Ed.), Published by Nautical Archaeology Society (Portsmouth) for the Joint Nautical Archaeology 
Policy Committee (York); Supra n. 166, Mackintosh. 
185 Supra n. 159, Maes. 
186 Peeters, H., (2018), Written Response of Hans Peeters, 28 April 2018, Filed with Author. 
187 Ibid; See e.g., DeRudder, T. and Maes, F. (Eds.), (2015), Workshop: The Legal Protection of Underwater 
Cultural Heritage 23 April 2015 – Final Report, Maritime Institute, University of Ghent (Ghent), (at: 
http://www.vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/ocrd/274121.pdf; accessed 9 January 2019); Special Issue: 
‘Conserving Marine Cultural Heritage’, (2009), 9(1) Conservation and Management of Archaeological 
Sites 1-77. 
188 Ibid; See e.g., Bruno, F., Lagudi, A., Barbieri, L., Muzzupappa, M., Mangeruga, M., Pupo, F., Cozza, 
M., Cozza, A., Ritacco, G., Peluso, R. and Tusa, S., (2017), ‘Virtual Diving in the Underwater 
Archaeological Site of Cala Minnola’, XLII-2/W3 ISPRS-International Archives of the Photogrammetry, 
Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences 121-126; WreckProtect, (2011), Guidelines for 
Protection of Submerged Wooden Cultural Heritage, including Cost-Benefit Analysis, M. Manders (Ed.), 
WreckProtect (Amersfoort); MACHU, (2008), MACHU Report, Managing Cultural Heritage Underwater 
– Number 1, R. Oosting and M. Manders (Eds.), MACHU (Amersfoort). 
189 Supra n. 170, Williams; Mackintosh, R., (2016), The 2001 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of 
the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Implementation and Enforcement in the Adriatic – HFF Grant Report, 
Honor Frost Foundation, (at: http://honorfrostfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/The-2001-
UNESCO-CPUCH-Rob-MacKintosh-2016-Final-Report.pdf; accessed: 9 January 2019). 
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and to provide greater political pressure on non-compliers and to propose new approaches 
or collaborative solutions to overcoming insufficient capacities – have become 
particularly prevalent within multilateral environmental agreements.190  As Klabbers has 
said, ‘[c]ompliance (or non-compliance) procedures are usually said to exist, and be 
necessary in international environmental protection because the environment cannot, for 
a number of reasons, be entrusted to the workings of traditional international law.’191  
Including such a process, while still restricted to inter-state compliance monitoring and 
pressure, could enhance the opportunity to explore collective action solutions, resolve 
capacity challenges requiring transnational collaboration and assistance, as well as 
provide communities, epistemic actors and NGOs with a stronger voice when applying 
their own pressure on states parties.192  Unfortunately, no form of implementation review 
was included in the UNESCO Convention, and states parties have been left to implement 
(or not implement) their commitments under the UNESCO Convention according to their 
own preferences or capacities.193  NGOs and non-state actors should also therefore expand 
their role in analysing areas for concern in terms of non-compliance and effort should be 
made to mobilise assistance and multi-sectoral collaboration from global civil society 
towards addressing such compliance weaknesses, in lieu of state action.  Fortunately, 
given the global governance context in which we find ourselves, there seems to be ‘clear 
evidence of increasing involvement’ of non-state actors and NGOs in protecting UCH at 
the global level.194  This should continue to be encouraged and facilitated, as well as 
forming a suitable topic for future academic research and analysis. 
 
3. Conclusion: A Global Approach to Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage 
This chapter has explored a number of key theories and concepts forming part of the 
hypothesis explored across Chapters 6 to 9, including transnational governance, 
integrated ocean management and multi-level governance.  It introduced the primary 
 
190 Victor, D.G., Raustiala, K. and Skolnikoff, E.B. (Eds.), (1998), The Implementation and Effectiveness 
of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA); 
Raustiala, K., (2001), Reporting and Review Institutions in 10 Selected Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi). 
191 Klabbers, J., (2008), ‘Compliance Procedures’, in The Oxford Handbook on International 
Environmental Law, D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 995-1009, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford), at p. 996. 
192 See generally, Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P. and Wolfrum, R. (Eds.), (2006), Ensuring Compliance with 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Dialogue Between Practitioners and Academia, Brill (Leiden); 
Supra n. 87, Zürn, at p. 733; Ibid, Klabbers. 
193 Supra n. 189; Supra n. 166, MacKintosh.  
194 Sarid, E., (2017), ‘International Underwater Cultural Heritage Governance: Past Doubts and Current 
Challenges’, 35(2) Berkeley Journal of International Law 219-261, at p. 240 (emphasis added). 
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research hypothesis of this study, which is whether a multi-level (global-regional-
national-local) governance approach could improve the protection of UCH across the 
world by particularly addressing, complementing or superseding the weaknesses of the 
international legal system.  It has demonstrated that the many social scientific and policy 
research fields are all searching for very similar solutions to common problems, such as 
global public goods, global constitutionalism, transnational law and governance, 
integrated ocean management, multi-level governance, and global governance.  In many 
senses, therefore, the search for an integrated approach to ocean governance should be 
recognised as closely interlinked with the search for transnational approaches to 
governance which, itself, is closely interlinked with taking a multiple-level and multiple-
stakeholder approach. 
 
The chapter thus began discussions – no doubt forming the subject of future academic 
discourse – on the types of norms, systems and organisations which should be facilitated 
at the global governance level in order to address the issues of cooperation and 
compliance which were explored in Chapters 3 to 5.  This includes the growing need for 
greater policy leadership and enforcement, for example, through NGOs, epistemic actors, 
soft law, transnational standardisation, and supranational courts and legal systems.  
Indeed, while more could possibly be said on the global level, there are two reasons why 
the chapter has been limited to basic proposals.  First, given the collective action 
challenges of producing effective systems and rules at the global level for global public 
goods, there is a considerable dearth of such systems and rules.  As such, the analysis 
here has only been able to demonstrate very basic and nascent examples of potential 
transnationalisation or NGO involvement at the global level, rather than having the 
opportunity to map out details of a ‘thick’ multiple-stakeholder regime at this level.  The 
second reason is that, because of the collective action challenges of organising 
communities and legal systems across the entire world towards global goods, there is an 
argument that the thickening of regimes immediately above or below the nation state – at 
the regional or local community level – is a more realistic target in the interim.   
 
Indeed, as Chapters 7 and 9 show, the regional and community governance levels provide 
far more comprehensive examples of increasing supranationalisation, transnationalisation 
and decentralisation in the context of UCH protection.  As such, while global 
constitutionalism or supranationalism appears some way off, the regional and community 
levels could provide a more suitable area on which to focus political resources and 
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academic analysis in the immediate future.  However, this is not to downplay the need for 
more intensive stakeholderisation of governance at the global level, which carries 
numerous advantages as evidenced above.  Such stakeholderisation can provide the frame 
in which supranational and non-state actors and communities can steer the agenda, make 
rules, implement and enforce rules, and evaluate and monitor the governance system’s 
performance.  As this chapter has shown at various junctures, this helps to quell 
weaknesses in the international legal system by wresting responsibility from states and 
driving forward enhancements in the transnational governance system.  However, it is at 
the regional level and community level where detailed supranationalisation and 
stakeholderisation appears most intensively and, in the immediate future, most plausibly.  















































Chapter Abstract:  
This chapter explores the need for regional-level governance in the protection of 
underwater cultural heritage (UCH).  It points to a surprising lack of existing research 
and literature highlighting the various benefits and strengths to be gained by cooperation 
across the regional level, such as across continental spaces or shared sea basins.  
Introducing three main types of regional-level governance – being multilateral, 
supranational and transnational – it explains how each system of regional-level 
governance can address the collective action weaknesses identified in Chapters 3 to 5.  It 
also shows that each carry distinct merits and are advantageous in different 
circumstances, such as: the sovereignty-inspiring nature of multilateralism; the 
sovereignty-constraining potential of supranationalism; and the sovereignty-evading 
powers of transnationalism.  It then takes this forward and introduces empirical research 
and secondary literature to the question of whether regional-level cooperation and 
integration could assist in the protection of UCH.  Here, by the use of new empirical 
evidence (from interview responses), as well as deriving broader views from across the 
academic literature, it demonstrates that UCH would be better served by an increased 
focus on the power, efficiency and influence of regional governance regimes and 
solutions.  Despite this, activity in this regard has been remarkably languid, with many 
academics up to now denying that there is even any need for regional-level solutions to 
UCH protection.  It concludes that further regional solutions need to be explored. 
 
1. Introduction: Three Types of Regional Governance 
This chapter argues that the ‘regional’ level forms a fundamentally vital component of 
any effective model of marine or environmental governance.  Nevertheless, it is an area 
which has thus far – and with little justification – been unfortunately neglected in the 
context of UCH protection.  This is regrettable considering that it was made clear, both 
within Article 6 of the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
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Cultural Heritage (UNESCO Convention)1 and Article 303(4) of the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOSC),2 that states should be committed to exploring further regional 
solutions beyond these international-level treaties.  Notably, it is also despite the fact that 
most comprehensive studies on the achievement of effective environmental management, 
particularly in a transnational environment such as the marine ocean space, highlight the 
critical necessity of regional-level institutions and processes.  Indeed, in the marine 
environment, the effectiveness of regional-level governance was more formally 
recognised during the 1970s as part of the post-Stockholm Declaration global 
environmental movement.  For example, the ‘Regional Seas Programme’ (RSP) 
established under the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1974, led to 
the establishment of a number of regional seas instruments across various worldwide 
regions throughout the 1970s and 1980s.3  The RSP also joined up with a number of 
existing regional treaties and organisations which had already begun establishing their 
own regional system, such as OSPAR in the North-East Atlantic and HELCOM in the 
Baltic.4   
 
In addition to the UNEP programme, which emphasised inter-state cooperation and 
coordination on marine environmental protection, it was also around this time that greater 
focus was placed on the significant potential of regional approaches to fisheries 
management.5  This led to the establishment of numerous Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations around the world which cover a variety of zones and species.6  
This time also saw the development of advanced port state controls which were achieved 
by utilising regional-level approaches, such as by the Paris MOU, which then inspired the 
creation of similar port state measures across other key regions.7  In addition, academic 
 
1 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 2001, 
in force 2 January 2009), 2562 UNTS 1. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 397. 
3 Rochette, J., Bille, R., Molenaar, E. J., Drankier, P. and Chabason, L., (2015), ‘Regional Oceans 
Governance Mechanisms: A Review’, 60 Marine Policy 9-19, at p. 10; Oral, N., (2015), ‘Forty Years of 
the UNEP Regional Seas Programme: From Past to Future’, in Research Handbook on International 
Marine Environmental Law, R. Rayfuse (Ed.), 339-362, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham); Vallega, A., (1994), 
‘The Regional Scale of Ocean Management and Marine Region Building’, 24(1) Ocean & Coastal 
Management 17-37. 
4 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, (adopted 22 
September 1992 (Paris), in force 25 March 1998), 2354 UNTS 67 (OSPAR Convention); Convention on 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, (9 April 1992 (Helsinki), in force 17 
January 2000), 1507 UNTS 167 (Helsinki Convention). 
5 Supra n. 3. 
6 See list of RFMOs at: European Commission, ‘Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs)’, 
(at: https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/rfmo_en, accessed:  1 March 2019). 




research in the ocean governance field is commonly disaggregated into the study of 
different regional and subregional contexts, such as within enclosed or semi-enclosed sea 
basins or across wider continental stretches.8  Such regional governance can be comprised 
of a number of different actors, rules and systems and, depending on the particular object, 
it is possible to find a vast number of overlapping, interlinked and complementary 
regulatory regimes.  In the main, however, there are perhaps three key forms of 
regionalisation: multilateral, supranational, and pluralistic regionalisation.9    
 
First, multilateral regionalisation refers to the development of intergovernmental treaties 
and agreements between neighbour states across a regional context.  Such intra-
continental agreements can cover various topics, including trade, security, cross-border 
enforcement, environmental protection, and the cross-border movement of goods, people 
and services.  An example which has been noted in the context of UCH protection would 
be the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage 
of Europe (Valletta Convention).10  Such intergovernmental regional agreements also 
range from mere Memoranda of Understanding, with little in the way of directly 
applicable law;11 right up to the development of substantive treaty rights and obligations 
enforceable through international enforcement machinery.12  This is the traditional form 
of regional governance which is found more commonly in regions around the world.  In 
the North-East Atlantic, for example, the OSPAR Convention and the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Atlantic Fisheries are examples of such 
regional-level multilateral arrangements.13 
 
 
pdf; accessed 1 March 2019); McDorman, T.L., (2000), ‘Regional Port State Control Agreements: Some 
Issues of International Law’, 5(2) Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 207-226, at pp. 208-209. 
8 Alexander, L.M., (1974), ‘Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The Case of Semi-Enclosed Seas’, 2(2) 
Ocean Development & International Law 151-186.  For example, research into marine governance of 
Europe often divides it up into areas of macro-regional focus, such as the Arctic Ocean, North-East Atlantic, 
North Sea, Baltic Sea, Mediterranean, and Black Sea. 
9 van Tatenhove, J.P., (2015), ‘Marine Governance: Institutional Capacity-Building in a Multi-Level 
Governance Setting’, in Governing Europe's Marine Environment: Europeanization of Regional Seas or 
Regionalization of EU Policies?, M. Gilek and K. Kern (Eds.), 35-52, Routledge (Abingdon), at pp. 37-38. 
10 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised), (adopted 16 January 
1992 (Valletta), in force 25 May 1995), Council of Europe, ETS No. 143. 
11 E.g., Memorandum of Understanding for the Transport of Packaged Dangerous Goods on Ro-Ro Ships 
in the Baltic Sea (1 January 2018, Copenhagen); Supra n. 7, Paris MOU. 
12 See, e.g., Council of Europe, ‘Complete List of the Council of Europe's Treaties’, (at:  https://www.coe.
int/en/web/conventions/full-list; accessed: 1 March 2019). 
13 Supra n. 4, OSPAR Convention; Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Atlantic 




The second manifestation of regional governance is the elaboration of more detailed 
supranational rule systems, perhaps best typified by the European Union or the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR).14  Such supranational law is, in many respects, a form 
of traditional intergovernmental law, but which has gone further in its capacity to 
constrain unilateral decision-making by nation states or to reach beyond their internal 
sovereign independence in certain areas.15  For example, the ECHR can deliver judgments 
which are directly enforceable in most countries signed up to the Convention.16  In the 
EU, for example, the development of directly enforceable law and the appointment of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union as the supreme court of law within all member 
states (for matters relating to EU law), ensures that regulations and rules developed 
through the EU’s architecture are truly enforced and harmonised across states.17  The high 
level of resource pooling, harmonisation, collective gains, and integrated budgetary 
commitments also reduces transaction costs and ensures that states cannot free ride by 
rejecting community-wide commitments.18  Supranationalism is therefore more effective 
than intergovernmentalism in its capacity to overcome the weaknesses of consent-based 
international law examined in Chapters 3 to 5.  Naturally, however, achieving such 
sovereignty-constraining levels of cooperation is not politically frictionless and, in the 
case of the EU, can take decades of gradual integration and trust building among friendly 
nations.  Neither are such supranational systems fully insulated against being undermined 
by poor compliance or even from being subsequently withdrawn from by attempting to 
take governance ‘back’ toward exclusive national sovereignty.19 
 
14 Stone Sweet, A. and Sandholtz, W., (1998), ‘Integration, Supranational Governance, and the 
Institutionalization of the European Polity’, in European Integration and Supranational Governance, W. 
Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (Eds.), 1-26, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Martinico G. and Pollicino, 
O., (2012), The Interaction Between Europe's Legal Systems: Judicial Dialogue and the Creation of 
Supranational Laws, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham). 
15 Schermers, H.G. and Blokker, N.M., (2011), International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity, 5th 
Edn, Brill (Leiden), at pp. 56-57; De Baere, G., Chané A. and Wouters, J., (2017), ‘The Contribution of 
International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law: A Framework for Analysis’, in The Enforcement 
of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States' Compliance, A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (Eds.), 19-81, 
Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 32-36. 
16 Keller, H. and Stone Sweet, A., (2008), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal 
Systems, Oxford University Press (Oxford). 
17 Stone Sweet, A., (2011), ‘The European Court of Justice’, in The Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. 
de Búrc (Eds.), 121-154, Oxford University Press (Oxford).  
18 Levy, R.E., (2017), ‘The Law and Economics of Supranationalism: The European Union and the 
Subsidiarity Principle in Collective Action Perspective’, 43(4) European Journal of Law and Economics 
441-473; Aspinwall, M. and Greenwood, M., (1997), Collective Action in the European Union: Interests 
and the New Politics of Associability, Routledge (Abingdon). 
19 Jakab, A. and Kochenov, D. (Eds.), (2016), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member 
States’ Compliance, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Falkner, G., Hartlapp, M., Leiber, S. and Treib, O., 
(2004), ‘Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?’, 
27(3) West European Politics 452-473; Martill, B. and Staiger, U. (Eds.), (2018), Brexit and Beyond: 




Finally, it is worth acknowledging that regional governance can occur outside of 
traditional inter-state legal processes, through self-coordination of non-state actors and 
by increasing public-private integration through pluralistic, or transnational, regional 
governance.  Here, the interaction of non-state actors can over time lead to the 
establishment of non-state law and systems of internal observance and enforcement of 
norms among communities, or can lead to networks which engage in policy research and 
development.  Such transnational networks can naturally occur across ‘regional’ contexts 
and could also be enhanced or hastened through facilitative processes, transboundary 
legal obligations, or funding, which have arisen by regional intergovernmentalism or 
supranationalism.20 They can also occur as ‘administrative networks’ around common 
policy objectives.21  Various examples of non-state actor networks across regional 
contexts are not difficult to find.22  Given their organic and sometimes informal nature, 
such transnational policy networks are capable of possessing less internal legal 
normativity than traditional supranational or intergovernmental law.23  However, they still 
provide additional behavioural modification among regional actors and can assist in 
advancing subsequent regional law by increased collective trust and goodwill, as well as 
by bottom-up regulatory forces.  Similarly, through supranational forms of 
regionalisation, it is possible to directly empower non-state actors through directly 
applicable laws and wider accountability mechanisms.24 
 
 
20 Bederman, D.J., (2008), Globalization and International Law, Palgrave Macmillan (London), at p. 154. 
21 Mastenbroek, E. and Martinsen, D.S., (2017), ‘Filling the gap in the European Administrative Space: The 
Role of Administrative Networks in EU Implementation and Enforcement’, 25(3) Journal of European 
Public Policy 422-435; Klaster, E., Wilderom, C.P.M. and Muntslag, D.R., (2017), ‘Balancing Relations 
and Results in Regional Networks of Public-Policy Implementation’, 27(4) Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 676-691. 
22 For example, again in the European context, networked cooperation among non-state actors can be found 
in organisations such as Eurocean (at: http://www.eurocean.org; accessed 1 March 2019), the Celtic Seas 
Partnership (at: http://www.celticseaspartnership.eu; accessed 1 March 2019), Association of European 
Renewable Energy Research Centres (at: http://www.eurec.be/en/; accessed 1 March 2019), European 
Environment and Sustainable Development Advisory Councils (at: http://eeac.eu; accessed 1 March 2019), 
European Network of Environmental Professionals (at: http://www.efaep.org; accessed 1 March 2019), and 
the European Association of Archaeologists (at: http://www.e-a-a.org; accessed 1 March 2019); European 
Maritime Law Organisation (at: http://www.emlo.org; accessed 1 March 2019). 
23 Berman, P.S., (2007), ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, 80(6) Southern California Law Review 1155-1238; 
Tamanaha, B.Z., (2008), ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’, 30(3) Sydney 
Law Review 375-411, at pp. 401-42; Shaffer, G.C. and Pollack, M.A., (2009), ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: 
Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance’, 94(3) Minnesota Law Review 
706-799, at p. 724. 
24 Rumsford, C., (2011), ‘Transnationalism and the Political Sociology of European Transformation: 
Bringing People Back In’, in Transnational Europe: Promise, Paradox, Limits, J. DeBardeleben and A. 
Hurrelmann (Eds.), 37-56, Palgrave Macmillan (London). 
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All of these forms of ‘regionalisation’ provide various benefits and drawbacks, depending 
on the particular regional or global good which is the focus of regulation.  The following 
chapter therefore examines some of these various benefits and possible weaknesses of 
regional level governance in the context of UCH protection.  It demonstrates that, while 
regional level governance shows considerable promise and potential value in resolving a 
great deal of challenges facing the protection of UCH, there remain a surprising number 
of policy experts in the UCH preservation community who have yet to be convinced of 
its necessity.  Through reliance on responses from interviews with experts and secondary 
evidence, the chapter in fact demonstrates that regional-level policies – of all types and 
sizes – should be pursued in earnest and at the earliest opportunity, if UCH is ever to be 
protected effectively. 
 
2. Addressing Weaknesses in International Law through Regional Governance 
Looking at the performance of regional-level systems in the ocean environment thus far, 
there seems little doubt that regionalism has the potential to produce a more efficient, 
effective and integrated system of ocean governance.25  Nevertheless, remarkably, while 
there is an increasing amount of detailed descriptive literature on the processes and drivers 
of regionalisation in ocean management,26 it is curiously rare to find expositions on 
precisely why we need regional-level ocean governance and the advantages of divesting 
national political and economic resources towards this end.  As Cook and Sachs once put 
it, the capacity of regional level approaches to provide global public goods is a ‘hugely 
neglected’ area of research.27  The best efforts have usually arisen when focused within 
specific regional contexts.  As one example, in 2016, Egede provided a number of 
persuasive arguments in favour of unifying resources, institutions and rules across the 
 
25 Supra n. 3, Rochette et al, at p. 9; van Tatenhove, J.P., (2016), ‘The Environmental State at Sea’, 25(1) 
Environmental Politics 160-179, at p. 175. 
26 E.g., Alexander, L.M., (1977), ‘Regional Arrangements in the Oceans’, 71(1) American Journal of 
International Law 84-109; Supra n. 3, Vallega; Vallega, A., (2002), ‘The Regional Approach to the Ocean, 
the Ocean Regions, and Ocean Regionalisation – A Post-Modern Dilemma’, 45(11-12) Ocean and Coastal 
Management 721–760; Raakjaer, J. and van Tatenhove, J.P., (Eds.), (2014), ‘Marine Governance of 
European Seas’, 50 (Part B) Marine Policy 323-382 (Special Issue of Marine Policy, 2014); Soma, K., van 
Tatenhove, J. and van Leeuwen, J., (Eds.), (2015), ‘Marine Governance in European Seas: Processes and 
Structures of Regionalization’, 117 Ocean and Coastal Management 1-74 (Special Issue of Ocean and 
Coastal Management, 2015); Gilek, M. and Kern, K., (Eds.), (2015), Governing Europe's Marine 
Environment: Europeanization of Regional Seas or Regionalization of EU Policies?, Routledge 
(Abingdon). 
27 Cook, L.D. and Sachs, J., (1999), ‘Regional Public Goods in International Assistance’, in Global Public 
Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 436-449, 
Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 437. 
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African Union, as opposed to adopting an Integrated Maritime strategy which keeps 
efforts only at the inter-national level.28  
 
Given this dearth of research looking at the need for and benefits of regional-level 
integration, some of its core advantages are compiled or proposed here: 
 
❖ Avoiding races-to-the-bottom: Famously first argued in favour of federalising 
corporate taxation laws in the US, the economic concept of the ‘race to the bottom’ 
provides that regulatory decentralisation can lead to harmful competition effects 
between jurisdictions who are continuously focused on attracting economic activity.29  
By tying national policies together across a region, it therefore prevents harmful races 
to the bottom of environmental, taxation, consumer, employment and other public 
good standards.30  While some studies have disputed the empirical realities of the 
‘race to the bottom’, by suggesting that regulatory competition can drive up standards 
in a ‘race to the top’, the evidence shows that various factors can indeed create 
conditions for races to the bottom, particularly with regard to public goods that 
produce externalities.31  For certain, the capacity to improve public standards by 
regional harmonisation has been evidenced by the globally pioneering environmental 
standards achieved across the EU framework.32 
 
❖ Foreclosing space to free riders: Regional spaces can be more easily enclosed or 
managed in a way which controls access for non-regional actors or free riders.33  
Between adjacent exclusive economic zones, for example, flag state freedoms are 
considerably limited by the sovereign rights of coastal states.  This ocean space can 
 
28 Egede, E., (2016), ‘Institutional Gaps in the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy’, 2016(1) Journal 
of Ocean Law and Governance in Africa 1-27. 
29 Yanblon, C.M., (2006), ‘The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and 
Decline of New Jersey: 1880-1910’, 32(2) Journal of Corporation Law 323-380. 
30 Dunoff, J.L., (2008), ‘Levels of Environmental Governance’, in The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law, D. Bodansky J. Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 85-106, Oxford University Press (Oxford), 
at p. 94 and 95.                                                                                                             
31 Holzinger, K. and Knill, C., (2004), ‘Competition and Cooperation in Environmental Policy: Individual 
and Interaction Effects’, 24(1) Journal of Public Policy 25-47; Holzinger, K. and Sommerer, T., (2011), 
‘‘Race to the Bottom’ or ‘Race to Brussels’? Environmental Competition in Europe’, 49(2) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 315-339. 
32 Axelrod, R.S. and Schreurs, M.A., (2014), ‘Environmental Policy Making and Global Leadership in the 
European Union’, in The Global Environment: Institutions, Law, and Policy, R.S. Axelrod and S. Van 
Deveer (Eds.), 4th Edn, 157-186, CQ Press (Washington DC). 
33 Molenaar, E.J., (2015), ‘Port and Coastal States’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, D.R. 
Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, K.N. Scott and T. Stephens (Eds.), 280-303, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford), at p. 300; Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M., (1999), ‘Global Public Goods: Concepts, Policies 
and Strategies’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. 
Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 450-507, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 490. 
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thus become effectively controlled by neighbouring states who can coordinate in the 
foreclosure of space to free riders and in the collective raising of standards within the 
enclosed region. 
 
❖ Smaller number of states makes collective action easier: As was discussed in Chapter 
4, the key means to overcome international cooperation failure is through the use of 
repeated interactions and the gradual development of group consciousness among 
actors.34  Having a smaller collective of states which are seeking this critical mass, 
each with resources available to offer across the regional marine space, results in a 
lower threshold to reach and more to gain by collective action and standard raising.35  
A smaller number of states will also make free riding easier to detect.36 
 
❖ Greater interdependence: Regional neighbours often have historic experience in 
achieving collective action solutions together, including over transboundary issues 
such as trade, transportation, communication, immigration, customs, and 
environmental protection.37  This could lead to numerous benefits, such as technical 
harmonisation, the removal of cultural, language and practical barriers, as well as a 
better infrastructure for cross-border enforcement.  This close integration and 
collective cooperation between neighbouring states could also strengthen the 
motivation to cooperate in the enforcement of collectively negotiated rules, given the 
stronger threat of countermeasures, trade sanctions, or lost collective gains.38  
Therefore, even in intergovernmental or transnational arrangements which are less 
co-dependent than supranational regimes, there is a greater capacity for effective 
enforcement mechanisms than is available at the global level. 
 
 
34 See Chapter 4, Section 2. Veld R.J., (2013), ‘Transgovernance: The Quest for Governance of Sustainable 
Development’, in Transgovernance: Advancing Sustainability Governance, L. Meuleman (Ed.), 275-310, 
Springer Verlag (Heidelberg), at pp. 280-282. 
35 Rochette, J. and Chabason, L., ‘A Regional Approach to Marine Environmental Protection: The 
“Regional Seas” Experience, in Oceans: The New Frontier, P. Jacquet, R.K. Pachauri and L. Tubiana 
(Eds.), 111-121, The Energy and Resources Institute (New Delhi), at p. 115. 
36 Martin, L.L., (1999), ‘The Political Economy of International Cooperation, in Global Public Goods: 
Cooperation in the 21st Century’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, 
I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 51-64, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 55. 
37 Birdsall, N. and Lawrence, R.Z., (1999), ‘Deep Integration and Trade Agreements: Good for Developing 
Countries?’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg 
and M. Stern (Eds.), 128-151, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 146. 
38 Diez, T., Tocci, N., Faleg, G. and Scherwitz, E., (2017), ‘Introduction: Promoting Regional Integration 
and Transforming Conlicts?’, in The EU, Promoting Regional Integration, and Conflict Resolution, T. Diez 
and N. Tocci (Eds.), 1-28, Palgrave Macmillan (London), at pp. 5-10; Tallberg, J, (2002), ‘Paths to 




❖ Collective trust and goodwill: States in a regional context, through their shared 
histories and closer interdependence, often have higher levels of collective trust and 
goodwill.39  Similarly, they may share cultural similarities which makes cooperation 
easier.  Under the global public goods analysis in Chapter 4, a key cause of inter-state 
cooperation failure was a fear of being undermined by free riding or recalcitrant 
states.40  This improved trust and goodwill not only means that states are more willing 
to offer resources and engage in extended collaborative efforts, but they can therefore 
rely on neighbouring states to ‘come up with the goods’ when called upon.41  
Furthermore, collective trust can be improved as regional states become more open to 
reciprocally softening political borders and sharing of political space, especially in 
the use of marine spatial planning, shared marine protected areas, or the co-
development of transboundary projects.42   
 
❖ Difficulty externalising harms: Given that much non-cooperation between states 
results from their ability to simply externalise harms or losses to “outsiders”, the 
shared nature of regional ocean space and the close proximity between neighbouring 
states makes any attempt to externalise harm more challenging.43  The high level of 
ecosystem interconnectivity within shared regional marine spaces means that harms 
produced by one state will be felt more strongly by neighbouring states.44  Similarly, 
the close political and social relationships between neighbouring states means that it 
is harder to ‘switch off’ from transboundary harm, especially regarding spillovers of 
an abstract, psychological, or sociocultural nature, such as environmental and cultural 
heritage destruction.45  This sense of ‘shared heritage’ has thus already been seen as 
a particularly strong argument in favour of regional treaties protecting the ocean 
environment.46 
 
39 Supra n. 30, Dunoff, at p. 87; Supra n. 33, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 476. 
40 See Chapter 3; Kaul, I., (2012), ‘Global Public Goods: Explaining Their Underprovision’, 15(3) Journal 
of International Economic Law 729-750. 
41 Matz-Lück, N. and Fuchs, J., (2014), ‘The Impact of OSPAR on Protected Area Management Beyond 
National Jurisdiction: Effective Regional Cooperation or a Network of Paper Parks?’, 49 Marine Policy 
155-166, at p. 163; Supra n. 37, Birdsall and Lawrence, at p. 146. 
42 Ooms, E., (2018), Interview with Erik Ooms, 27 February 2018, Transcript on File; Jay, S.A. and Toonen, 
H.M., (2015), ‘The Power of the Offshore (Super-) Grid in Advancing Marine Regionalization’, 117 Ocean 
and Coastal Management 32-42. 
43 Supra n. 30, Dunoff, at p. 90; Mattli, W., (1999), The Logic of Regional Integration Europe and Beyond, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at pp. 46-50. 
44 Supra n. 27, Cook and Sachs, at p. 438; Supra n. 33, Molenaar, at p. 300; Supra n. 41, Matz-Lück and 
Fuchs, at p. 163. 
45 Supra n. 33, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 476. 
46 Supra n. 35, Rochette and Chabason, at p. 115; Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea 
against Pollution (Barcelona Convention), (adopted 16 February 1976, in force 2 December 1978), 1102 




❖ More flexible to regional context: Every regional space is different, with different 
actors, values, ecosystems, geographies, cultures, resources, and challenges.47  It 
therefore makes sense that negotiations over collective action towards global goods 
are fully adaptable to addressing such localised contexts.48  The centralisation of 
policymaking also allows for more efficient coordination of effort by disparate 
environmental groups and campaigners, who can collectivise political pressure upon 
central decision-makers, enabling them to properly contest multinational economic 
actors who can easily take advantage of segregated national polities.49 
 
❖ Suitably equipped to manage localised challenges: More practically, it is unsurprising 
that most of the maritime actors operating in regional spaces are going to be nationals 
from or vessels registered in nearby states.  In this sense, the coastal states within a 
regional zone will possess the resources required to achieve effective maritime 
surveillance and enforcement (e.g., localised coast guard and police units, 
surveillance equipment, proximate public agencies), which can be efficiently 
pooled.50  They will also possess the greater number of actors within the region whose 
operations need regulating or who can themselves assist in the development and 
enforcement of effective policy. 
 
❖ Policy innovation and global trendsetting: The smaller and more concentrated 
collaborative spaces in which regional governance takes place permit a higher level 
of flexibility, policy innovation and norm entrepreneurship.  This can be a source of 
inspiration for other regional spaces, by illustrating what can be achieved by regional 
cooperation and how.51  This partial decentralisation from globalised approaches can 
 
Environment from Pollution, (adopted 24 April 1978 (Kuwait), in force 1 July 1979), Preamble; Supra n. 
27, Cook and Sachs, at p. 438. 
47 Kern, K. and Gilek, M., (2015), ‘Governing Europe’s Marine Environment: Key Topics and Challenges’, 
in Governing Europe's Marine Environment: Europeanization of Regional Seas or Regionalization of EU 
Policies?, M. Gilek and K. Kern (Eds.), 1-12,  Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 3. 
48 Supra n. 35, Rochette and Chabason, at p. 114; Rochette, J., Unger, S., Herr, D., Johnson, D., Nakamura, 
T., Packeiser, T., Proelss, A., Visbeck, M., Wright, A. and Cebrian, D., (2014), ‘The Regional Approach to 
the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’, 49 
Marine Policy 109-117, at p. 109; Blasiak, R. and Yagi, N., (2016), ‘Shaping an International Agreement 
on Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction: Lessons From High Seas Fisheries’, 71 Marine 
Policy 210-216, at p. 212; Ardron, J., Druel, E., Gjerde, K., Houghton, K., Rochette, J. and Unger, S., 
(2013), Advancing Governance of the High Seas’, 1/2013 IASS Policy Brief 1-12, at p. 7; Supra n. 37, 
Birdsall and Lawrence, at p. 146. 
49 Supra n. 30, Dunoff, at p. 97; Supra n. 41, Matz-Lück and Fuchs, at p. 163. 
50 Supra n. 28, Egede. 
51 Egan, M. (2009) ‘Governance and Learning in the Post-Maastricht Era?’, 16(8) Journal of European 
Public Policy 1244-1253, at p. 1248; Zito, A. and Schout, A., (2009) ‘Learning Theory Reconsidered: EU 
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also enable national governments to shift the blame for unpopular but necessary 
policies onto regional organisations, thus increasing the political incentive for 
national governments to acquiesce in accepting externally devised limitations and 
obligations.52  However, there is an inherent risk that too much blame-shifting by 
national governments on to the regional level can serve to undermine the value and 
importance of regional governance itself, creating an illusion among national voters 
of being restricted by an overbearing regional technocracy. 
 
In other words, where there is insufficient global trust and goodwill to commit to 
resigning sovereign rights where needed in the production of global goods, the use of 
regional cooperation can provide a vitally effective means to go beyond the global-level 
framework and, from there, strengthen inter-state commitments and trust.53  This can 
often provide more effective protection in lieu of meaningful global commitments and 
will usually, over time, increase the level of state obligations, trust, interdependence and 
willingness to be bound on certain ‘external’ concerns; gradually also strengthening the 
quality of future agreements at the global level.54  In the ocean environment, where deep-
seated concerns relating to sovereign freedoms and territorial rights have widely hindered 
effective collective action at the global level, the use of regional-level regulation has thus 
become an ideal and increasingly touted interim solution to break the impasse with slow 
or struggling ‘inter-national’ approaches at the global bargaining table.55  It is therefore 
no surprise that a leading monographic exposition of ‘integrated’ ocean management by 
Yoshifumi Tanaka viewed such an approach as effectively synonymous with regional-
level governance.56 
 
Regional governance can therefore be viewed as a conduit for more effective global 
governance.57  Travelling from the regional upwards to the global, it is possible that 
 
Integration Theories and Learning’, 16(8) Journal of European Public Policy 1103-1123, at p. 1115; Wälti, 
S., (2010), ‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance’, in Handbook on Multi-Level Governance, H. 
Enderlein, S. Wälti and M. Zürn (Eds.), 411-422, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham), at pp. 415-416. 
52 Marks, G., (1999), ‘An Actor-Centred Approach to Multilevel Governance’, in The Regional Dimension 
of the European Union: Towards a ‘Third Level’ in Europe?, C. Jeffery (Ed.), 20-40, Routledge 
(Abingdon), at p. 26; Ibid, Wälti, at p. 415. 
53 Supra n. 33, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 476; Supra n. 48, Rochette et al, at p. 109. 
54 Supra n. 35, Rochette and Chabason, at pp. 114 and 119. 
55 Supra n. 33, Molenaar, at p. 300; Hayward, P., (1984), ‘Environmental Protection: Regional Approaches’, 
8(2) Marine Policy 106-119. 
56 Tanaka, Y., (2008), A Dual Approach to Ocean Governance: The Cases of Zonal and Integrated 
Management in International Law of the Sea, Routledge (Abingdon). 
57 Thakur, R. and Van Langenhove, L., (2006), ‘Enhancing Global Governance Through Regional 
Integration’, 12(3) Global Governance 233-240; C.f., Supra n. 27, Cook and Sachs, at pp. 440-441. 
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successful regional approaches and effective innovation in each region can cross-fertilise 
to other regions or can provide inspiration for global solutions.58  While downstream, it 
is possible for global programmes to allocate governance responsibility for global goods 
to regional organisations and agencies,59 and to operate as a facilitator and arbiter between 
different regional regimes.60  For example, as Visbeck et al recently said, while regional 
systems are beneficial ‘to field-test different approaches and . . . to take region-specific 
issues into account . . . they are most effective when embedded in a global framework of 
goals and targets.’61  Importantly, they often represent more detailed, substantive and 
sovereignty-constraining characteristics than global treaties.  As such, once states have 
become familiar with collective action on ‘externally valued’ issues at the regional level, 
it is a much smaller step to just agree to transmigrate these values inter-regionally.   
 
A good example in the United Kingdom has been the UNESCO 1970 Convention on the 
Export and Import of Illicit Cultural Property.62  This treaty was not ratified by the UK 
until 2002, 32 years after its signing.  However, a key reason for the UK government 
being motivated to join the treaty was that UK legislation had gradually aligned with the 
Convention anyway as a result of the EU 1993 Directive on Return of Cultural Objects 
Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a Member State, which was first negotiated 
at the regional level.63  Many examples can be found of this sequential migration of 
standards from the regional level to the global.  For example, the development of stringent 
port state measures, now a norm in many regions around the world and the principal 
means for controlling ports-of-convenience, has been driven at the regional and not global 
 
58 Supra n. 33, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at pp. 466 and 476. 
59 See e.g., European Commission, (1999), Preparing for Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, 
Commission Communication to the Council and the Parliament, 19 May 1999, COM (1999) 230. 
60 For example, the aforementioned Regional Seas Programme under the UN Environment Programme 
(supra n. 3). 
61 Visbeck, M., Kronfeld-Goharani, U., Neumann, B., Rickels, W., Schmidt, J., van Doorn, E., Matz-Lück, 
N. and Proelss, A., (2014), ‘A Sustainable Development Goal for the Ocean and Coasts: Global Ocean 
Challenges Benefit from Regional Initiatives Supporting Globally Coordinated Solutions’, 49 Marine 
Policy 87-89, at p. 88. 
62 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer 
of Ownership of Cultural Property, (adopted 14 November 1970, in force 24 April 1972), 823 UNTS 231. 
63 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (2002), Explanatory Memorandum on the Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, April 2002, 
Command Paper Number 5500; Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural 
objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State, 27 March 1993, 74 Official Journal of 
the European Union 74. 
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level, and led by the Paris MOU between European states in 1982.64  This is now bolstered 
at the global level, ex post, with the FAO’s Port State Measures Agreement.65 
 
Friedheim once stated that ‘[a]lthough some ocean problems are amenable to a bilateral 
or regional solution, many are not.’66  However, he then fails to explain the basis of this 
conclusion, which appears to have been based on a defensive view of nationalism, rather 
than any real assessment of regionalism’s actual potential for ocean management.  In 
reality, there seems no plausible argument why most problems of ocean governance – 
themselves issues which impact or contain spillovers to communities and future 
generations outside of the state in question – cannot be effectively resolved by processes 
of regional integration, built on a practical framework of constitutional subsidiarity.  In 
this sense, the global level only need to be used where it is necessary on account of 
spillovers from the regional levels, such as specifically addressing the rights of non-
regional flag states, facilitating inter-regional cooperation, or driving up the quality of 
regional regimes.67  Similarly, it does not lose sight of the importance of autonomy and 
freedom of communities at the national and subnational level to regulate any matters 
which carry minimal spillover. 
 
Therefore, most global environmental treaties or conventions relating to global public 
goods appear to recognise the significant potential of regional-level approaches by 
usually permitting or even calling for subsequent efforts at regional or bilateral levels to 
build stricter or more effective and detailed regimes.68  For example, the LOSC regularly 
calls for the use of regional organisations and systems to advance protection of the ocean 
environment,69 including an acknowledgement that such measures may be taken in the 
protection of UCH.70  Indeed, the UNESCO 2001 Convention itself says that states ‘are 
encouraged to enter into bilateral, regional or other multilateral agreements or develop 
 
64 Supra n. 7, Paris MOU. 
65 Food and Agricultural Organization, (2009), Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, (adopted 22 November 2009, in force 5 June 2016), 
(at: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/037s-e.pdf; accessed 1 March 2019). 
66 Friedheim, R.L., (1999), ‘Ocean Governance at the Millennium; Where We Have Been; Where We 
Should Go’, 42 Ocean and Coastal Management 747-765, at p. 748. 
67 ‘[N]ot every international environmental problem needs to be dealt with on a global level’ (Alhéritière, 
D., (1982), ‘Marine Pollution Regulation: Regional Approaches’, 6(3) Marine Policy 162-174, at p. 172. 
68 Drankier, P., (2008), ‘Embedding Maritime Spatial Planning in National Legal Frameworks’, 14(1) 
Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 7-27, at p. 10. 
69 E.g., Supra n. 2, LOSC, Arts. 123 and 197; Barnes, R.A., Freestone, D. and Ong, D.M., (2006), ‘The 
Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects’, in The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, D. Freestone, 
R.A. Barnes and D.M. Ong (Eds.), 1-27, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 6. 
70 Supra n. 2, LOSC, Art. 303(4). 
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existing agreements’ for protecting UCH, and such agreements can ‘adopt rules and 
regulations which would ensure better protection of underwater cultural heritage than 
those adopted in this Convention.’71  As Aznar said in interview, a ‘regional (or sub-
regional) approach must be explored, including all stakeholders’ and the ‘2001 
Convention fosters this in its Article 6.’72   
 
As Tulio Scovazzi, renowned Professor of International Law, also writes of this provision 
within the UNESCO Convention: 
 
‘[It] opens the way to multiple-level protection of underwater cultural 
heritage.  This corresponds to what has already happened in the field of 
the protection of the natural environment, where treaties having a world 
sphere of application are often followed by treaties concluded at regional 
and subregional levels.  The key to coordination among treaties applicable 
at different levels is the criterium of the better protection, in the sense that 
the regional and subregional treaties are concluded to ensure better 
protection granted by those adopted at a more general level.’73 
 
3. Regional Governance and Underwater Cultural Heritage Protection 
(a) Existing Regional Regimes 
Despite agreement within both the LOSC and UNESCO Convention that regimes should 
be developed at the regional level which go beyond those achieved at the international 
table, as well as increasingly harmonised opinion that such regional and subregional 
approaches are needed to address shared environmental challenges, developments in this 
regard with respect to UCH have been disconcertingly languid.  As Williams said in 
interview, ‘there was tremendous scope for regional agreements [but] I can’t name one’.74  
He continues, saying that the UNESCO Convention ‘was meant to work on a cooperative 
 
71 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 6(1); DeRudder, T. and Maes, F. (Eds.), (2015), Workshop: The 
Legal Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage 23 April 2015 – Final Report, Maritime Institute, 
University of Ghent (Ghent), (at: http://www.vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/ocrd/274121.pdf; accessed 8 
January 2019), at p. 14 (per Varmer). 
72 Aznar, M.J., (2018), Interview with Mariano J. Aznar, 12 February 2018, Transcript on File. 
73 Scovazzi, T., (2006), ‘The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage’, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, B.T. Hoffman (Ed.), 285-292, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 291. 
74 Williams, M., (2018), Interview with Mike Williams, 18 June 2018, Transcript on File; ‘There are no 
existing examples of general multilateral agreements other than the Underwater Convention.’ (O’Keefe, 
P.J., (2014), Shipwrecked Heritage: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural 
Heritage, 2nd Edn, Institute of Art and Law (Builth Wells), at p. 54). 
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basis.  Well, if you haven’t got regional agreements, I don’t think you are cooperating.’75  
It only appears to be the development of bilateral state-to-state agreements where most 
UCH-related inter-national norm-building has been achieved.76  As Firth has said, 
however, such bilateral agreements are only relevant to ‘specific instances’; or, in other 
words, specific wrecks of considerable interest to a flag state where – as was explained 
in Chapter 4 – there is sufficient political motivation to arrange a specific partnership with 
the coastal state regarding a known wreck of specific political or economic significance.77   
 
However, in terms of detailed regional regimes specifically addressing the in situ 
protection of UCH – whether multilateral, supranational, or transnational – progress has 
been poor.  For example, even though European nations can often regard themselves as 
leading in the field of archaeological site management, there are no substantive regimes 
for the protection of UCH across any of Europe’s main regional seas.78  As was noted in 
Chapter 1, efforts to draft an inter-state treaty on the protection of UCH failed at the 
European level in 1985, given disagreements over the allocation of jurisdiction.79  
However, much has changed since this negotiating effort which was undertaken over 
three decades ago.  The approach of states could be considerably different in the modern-
day era and, given greater awareness of the plight of marine heritage, could pay far less 
attention to questions of maritime jurisdiction and creeping coastal state rights; and far 
more fruitful attention, instead, to expanding on detailed rules for integrated approaches, 
regulatory harmonisation, resource pooling, and achieving meaningful systems of 
cooperation and coordination between states, agencies and private operators.  As Risvas 
said in 2013, ‘[a]lthough an attempt to develop a European convention on UCH failed 
during the 1980s, it seems that regionalism is regaining its momentum.’80   
 
It is true that the Council of Europe’s Valletta Convention and Landscape Convention 
have played a key role in driving up the quality of archaeological site management and 
protection across Europe.81  However, as noted previously, neither apply beyond 
 
75 Ibid, Williams. 
76 See Chapter 4, Section 3(c); Manders, M., (2018), Interview with Martijn Manders, 15 February 2018, 
Transcript on File. 
77 See Chapter 4, Section 3(c). 
78 Altvater, S., (2018), Interview with Susanne Altvater, 17 May 2018, Transcript on File. 
79 See Chapter 1, Section 4. Supra n. 74, O’Keefe, at pp. 53-54. 
80 Risvas, M., (2013), ‘The Duty to Cooperate and the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 2(3) 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 562-590, at p. 587. 
81 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised), (adopted 16 January 
1992 (Valletta), in force 25 May 1995), Council of Europe, ETS No. 143; European Landscape Convention 
(adopted 20 October 2000, in force 1 March 2004), Council of Europe, ETS No. 176; ‘I mean you can look 
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territorial waters.82  Nor do they provide a great deal of pressure on states to curtail their 
economic expansion while preserving sites for the benefits of others.  Furthermore, their 
emphasis is more on archaeological standards, as opposed to developing specific and 
detailed rules of cross-border integration and more effective systems of collective 
governance.  However, progress in the development of regional regimes for marine 
environmental protection, security and surveillance cooperation, port state controls, and 
marine planning, could deliver numerous incidental protections for UCH.  This includes 
agreements on the establishment of marine protected areas, such as the 1995 Protocol to 
the Barcelona Convention (protecting the Mediterranean)83 which allows states parties to 
establish ‘Specially Protected Areas of Mediterranean Importance’ (SPAMIs), with the 
ability to include sites based on their cultural importance.84  However, despite Aznar’s 
view that this provides a potential pathway towards the protection of UCH, it has yet to 
be utilised in any manner at all for such a purpose.85  Furthermore, even if it was being 
used, the same issues with bilateral cooperation over specific wrecks are likely to apply, 
in that this mechanism’s focus on superlative significance is likely to only suit well-known 
(underwater) landmarks, where there is sufficient political and economic incentive to 
divert national resources and political energy towards their protection.86 
 
As is explored again in subsection (iii) below, because of the closer interdependence and 
collective sense of shared heritage, political action and meaningful progress towards UCH 
protection has been perhaps best witnessed in regional sea basins or semi-enclosed seas.  
For example, in addition to the development of the SPAMI Protocol to the Barcelona 
Convention, states in the Mediterranean have agreed rules for protecting UCH within the 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management Protocol.87  Similarly, a conference between 
 
at things that aren't always necessarily focused on underwater cultural heritage.  For Europe, you have the 
Valletta Convention.  That has already filled in gaps.’ (Guérin, U., (2018), Interview with Ulrike Guérin, 
16 May 2018, Transcript on File). 
82 Ibid, Valletta Convention, Art. 1(2)(ii); Ibid, European Landscape Convention, Art. 2. 
83 Protocol concerning specially protected areas and biological diversity in the Mediterranean, (adopted 14 
December 1999, under the Barcelona Convention (supra n. 46), as amended 10 June 1995), 322 Official 
Journal of the European Communities 3-17. 
84 Ibid, Protocol concerning specially protected areas and biological diversity in the Mediterranean, Art. 
4(d). 
85 Aznar, M.J., (2006), ‘Spain’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National Perspectives 
in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), 271-296, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 
293; Supra n. 71, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 14. 
86 As Aznar noted in interview, ‘[i]t is not the perfect solution [to achieving a more regionally integrated 
approach], but I think it is one of the proposed solutions.’ (Supra n. 72, Aznar). 
87 Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean, (adopted 21 January 2008, under 
the Barcelona Convention (supra n. 46), as amended 10 June 1995), 34 Official Journal of the European 
Communities 19-28; Firth, A., (2013), ‘Marine Spatial Planning and the Historic Environment’, Report for 
English Heritage, Project Number 5460, Fjordr Ref: 16030, Fjordr (Tisbury), at pp. 45-46. 
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Mediterranean states in Siracusa in March 2001, led to the Siracusa Declaration on the 
Submarine Cultural Heritage of the Mediterranean Sea calling for a mutual respect for 
shared submerged cultural heritage of the Mediterranean sea basin and to explore future 
options for cooperation and bilateral and regional agreements.88  Two years later saw 
another international conference in Siracusa in 2003 which explored further options for 
cooperation, at which Italy proposed a draft multilateral convention for Mediterranean 
states.89  However, it appears not to have gone any further than this.  
 
Similarly, the Baltic Sea is often heralded as a leading sub-region for UCH protection, 
largely assisted by overarching coordination of the HELCOM Secretariat which is an 
effective intergovernmental commission for coordinating marine environmental 
protection efforts across the Baltic Sea.90  This has led to numerous initiatives and 
working groups over the years with a focus on coordinating inter-state activity towards 
heritage protection, such as the Baltic Sea Heritage Co-Operation initiative,91 the Baltic 
Region Heritage Committee,92 the Code of Good Practice for the Management of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage in the Baltic Sea Region,93 and numerous marine spatial 
planning (MSP) pilots and working groups which have included UCH to varying 
extents.94  The most relevant MSP initiative is the BalticRIM project, funded by the EU 
and running between 2017-2020, which is presently exploring the means to more 
 
88 Scovazzi, T., (2009), ‘The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: An Italian Perspective’, in The 
Illicit Traffic of Cultural Property in the Mediterranean, A.F. Vrdoljak and F. Francioni (Eds.), EUI 
Working Papers, AEL 2009/9, 75-88, Academy of European Law (Trier), at pp. 85-86; Strecker, A., (2009), 
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Underwater Cultural Heritage in the Mediterranean Region’, in The Illicit Traffic of Cultural Property in 
the Mediterranean, A.F. Vrdoljak and F. Francioni (Eds.), EUI Working Papers, AEL 2009/9, 59-74, 
Academy of European Law (Trier), at p. 70. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, (adopted 9 April 1992 
(Helsinki), in force 17 January 2000), 1507 UNTS 167; Maarleveld, T.J., (2018), Interview with Thijs J. 
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effectively integrate marine cultural heritage within broader MSP efforts across the Baltic 
Sea. 
 
As with the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea also tried and failed to complete a new draft 
regional agreement around the time that the UNESCO Convention was concluded.95  As 
argued below, however, it has largely been on account of an erroneous view that a 
regional agreement will replace the UNESCO Convention; whereas, in fact, the 
UNESCO Convention works well as both a parallel complement and precursor to 
effective regional regimes.  Finally, there are other regions which have made some 
motions towards better regional coordination.  Two such regions, which are often touted 
as areas with great potential for more effective regionalism on UCH protection, are across 
Latin America and the Caribbean.96   Here, for example, UNESCO has played an active 
role in coordinating intergovernmental meetings between regional states who are, in many 
cases, already party to the UNESCO Convention.97  However, detailed schemes of 
cooperation are still some way off.  Finally, as explored below, Williams once noted a 
discussion raised by some Northern European state delegates, back in 2006, regarding a 
new agreement specifically aimed at the wrecks of the Battle of Jutland, which could 
eventually expand out to the whole North Sea.98  Although, again, this does not appear to 
have reached a sufficient critical mass of political interest among budget-constrained and 
time-limited governments. 
 
(b) The Need for More and Better Regional Regimes 
Despite this lack of effort, there is a growing view among most in the archaeological and 
marine environmental community that regional agreements could provide the key to 
enhancing the protection of UCH beyond the struggling international efforts so far.  
Remarkably, however, this view is not everywhere subscribed.  For example, Williams 
noted how there are several leading policy advocates in the field of UCH who are set 
against the idea of the United Kingdom joining a regional regime on UCH protection, 
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fearing that it would seriously undermine the case for ratification of the UNESCO 2001 
Convention.99  This is despite the fact that, as was demonstrated above in the context of 
the UNESCO 1970 Convention on Cultural Property, regional regimes can be a highly 
effective way to align standards and thereby set the path towards ratification and 
harmonisation of a global multilateral regime.  As Williams said, there is an argument 
that once signed up to a regional agreement you could ask, ‘why not just sign up to the 
UNESCO Convention’ at that point?100  He then equated regional agreements, in many 
senses, to a “Try Before You Buy” scheme wherein states can test the water on stricter 
terms, before growing outwards to a larger scale.101  He further discussed how the political 
context of UCH in Europe would likely suit a regional approach first, before truly 
committing to the global level; whereas, by contrast, the political context of UCH in Latin 
America has made it more suited to securing the global approach first, before then 
exploring regional approaches.102 
 
However, while these views accord well with the literature review conducted above and 
with wider evidence of such approaches being effective in the natural environmental 
context, it is not a view which is shared among all in the UCH community.  As Guérin 
said in interview, ‘in the end, underwater archaeology is quite a small world so most 
people – well certainly underwater archaeologists – say but we have the 2001 Convention, 
why would you need anything else?’103  She instead stressed the importance of ensuring 
that states sign up to the UNESCO Convention, rather than engage in distracting efforts 
at regional integration which would be ‘counter-productive’.104  She felt that the Titanic 
and Estonia wrecks were exceptional cases, as would be any World War II wrecks, given 
that they were not covered by the 100-year age definition of UCH in the Convention; but, 
otherwise, it is not helpful to distract away from the UNESCO Convention.105   
 
O’Keefe makes a similar point, writing in 2014 that there ‘would not seem to be any point 
in attempting to negotiate another such general agreement in the near future’, excepting 
special wreck sites, or countries who may see the advantage of leading a multilateral 
agreement specifically around the protection of their own UCH, such as Spain and 
 
99 Supra n. 74, Williams. 
100 Supra n. 74, Williams. 
101 Supra n. 74, Williams. 
102 Supra n. 74, Williams. 
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China.106  It is perhaps understandable that there is concern among the UCH community 
that regional multilateral conventions might only undermine, rather than support, the 
UNESCO Convention, given the track record of the 1985 Draft European Convention and 
other efforts.  For example, the 2003 draft Agreement on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage in the Mediterranean Sea proposed by Italy was clearly intended to offer 
an alternative to the UNESCO Convention and introduce clauses which ameliorate the 
concerns of states with the UNESCO Convention.107 
 
Guérin goes further and suggests that the transnationality of UCH is an argument against 
such regional approaches, given that such approaches cannot deal with third states outside 
the region who are visiting or have links to UCH within the region.108  For example, she 
refers to the Titanic Agreement and Estonia Agreement which have struggled to curtail 
free riders.109  In a similar vein, Risvas warns that regional approaches ‘will not lead 
overnight to the creation of a comprehensive and generally accepted legal framework, 
since cooperation obligations contained therein will bind only state parties.’110  
Adlercreutz more firmly rejected regional governance when he said that anybody who 
promotes the idea of regional cooperation for UCH protection ‘must be oblivious to the 
non-effectiveness of regional agreements on maritime law, amply demonstrated in the 
agreement between Estonia, Finland and Sweden [protecting the M/S Estonia].  This 
treaty has not prevented German and US nationals from extensive diving and filming on 
the wreck.’111  This is similar to O’Keefe, who said that regional treaties: 
 
‘will have a limited effect albeit at the expense of considerable public 
effort.  Their greatest failing will be the difficulty of enforcement.  For 
vessels not flying the flag of a Party or having nationals of the Party 
aboard, they will only be effective if they come within the jurisdiction of 
a Party to the . . . treaty.’112 
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However, this view does not appear to consider that a regional approach has the capacity 
to introduce more meaningful rules and systems so as to collectively monitor and enforce 
against such free riders and third states in the first place.  Indeed, there are likely to be far 
more non-state parties and non-compliers within a global treaty framework, such as the 
UNESCO Convention.  
 
In response to O’Keefe and Adlercreutz, one could ask whether a subregional agreement 
– which could one day feasibly include rules for jointly on collaborating in monitoring 
and reporting suspicious activities, raising standards of inspection by port authorities and 
coastguard units, coordinating rules on at-sea boarding or inspection, facilitating cross-
border arrest and criminal prosecution, collectively pooling enforcement and coastguard 
resources, sharing security technology and data (e.g., surveillance equipment and data, 
criminal reports, missing cultural property lists), harmonising rules and legislation 
(including even rules which can be directly enforced against non-complying national 
government and agencies), developing funds for cross-border assistance and sectoral 
economic adjustment, provision and joint development of security technology, 
deployment of cross-border reporting incentives, compiling a database of ‘blacklisted’ 
and ‘greylisted’ vessels and persons who cannot use port facilities or who receive more 
vigilant inspections, rules for inter-regional cooperation and coordination of listed vessels 
and individuals or other security information, and introducing more detailed and 
harmonised rules for the allocation and joint management of ‘protected zones’ around 
UCH sites of shared regional importance – would not assist in addressing such third state 
free riding.  Indeed, O’Keefe even recognises that harmonised port state measures across 
regions would go a long way to solving free riding, which itself has been principally 
driven by regionalism.113 
 
As Ooms noted in interview, the higher the ‘level’ at which international negotiations 
take place, the ‘more vague and strategic it is [and] the less effect it has.’114  Most writers 
on UCH policy have therefore increasingly come around to a more forward-looking view 
which recognises the significant potential of lower-scaled regional approaches, pursued 
completely in parallel and in full complement to the more vague and principle-based 
global level treaties which are preoccupied with everybody keeping as much sovereign 
 
113 Supra n. 74, O’Keefe, at p. 82. 
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control as possible.  As noted above, there is a far lower threshold for collective action to 
be achieved at the regional level and states will be more willing to sacrifice some 
semblance of national sovereignty in favour of protecting regionally shared and enjoyed 
cultural heritage.  As Risvas has said, ‘[r]egional cooperation could also avoid the dangers 
of a universal approach [where such agreements] providing for information sharing and 
based on port jurisdiction could create a protective web.  States could impose conditions 
or close their ports to ships allegedly engaged in activities detrimental to the protection 
of UCH.’115   
 
By providing more detailed rules of cooperation which anticipate global public good 
collective action weaknesses and security challenges before the event, it is therefore 
possible to enhance security across all regional ports and auxiliary security units, and 
within and between maritime sectors, thus foreclosing the space to free riders.  A regional 
approach has proven very effective in the case of marine environmental challenges which 
are also under the very same threat of being undermined by third parties from outside the 
region, such as protection against pollution, health and safety failures, and overfishing.  
The very aim of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and the port state measure 
MOUs have been to regulate such non-regional actors.116 
 
It also does not make sense to argue that UCH is not a regional issue, warranting a 
transnational response.  For example, while Ooms recognised that there are likely to be 
some benefits of regional cooperation in the protection of UCH, such as sharing best 
practices, he urged caution and suggested that only pan-European issues need to be solved 
at a pan-European level.117  For him, fishing was such an issue that necessitates such 
detailed schemes of transnational cooperation, saying ‘the fishing front is really a 
European front because it’s so transnational; the Dutch fishing vessels go to the UK, they 
go to Norway.  The fish go everywhere.’118  However, one could counter-argue that you 
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find UCH belonging or linked to different flag states or culturally linked states in different 
coastal jurisdictions; just as you often find vessels and nationals from various other states 
implicated in looting or other impactful activities.  As Evans et al say, this misallocation 
of UCH interests between political spaces ‘precipitates the need for shared, or 
collaborative management, as opposed to the more traditional concepts of cultural 
property, ownership, or even stewardship’.119  Ooms did in some senses concede this 
point by later saying ‘it could be beneficial to . . . have heritage maps on the transnational 
scale and discuss with each other in more detail . . . and also if it’s cross-border heritage 
there might be also . . . influences from one national area to another national area’.120 
 
As argued above, various factors can increase the likelihood of such regional efforts 
becoming more comprehensive and effective, such as: the smaller collection of state 
groupings; the stronger level of trust; the previous experience of cooperation; the greater 
interdependence; and the ability to integrate protection with other areas of cooperation.  
As Strati writes, it is possible to adopt ‘more stringent measures at the regional level.’121  
Similarly, Scovazzi has stressed often that the intention to pave the way to regional 
measures was so as to ‘adopt rules and regulations which would ensure better protection’ 
of UCH than under the Convention.122  Similarly, in 2009, Williams wrote that a regional 
approach could be ‘far more comprehensive and actively incorporate . . . elements of the 
Convention that the [maritime powers] could support.’123  This could include ‘retention 
of title in perpetuity, prohibition of unauthorized interference, a preference for in situ 
preservation, a system of authorization incorporating the Annex to the Convention, 
formulation of a management and research framework, and a declaration that the 
agreement is intended to give effect to the Parties’ obligation under Article 303’ of the 
LOSC.124  As Sarid wrote recently, in the same way, regional agreements ‘can be more 
conducive to the specific countries’ interests.’125   
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Regional cooperation is also an opportunity to share best practices and for providing 
innovative labs for testing and trialling new means of inter-state cooperation and 
integration in protecting UCH.  As Dromgoole writes, ‘[s]uch cooperation can lead not 
only to improvements with respect to the day-to-day practicalities of management of 
UCH within the region, but also – through the sharing of ideas, experiences and best 
practice – with respect to the general management techniques employed.’126  As Maes 
also said in his response, ‘[c]ooperation between states (bilateral, regional and universal 
without UNESCO) should in particular be the case in the protection of ship wrecks 
(cooperation coastal state – flag state) and for other UCH with the objective of 
cooperation for in situ scientific research, data exchange, knowledge sharing, state 
practice in policy and the implementation of the UNESCO Convention in national 
legislation.’127  Peeters also responded that he would prefer ‘a regional (cross-national)’ 
effort, which achieves ‘a common research approach and dedicated mutual involvement 
through input of expertise (and equipment).’128   
 
Fitting with the theoretical arguments raised above, regional cooperation also provides an 
opportunity to pool resources and coordinate activities for mutual benefit, thus leading to 
greater collective output of UCH protection.  For example, O’Connor writes how regional 
cooperation over UCH protection might have assisted in the listing and protection of the 
Carpathia wreck which, while feasibly open to listing under Irish legislation, would not 
have been very effectively protected without additional support from regional states.  She 
writes that, ‘[p]erhaps if there had been a format for consultation and action between a 
number of adjacent States with a set procedure in place, things might have worked out 
differently.  A co-operative approach is likely to be favoured in similar instances in the 
future.’129 
 
González has also, somewhat indirectly, supported all of the arguments raised above with 
regard to the benefits available by pursuing a regional approach in tandem with the 
international approach.  Although he was making a tenuous assertion that states within 
sea basins are better at regional cooperation than states sharing a coastline in open ocean, 
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he was indirectly raising arguments in favour of regional cooperation by saying that 
‘regional states are usually all collaborating together on fiscal measures and coast guard 
authorities’.130  They ‘are used to collaborating together and they are able to stand together 
in ensuring any recovered artifacts or exploitation of wrecks remains within the region, 
they are therefore more likely to be happy to share information and keep each other 
informed of wrecks in the area.’131  Furthermore, the ‘various environmental and fisheries 
agreements . . . could make it easier for such States to mutually monitor the exercise of 
due diligence regarding activities that may incidentally affect UCH.’132  Williams makes 
a similar point about the familiarity and better integration which is possible in regional 
contexts: 
 
‘You have precedent.  You have OSPAR.  You already have North Sea 
agreements which have been successful for fishing, for environment, 
pollution.  You’ve got a well-trodden path. […] And I think regional 
agreements [should be] piggybacking on the track record of environmental 
regional agreements, because that’s familiar.  That’s comfortable.’133 
 
The critical point, as was explored in detail across Chapters 3 to 5, is that the ratification 
of the UNESCO Convention by a state means very little in isolation.  What makes the 
difference is the actual implementation and enforcement of impactful legislation, wherein 
states agree to curtail other economic and domestic priorities in preference to protecting 
an unknown and unregulated resource, for which most of the benefit might be leaked to 
external communities and future generations.  Regional cooperation therefore provides 
an opportunity for a lower subset of states to collectively negotiate substantive legal 
solutions which can deliver mutual benefit, while also requiring less trust-building and 
being at less risk to free riding or uncooperative states.   
 
As Ooms said in interview, the principle of subsidiarity would mean it is always worth 
asking what is the optimum level at which to address a particular issue.134  As both he and 
Altvater rightly pointed out, the higher the level, the more people involved, the more 
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difficult it is to find an impactful lowest common denominator between them.135  This 
was demonstrated with the UNESCO Convention itself which, other than the widely 
accepted Rules in the Annex, struggled to go much further than the LOSC in terms of 
relative rights and responsibilities.  However, as Chapters 3 to 5 examined, what matters 
more when addressing the externalities of global public goods appears to be the 
willingness of nation states to acquiesce in their national sovereignty on certain matters 
and to surrender their exclusive freedom to regulate issues which cause spillovers.  If they 
are unwilling to do this at a regional level, among a smaller number of states with which 
they share a great deal of interdependence, trust, integration and cooperative practice, 
then it is certain that cooperation and compliance will be even weaker at the global level. 
 
As was argued in Section 1, this has increasingly become recognised with the 
transnational and global public good context of marine environmental governance.  As 
Maarleveld said in interview, for environmental issues ‘some lawyers already 10 or 20 
years ago said we should go completely away from the way of organising international 
law on the basis of territories.’136  Similarly, as Altvater said, regional conventions ‘are a 
very nice way to bring countries together and to make them work together.’137  For 
example, ‘countries bordering the Baltic Sea are discussing issues around environment, 
economy, maritime spatial planning, and this is really the way it should be.’138  Therefore, 
while it is good for states to have their own EEZs, ‘they should actually work on that 
more effectively and extend [their] supranational contracts’.139  Williams raises a similar 
point that civil servants and governments are already comfortable operating and sharing 
governance regionally in terms of natural heritage protection.140 
 
In other words, all of the literature review and most of the interview responses in this 
study would find a persuasive argument that far greater effort needs to be employed in 
the pursuance of more detailed and meaningful regional systems of cooperation in 
protecting UCH.  The concerns with regard to the threat from third states – as felt by 
O’Keefe, Guérin, Adlercreutz, and many others in the UCH community – appear to be 
overstated and a perhaps distorted understanding based on prior experiences at that point, 
which do not fully appreciate the potential of regional webs of protection as a mechanism 
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for resolving many of the collective action and compliance weaknesses inherent in global-
level multilateral frameworks.  As Maarleveld said in interview, the ‘regional protection 
of the joint heritage . . . would, protection-wise, be very productive.’141  Similarly, Firth 
responds, with a hint of allusion to UK’s political situation following the Brexit 
referendum in 2016, ‘I think there is potential [for regional solutions] and ideally I think 
that it would be great to see them happening.  It's just, at the moment, people are not in 
that space at the moment in a major way.’142  This statement lands directly on a key issue, 
which is that while many may respect regionalism’s potential value, they actually have 
more concern about the political feasibility of achieving such regional integration. 
 
(c) The Actual Achievement of Regional Regimes 
While the advantages may be clear, the actual achievement of regional multilateral 
solutions to protect UCH from indirect threats, even at the regional level, remains 
challenging.  Not only did the 1985 Draft Convention fail to achieve Europe-wide 
protections beyond the limited provisions in the LOSC, but even a multilateral agreement 
between key European states to protect a wreck of common cultural importance on 
Finland’s continental shelf has struggled to curtail unauthorised interference by free 
riders.143  As Rochette and Chabason have said of regional agreements in the natural 
heritage context, ‘regional initiatives too often suffer the same difficulties as global 
mechanisms: poor institutional coordination, insufficient funding[, and] disregard of legal 
instruments.’144  It is also worth acknowledging that many regions around the world not 
only lack the resources or political goodwill to fully engage in regional cooperation, but 
might also lack the same enthusiasm for regionalism than can be found among European 
commentators – such as the present author – who are more comfortable with supranational 
regulation.145  Similarly, as noted above, there are always challenges in terms of finding 
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the lowest common denominator and coordinating interests across multiple interest 
groups.146  It is also difficult to ignore the rise of populist nationalist dissidence, as well 
as the twin developments of United States President Trump’s election and the UK’s vote 
to leave the European Union in 2016. 
 
Nevertheless, on account of all of the evidence above that regional approaches could be 
more effective in the protection of the historic marine environment, while also providing 
a vital pathway towards more advanced global and local systems, the next stage for UCH 
protection must be the expansion of detailed regimes at the regional level.  As noted 
above, if states are unwilling to commit resources and energy or to constrain their own 
sovereignty at the regional level, then there is little hope at the global level.  However, as 
highlighted by Firth in interview with a patent allusion to the present political climate in 
Europe and elsewhere, the current climate is perhaps unfavourable to further European 
integration.  He adds, ‘if I was to propose to colleagues that now would be a great time to 
have a conference . . . with a view to setting up some kind of framework, you know, the 
mood music is not good.’147  Similarly, Maarleveld responds how it ‘is easily said, but 
not easily done of course.  And, let’s be honest, the international developments or the 
national developments in some major countries are not very promising at present.’148 
 
Indeed, all interviewees acknowledged challenges presented by the shift in narrative in 
many countries back towards nationalism and away from the idealised notion of European 
supranationalism.  As noted above, Ooms said one must think carefully about what level 
is needed and whether it is a pan-European issue which needs a pan-European response.149  
Similarly, both Maes and Williams warned against making this a European Union matter, 
given the current climate surrounding the political union.  As Williams said, ‘don’t do it 
as an EU instrument.  That’s the kiss of death!’150  Maes felt that, instead, an MOU 
between states would be sufficient.151  Nevertheless, while such memoranda of 
understanding can be useful for coordinating activities, they perhaps lack the level of 
integration and harmonisation which is required for many of the unpredictable, varied and 
 
146 Supra n. 42, Ooms; Supra n. 78, Altvater. 
147 Speaking with regard to the United Kingdom, Firth also adds, it ‘is made doubly difficult post-Brexit 
[where there is so much] uncertainty over the UK’s place in the world and how it’s going to go forward.’ 
(Supra n. 142, Firth). 
148 Supra n. 90, Maarleveld. 
149 Supra n. 42, Ooms. 
150 Supra n. 74, Williams. 
151 ‘I don’t think we need a new treaty.  A Memorandum of Understanding would be more suitable and 
effective to enhance bilateral, regional or subregional cooperation.  This should not be an EU matter.’ 
(Supra n. 127, Maes). 
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complex challenges facing UCH from incidental, illicit and indirect threats.  
Alternatively, Williams suggested that, in the UK at least, the situation surrounding Brexit 
could provide an opportunity, rather than a threat, to better regional-level activity.  States 
‘are taking this national route and therefore I think a regional agreement sits more 
comfortably. […] The message that [the British public apparently] want to send is that 
“We’re out of the EU, but not Europe.” . . . I think it’s actually an easier sell.’152 
 
Unfortunately, as has been argued throughout this study, the only real force that will drive 
forth regional-level cooperation is the political incentivisation of governments who are, 
otherwise, ever-increasingly constrained in terms of workload and resources.  As Firth 
says, ‘you would be looking to public authorities who have generally got no resources 
and are definitely not looking to extend their remit.  And I think that's a major problem’.153  
As he rightly points out, there is a great deal of variation between states in Europe as to 
their motivation towards a regional solution and much will depend on the target 
objective.154  But ultimately, he says, ‘you have to have a very clear need, something that 
can’t be resolved anywhere else and the thing that can’t be resolved has got to be 
considered so significant that people will get together over it.’155  However, the findings 
in this thesis across Chapters 3 to 5 would suggest that the alternative national-
international approach has been, and most certainly will continue to be, less than 
effective.  The very difficulty for UCH is that it is under-prioritised by national 
governments, given its global public good nature.  As such, effective progress needs to 
be sought at any and all levels.  As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, relying on political 
incentivisation will only get so far; and, in the context of UCH protection and its low 
priority on the government’s agenda, it will not get far at all.   
 
However, the lower threshold needed to achieve mutual gain, as well as the higher levels 
of trust and interdependence between regional states, will each increase the willingness 
of states to concede exclusive freedoms and to engage in detailed regime-thickening 
between neighbours as opposed to between distant continents.  It is for this reason that 
most in the UCH community have recognised that enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, as 
well as island groups or neighbouring coastal states, i.e., subregions, have an even 
stronger capacity for achieving the initially effective regional solutions.  This is especially 
 
152 Supra n. 74, Williams. 
153 Supra n. 142, Firth. 
154 Supra n. 142, Firth. 
155 Supra n. 142, Firth. 
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because of their shared sense of heritage and their recognition that working together will 
benefit the regional sea’s heritage as a whole.156  As Maarleveld has said, ‘[a]cceptance 
of the past as a common heritage is perhaps a more realistic basis for future development 
and future co-operation.’157 
 
Similarly, contradicting his earlier statement on the inability of regional systems to 
address free riding, O’Keefe writes that: 
 
‘[R]egional agreements offer great scope for enhanced protection if the 
States concerned have a common attitude to this heritage.  Geographic 
proximity may well be insufficient to provide that common attitude.  
Shared cultures and history are a better glue that will unite particular 
groups of States to protect their underwater cultural heritage.  This may be 
found in areas such as the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and the Caribbean.’158 
 
Forrest also points to Southern Africa as an area where regional cooperation would be 
highly effective for sharing resources and coordinating assistance to protect shared 
heritage.159   Plus, as was highlighted above, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Baltic and 
the North East Atlantic are further promising examples.  Similarly, Firth points to the 
Dogger Bank as a UCH hotspot where states across the North Sea are likely to find a 
common cause for collaboration towards the landscape’s protection.160  Ooms also 
reiterates that things are always going to be politically and practically more challenging 
‘than if you do it with a smaller group’, referring for example to cooperation between the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Germany over the Wadden Sea.161  Here, he notes, you are 




156 Supra n. 73, Scovazzi, at p. 291; Supra n. 130, González, at p. 310; Supra n. 80, at p. 587; Supra n. 72, 
Aznar; Supra n. 142, Firth; Supra n. 90, Maarleveld; Supra n. 42, Ooms; Supra n. 78, Altvater. 
157 Maarleveld, T.J., (2006), ‘Netherlands’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National 
Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), 161-188, Martinus Nijhoff 
(Leiden), at p. 183. 
158 Supra n. 74, O’Keefe, at p. 54.  
159 Forrest, C., (2006), ‘South Africa’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National 
Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), 247-270, Martinus Nijhoff 
(Leiden), at p. 269. 
160 Supra n. 142, Firth. 
161 Supra n. 42, Ooms. 
162 Supra n. 42, Ooms. 
321 
 
For many, working in such a regional or subregional manner is therefore likely to be more 
attractive than at the global level.  For example, both Maarleveld and Williams found it 
noteworthy that Latin American states appear particularly motivated to keep exploring 
regional solutions (in tandem with global) in order to effectively club together and more 
forcefully shake off Spanish claims of national patrimony over colonial-era heritage.163  
O’Connor also reassures that the state of Ireland would be much more supportive of 
taking a pan-European approach to UCH.164  In other words, with more targeted effort 
and coordination among the UCH community, there is a significant opportunity to 
strengthen the protection of UCH by regionalism, whether without or throughout the 
UNESCO and LOSC Conventions.  Furthermore, such efforts would likely advance the 
global and community regulatory levels yet further, by encouraging states to make more 
meaningful concessions and to acquiesce sovereignty in a greater number of areas 
outward towards regional actors and agencies.  From here, state governments will become 
accustomed to integrated methods of collaboration and the production of collective gains 
over an increasing number of public goods.  As Maarleveld responded, although it will 
present a difficult political challenge, ‘nevertheless, I think that is the way to go and it is 
not completely unrealistic.’165 
 
(d) Choice Between Different Types of Regional Governance 
The question then becomes which pathway to adopt between the multilateral, 
supranational, or transnational forms of regionalism.  As was noted above, many have 
expressed concern at the notion of an “overbearing” supranational and technocratic 
authority, such as the EU, assuming competence over a question which is particularly 
sensitive in terms of national and cultural identity, or which they view as the exclusive 
prerogative of the nation state.166  Even the EU Council itself has recognised the risks of 
becoming involved in UCH protection, having refused to pursue a request to explore the 
effective harmonisation of rules implementing the UNESCO Convention.167  Indeed, 
although he has acknowledged that supranationalism is likely to be eventually necessary, 
 
163 Supra n. 90, Maarleveld; Supra n. 74, Williams. 
164 ‘A co-operative approach to the protection of UCH in the EEZ and on the continental shelf is likely to 
find favour as the preferred option in Ireland. Perhaps one useful model for at least pan-European co-
operation might be the EU Guidelines for Administrative Co-operation between Member States/Competent 
Authorities in relation to the Export of Cultural Goods.’ (Supra n. 129, O’Connor, at p. 143). 
165 Supra n. 90, Maarleveld. 
166 See also Supra n. 71, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 21. 
167 Supra n. 71, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 21 (per Pieters).  Note also Aznar’s response in interview: ‘The 
European Union has no competences at all over the protection of cultural heritage. But it has some indirect 
competences over some other questions, such as marine spatial planning, fisheries, environment, or the 
integrated coastal global management.’ (Supra n. 72, Aznar). 
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because ‘the nation state is simultaneously too big and too small to cope with the real-
world problems’, Firth was also of the view that a regional regime in Europe is only likely 
to consist of states agreeing how to coordinate their sovereign rights, which are effectively 
maintained in relation to UCH, rather than all sharing a common responsibility and 
agreeing to soften the role of sovereignty and inter-state jurisdictional rules.168  Similarly, 
Williams’s discussion of an initial regime for the Battle of Jutland wrecks had terms 
which emphasised the allocation of sovereign interests, rather than the development of 
private law harmonisation and multi-level community integration.169  As Altvater said ‘I 
think that the big dream should be that we feel [like] a work community, but of course 
we are far away.  [Even] in the Baltic Sea, they are all thinking nationally.’170  She also 
notes how it is difficult to secure concessions between nation states in a highly varied and 
more politically intense region like the Mediterranean, where ‘every country is working 
on its own and they’re not really interested in collaboration.  That’s why they have 
problems, of course.’171   
 
Perhaps these views are all correct and perhaps, therefore, the conventional inter-national 
pathway, whether in the form of an MOU or multilateral treaty, is the most realistic option 
for UCH protection just in the immediate era, as opposed to more sovereignty-
constraining forms of supranationalism.  Indeed, the Brexit vote in 2016 would suggest 
that supranationalism, while it may carry many collective action benefits, is not likely to 
be a widely popular approach against the increasingly vocal anti-Europe dissidence, even 
if such integration is going to be better at addressing global or pan-European concerns.  
Nevertheless, as was demonstrated in Chapter 3, Section 5 – with regard to ever-
increasing transnationalisation, regionalisation and integration of fisheries governance – 
such a multilateral agreement over UCH (productively interoperating with the UNESCO 
agreement) would merely represent the “next stage” in the inevitable progression to ever-
greater and more-intensive regionalisation in the cosmopolitan future.  It could 
significantly enhance regulatory harmonisation by agreeing certain minimum standards 
and could provide a framework for facilitating future dialogue and collaboration across 
borders.   
 
168 ‘I certainly don’t think they pool responsibility across them.  They wouldn’t let go of British sovereignty, 
in exchange for Germany sovereignty, or a collective with all of them together[;] a joint enterprise. […] I 
think it would be regarded as them cooperating with respect to looking after “theirs” more effectively, rather 
than a pooled responsibility towards all of them, irrespective of nationality.’ (Supra n. 142, Firth). 
169 Supra n. 98, González, O'Keefe and Williams. 





In the long-run, a supranational approach – wherein governments no longer have the 
power to think in a manner exclusive of everyone else but their own citizens – is going to 
be the most effective.  The European Union could not only coordinate funding towards 
achieving pan-European public goods, but can compel nation states to more fully 
implement agreed rules and can empower individuals and communities to enforce 
harmonised standards across borders.172  Furthermore, their large mandate over other 
transnational matters can lead to better integration and harmony between different 
competing sectors in the maritime context.  Indeed, even though Maes responded that the 
protection of UCH should not be an EU issue, he has elsewhere contradictorily noted that 
protection of UCH in Belgium is challenging because much of the threat to UCH comes 
from fishing which is a pan-European issue of EU competence.173  This could be achieved 
more quickly perhaps by taking a sea basin or subregional approach, which could be 
politically and practically more feasible than a Europe-wide approach.  From there, one 
could witness deeper integration and regulatory harmonisation on UCH protection which 
moves beyond the trite inter-state and nationalistic narratives which have undermined 
effective protection up to now.   
 
As Ooms said of marine environmental protection: 
 
‘This does not mean that cooperation should go further than this […].  The 
question is more in what form, what kind of institutional arrangement.  Do 
we want the EU to have a leading role or let the sea basins discuss their 
issues . . . and develop their own institutional arrangement?  This last 
option can be more effective in reality.’174 
 
Finally, the transnational pathway is not mutually exclusive of the other two and, in fact, 
is likely to be achieved far better as a result of better inter-state regulatory harmonisation 
and the facilitation of regional agencies and frameworks.  However, as explored in 
Chapters 6 and 9, global and community-level governance and collaboration by hybrid 
and non-state actors can also take place on transnational (and hence regional) scales, with 
or without governmental intervention.  Yet, such transnational networks and regimes can 
 
172 Supra n. 71, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 21 (per DeRudder). 
173 Supra n. 127, Maes; Supra n. 71, DeRudder and Maes, at p. 15. 
174 Supra n. 42, Ooms. 
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be cultivated much more swiftly when facilitated by national-level and regional-level 
law.175  As Aznar responded, ‘[c]ollaboration, either hard (through new agreements) and 
soft (through other types of conversations), must be tunneled through these regional 
environments.’176  As Altvater also said, states also need to start ‘using tools, like MSP, 
and have some channels now open to each other and to really combine users and 
protection and to be more flexible across borders.  This is, I think, the way it should be’.177   
 
Thus, the UCH policy community should also be continually exploring the means to build 
better communication, coordination and collaboration towards UCH protection among all 
maritime, coastal and inland communities – including public, private and hybrid actors – 
across a regional frame.  This would also include integrating efforts to protect UCH across 
different sectors, thus more effectively saving resources and targeting key groups.  As 
Firth suggests, it would make a lot of sense to integrate the development of better 
protection for UCH within regional regimes dealing with fishing or energy generation.178  
Throughout Chapter 9, therefore, it is argued that strategic utilisation of non-state actors 
and communities as rule makers and rule enforcers could also serve to address concerns 
raised, for example by Firth above, regarding the lack of public resources towards 
common goals. 
 
4. Conclusion: Adopting a Regional Governance Approach to Protecting 
Underwater Cultural Heritage 
It is regrettable that efforts by Italy to draft a new Mediterranean agreement on UCH 
protection around the time of the UNESCO Convention appeared to be framed as an 
“alternative” to the international-level treaty; or that the failed European Draft 
Convention in 1985 was preoccupied with jurisdictional issues which became the 
preoccupation of the UNESCO Convention.179  These events may have led to a 
misconception among many in the UCH community that regional agreements are only 
helpful for avoiding the UNESCO Convention, rather than serving to facilitate its 
effectiveness and implementation.  As Williams relayed in interview, ‘the view seems to 
be that it’s one or the other.  I don’t buy it.’180  As was demonstrated by Tanaka’s 
 
175 See Chapter 10.  
176 Supra n. 72, Aznar. 
177 Supra n. 78, Altvater. 
178 Supra n. 142, Firth. 
179 Supra n. 107. 
180 Supra n. 74, Williams. 
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insightful monograph on integrated ocean management in 2008, it is possible and 
desirable to have regional ‘integrated’ solutions operating in parallel and in complement 
to higher-level treaties, such as the LOSC (and the UNESCO Convention), which just set 
the initial rules for sovereign ownership and jurisdictional power.181  This 
complementarity between national-level regulation and regulation at other levels is 
therefore explored in Chapters 8 and 10. 
 
Further, as was demonstrated above with the examples of the UNESCO 1970 Convention 
on the Illicit Import and Export of Cultural Property and the Paris MOU, there is evidence 
that not only are regional regimes more detailed and impactful than global-level treaties, 
but they can significantly raise and strengthen standards at the global-level.  Another 
pertinent example of this vertical expansion, from regional level cooperation towards the 
global, was the quick adoption by the United Kingdom and other European states of the 
Rules contained in the Annex to the UNESCO Convention, predominantly on the basis 
that the regional-level Valletta Convention had already brought legislation into harmony 
with these higher standards.182  Overall therefore, the findings in this chapter have 
provided persuasive evidence that the concerns among the UCH community about 
regional-level treaties appear misplaced and that new regional agreements should now be 
more seriously explored or pursued, in tandem with the traditional international-level 
efforts, whether through multilateral, supranational, or pluralistic pathways.  As Chapter 
10 argues, such regional approaches are complementary and would integrate well with 












181 Supra n. 56, Tanaka. 
182 UK Parliament, (2005), House of Commons, 24 January 2005, Hansard, Column 46W (at: http://



































A National Governance Approach to the Protection of Underwater Cultural 
Heritage 
 
Chapter Abstract:  
Looking at the national level within a multi-level analysis, this chapter in effect argues in 
the opposite direction from earlier chapters by providing a defence of the traditional 
national-level system of law and governance, as manifested by public international law, 
private international law and domestic law.  It provides just some of the many arguments 
why the nation state will continue to be the most important player in the global 
governance framework, operating as a vital democratic and legitimate system 
coordinating activity at the heart of a multi-level network.  However, it also robustly 
asserts that taking a ‘transnational’ or ‘multi-level’ approach need not be mutually 
exclusive to the use of traditional national legal processes and that both approaches can 
and – indeed – should interoperate in a fruitful symbiosis.  It then examines this against 
the protection of underwater cultural heritage (UCH), showing that there remains a 
justified belief that the state and traditional models of public international law and zonal 
ocean regulation should continue to play a central role in driving forward future systems 
of protection of UCH.  This sets the stage for conclusions later in Chapter 10, which 
promotes the continued role of each global, regional, national and community-level 
approaches. 
 
1. The Indispensable Strengths of National-Level Governance 
National-level governance refers to the majority of our present legal system protecting 
UCH, which has already been explored at length by other researchers over the past few 
decades, including the tools of national law, private international law, and public 
international law – as well as the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO Convention)1 and the UN 1982 Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOSC)2 – as introduced in Chapters 1 and 2, and critiqued in Chapters 
 
1 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 2001, 
in force 2 January 2009), 2562 UNTS 1. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 397. 
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3 to 5.3  It effectively encapsulates what has been once widely defined as the 
‘Westphalian’ approach to understanding law and jurisprudence, as underscored in 
Chapter 5.   Given that this Westphalian-esque understanding of law has been adopted by 
almost all of the existing literature on UCH protection, this brief chapter does not need to 
explore its precise permutations and applications to UCH.  Indeed, earlier chapters have 
already scrutinised this national-level legal system in detail and other diverse literatures 
are available for exploring the substantive legal rules inside the national-level system.  
This chapter instead seeks to look more critically at the arguments taken by this thesis 
across Chapters 3 to 9, in order to provide some defence of the traditional and horizontal 
national-level approach.   
 
It must be stressed that an effective multi-level governance approach would not just 
recognise the value and importance of regulation at the national level, but sees it as likely 
to remain the most important level of regulation for some time.4  In other words, the 
proposed integrated approach in this thesis does not seek to replace national regulation 
with supranational or transnational law; but to complement and enhance it, specifically in 
those areas where national regulation is prone to defective global public goods 
production.  The acknowledgement that national-level governance continues to be the 
most important level of regulation is widespread and rarely disputed.5  Many have 
contended, for example, that the democratic election of national governments, as well as 
processes which increase democratisation, such as political parties, media coverage, and 
electoral systems, makes governmental regulation a vital democratising and legitimising 
 
3 Vrdoljak, A.F., (2014), ‘Human Rights and Cultural Heritage in International Law’, in International Law 
for Common Goods Normative Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture and Nature, F. Lenzerini and A.F. 
Vrdoljak (Eds.), 139-173, Hart (Oxford), at p. 142. 
4 Marauhn, T., (2008), ‘Changing Role of the State’, in The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law, D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 727-748, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford), at pp. 728-729; Eckerberg, K. and Joas, M., (2004), ‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance: A 
Concept Under Stress?’, 9(5) Local Environment 405-412, at p. 411; ‘[D]espite the proliferation of non-
State entities, States remain the primary protagonists on the international scene.’ (Chechi, A., (2015), ‘Non-
State Actors and Cultural Heritage: Friends or Foes?’, 19 Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho de la 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 457-479, at p. 471); MacCormick, N., (1993), ‘Beyond the Sovereign 
State’, 56(1) Modern Law Review 1-18; Walker, N., (2016), ‘Constitutional Pluralism Revisited’, 22(3) 
European Law Journal 333-355; Bodansky, D., Brunnée J. and Hey, E., (2008), ‘International 
Environmental Law: Mapping the Field’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, D. 
Bodansky J. Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 1-28, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 22. 
5 Ibid; Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M., (1999), ‘Global Public Goods: Concepts, Policies and 
Strategies’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg 
and M. Stern (Eds.), 450-507, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 466; ‘Despite the increasing 
involvement of non-state actors in these international institutions, it is clear that states retain a tight grip on 
international law-making activities.’ (Harrison, J., (2011), Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the 
Development of International Law, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 283); Boyle, A. and 
Chinkin, C., (2007), The Making of International Law, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 41-46. 
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function in the entire global governance framework.6  Indeed, even though global law 
seeks to constrain sovereignty, non-state actors are likely to negotiate mutually acceptable 
solutions in collaboration with states and within the bounds of national law when possible.  
Global governance, here in a multi-level formulation, therefore, often seeks to enhance 
national regulation by a number of facilitative means, such as developing collective 
goodwill and enhanced capability for transnational policy cooperation, strengthening or 
empowering communities to bring political pressure, realigning resources through 
capacity building, or supporting enhanced co-regulation by enabling the flow of 
transnational norms.   
 
Zürn once summarised three widely accepted reasons why the nation state will remain 
the key player in global governance.7  First, the development of global governance will 
‘apply only to denationalized issue areas’.8  In other words, for issues which remain 
inherently national – such as public services, taxation, education, internal security, 
strategic investment, and so on – the principle of subsidiarity would argue that the state 
is the key player (except where issues might be better served at the regional or community 
level).  Only for inherently transnational issues, such as marine management in a shared 
ocean, or those issues carrying a spillover of abstract values to external communities, 
such as the protection of global cultural and natural heritage, must national governments 
be further restricted from self-centred decision-making where it might occur.9   
 
Second, ‘even in strongly denationalized issue areas . . . it is hard to see how governance 
goals can be achieved without the nation-state [which] seems to be indispensable.  This 
is due to its control of resources based on its legal monopoly on the use of force and its 
capacity to raise taxes.’10  Finally, Zürn acknowledged that while international institutions 
are increasingly receptive to non-state actors, states will remain the principal aggregators 
and, thus, receptors of political pressure for some time.11  Indeed, the process for creating 
 
6 Franck, T.M., (1992), ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, 86(1) American Journal of 
International Law 46-91; Peters B.G. and Pierre, J., (2006), ‘Governance, Accountability, and Democratic 
Legitimacy’, in Governance and Democracy: Comparing National, European and International 
Experiences, A. Benz and Y. Papadopoulos (Eds.), 29-43, Routledge (Abingdon); Goetz, K.H., (2008), 
‘Governance as a Path to Government’, 31(1-2) West European Politics 258-279. 
7 Zürn, M., (2012), ‘Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance, D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), 730-774, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 735. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See Chapter 4. 
10 Supra n. 7, Zürn, at p. 735; Barrett, S., (1999), ‘Montreal versus Kyoto: International Cooperation and 
the Global Environment’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, 




and enforcing national law is more familiar to most non-state actors, thus providing high 
levels of predictability, stability and accountability at the heart of the global governance 
framework. 
 
As a result, the state becomes something of a legitimiser, administrator, and facilitator, 
who provides a vital democratic balance between other competing and overlapping 
governance regimes.12  Only in those cases where inter-national bargaining fails to 
produce effective transnational standards, would alternative means – through a multi-
level and transnational framework – seek to sidestep national governance and, thereby, 
either drive up its quality or bypass it.13  Hence, we see many writers in the 21st Century 
referring to new forms of “sovereignty” – such as new,14 cosmopolitan,15 
interdependent,16 relational,17 responsible18 post-Westphalian,19 contingent or conditional 
forms of sovereignty,20 and so on – in recognition of the increased position of trusteeship 
 
12 Genschel, P. and Zangl, B., (2008), ‘Transformations of the State: From Monopolist to Manager of 
Political Authority’, TranState Working Papers, No. 76, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research 
Center 597; Bederman, D.J., (2008), Globalization and International Law, Palgrave Macmillan (London), 
at pp. 147-148. 
13 ‘Typically, although states are the direct addressees of international environmental obligations, private 
actors are the ultimate regulatory target. Some international environmental regimes actually define the 
applicable standards of private conduct directly.’ (Supra n. 4, Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, at p. 20). 
14 Chayes, A. and Chayes, A.H., (1996), The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA); Lake, D.A., (2003), ‘The New Sovereignty in 
International Relations’, 5(3) International Studies Review 303-323. 
15 Adelman, S., (2011), ‘Cosmopolitan Sovereignty’, C.M. Bailliet and K.F. Aas (Eds), 11-28, Routledge 
(Abingdon); Held, D., (2002), ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty’, 8(1) Legal 
Theory 1-44; Beck, U., (2006), The Cosmopolitan Vision, Polity Press (Cambridge). 
16 Perrez, F.X., (2000), Cooperative Sovereignty: From Independence to Interdependence in the Structure 
of International Environmental Law, Brill (Leiden); Ţuţuianu, S.U., (2012), Towards Global Justice: 
Sovereignty in an Interdependent World, Springer (New York); Diehl, P.F. (Ed.), (2005), The Politics of 
Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World, 3rd Edn, Lynne Rienner 
(Boulder); Schrijver, N., (1997), Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge). 
17 Stacy, H., (2003), ‘Relational Sovereignty’, 55(5) Stanford Law Review 2029-2060; Criddle, E.J., (2012), 
‘Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational Theory’, 87(3) Notre Dame Law Review 1073-1112. 
18 Deng F.M., Kimaro S., Lyons T., Rothchild D. and Zartman D., (1996), Sovereignty as Responsibility: 
Conflict Management in Africa, Brookings Institution Press (Washington DC); Bellamy A.J, (2009) 
Responsibility to Protect, Polity Press (Cambridge); Glenville, L., (2013), ‘The Myth of “Traditional” 
Sovereignty’, 57(1) International Studies Quarterly 79-90. 
19 Jacobsen, T., Sampford, C. and Thukur, R. (Eds.), (2008), Re-Envisioning Sovereignty: The End of 
Westphalia?, Ashgate Publishing (Farnham); Engel, E.A., (2004), ‘The Transformation of the International 
Legal System: The Post-Westphalian Legal Order’, 23(1) Quinnipiac Law Review 23-46; Lansford, T., 
(2000), ‘Post-Westphalian Europe? Sovereignty and the Modern Nation State’, 37(1) International Studies 
1-15; Dryzek, J.S., (2012), ‘Global Civil Society: The Progress of Post-Westphalian Politics’, 15 Annual 
Review of Political Science 101-119. 
20 Elden, S., (2006), ‘Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders’, 26(1) SAIS 
Review of International Affairs 11-24; Mathieu, X., (2018), ‘Sovereign Myths in International Relations: 
Sovereignty as Equality and the Reproduction of Eurocentric Blindness’, Journal of International Political 
Theory (Forthcoming); Dietsch, P., (2011), ‘Rethinking Sovereignty in International Fiscal Policy’, 37(5) 
Review of International Studies 2107-2120; Knell, K.E., (2018), ‘A Doctrine of Contingent Sovereignty’, 
62(2) Orbis 313-334. 
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bestowed upon states towards the international community.21  Quite what these forms of 
sovereignty mean, and the extent to which they really permit the international community 
to override the complete autonomy of nation states, or actually impose legal 
responsibilities upon states for unquantifiable harm to non-state actors, still seems open 
to a considerable amount of doubt, as has been argued by this thesis more broadly.22 
 
However, the advantages to this traditional international approach, which could see most 
issues compressed into intergovernmental negotiations, are clear.  For example, inter-
state processes would be far more cost-effective and time-efficient.23  Being managed by 
a hierarchised and hardened constitutional order which is more powerful and 
democratically legitimate, the negotiations can also be better kept on track, can result in 
perceptibly and practicably harder norms, can provide a sense of impartiality and 
trustworthiness, and can help ameliorate power disparity between stakeholders.24  They 
could also lighten the workload of stakeholders, by enabling publicly-funded authorities 
to overtake the bureaucratic work of ocean management and allowing stakeholders to get 
on with their day-to-day activities.25  Nation states therefore possess considerable 
democratic legitimacy and accountability, as well as effective and powerful tools for 
enforcement, such that they actually have the capacity to capture and control externalising 
behaviour in the first place.26   
 
2. The Transnational Approach as a Multiple-Level Mix 
(a) State Law versus Non-State Law 
These very same advantages of state-based law – predictability, accountability, 
legitimacy, enforceability, funding, familiarity, stability, transparency, facilitative 
capacity – can therefore also point directly to most of the critical challenges facing non-
state (transnational) legal processes which are promoted in Chapters 6, 7 and 9.  A detailed 
analysis of these issues in the context of UCH protection is unfortunately beyond the 
 
21 Supra n. 4, Marauhn; Gavouneli, M., (2007), Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea, Martinus 
Nijhoff (Leiden). 
22 See Chapters 3, 4 and 5, particularly Chapter 5, Section 3(a); Supra nn. 4 and 5; Pitty, R. and Smith, S., 
(2011), ‘The Indigenous Challenge to Westphalian Sovereignty’, 46(1) Australian Journal of Political 
Science 121-139, at p. 125.   
23 See Chapter 9, Section 2. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid; Berman, P.S., (2015), ‘Non-State Lawmaking through the Lens of Global Legal Pluralism’, in 
Negotiating State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism, M.A. Helfand 
(Ed.), 15-40, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p.16. 
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space permitted in this study, which is focused only on establishing the initial case for 
integrated and multi-level solutions.  However, it is worth acknowledging that the 
transnational and multi-level regulatory approaches proposed in this thesis are not always 
the most ideal approach in every factual context and, in many cases, may carry other 
weaknesses rendering them less effective than national law.  For example, given that 
epistemic communities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are now given far 
greater responsibility under global governance, many studies have increasingly explored 
the legitimacy, transparency, and democratic accountability concerns that might arise by 
providing representation for civil society by private or unelected organisations.27   
 
Edwards and Zadek, for example, while highlighting the committed nature and technical 
expertise of NGOs and other non-state actors, making them effective in governing on 
behalf of under-represented groups in global civil society,28 also stress the importance of 
ensuring that their operations remain transparent and truly representative of the 
communities they support.29  Kotzé has highlighted, thus, that ‘some solutions to this 
legitimacy crisis [include] democratization, the integration of fragmented regimes, and 
the creation of a world environment organization.  But these solutions are not without 
 
27 E.g., Bodansky, D., (1999), ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for 
International Environmental Law’, 93(3) American Journal of International Law 596-624, pp. 596–624; 
Bodansky, D., (2008), ‘Legitimacy’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, D. 
Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 704-726, Oxford University Press; Tallberg, J., (2016), 
‘Transparency’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations, J.K. Cogan, I. Hurd and I. 
Johnstone (Eds.), 1170-1192, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Koenig-Archibugi, M., ‘Accountability’, 
in The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations, J.K. Cogan, I. Hurd and I. Johnstone (Eds.), 1146-
1169, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Zaum, D., ‘Legitimacy’, in The Oxford Handbook of International 
Organizations, J.K. Cogan, I. Hurd and I. Johnstone (Eds.), 1107-1125, Oxford University Press (Oxford); 
Shaffer, G.C., (2001), ‘The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and 
Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters’, 25(1) Harvard Environmental Law 
Review 1-93, at p. 24; Kahler, M. and Lake, D.A. (Eds.), (2003), Governance in a Global Economy: 
Political Authority in Transition, Princeton, University Press (Princeton); Papadopoulos, Y., (2008), 
‘Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and Multilevel Governance’, in Multi-Level 
Governance in the European Union: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, T. Conzelmann and R. Smith (Eds.), 
31-52, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft (Baden-Baden); Peters, B. and Pierre, J., (2004), ‘Multi-Level 
Governance and Democracy: A Faustian Bargain?’, in Multi-Level Governance, I. Bache and M. Flinders 
(Eds.), 75-89, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Harlow, C. and Rawlings, R., (2006), ‘Promoting 
Accountability in Multi-Level Governance: A Network Approach’, European Governance Papers, No. C-
02-06, (at: http://www.connexnetwork.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-06-02.pdf; accessed 1 May 2019); 
Morgera, E., (2009), Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law, Oxford University 
Press (Oxford). 
28 Edwards M. and Zadek, S., (2003), ‘Governing the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Role and 
Legitimacy of Nonstate Actors’, in Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, I. Kaul, P. 
Conceição, K. Le Goulven, R.U. Mendoza (Eds.), 200-224, Oxford University Press (Oxford).  See also 
Willetts, P., (2011), Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global 
Governance, Routledge (Abingdon); Lewis, D. and Kanji, N., (2009), Non-Governmental Organizations 




their own difficulties and they seem to have had little success to date.’30  For Eckerberg 
and Joas, it is resolved by making effective choices between ‘representative democracy’ 
and ‘deliberative policymaking’, with the latter only being used when the former is not 
possible or suitable.31  Community-level actors may also design legal norms in a manner 
which excludes interests external to that community.32  For example, multinational 
corporations may prioritise their shareholders (in profits) above impacted stakeholders, 
just as local communities may seek to prioritise the local environment at the expense of 
the regional environment.  Contrastingly, too much centralisation at the regional level is 
likely to stifle innovation at the local level and could lead to community 
disenfranchisement with political order.  However, such challenges can be better 
controlled by meta-regulation which seeks to harness the regulatory power of 
communities in a co-regulatory framework (see Chapter 9).   
 
Many other challenges with the transnational approach need to be subject to future 
research in the context of UCH protection and ocean management.  For example, a major 
limitation on the use of external agencies and actors is the challenge of funding.33  Given 
that the state can effectively fund the production of public goods with the use of taxation, 
there is a need for more creative and mutually beneficial solutions in order to establish 
and sustain global, regional, and community-level governors, such as by monetising 
cultural and ecosystem services.34  In the case of UCH, it is possible to see NGOs 
providing consultancy work, seeking donations, or charging membership fees, in order to 
fund their work; but state financial backing still appears necessary to effect actual change 
at regional and global levels.35  However, there need not be sole reliance on commitment 
from public authorities.  If enough transnational actors can collectivise together within a 
 
30 Kotzé, L.J., (2012), ‘Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism’, 1(1) Transnational 
Environmental Law 199-233, at p. 222; Bierman, F., (2007), ‘Reforming Global Environmental 
Governance: From UNEP Towards a World Environment Organization’, in Global Environmental 
Governance: Perspectives on the Current Debate, L. Swart  and E. Perry (Eds.), 103-123, Center for UN 
Reform Education (New York); Meyer-Ohlendorf, N. and Knigge, M., (2007), ‘A United Nations 
Environment Organization’, in Global Environmental Governance: Perspectives on the Current Debate, 
L. Swart and E. Perry (Eds.), 124-141, Center for UN Reform Education (New York). 
31 Supra n. 4, Eckerberg and Joas, at p. 411. 
32 Brousseau, E. and Dedeurwaerdere, T., (2012), ‘Global Public Goods: The Participatory Governance 
Challenges’, in Reflexive Governance for Global Public Goods, E. Brousseau, T. Dedeurwaerdere and B. 
Siebenhüner (Eds.), 21-36, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA), at p. 24. 
33 Kilby, P., (2006), ‘Accountability for Empowerment: Dilemmas Facing Non-Governmental 
Organizations’, 34(6) World Development 951-963; Parks, T., (2008), ‘The Rise and Fall of Donor Funding 
for Advocacy NGOs: Understanding the Impact’, 18(2) Development in Practice 213-222. 
34 OECD, (2013), Scaling-Up Finance Mechanisms for Biodiversity, OECD Publishing (Paris). 
35 Ram, R., (2003), ‘Roles of Bilateral and Multilateral Aid in Economic Growth of Developing Countries’, 
56(1) Kyklos 95-110; Addison, T., Mavrotas, G. and McGillivray, M., (2005), ‘Aid, Debt Relief and New 
Sources of Finance for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals’, 58(2) Journal of International Affairs 
113-127, at pp. 118-119. 
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network, it is imminently possible to create well-funded organisations and regimes to 
achieve collective action towards network objectives without the need for state law.36  
Much global and regional level meta-governance should therefore also focus on the 
facilitation of such transnational networking.37 
 
Another challenge with global governance outside the national level is that of 
coordination between overlapping regimes and the need for overall policy leadership.38  
The high level of polycentrism and decentralism across multiple orders provides for a 
more fragmented, complex, and unpredictable environment.39  The use of a clearer multi-
level structure, as set out in this chapter and elsewhere in the thesis, however, would 
provide some solution to this, in the form of clearer hierarchical coordination.  Zürn also 
notes the higher-level coordination by foremost international organisations such as the 
United Nations and G20, although he rightly expresses concern regarding the priorities 
of these organisations and their lack of accountability.40  Either way, the issue of regime 
overlap and fragmentation seems hardly insurmountable.  As Molenaar noted as far back 
as 2004, it is increasingly possible to find regimes in the ocean governance context which 
directly address overlaps and coordination between one another.41  Finally, another 
difficulty which has faced the integration of non-state actors into the governance 
framework has been obvious difficulties with intra- and inter-community management 
 
36 Dingwerth, K., (2008), ‘Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World: A Comparative 
Perspective’, 52(3) International Studies Quarterly 607-634; Hale, T. and Held, D. (Eds.), (2011), 
Handbook of Transnational Governance: New Institutions and Innovations, Polity Press (Malden, MA). 
37 See Chapter 9, Section 2; Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D., (2009), ‘The Governance Triangle: Regulatory 
Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State’, in The Politics of Global Regulation, W. Mattli and N. 
Woods (Eds.), 44-88, Princeton University Press (Princeton). 
38 Biermann, F., Pattberg, P., Van Asselt, H. and Zelli, F., (2009), ‘The Fragmentation of Global 
Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis’, 9(4) Global Environmental Politics 14-40; 
Cafaggi, F. and Caron, D.D., (2012), ‘Global Public Goods amidst a Plurality of Legal Orders: A 
Symposium’, 23(3) European Journal of International Law 643-649, at p. 645. 
39 Ibid; Fairbrass, J. and Jordan, A., ‘Multi-Level Governance and Environmental Policy’, in Multi-Level 
Governance, I. Bache and M. Flinders (Eds.), 147-164, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 151-152; 
Dreyer, M. and Sellke, P., (2015), ‘The Regional Advisory Councils in European Fisheries: An Appropriate 
Approach to Stakeholder Involvement in an EU Integrated Marine Governance?’, in Governing Europe's 
Marine Environment: Europeanization of Regional Seas or Regionalization of EU Policies?, M. Gilek and 
K. Kern (Eds.), 121-140, Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 135; International Law Commission, (2006), 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 13, at pp. 252-253; Stephenson, P., (2013), 
‘Twenty Years of Multi-Level Governance: ‘Where Does it Come From? What is it? Where is it Going?’, 
20(6) Journal of European Public Policy 817-837, at p. 824. 
40 Supra n. 7, Zürn, at p. 740. 
41 For example, Molenaar refers to an example in Art. VI of the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, which acknowledges the supremacy of the International Whaling 
Commission, as well as in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission’s Resolution 98/03 ‘On Southern Bluefin 
Tuna’, which acknowledges the primacy of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. 
(Molenaar, E.J., (2004), ‘Unregulated Deep-Sea Fishing: A Need for a Multi-Level Approach’, 19(3) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 223-246, at p. 232. 
335 
 
and conflict, with the resulting unpredictable and time-intensive decision-making which 
comes from highly reflexive and collaboration-driven approaches.42  Nevertheless, many 
rightly suggest that most such conflicts between stakeholder groups are merely latent 
misunderstandings and a failure to communicate underlying interests, which collaborative 
processes could assist in unearthing and reappraising through a more transparent, 
inclusive, equitable, and forward-focused process.43 
 
Importantly, all of these drawbacks are viewed more often as necessary governance 
challenges needing to be dealt with by the ongoing refinement of governing processes, 
rather than arguments against the need for a new global solution beyond inter-state law.44  
Future global governance research in the context of UCH might therefore seek to 
empirically examine – in more detail than has been possible in the space of this thesis – 
the key non-state actors and multi-level regimes operating in the framework and, in 
particular, the manner in which their accountability, democratic legitimacy, 
representativity, funding, stability, predictability, transparency, efficiency, coordination, 
power, and enforcement capacity, can all be improved according to effective governance 
principles.45  Much of this is beyond the aims of the immediate study, which has been 
solely to evaluate the potential opportunities and advantages derived by taking a multi-
level and transnational approach to UCH protection, beyond the struggling system of 
marine environmental governance. 
 
In most cases, however, it is difficult to tell whether objections by scholars and experts 
to the idea of expanding into processes beyond a horizontal state-based system is simply 
the perceived political and practical challenges of such an approach, rather than any 
 
42 See Chapter 9; Supra n. 39, Dreyer and Sellke, at pp. 135-136. 
43 Conzelmann, T., (2008), ‘A New Mode of Governing? Multi-Level Governance between Cooperation 
and Conflict’, in Multi-Level Governance in the European Union: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, T. 
Conzelmann and R. Smith (Eds.), 11-30, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft (Baden-Baden); McDougall, C. and 
Banjade, M.R., (2015), ‘Social Capital, Conflict, and Adaptive Collaborative Governance: Exploring the 
Dialectic’, 20(1) Ecology and Society 44-66; Ansell, C. and Gash, A., (2008), ‘Collaborative Governance 
in Theory and Practice’, 18(4) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 543-571, at p. 553. 
44 Jentoft, S. and Knol, M., (2014), ‘Marine Spatial Planning: Risk or Opportunity for Fisheries in the North 
Sea?’, 12(1) Maritime Studies 13-28, at p. 14; ‘Global governance is something that happens; no one, 
apparently, actually does it.  [It] is the result of a political process and is shaped by power, access, 
mobilization, leadership, and other political variables.’ (Avant, D.D., Finnemore, M. and Sell, S.K., (2010), 
‘Who Governs the Globe?’, in Who Governs the Globe?, D.D. Avant, M. Finnemore and S.K. Sell (Eds.), 
1-34, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 7). 
45 Supra n. 28, Edwards and Zadek, at pp. 200-213; Supra n. 12, Bederman, at p. 171; MacDonald, T., 
(2008), Global Stakeholder Democracy: Power and Representation Beyond Liberal States, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford); Korten, D.C., (1994), Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the 
Global Agenda, Kumarian Press (Sterling, VA), at p. 201. 
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reflection of its potential merits.46  For example, in the context of regional marine spatial 
planning (see Chapter 9), while the European Commission stressed the multi-sectoral and 
stakeholder-driven motivations for using the transnationalising process, as well as the 
eventual need for joint processes of enforcement, it was forced to accept that the ultimate 
‘[d]ecision-making competence in this area lies with the Member States.’47  Similarly, a 
report on marine spatial planning in 2011 felt that, to be effective, ‘transboundary 
consultation and coordination procedures would need to be mandatory and implemented 
through appropriate mechanisms for joint decision-making and conflict resolution.’48    
 
When evaluating the Transboundary Planning in the European Atlantic Project, Jay et al 
also had to concede marine spatial planning ‘is unlikely to lead to a joint plan, but should 
offer effective links between national MSP processes’.49  For example, in interview, de 
Vrees felt that there was never going to be a single (multinational) marine plan for a sea 
basin, such as the North Sea.  However, when asked whether this was necessarily the best 
option, he agreed that ‘there would be a better solution if you do it differently’ and that 
there is an alternative ‘optimum solution’, including co-building offshore infrastructure.50  
In other words, while it may be true that a multi-level and multi-actor process may be 
preferable, it is the practical and political feasibility of achieving such transnational 
regimes which makes the development of such integrated governance more difficult for 
the time being.  As Barnes rightly put it in 2016, the ‘need for greater integration between 
different sectoral activities is generally recognized, but remains a significant challenge in 
a decentralized legal system.’51 
 
(b) State Law with Non-State Law: The ‘Transnational’ Approach 
The previous section demonstrated that it is not a binary question about which is 
preferable between state-based and non-state-based law, but can depend on what is the 
 
46 E.g., Flannery, W., O’Hagan, A.M., O’Mahony, C., Ritchie, H. and Twomey, S., (2014), ‘Evaluating 
Conditions for Transboundary Marine Spatial Planning: Challenges and Opportunities on the Island of 
Ireland’, 51 Marine Policy 86-95, at pp. 88-89. 
47 European Commission, (2007), An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union, 10 October 2007, 
COM (2007) 575 Final, at p. 6. 
48 Cameron, L., Hekkenberg, M. and Veum, K. (Eds.), (2011), Transnational Maritime Spatial Planning: 
Recommendations, Seanergy 2020 (Bruseels), at p. 41. 
49 Jay, S., Alves, F.L., O'Mahony, C., Gomez, M., Rooney, A., Almodovar, M., Gee, K., de Vivero, J.L.S., 
Gonçalves, J.M., da Luz Fernandes, M., Tello, O., Twomey, S., Prado, I., Fonseca, C., Bentes, L., 
Henriques, G. and Campos, A., (2016), ‘Transboundary Dimensions of Marine Spatial Planning: Fostering 
Inter-Jurisdictional Relations and Governance’, 65 Marine Policy 85-96, at p. 87. 
50 De Vrees, L., (2018), Interview with Leo De Vrees, 21 March 2018, Transcript on File. 
51 Barnes, R., (2016), ‘The Proposed LOSC Implementation Agreement on Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction and Its Impact on International Fisheries Law’, 31(4) International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 583-619, at p. 596. 
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most suitable ‘level’ at which particular collective action challenges should be addressed, 
as well as the various elements, stakeholders and systems implicated at different stages.  
In other words, one should view effective transnational governance as requiring a mix of 
multiple-level law and systems.  As was also argued in Chapter 6, while this 
polycentricity may breed complexity, it is possible to coordinate such regimes effectively 
through overlapping and integrating hierarchised networks that are coordinated across 
global-regional-national-local scales.  This is where integrated ocean management 
(IOM), as also highlighted in Chapter 6, has begun to be pitched as a new multi-level 
paradigm for ocean governance.  There it was shown that IOM represents a call for a 
transnational (multi-level and multi-stakeholder) approach to protecting the marine 
environment.   
 
However, while some writers have seen IOM as an aspirational framework which can be 
incorporated within the national-level system for managing the seas under the LOSC, 
most still recognise that IOM and national-level regulation can and should be 
interoperating symbiotically.  For example, leading authorities on the law of the sea, such 
as Harrison,52 Rothwell, Oude Elferink, Scott and Stephens,53 have maintained the 
essential respect for the central function of national-level law in ocean governance.  
Indeed, Barnes also appears to limit the notion of IOM to a ‘broad policy objective’ within 
the implementation of the LOSC, recognising the ongoing centrality of inter-state 
relations in the law of the sea.54  However, others have also promoted the view that, while 
the national-level ‘constitution’ under the LOSC provides an important level of stability, 
familiarity, and equity within a negotiated system for the inter-national allocation of the 
ocean’s wealth, the very purpose of IOM is to overcome the abject failures of the inter-
state LOSC framework to provide for long-term sustainable ocean management where 
such failure points occur.55  In other words, the vision appears to be closer to Tanaka’s 
 
52 Harrison, J., (2017), Saving the Oceans Through Law: The International Legal Framework for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment, Oxford University Press (Oxford). 
53 Rothwell, D.R., Oude Elferink, A.G., Scott, K.N. and Stephens, T., (2015), ‘Charting the Future of the 
Law of the Sea’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, D.R. Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, K.N. 
Scott and T. Stephens (Eds.), 888-912, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 899. 
54 Barnes, R., (2012), ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and Integrated Regulation of the Oceans’, 27(4) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 859-866, at p. 859. 
55 E.g., Allott, P., (1992), ‘Mare Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea’, 86(4) American Journal 
of International Law 764-787; Freestone, D., Johnson, D., Ardron, J., Morrison, K.K. and Unger, S., (2014), 
‘Can Existing Institutions Protect Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction? Experiences from 
Two On-Going Processes’, 49 Marine Policy 167-175, at p. 174; Scott, K.N., (2015), ‘Integrated Oceans 
Management: A New Frontier in Marine Environmental Protection’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Law 
of the Sea, D.R. Rothwell, A.G. Oude Elferink, K.N. Scott and T. Stephens (Eds.), 463-490, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford), at p. 489. 
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‘dual’ model of IOM introduced in his insightful 2008 monograph, which argued that 
both an integrated and zonal approach to ocean management could run in a parallel and 
dialectical relationship (with “zonal” referring to the strict boundaries between national 
territorial jurisdiction as inherent under Westphalianism).56   
 
The future constitutional role of the LOSC under such a hybrid governance model – 
between integration and zonality – is an intriguing question worthy of future analysis.57  
It certainly seems possible, in line with the views of each Barnes, Harrison, and Rothwell 
et al, above, that the negotiation of inter-state rights and responsibilities can still provide 
an important constitutional undergirding to the broader integrated model.  An example of 
this hybridity can be found in one of the foremost accounts of IOM, wherein Scott 
regarded it as ‘multi-sectoral’, ‘spatially-focused’, carrying a ‘strong temporal 
dimension’, while also necessitating ‘a relatively high level of political, legal, and 
institutional coordination at all levels of implementation including meaningful 
stakeholder participation.’58  This more popular view, thus, seems to focus upon a co-
productive relationship between zonality and integration, initially at least, with the 
integrated system eventually superseding the LOSC in the long-term.59  In this way, it 
must be understood that transnational law and governance are a complement, rather than 
substitute, for traditional international and national legal processes, with the purpose of 
enhancing the traditional national-level legal system, rather than replacing it.   
 
3. National-Level Governance and Underwater Cultural Heritage 
As explored in the previous chapter on regional-level governance, there is a widespread 
view among many in the UCH and heritage community that ratification and expansion of 
the UNESCO Convention should be the single focus for improving the global protection 
of UCH.  As Williams put it in interview, the UNESCO Convention has become 
‘something of a Holy Grail’ in the UCH community, which has led many key policy 
 
56 Tanaka, Y., (2008), A Dual Approach to Ocean Governance: The Cases of Zonal and Integrated 
Management in International Law of the Sea, Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 17. 
57 See Chapter 10; C.f., Supra n. 21, Gavouneli. It is interesting to note that, during interview, Williams was 
of the opinion that a new Law of the Sea Convention will be negotiated in the near future (Williams, M., 
(2018), Interview with Mike Williams, 18 June 2018, Transcript on File). 
58 Supra n. 55, Scott, at p. 466. 
59 United Nations General Assembly, (2008), Report of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group 
to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas 
of national jurisdiction: Letter dated 15 May 2008 from the Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly, 16 May 2008, UN Doc. A/63/79, at 
paras. 44 and 54. 
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experts to ‘become blinded’ to other alternatives and to solely focus on its ratification.60  
Guérin also expressed the widespread view that regional treaties are a distraction away 
from the UNESCO Convention, which should be the main focus.61  However, it has also 
been highlighted that regional-level treaties and international treaties are not mutually 
exclusive and that regionalism can often actually assist in promoting the implementation 
and success of multilateral frameworks.    
 
Certainly, there is no harm in also maintaining the ‘zonal’ system of ocean law, as 
instituted under the helm of Westphalianism.  Coastal states should continue to regulate 
specific marine matters within their internal, territorial, archipelagic, contiguous, 
exclusive economic, and continental shelf zones.  The UNESCO Convention instead 
provides a useful statement of where their initial powers of jurisdiction can be found and, 
from this baseline, where such sovereign power can be further constrained and contested 
by other competing regimes within or without the inter-national legal order.  For example, 
while the UNESCO Convention leaves coastal states to regulate UCH in their internal, 
territorial and archipelagic waters exclusively;62 it does so under the proviso that all states 
must ‘cooperate’ in the protection of UCH,63 prevent harm to UCH from incidental 
threats64 and, importantly, that the exclusive freedom of states within these waters 
continues to remain ‘[w]ithout prejudice to other international agreements and rules of 
international law regarding the protection of underwater cultural heritage’,65 wherein 
states are ‘encouraged to enter into bilateral, regional or other multilateral agreements or 
develop existing agreements . . . which would ensure better protection of underwater 
cultural heritage than those adopted in this Convention.’66   
 
In other words, exclusive sovereign powers of regulation over UCH should only be 
exclusive sovereign powers to the extent that they provide effective global protection; 
otherwise, alternative regimes should be used to constrain and limit self-centred uses of 
sovereign power through a model of active cooperation and regime building and 
thickening, as argued in Chapter 3.  This means that the unceasing and inevitable 
jurisdictionalisation of UCH across coastal states’ EEZs and continental shelves, which 
 
60 Supra n. 57, Williams. 
61 Guérin, U., (2018), Interview with Ulrike Guérin, 16 May 2018, Transcript on File. 
62 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 7. 
63 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art 2(2). 
64 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 5. 
65 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art. 7(2). 
66 Supra n. 1, UNESCO Convention, Art 6(1). 
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is being witnessed as a widespread customary phenomenon both before and after the 
UNESCO Convention, should matter less in effect, given that any such jurisdiction is 
provided conditionally upon its further constraint in the interests of the international 
community and future generations.  New forms of international legal liability may 
therefore need to reside where a state has been passive or inactive in developing 
meaningful and effective multiple-level regimes. 
 
Chapter 3 used the gradual thickening of fisheries regimes as an example of stronger 
levels of active, rather than passive, transnational cooperation.  Here, although states are 
entitled to exclusive rights over living resources up to 200-nautical miles offshore, the 
recognised need for cooperation to protect external interests has driven forward numerous 
multilateral, supranational, and transnational norms which constrain this exclusivity and 
ensure that states minimise self-centred decisionmaking over shared fish stocks and 
ecosystems.67  Admittedly, even after decades of concerted effort, such systems of 
cooperation are still a work-in-progress,68 but it is certainly possible to reserve praise for 
many of the developments and improvements.  As one example, the Common Fisheries 
Policy – working in fruitful co-production with regional fisheries management 
organisations and other national-level policies – has received considerable credit for 
reviving North Sea cod stocks.69  Put another way, the UNESCO Convention just sets the 
initial agreed boundaries between states; which can be continually tempered and 
contorted by subsequent conflicting and overlapping regimes and systems of norms.   
 
As Kern and Gilek said recently in reference to the rapid supranationalisation and 
transnationalisation of European marine space, ‘national environmental governance 
systems are still the backbones of regional environmental governance’.70  This same 
perspective applies to the UNESCO Convention where, as Leshikar-Dention puts it, states 
continue to be ‘principal players’ in achieving UCH protection.71  Finally, as noted and 
perhaps most critically of all, the UNESCO Convention also provides an invaluable 
commitment between states to implement the Annexed Rules, which sets a common 
 
67 See Chapter 3, Section 4. 
68 E.g., Supra n. 51, Barnes, pp. 592-594. 
69 Fernandes, P.G. and Cook, R.M., (2013), ‘Reversal of Fish Stock Decline in the Northeast Atlantic’, 
23(15) Current Biology 1432-1437. 
70 Kern, K. and Gilek, M., (2015), ‘Governing Europe’s Marine Environment: Key Topics and Challenges’, 
in Governing Europe's Marine Environment: Europeanization of Regional Seas or Regionalization of EU 
Policies?, M. Gilek and K. Kern (Eds.), 1-12,  Routledge (Abingdon), at p. 3. 
71 Leshikar-Denton, M.E., (2010), ‘Cooperation is the Key: We Can Protect the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage’, 5(2) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 85-95, at p. 89. 
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baseline for the treatment of UCH and its future management.72  As Williams rightly 
suggested in interview, states such as the United Kingdom and Norway have effectively 
adopted 98% of the Convention by agreeing to apply the Rules to the future management 
of UCH.73  Efforts to achieve its widespread ratification and implementation should 
therefore continue in conjunction with considerably greater efforts at expanding other 
regimes – whether bilateral, multilateral, supranational, or transnational – whenever 
needed across all other levels. 
 
4. Conclusion: A National Governance Approach to the Protection of Underwater 
Cultural Heritage 
This chapter has provided a succinct, yet vital, defence of national sovereignty and the 
future role of international law in producing global public goods and addressing the 
common concerns of humankind.  As national-level law has been addressed in most other 
literature; and national-level governance has been critiqued in all the other chapters across 
this thesis; this chapter was necessarily to-the-point and focused on picking up several 
loose threads from the arguments taken in the study.  The evidence produced in this 
chapter therefore proposes that, while the overarching argument of this thesis is that 
national level regulation – i.e., national law, private international law, and public 
international law – should not be the exclusive means to produce global public goods, 
such as UCH protection; neither should global, regional, and community-level 
approaches be exclusive of the national.  Instead, the national level will remain the most 
critical and essential level for expanding norms and systems across the other levels and 
for providing a vitally important democratic ‘legitimiser’ of the migration of such norms.  
As the concluding chapter explores further, and in some paradoxical sense, increasing 
cooperation between states at the national level – in the form of widespread ratification 
of the UNESCO Convention – would actually enhance and hasten the development of 
other multilateral, supranational and transnational regimes across the multiple-level mix.  
Nevertheless, ratification should not be seen as the sole pathway to such supranational 
and transnational regimes, with both forces interacting and strengthening each other.74 
 
 
72 Supra n. 57, Williams; Firth, A., (2018), Interview with Antony Firth, 15 March 2018, Transcript on File; 
Manders, M., (2018), Interview with Martijn Manders, 15 February 2018, Transcript on File. 
73 Supra n. 57, Williams. 
74 See Chapter 10. 
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Many challenges are inherent with the actual achievement of this, as has been highlighted 
throughout this thesis, such as a present thrust in many sections of the world to “take back 
control” of national sovereignty and to eschew the influence of interests outside 
traditional political boundaries.  However, this desire to maintain the Westphalian fiction 
in absolute totality is not an argument about which approach is, practically speaking, 
better for producing global public goods or addressing common concerns of humankind.  
It is perhaps better framed as a yearning for community enfranchisement, a maintenance 
of national or native traditions, and a fear of cultural heterogeneity.  This does not, 
unfortunately, change the reality that global and regional solutions are frankly needed to 
address all public goods having spillover effects.  The following chapter will therefore 
examine the final ‘community’ level in the multiple-level mix, which will reach beyond 
the concept of global and regional cooperation and, instead, focus on the decentralisation 
and delegation of governance and influence to communities.  Chapter 10 then concludes 
by drawing together the findings and arguments proffered throughout this thesis.  It also 
demonstrates that, as noted, the national level and transnational level are mutually 
supporting concepts and the ratification of the UNESCO Convention would equally serve 





















This final chapter exploring the multi-level governance approach to UCH protection 
focuses on the community level of governance.  By understanding community-level 
governance through a more inclusive definition of “communities” – seeing them as local, 
regional, global, and transnational in nature – the chapter provides further evidence of 
the benefits of improving stakeholder-inclusivity at all levels when addressing global 
public goods.  First exploring the weaknesses of top-down and market-based regulation, 
it highlights Ostrom’s famous appeal for greater community self-regulation and the 
numerous strengths and benefits that communities have in developing and enforcing 
internal rules, particularly with regard to reflexive issues such as environmental and 
cultural heritage protection.  It also highlights how meta-regulation can provide a fertile 
ground and suitable framework for such community systems to flourish and prosper.  It 
then applies all this to the context of UCH protection, demonstrating that there are 
numerous examples and case studies highlighting how community ‘buy-in’, 
incentivisation and self-governance have led to effective protection in lieu of top-down 
law.  In the case of self-governance, this is tested by looking specifically at transboundary 
marine spatial planning and exploring whether its central value in protecting UCH lies 
in its capacity to facilitate community-level rules and systems.  Overall, the findings 
provide evidence that stakeholder networks or ‘communities’ – whether operating 
publicly, privately, locally or transnationally – can create and enforce rules which 
provide an important level of additional protection for UCH by sidestepping some of the 
weaknesses of positivist or national law. 
 
1. Overcoming the Limits of Top-Down and Market-Based Regulation 
The following chapter takes a slightly different approach to resolving the weaknesses of 
the Westphalian system in protecting UCH.  Whereas Chapters 6 to 8 were focused on 
the types of cooperation outside of the state, in a multi-level frame, including international 
treaties such as the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
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Cultural Heritage (UNESCO Convention)1 and the UN 1982 Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (LOSC);2 this chapter looks at cooperation from within the state, at the stakeholder 
level.  It is therefore focused more upon the advantages of taking a multi-stakeholder 
approach.  It does this by exploring the numerous weaknesses which can arise by relying 
solely on ‘top-down’ governance in order to manage complex and reflexive challenges 
such as cultural heritage and environmental protection.  Relying on interview feedback, 
as well as relying on secondary literature to draw in numerous examples around the world, 
it argues that communities can be utilised very effectively using models of self-regulation 
or co-regulation.  This resolves many of the weaknesses highlighted in Chapters 3 to 5, 
particularly in relation to scarcity of public resources and difficulties with the 
responsiveness of regulation to transnational fragmentation and complexity.  It concludes 
by highlighting examples of where collaborative governance and transboundary marine 
spatial planning could assist in effectively achieving community empowerment in the 
protection of UCH. 
 
The community governance level, which centres upon an increased regulatory role for 
communities of stakeholders – whether such communities are local/transnational, 
homogenous/heterogeneous, private/public/hybrid – addresses demands for intensive 
multi-stakeholderisation of environmental and cultural heritage law.  It expands 
particularly upon the research of Nobel prize-winning economist Elinor Ostrom published 
in 1990, which was widely regarded as ‘groundbreaking’ evidence of the capacity of 
communities to more effectively and sustainably manage their own resources 
independently.3  Breaking from the pessimistic depiction of all humankind as self-
interested decision-makers, as was central to Garrett Hardin’s famous 1968 hypothesis 
on the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, Ostrom’s work showed that even rationally-oriented 
communities – where they possess a number of qualities which enables them to self-
govern – can self-organise in the governance of commons more effectively than is 
 
1 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 2001, 
in force 2 January 2009), 2562 UNTS 1. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 397. 
3 Wilson, D. S., Ostrom, E. and Cox, M. E., (2013), ‘Generalizing the Core Design Principles for the 
Efficacy of Groups’, 90 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 521-532, at p. 522.  See, e.g., 
Ostrom, E., (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), and subsequent work. For legal literature, see Weston, B.H. and 
Bollier, D., (2013), Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human Rights, and the Law of the Commons, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge). 
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possible by top-down regulation alone.4  The recognised capacity of communities to 
reflexively manage numerous competing, overlapping and shifting stakeholder interests, 
has thus propelled forward the use of  new governance forms – such as ‘collaborative’5 
or ‘new’6 governance – as a third regulatory mechanism for achieving public objectives, 
beyond the limited capacities of ‘command-and-control’ and ‘market-based’ regulation.7 
 
Command-and-control regulation, being our traditional go-to form of legal enforcement, 
is widely felt to be ineffective alone in achieving sustainable or environmentally 
protective behavioural patterns among stakeholders.8  In particular, the constantly shifting 
and highly context-dependent patterns of stakeholder interactions and decision-making, 
makes the development of clear and predictable environmental rules which stakeholders 
can follow and understand highly challenging.9  It is also difficult to develop firm legal 
rules which carry normativity, given the need for highly generalised principle-based rules 
which must be interpreted ad hoc.10  This also compounds the difficulty of enforcement 
given the considerable challenges of detecting where rules have been breached and with 
compiling sufficient evidence to punish rulebreakers, leading to a costly system if it is to 
effectively detect breaches and distribute fair and accurate punishments.11   
 
 
4 Jillions, A., (2012), ‘Commanding the Commons: Constitutional Enforcement and the Law of the Sea’, 
Global Constitutionalism, 1(3), 429-454, at pp. 448-449; Brown Weiss, E., (2014), ‘Nature and the Law: 
The Global Commons and the Common Concern of Humankind’, in Sustainable Humanity, Sustainable 
Nature: Our Responsibility, Extra Series 41, Pontifical Academy of Sciences (Vatican City), at p. 10. 
5 Ansell, C. and Gash, A., (2008), ‘Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice’, 18(4) Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory 543-571; Emerson, K. and Nabatchi, T., (2015), Collaborative 
Governance Regimes, Georgetown University Press (Washington DC); Donahue, J.D. and Zeckhauser, 
R.J., (2012), Collaborative Governance: Private Roles for Public Goals in Turbulent Times, Princeton 
University Press (Princeton). 
6 Rhodes, R.A.W., (1996), ‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’, XLIV Political 
Studies 652-667; Holley, C., Gunningham, N. and Shearing, C., (2011), The New Environmental 
Governance, Routledge (Abingdon); Lobel, O., (2012), ‘New Governance as Regulatory Governance’, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Governance, D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), 65-82, Oxford University Press (Oxford); 
Salamon, L., (2002), ‘The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction’, in The Tools 
of Government: A Guide to the New Governance, L. Salamon (Ed.), 1-47, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford). 
7 Supra nn. 3-4. 
8 Supra nn. 5-7.  
9 Orts, E.W., (1995), ‘A Reflexive Model of Environmental Regulation’, 5(4) Business Ethics Quarterly 
779-794, at p. 781; Aalders, M. and Wilthagen, T., (1997), ‘Moving Beyond Command‐and‐Control: 
Reflexivity in the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment’, 19(4) Law & Policy 
415-443; Steinzor, R.I., (1998), ‘Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from 
Command to Self-Control’, 22(1) Harvard Environmental Law Review 103-202; Sinclair, D., ‘Self-
Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies’, 19(4) Law & Policy 529-559. 
10 Ibid; de Sadeleer, N., (2005), Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford). 
11 Ibid; Supra n. 9, Sinclair, at p. 535. 
346 
 
Indeed, most domestic legal systems are limited in terms of the resources and processes 
they have available for implementation and enforcement.12  Furthermore, in a 
transboundary marine context at least, not all actors who can impact on UCH are as 
effectively supervised by top-down rules posited by a distant national regulator.13  
Command-and-control regulation – which is dictated without accounting for true 
normative preferences or without offering an opportunity to shape the regulation – can 
therefore suffer from a considerable lack of community buy-in and social legitimacy.14  
In practice, this can mean that the rules are habitually flouted or disregarded, as was 
demonstrated quite dramatically in ocean space in Chapter 5. 
 
The second form of regulation to address public good production, assisted into the 
mainstream by the Chicago School of Economics in the mid-20th Century, is by market-
based mechanisms.15  The capacity and efficiency of markets to swiftly modify behaviour 
and to achieve allocation of resources to near-Pareto preferences is phenomenal.16  
Unfortunately, however, market-based models are only effective in very specific factual 
contexts.  In particular, any good which radiates abstract values that overspill to non-
owners will be systematically underproduced on account of its perpetual 
undervaluation.17  Furthermore, the need for public enjoyment of public goods – such as 
 
12 Barrett, S., (2007), Why Cooperate?: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, Oxford University 
Press (Oxford), at pp. 190-191. 
13 See Chapters 3 to 5. 
14 Gunningham, N., (2009), ‘The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The Localization of 
Regulation’, 36(1) Journal of Law and Society 145-166, at p. 167; Bodansky, D., (2012), ‘What’s in a 
Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and Legitimacy’ 23(3) European Journal of 
International Law 651-668 at p. 656; Rowat, D. and Engelhardt, U., (2007), ‘Seychelles: A Case Study of 
Community Involvement in the Development of Whale Shark Ecotourism and its Socio-Economic Impact’, 
84(1) Fisheries Research 109-113, at p. 112. 
15 Coase, R.H., (1993), ‘Law and Economics at Chicago’, 36(1:2) Journal of Law and Economics 239-254; 
Mackaay, E. (2000), ‘History of Law and Economics’, 1 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 65-117; 
Kitch, E.W., (1983), ‘The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago: 1932-1970’, 
26(1) Journal of Law and Economics 163-234.  Although, of course, concepts on the use of markets in 
regulation can perhaps be equally attributed to Adam Smith in the early 19th Century, among many others. 
16 Ackerman, F. and Gallagher, K., (2000), ‘Getting the Prices Wrong: The Limits of Market-Based 
Environmental Policy’, Global Development and Environment Institute Working Paper, No. 00-05 (Tufts 
University, MA); Ecorys, O., (2011), The Role of Market-Based Instruments in Achieving a Resource 
Efficient Economy, Report for the European Commission & DG Environment, Cambridge Econometrics 
and COWI (Rotterdam); Katsoulacos, Y. and Xepapadeas, A., (1996), ‘Environmental Innovation, 
Spillovers and Optimal Policy Rules’, in Environmental Policy and Market Structure, C. Carraro, Y. 
Katsoulacos and A. Xepapadeas (Eds.), 143-150, Kluwer Academic Publishers (Dordrecht); Kverndokk, 
S. and Rose, A., (2009), ‘Externalities, Efficiency and Equity’, 1 JM Gowdy: Economics Interactions with 
Other Disciplines 115-138. 
17 Ibid, Ackerman and Gallagher; Ibid, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas; Peacock, A., (1978), ‘Preserving the 
Past: An International Economic Dilemma’, 2(2) Journal of Cultural Economics 1-11; Vadi, V., (2014), 
‘Public Goods, Foreign Investments and the International Protection of Cultural Heritage’, in International 
Law for Common Goods: Normative Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture and Nature, F. Lenzerini and 
A.F. Vrdoljak (Eds.), 231-248, Hart (Oxford); c.f., Posner, E.A., (2007), ‘International Protection of 
Cultural Property: Some Skeptical Observations’, 8(1) Chicago Journal of International Law 213-232. 
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sustainable recreation, in situ research, aesthetic enjoyment, and access and benefit 
sharing of UCH – makes exclusive private dominion a highly unattractive model of 
management.18  However, it is certainly feasible to argue that rules for public-oriented 
and in situ ownership, perhaps by local or transnational communities, could carry the 
capacity to effectively propertise UCH in a manner permitting public enjoyment (see 
Section 4 below).   
 
Overall, therefore, governance research since the late 20th Century has increasingly 
pointed to community governance as an effective ‘third option’ to resolve situations when 
these first two mechanisms are ineffective.19  Given that command-and-control and 
market-based regulation are particularly defective in the highly heterogenous, reflexive 
and contextual world of global environmental protection, community governance – or 
‘collaborative’20 or ‘new’21 governance – could be viewed as a vital element of effective 
regulation for pressing environmental challenges such as climate change or, indeed, the 
protection of UCH.  While collaborative governance no doubt has its challenges, which 
would be the subject of future research in the context of UCH; it must be understood as a 
necessity in certain contexts where traditional regulation fails.22 
 
2. Community Governance as the “Third” Regulatory Mechanism 
Within MLG research, the lower level here referred to as community governance, is more 
commonly referred to as the ‘local’, ‘subnational’, or ‘stakeholder’ level, all with slightly 
different emphases.  However,  ‘community’ is the preferred term of this study, given that 
this permits that self-governing communities need not be geographically distinct or 
homogenous (local); nor represented by subnational entities, such as councils or local 
government (subnational); and they will always represent stakeholders as individuals or 
collectives.23  Self-governing communities can indeed come in a vast variety of forms: it 
 
18 Ibid; Shaffer, G.C., (2012), ‘International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World’, 
23(3) European Journal of International Law 669-693, at p. 683. 
19 Supra nn. 3-6; Supra n. 14, Gunningham; Sørensen, E. and Torfing, J., (2007), ‘Introduction: Governance 
Network Research: Towards a Second Generation’, in Theories of Democratic Network Governance, E. 
Sørensen and J. Torfing (Eds.), 1-21, Palgrave Macmillan (London). 
20 Supra n. 5. 
21 Supra n. 6. 
22 Bryson, J.M., Crosby, B.C. and Stone, M.M., (2015), ‘Designing and Implementing Cross‐Sector 
Collaborations: Needed and Challenging’, 75(5) Public Administration Review 647-663; Perrings, C. and 
Gadgil, M., (2003), ‘Conserving Biodiversity: Reconciling Local and Global Benefits’, in Providing Global 
Public Goods: Managing Globalization, I. Kaul, P. Conceição, K. Le Goulven and R.U. Mendoza (Eds.), 
532-555, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 535 and 543. 
23 MacDonald, T., (2008), Global Stakeholder Democracy: Power and Representation Beyond Liberal 
States, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 84. 
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is possible to see a maritime economic sector, such as the fisheries or energy sectors, as 
a community; just as it is possible to see polycentric transnational networks of public and 
private actors across multiple sectors, all cooperating in the management of the same 
micro-regional sea basin, as a “community”, albeit a transnational community.  Thus, 
communities can be global, regional, national, or local, in spatial reach, and can range 
from homogenous to heterogeneous, in complexion.  In many ways, therefore, 
community governance could also be what others have termed ‘network governance’, 
where transnational communities represent issue-linked regulatory networks.24  It can be 
implicated across all of the global, regional and national scales, but it is characterised by 
the everyday interactions of actual persons, organisations and stakeholders.  As such, the 
research in this chapter is complementary to and continues the work undertaken in 
Chapter 6, which sought to explore options and potential benefits of expanding 
stakeholderisation of UCH protection at the global level. 
 
Ostrom’s work found that communities could be particularly effective at sustainably 
managing a shared commons, such as fish stocks or grazing lands.25  This well-timed 
research thus joined forces with the global governance revolution, ultimately leading to 
the worldwide expansion of research into co-management or collaborative governance 
approaches to achieving community sustainability.26  Social scientific research in this area 
– empirically exploring the various factors which improve a community’s capacity for 
effective self-governance and the role of public authorities in meta-governance – has 
 
24 Hale, T. and Held, D., (2011), Handbook of Transnational Governance: New Institutions and 
Innovations, Polity Press (Cambridge); Supra n. 19, Sørensen and Torfing; Andonova, L.B., Betsill, M.M. 
and Bulkeley, H., (2009), ‘Transnational Climate Governance’, 9(2) Global Environmental Politics 52-73; 
Kern, K. and Bulkeley, H, (2009), ‘Cities, Europeanization and Multi‐Level Governance: Governing 
Climate Change through Transnational Municipal Networks’, 47(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 
309-332; Henriksen, L.F. and Ponte, S., (2018), ‘Public Orchestration, Social Networks, and Transnational 
Environmental Governance: Lessons from the Aviation Industry’, 12(1) Regulation & Governance 23-45. 
25 Supra n. 3. See also, Ostrom, E., (2012), ‘Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions: Must We 
Wait for Global Solutions to Climate Change before Taking Action at Other Scales?’, 49(2) Economic 
Theory Journal 353–369. 
26 Jentoft, S., (1989), ‘Fisheries Co-Management: Delegating Government Responsibility to Fishermen's 
Organizations’, 13(2) Marine Policy 137-154; Singleton, S., (2000), ‘Co‐Operation or Capture? The Paradox 
of Co-Management and Community Participation in Natural Resource Management and Environmental Policy‐
Making’, 9(2) Environmental Politics 1-21; Berkes, F., (2009), ‘Evolution of Co-Management: Role of 
Knowledge Generation, Bridging Organizations and Social Learning’, 90(5) Journal of Environmental 
Management 1692-1702; Koontz, T.M., Steelman, T.A., Carmin, J., Korfmacher, K.S., Moseley, C. and Thomas, 
C.W., (2010), Collaborative Environmental Management: What Roles for Government?, Routledge (Abingdon); 
Armitage, D., Berkes, F. and Doubleday, N. (Eds.), (2010), Adaptive Co-Management: Collaboration, Learning, 
and Multi-Level Governance, UBC Press (Vancouver); Goss, S., (2001), Making Local Governance Work: 
Networks, Relationships and the Management of Change, Palgrave (Basingstoke); Rydin, Y., (2006), 
Networks and Institutions in Natural Resource Management, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham); Weber, E.P., 
(2003), Bringing Society Back in: Grassroots Ecosystem Management, Accountability, and Sustainable 
Communities, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA). 
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therefore proliferated in the space of two decades.27  Numerous case studies and 
experiments have verified that internal enforcement mechanisms among communities, 
such as reputational pressures or the threat of ostracism, can drive up compliance with 
regulatory norms.28  In addition to ostracism, suspension, and loss of reputation, the 
capacity for creative use of resources and self-organisation makes communities capable 
of devising unique internal enforcement mechanisms.  An illustrative example has 
perhaps been the capacity of online social networks to develop mechanisms for achieving 
public objectives, such as by suspending user accounts, modifying search rankings, or 
adopting ratings systems.29  Communities are thus inherently creative in their use of 
resources and in their capacity to problem-solve in a manner which utilises their own 
resources and capabilities efficiently.  Their familiarity with each participant’s potential 
contribution, along with their aptitude for reflexively making use of the various resources 
made available to them at different times, and their ability to seek mutually beneficial 
solutions when faced with complex social contexts, can therefore make them suitably 
adaptive and effective governors.30   
 
Through its capacity for more frequent and detailed interactions between members, 
community regulation is also inherently more suited to developing rules and systems to 
 
27 Bell, S. and Park, A., (2006), ‘The Problematic Metagovernance of Networks: Water Reform in New 
South Wales’, 26(1) Journal of Public Policy 63-83; Gillespie, A., (2012), ‘Science, Values and People: 
The Three Factors that Will Define the Next Generation of International Conservation Agreements’, 1(1) 
Transnational Environmental Law 169-182, at p. 179; Supra n. 3, Weston and Bollier; Bell, S. and 
Hindmoor, A., (2009), Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of the State in Modern Society, Cambridge 
University Press (Cambridge). 
28 Milgrom, P., North, D. and Weingast, B., (1990), ‘The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The 
Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs’, 1 Economics and Politics 1–23; 
Brousseau, E. and Dedeurwaerdere, T., (2012), ‘Global Public Goods: The Participatory Governance 
Challenges’, in Reflexive Governance for Global Public Goods, E. Brousseau, T. Dedeurwaerdere and B. 
Siebenhüner (Eds.), 21-36, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA), at p. 31; Masten, S.E. and Prüfer, J., (2014), ‘On 
the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts’, 43(2) Journal of Legal Studies 
359-400. 
29 Lievens, E. and Valcke, P., (2012), ‘Regulatory Trends in a Social Media Context’, in Routledge 
Handbook of Media Law, M.E. Price, S. Verhulst and L. Morgan (Eds.), 557-580, Routledge (Abingdon); 
Bakos, Y. and Dellarocas, C., (2011), ‘Cooperation Without Enforcement? A Comparative Analysis of 
Litigation and Online Reputation as Quality Assurance Mechanisms’, 57(11) Management Science 1944-
1962; Bederman, D.J., (2008), Globalization and International Law, Palgrave Macmillan (London), at pp. 
85-86; Galves, F., (2009), ‘Virtual Justice as Reality: Making the Resolution of E-Commerce Disputes 
More Convenient, Legitimate, Efficient and Secure’, 2009(1) University of Illinois Journal of Law 
Technology & Policy 1-68, at pp. 62-66. 
30 Baber, W.F. and Bartlett, R.V., (2015), Consensus and Global Environmental Governance: Deliberative 
Democracy in Nature's Regime, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA); Gollagher, M. and Hartz-Karp, J., (2013), 
‘The Role of Deliberative Collaborative Governance in Achieving Sustainable Cities’, 5(6) Sustainability 
2343-2366; Weymouth, R. and Hartz-Karp, J., (2015), ‘Deliberative Collaborative Governance as a 
Democratic Reform to Reolve Wicked Problems and Improve Trust’, 17(1) Journal of Economic and Social 
Policy No. 4; Kingsbury, B., (2008), ‘Global Environmental Governance as Administration: Implications 
for International Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, D. Bodansky J. 
Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 63-84, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 68-69. 
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overcome collective action weaknesses.31  It therefore becomes possible to empower 
stakeholders and provide a self-repeating pattern of cognisance of legal norms and 
compliance.32  This adaptability also makes regulation more responsive than command-
based or market-based systems to the constant, dynamic changes in the regulatory 
environment.33  Further, by necessarily having a role in the day-to-day management or 
utilisation of a resource, such as by being local residents or consumers or producers, 
communities make suitable monitors, reporters and enforcers against rule-breaking and 
free riding.34  This includes reporting suspicious or flagrant activities of community 
members and non-members who may be visiting or making use of a shared commons.   
 
Stakeholder-led regulation which permits various public and private representatives to 
group together, explain their collective preferences and interests, and then jointly seek 
optimum solutions, are also likely to enjoy a vastly higher level of community buy-in and 
sense of social legitimacy.35  Thus conferring  an improvement in compliance at the 
critical stakeholder level.36  As Gillespie has put it, the ‘the justification for including 
 
31 Supra nn. 3-6; Zadek, S., (2006), ‘The Logic of Collaborative Governance: Corporate Responsibility, 
Accountability, and the Social Contract’, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper, No. 
17, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA); Moura, P.T. and Chaddad, F.R., (2012), ‘Collective Action and 
the Governance of Multistakeholder Initiatives: A Case Study of Bonsucro’, 12(1) Journal on Chain and 
Network Science 13-24. 
32 Supra n. 30, Kingsbury, at p. 71; Supra n. 18, Shaffer, at pp. 686-687. 
33 Chaffin, B.C., Gosnell, H. and Cosens, B.A., (2014), ‘A Decade of Adaptive Governance Scholarship: 
Synthesis and Future Directions’, 19(3) Ecology and Society 56-68; Supra n. 22, Perrings and Gadgil, at 
pp. 535-536; Englender, D., Kirschey, J., Stöfen, A. and Zink, A., (2014), ‘Cooperation and Compliance 
Control in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’, 49 Marine Policy 186-194, at p. 187; Armstrong, J. H. and 
Kamieniecki, S., (2017), ‘Strategic Adaptive Governance and Climate Change: Policymaking during 
Extreme Political Upheaval’, 9(7) Sustainability 1244-1262. 
34 Alexander, S.M., Epstein, G., Bodin, Ö., Armitage, D. and Campbell, D., (2018), ‘Participation in 
Planning and Social Networks Increase Social Monitoring in Community-Based Conservation’, 2018 
Conservation Letters 12562; Lawrence, A., (2010), Taking Stock of Nature: Participatory Biodiversity 
Assessment for Policy, Planning and Practice, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge); Johnson, N., 
Alessa, L., Behe, C., Danielsen, F., Gearheard, S., Gofman-Wallingford, V., Kliskey, A., Krümmel, E.M., 
Lynch, A., Mustonen, T. and Pulsifer, P., (2015), ‘The Contributions of Community-Based Monitoring and 
Traditional Knowledge to Arctic Observing Networks: Reflections on the State of the Field’, 1 Arctic 28-
40; Abbot, J. and Guijt, I., (1998), Changing Views on Change: Participatory Approaches to Monitoring 
the Environment, International Institute for Environment and Development (London); Supra n. 29, 
Bederman, at pp. 75-78. 
35 Supra n. 5, Emerson and Nabatchi, at pp. 64-68; Cashore, B., (2002), ‘Legitimacy and the Privatization 
of Environmental Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-
Making Authority’, 15(4) Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 
503-529; Supra n. 27, Gillespie, at p. 179; c.f., Sandström A., Crona  B. and Bodin, Ö., (2013), ‘Legitimacy 
in Co‐Management: The Impact of Preexisting Structures, Social Networks and Governance Strategies’, 
24(1) Environmental Policy and Governance 60-76; c.f., Scott, C., Cafaggi, F. and Senden, L., (2011), ‘The 
Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation’, 38(1) Journal of Law and 
Society 1-19. 
36 Ibid; Slaughter, A-M., (2004), ‘International Relations Theory and International Law: A Prospectus’, in 
The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives, E. Benvenisti 
and M. Hirsch (Eds.), 16-49, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at pp. 46-47; Supra n. 4, Brown 
Weiss, at p. 11; Papanicolopulu, I., (2012), ‘The Law of the Sea Convention: No Place for Persons?’, 27(4) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 867-874, at p. 872; Bodansky, D., Brunnée J. and Hey, 
351 
 
local communities in conservation is not merely philanthropic.  It is also self-interested, 
since one of the most important factors for long-term success in conservation is having 
the buy-in of affected . . . populations.’37  In empirically examining this high compliance 
by community buy-in, for example, Mitchell has found that compliance by stakeholders 
with oil pollution laws in two international regimes was greater in the more stakeholder-
inclusive regime, despite both regimes being comparable in terms of compliance by 
states.38  What is more, if private communities can be trusted to self-craft rules, 
transaction costs can be minimised and rules can be designed in a manner making them 
easier to implement, as well as suited to the individual interests of community members, 
and in a familiar format which is easier to understand.39   
 
Achieving community buy-in is critical to the achievement of cultural heritage protection, 
wherein the resources, tools, daily engagement and close proximity of local communities 
makes them truly invaluable as “partners” in the protection of our global heritage.40  
Francesco Bandarin, Director of UNESCO’s World Heritage Centre, landed upon the 
issue when he said that ‘without the understanding and support of the public at large, 
without the respect and daily care of the local communities, which are the true custodians 
of World Heritage, no amount of funds or army of experts will suffice in protecting the 
sites’.41  In the context of archaeological resources, for example, Soto once discussed the 
invaluable role played by the local community and even ex-treasure hunters, in achieving 
protection and ecotourism at archaeological sites in Latin America.42  Numerous other 
examples increasingly arise from studies and literature on heritage management which 
 
E., (2008), ‘International Environmental Law: Mapping the Field’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law, D. Bodansky J. Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 1-28, Oxford University 
Press (Oxford), at p. 20. 
37 Supra n. 27, Gillespie, at p. 179. 
38 Mitchell, R.B., (1994), Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance, 
MIT Press (Cambridge, MA), at pp. 299–300. 
39 Gunningham, N. and Rees, J., (1997), ‘Industry Self‐Regulation: An Institutional Perspective’, 19(4) Law 
& Policy 363-414; Cafaggi, F. and Pistor, K., (2015), ‘Regulatory Capabilities: A Normative Framework 
for Assessing the Distributional Effects of Regulation’, 9(2) Regulation & Governance 95-107; Barzel, Y., 
(2002), A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State, Cambridge 
University Press (Cambridge); Ogus, A., (1995), ‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’, 15(1) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 97-108. 
40 Supra nn. 30 and 34; Chechi, A., (2015), ‘Non-State Actors and Cultural Heritage: Friends or Foes?’, 19 
Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 457-479, at pp. 474-475. 
41 UNESCO, (1999), Twelfth General Assembly of States Parties to the Convention Concerning the 
Protection of World Natural and Cultural Heritage – Summary Record, 8 November 1999 (Paris), UN Doc. 
WHC-99/CONF.206/7, at para. 20.  
42 Soto, A., (2006), ‘Finding Solutions for Lost Cities: Indigenous Populations and Biological and Cultural 
Diversity’, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, B.T. Hoffman (Ed.), 429-435, 
Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 430. 
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relate to the collaboration of local communities.43  By its capacity to make integrated use 
of traditional practices, knowledge and innovation, such public-private integration also 
has numerous social benefits and puts a much greater value on cultural and indigenous 
diversity.44  As is often said, therefore, while stakeholder-led governance is highly 
challenging and can take longer to reach agreed rules, the resulting quality of the norms 
and the high level of community buy-in makes the eventual implementation much more 
time-efficient and more effective overall.45   
 
Naturally, the reliance upon communities to self-govern is not a panacea to global 
environmental governance.  Indeed, many studies have stressed the practical challenges 
and risks inherent in using this form of regulation.  For example, the high level of 
unpredictability and shifting contexts creates a considerable demand for constant 
 
43 International Journal of Heritage Studies, (2010), ‘Heritage and Community Engagement: Collaboration 
or Contestation?’, Special Issue (2010, Volume 16, Issue 1-2); Hodges, A. and Watson, S., (2000), 
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Journal of Heritage Studies 231-243; Deacon, H. and Smeets, R., (2013), ‘Authenticity, Value and 
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of Field Archaeology 355-367; Cortés‐Vázquez, J., Jiménez‐Esquinas, G. and Sánchez‐Carretero, C., 
(2017), ‘Heritage and Participatory Governance: An Analysis of Political Strategies and Social Fractures 
in Spain’, 33(1) Anthropology Today 15-18. Smith, L. and Waterton, E., (2012), Heritage, Communities 
and Archaeology, Bristol Classical Press (London); Göttler, M. and Ripp, M. (Eds.), (2017), Community 
Involvement in Heritage Management Guidebook, Organization of World Heritage Cities (Regensburg); 
Chirikure, S., Pwiti, G., Damm, C., Folorunso, C.A., Hughes, D.M., Phillips, C., Taruvinga, P., Chirikure, 
S. and Pwiti, G., (2008), ‘Community Involvement in Archaeology and Cultural Heritage Management: An 
Assessment from Case Studies in Southern Africa and Elsewhere’, 49(3) Current Anthropology 467-485.  
Secci and Spanu also note an increasing movement in the same direction with regard to integrating 
underwater archaeology and community archaeology (Secci, M. and Spanu, P.G., (2015), ‘Critique of 
Practical Archaeology: Underwater Cultural Heritage and Best Practices’, 10(1) Journal of Maritime 
Archaeology 29-44, at p. 33). 
44 Gómez-Baggethun, E., Corbera, E. and Reyes-García, V., (2013), ‘Traditional Ecological Knowledge 
and Global Environmental Change: Research Findings and Policy Implications’, 18(4) Ecology and Society 
72; Diver, S., (2016), ‘Co-Management as a Catalyst: Pathways to Post-Colonial Forestry in the Klamath 
Basin, California’, 44(5) Human Ecology 533-546; Nordic Council of Ministers, (2015), Local Knowledge 
and Resource Management: On the Use of Indigenous and Local Knowledge to Document and Manage 
Natural Resources in the Arctic, Nordic Council of Ministers (Copenhagen); Supra n. 27, Gillespie, at p. 
179; United Nations General Assembly, (2007), UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
(adopted 2 October 2007), UN Doc. A/RES/61/295. 
45 Wälti, S., (2010), ‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance’, in Handbook on Multi-Level Governance, 
H. Enderlein, S. Wälti and M. Zürn (Eds.), 411-422, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham), at p. 413; Calado, H., 
Bentz, J., Ng, K., Zivian, A., Schaefer, N., Pringle, C., Johnson, D. and Phillips, M., (2012), ‘NGO 
Involvement in Marine Spatial Planning: A Way Forward?’, 36(2) Marine Policy 382-388, at p. 385; 
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adjustment and can make such governance prone to deadlock,46 stakeholder fatigue,47 
motivational weaknesses,48 power imbalances,49 community unpreparedness,50 harmful 
path dependency,51 intra- and inter-community conflict,52 and the need for a leader or 
policy ‘champion’.53  It is therefore becoming increasingly suggested that these collective 
negotiation processes need some form of higher-level coordination, perhaps by trained 
 
46 Hemmati, M. (Ed.), (2002), Multi-Stakeholder Processes for Governance and Sustainability: Beyond 
Deadlock and Conflict, Routledge (Abingdon); Sørensen, E. and Torfing, J., (2009), ‘Making Governance 
Networks Effective and Democratic through Metagovernance’, 87(2) Public Administration 234-258. 
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Development at University Level, W. Leal Filho and L. Brandli (Eds.), 335-342, Springer (New York), at 
p. 339. 
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51 Heinmiller, T., (2009), ‘Path Dependency and Collective Action in Common Pool Governance’, 3(1) 
International Journal of the Commons 131-147; Van Assche, K., Beunen, R., Jacobs, J. and Teampau, P., 
(2011), ‘Crossing Trails in the Marshes: Rigidity and Flexibility in the Governance of the Danube Delta’, 
54(8) Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 997-1018; Wilson, G.A., (2014), ‘Community 
Resilience: Path Dependency, Lock-In Effects and Transitional Ruptures’, 57(1) Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management 1-26.  See also Kirk, E.A., Reeves, A.D. and Blackstock, K.L., (2007), ‘Path 
Dependency and the Implementation of Environmental Regulation’, 25(2) Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy 250-268. 
52 Castro, A.P. and Nielsen, E., (2001), ‘Indigenous People and Co-Management: Implications for Conflict 
Management’, 4(4-5) Environmental Science & Policy 229-239; Castro, A.P. and Nielsen, E. (Eds.), (2003), 
Natural Resource Conflict Management Case Studies: An Analysis of Power, Participation and Protected 
Areas, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Rome); Yasmi, Y., Schanz, H. and Salim, 
A., (2006), Manifestation of Conflict Escalation in Natural Resource Management’, 9(6) Environmental 
Science & Policy 538-546; De Pourcq, K., Thomas, E., Arts, B., Vranckx, A., Léon-Sicard, T. and Van 
Damme, P., (2015), ‘Conflict in Protected Areas: Who Says Co-Management Does Not Work?’, 10(12) 
PloS one e0144943; Daniels S.E. and Walker, G.B., (2001), Working Through Environmental Conflict: 
The Collaborative Learning Approach, Praeger (Santa Barbara); Patel, T., Dhiaulhaq, A., Gritten, D., 
Yasmi, Y., De Bruyn, T., Sharma Paudel, N., Luintel, H., Khatri, D.B., Silori, C. and Suzuki, R., (2013), 
‘Predicting Future Conflict Under REDD+ Implementation’, 4(2) Forests 343-363. 
53 Huxham, C. and Vangen, S., (2000), ‘Leadership in the Shaping and Implementation of Collaboration 
Agendas: How Things Happen in a (Not Quite) Joined-Up World’, 43(6) Academy of Management Journal 
1159-1175; Mayer, M. and Kenter, R., (2017), ‘The Prevailing Elements of Public Sector Collaboration’, 
in Advancing Collaboration Theory: Models, Typologies, and Evidence, J.C. Morris and K. Miller-Stevens 
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collaborative facilitators and mediators.54  Furthermore, there is a growing volume of 
research dedicated to resolving these necessary governance challenges, with subjects 
ranging from collaborative governance,55 new governance,56 smart regulation,57 network 
governance,58 co-management,59 co-regulation,60 polycentric governance,61 public-
private partnerships,62 participatory governance,63 to reflexive governance.64  All of these 
fields see the development of more effective governance as a matter of necessity given 
the larger gains available than through traditional law.  Yet, such community governance 
 
54 Celtic Seas Partnership, ‘Fisheries Mediation’, (at: http://www.celticseaspartnership.eu/celtic-seas-
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is needed only to bolster the specific areas where there are externalities or weaknesses 
present in the first two traditional forms of regulation – i.e., command-and-control and 
market-based regulation – causing them to require additional community input, 
innovation, leadership and buy-in. 
 
Environmental governance under such a community-level approach would thus support 
the principle of subsidiarity being applied to its furthest extent, in that the “lower” levels 
of governance – stakeholders and communities themselves, whether represented as towns, 
villages, councils, groups, associations, companies, or even economic and social sectors 
– should be viewed as the first choice as governors, except in those areas where public 
authorities are required to produce higher level regulation to steer local, national or 
regional decision-making, or to develop meta-regulation to facilitate such collaborative 
processes and to achieve effective public-private partnering.65  This also justifies the 
increasing importance attached to transparency and participatory rights in environmental 
planning and decision-making.66  Such transparency may relate to the regulatory 
processes, thereby making them more participative and legitimate.  It also provides 
stakeholders with ammunition to enforce their environmental interests in multi-level 
public or private regulatory regimes, as well as engage with and drive forward reviews of 
state compliance.67  What is more, it improves the collective knowledge (and thus 
accurate preference-setting) of negotiating stakeholders, thus improving coordination of 
skills, innovation, effort and resources.68  Such participatory rules in international 
environmental law also provide consumers, voters or stakeholders with more accurate 
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As Altvater discussed in interview, the EU and national governments have arguably been 
too ‘arrogant’ in the past and have failed to really listen to the concerns and interests of 
local and regional communities.69  However, she points out, they are becoming much 
more cautious now, particularly in the light of political developments across Europe, 
where ‘there is a great move now’ towards decentralisation and community 
empowerment in addressing wider challenges.70  Pertinently, she adds: 
 
‘[Y]ou really need to include communities and, in my training with coastal 
communities, I see of course that they feel lost and forgotten, and if you 
show them ways and work with them, you see how much energy they have.  
If they see someone is really interested in them, then they get more power 
and strength and more self-confidence and say what they want.  They have 
a louder voice, which is very relevant for them.’71 
 
3. Community Governance and Meta-Regulation 
At the heart of the social inclusivity requirement is the foremost realisation that public 
actors alone are not capable of producing all global public goods themselves.  The forces 
of externalisation, privatisation, and innovation are pathways by which private actors are 
increasingly propelled into the role of providing global public goods, particularly in the 
transboundary environment.72  Indeed, a familiar challenge in the achievement of global 
public good output is the gradual shrinking in available government budgets around the 
world.  As Firth said, regarding a new European framework for UCH protection, one of 
the issues would be the ‘austerity pressure for the last decade now, meaning that . . . you 
would be looking to public authorities who generally have got no resources and are 
definitely not looking to extend their remit.  I think that’s a major problem.’73  Similarly, 
as Historic England say of protected wrecks in the United Kingdom:  
 
‘[O]ur financial resources can only solve a small fraction of the problems.  
Other partners also play a vital role in stabilising these important sites.  
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Concerted efforts by owners, local government, national government 
departments and agencies and the organisations that make decisions about 
our environment can all help to make a real difference.’74 
 
The result is that, across the world, we increasingly see private actors filling this void in 
order to deliver public good provision where governments are no longer able to justify 
the allocation of tax revenue from present-day national citizens.75  From here, top-down 
regulation can therefore be utilised to varying degrees in order to provide the ‘rules’ for 
community cooperation, facilitate stakeholder negotiations, allocate suitable resources, 
resolve intractable disputes, prevent externalisation of harms by communities, and to keep 
communities on track towards the production of public goods.76  In so many words, public 
authorities appear increasingly as facilitators or coordinators of public-private effort, 
trying as far as possible – depending on the reliability and level of trust and goodwill 
among community members – to enable communities to self-govern in the achievement 
of wider social and public objectives.  Such co-managed communities can be found 
globally, such as the co-regulation of internet intermediaries in cyberspace,77 or the fall-
back public oversight of international commercial arbitration under the United Nations 
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards;78 
just as they can be found in local contexts, such as the adaptive co-management of 
 
74 Historic England, ‘Protected Wreck Sites at Risk’, (at: https://historicengland.org.uk/advice/heritage-at-
risk/archaeology/protected-wreck-sites-at-risk; accessed 1 May 2019). 
75 Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D., (2002), ‘Private Actors and the State: Internationalization and Changing 
Patterns of Governance’, 15(1) Governance 41-63; Börzel, T.A. and Risse, T., (2005), ‘Public-Private 
Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of International Governance’, in Complex Sovereignty: 
Reconstructing Political Authority in the Twenty-First Century, E.Grande and LW. Pauly (Eds.), 195-216, 
University of Toronto Press (Toronto); Martin, L.L., (1999), ‘The Political Economy of International 
Cooperation, in Global Public Goods: Cooperation in the 21st Century’, in Global Public Goods: 
International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 51-64, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford), at pp. 61-62; Green, J.F., (2013), Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and 
Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance, Princeton University Press (Princeton); Brinkerhoff, 
D.W. and Brinkerhoff, J.M., (2011), ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Perspectives on Purposes, Publicness, 
and Good Governance’, 31(1) Public Administration and Development 2-14. 
76 Supra n. 28; Viet Thang, H., (2018), Rethinking Fisheries Governance: The Role of States and Meta-
Governance, Palgrave Macmillian (London); Edwards, M. and Zadek, S., (2003), ‘Governing the Provision 
of Global Public Goods: The Role and Legitimacy of Nonstate Actors’, in Providing Global Public Goods: 
Managing Globalization, I. Kaul, P. Conceição, K. Le Goulven and R.U. Mendoza (Eds.), 200-224, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford), at p. 200. 
77 Supra n. 60, Marsden. 
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ecologically-variable marine protected areas or fishing zones,79 or the co-governed 
community management of common spaces or resources.80 
 
As Kaul has put it, ‘[i]n some instances, governments still play a critical role, helping 
non-state actors to overcome collective-action problems.  But they rarely deliver public 
goods in their entirety.’81  We therefore increasingly find efficient co-management 
arrangements between states and private actors in what have become known as public-
private partnerships,82 where such partnerships might involve the consultation, 
enforcement or regulatory input by private standards bodies, right up to full-scale multi-
actor regimes, incorporating objectives and rules which have been defined by a 
combination of public and private actors.83  The global public good of ocean security, for 
example, is increasingly the result of efficient coordination of resources between public 
and private actors; ranging from relatively simple data sharing between public regulators 
and private corporations; to self-regulation and corporate social responsibility among 
maritime sectors; to self-funded NGOs and epistemic actors; right up to full-scale 
mercenary enforcement of ocean security by firms hiring private armies.84 
 
The purpose of meta-regulation by public authorities is thus to create an environment 
where stakeholders can independently determine those areas where further intra- or inter-
community cooperation, coordination, and collaboration – what Brown and Keast have 
referred to as the ‘3Cs’ – could achieve more effective and sustainable results than 
traditional command-and-control regulation.85  Such co-managed communities can be 
 
79 Supra nn. 26 and 59; Pomeroy, R.S. and Berkes, F., (1997), ‘Two to Tango: The Role of Government in 
Fisheries Co-Management’, 21(5) Marine Policy 465-480. 
80 Supra nn. 3-5; Supra n. 26, Singleton; Supra n. 26, Koontz et al.; Supra n. 26, Goss; Supra n. 26, Weber. 
81 Kaul, I., (2012), ‘Rethinking Public Goods and Global Public Goods’, in Reflexive Governance for 
Global Public Goods, E. Brousseau, T. Dedeurwaerdere and B. Siebenhüner (Eds.), 37-54, MIT Press 
(Cambridge, MA), at p. 41; Supra n. 14, Bodansky, at p. 653. 
82 Supra n. 62; Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M., (1999), ‘Global Public Goods: Concepts, Policies and 
Strategies’, in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg 
and M. Stern (Eds.), 450-507, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 489; Supra n. 29, Bederman, at p. 
151. 
83 Ibid; Supra n. 81, Kaul, at p. 41. 
84 Liss, C. and Sharman, J.C., (2015), ‘Global Corporate Crime-Fighters: Private Transnational Responses 
to Piracy and Money Laundering’, 22(4) Review of International Political Economy 693-718; Seyle, C. and 
Madsen, J.V., (2015), ‘Non-State Actors in Maritime Security’, in Strengthening Maritime Security 
Through Cooperation, I. Chapsos and C. Kitchen (Eds.), 23-36, IOS Press (Amsterdam); Petrig, A., (2013), 
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International & Comparative Law Quarterly 667-701; Supra n. 29, Bederman, at p. 83. 
85 Brown, K. and Keast, R., (2003), ‘Citizen-Government Engagement: Community Connection Through 
Networked Arrangements’, 25(1) Asian Journal of Public Administration 107-131, at pp. 115-119; Keast, 
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Strategies’, 10(1) International Public Management Journal 9-33; Mandell, M. and Keast, R., (2007), 
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found on a scale between those that are almost entirely autonomous and free to self-
regulate, to those communities which are still primarily steered by detailed public 
regulation.86  It is even feasible that communities can be largely entrusted to design their 
own regulatory systems from the bottom-up, effectively utilising public regulatory tools 
and market-based models in the process.  In many senses, therefore, this emphasises that 
exclusive focus on education and capacity building will not be sufficient if the 
surrounding legal framework fails to create an effective environment of engagement and 
enforcement.  However, mapping out the design and implementation of such co-
directional social-ecological systems in the context of UCH protection, making use of 
public resources and facilitative leadership, is beyond the present remit which is only 
intended to introduce the concept of community-level regulation and its future potential. 
 
In order to effectively stimulate communities into engaging with and providing public 
goods for the international community, it is hence important for meta-regulators to think 
about community incentivisation, motivation or compensation.  Indeed, if the benefits for 
protecting a resource will spillover to the wider international community or to future 
generations, then the community will likely need additional incentive to address the 
shortfall in cost-benefit distribution.87  The recent announcement that several wealthy 
debtor nations to the Seychelles have agreed to deduct billions of dollars from their 
national debt, in exchange for the implementation of a vast marine protected area across 
the Seychelles, is a good illustration of this beneficial trade-off in the inter-national 
context.88  Another market-based strategy which enables communities to more effectively 
propertise a local resource, for example, is the motivation to secure and maintain World 
Heritage status so as to attract global tourism, which in turn provides a strong financial 
incentive for communities to protect and preserve their local heritage.  Similarly, 
Bederman provides an illustrative example in the differing approaches to protecting wild 
 
‘Evaluating Network Arrangements: Toward Revised Performance Measures’, 30(4) Public Performance 
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(2010), ‘Forests, Payment for Environmental Services and Livelihoods’, in Payments for Environmental 
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88 Carrington, D., (2018), ‘Debt for Dolphins: Seychelles Creates Huge Marine Parks in World-First 
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African elephants from poaching in Kenya and Zimbabwe.89  In this study, although 
Kenya increased the number of game wardens and their powers of enforcement, they still 
suffered a considerable loss of elephant population, particularly through the bribery of 
wardens.  By contrast, Zimbabwe introduced a more bottom-up system of community 
ownership of the elephant herds, enabling local communities to share in the income 
produced by tourism and providing them with the tools to deter or report poaching, 
leading to a considerably improved long-term protection for the local population.90   
 
Nevertheless, as Zulu once said in the context of forest co-management in Malawi, 
thinking of incentives must go beyond thinking merely of financial payoff, but should 
also consider other psychological and sociocultural motivations.91  Thus, more creative 
examples of payments for such ‘environmental services’ are increasingly found in a 
number of contexts.92  In some cases, it is possible that merely general awareness-raising 
and education about the external “value” of local resources might improve a sense of 
community guardianship, although a moral sense of value is unlikely to be sufficient 
motivation alone and, as Lipe points out, it can even increase the risk of looting and free 
riding by the community.93  A good example of this in the UCH context has been 
illustrated by Harvey and Shefi regarding the Clarence wreck in Australia.  Here, a 
protected zone was created around the wreck and widely publicised, including placing 
markers and signage at the site.  However, this ‘drew the attention of the public to the 
shipwreck’ and, in fact, the markers became a useful reference point for anchoring before 
diving and recreational fishing, harming the wreck further.94  
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Advanced Research (Santa Fe), at p. 60. 
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In other cases, the incentive for communities to engage with public objectives may be 
more obvious.  For example, a fishing community will understand that without 
cooperation and a community ethic, a tragedy of the commons might produce a lose-lose 
situation for all users of the shared ecosystem.  Other motivators, outside of tourism or 
fiscal incentives, could also include the provision of resources and opportunities for 
development, such as capacity building, exchange programmes, or research twinning – 
all of which are visible elements in the UNESCO Convention.  In other words, 
communities can be immensely effective regulatory tools, provided they are suitably 
supported, motivated, and empowered. 
 
4. Community Governance and Underwater Cultural Heritage 
(a) Community Buy-In 
The most dominant means of achieving effective community governance in the protection 
of UCH – outside of the governance by national communities – has been by enhancing 
the level of community ‘buy-in’ with the values and benefits of protection.  It was argued 
throughout Chapters 3 to 5 that a critical issue with the multiple-value nature of heritage 
is that much of this value is lost as an externality to others, outside of the communities or 
national governments implicated with its protection and preservation.  The concept of 
community buy-in therefore focuses on educating the community and building a sense of 
pride or ownership in heritage over which they have stewardship.  This increases the 
overall share that the community receives of the abstract values of the heritage, such as 
archaeological, educational, historical, social, empathy, and cultural value, and impacts 
their motivation and incentive to ensure its protection.  As De La Torre and Mason have 
said, it ‘is self-evident that no society makes an effort to conserve what it does not 
value’.95  Similarly, as Guérin responded in interview, ‘if you ask for something then you 
have to say why.’96  Moreover, as Aznar responds, ‘[t]he best rules, the sexiest institutions 
are useless if citizens are not concerned about’ the protection of UCH and the time 
capsules that they represent.97  Williams also noted how he had come to appreciate that 




95 de la Torre, M. and Mason, R., (2002), ‘Introduction’, in Assessing the Values of Cultural Heritage – 
Research Report, M. de la Torre (Ed.), 3-4, The Getty Conservation Institute (Los Angeles), at p. 3. 
96 Guérin, U., (2018), Interview with Ulrike Guérin, 16 May 2018, Transcript on File. 
97 Aznar, M.J., (2018), Interview with Mariano J. Aznar, 12 February 2018, Transcript on File. 
98 Williams, M., (2018), Interview with Mike Williams, 18 June 2018, Transcript on File. 
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Examples abound from where such community buy-in has been effective in protecting 
UCH.  Indeed, much effort has been focused on providing communities with a better 
understanding of UCH’s archaeological, historical and educational value.  For UNESCO 
and other international initiatives, education of communities has been seen as an 
affordable, politically sensitive and long-term solution to community empowerment and 
resilience, eventually leading to effective self-governance in the protection of UCH.99  It 
has also been a key means of compensation for former flag states to incentivise coastal 
states to cooperate bilaterally, usually through MOUs, with regard to specific wrecks.100  
A good example of this community engagement of UCH value is that provided by 
Erreguerena in relation to the Sound of Campeche in Mexico, who suggests that top-down 
regulation has been ineffective in protecting the UCH contained in the Sound of 
Campeche; but it is only by intensive efforts at community engagement, education and 
collaboration, including with local divers, fisheries, maritime sectors, coastal 
communities, academic institutions, and international organisations and NGOs, that more 
effective protection has been achieved.101 
 
The impact of local ‘valuation’ of heritage has also been aptly demonstrated in 2017 by 
Jeffery and Palmer, who note the difference in protection of nearby UCH across different 
Pacific Islands which varies ‘for a number of socio-historical-political reasons.’102  
Tellingly, they note that the Republic of Palau ‘places significant value on the many 
Japanese World War II sites in its waters’ which has led to firm reprimands for looters 
and free riders.  By contrast, the State of Chuuk in the Federated States of Micronesia, 
‘appears to place little historical value on their Chuuk Lagoon World War II shipwrecks’, 
which has resulted in poor protection and looting.103  The Clarence schooner in Australia, 
referred to earlier, provides another illustrative example which is similar, in many senses, 
to Bederman’s Zimbabwean elephants example.  In particular, Harvey and Shefi have 
relayed how despite providing enforcement officers with the capacity to enforce on-the-
spot fines and ramping up the value of the fines, ‘the threat to Clarence was not 
significantly reduced.’104  Instead, far more effective protection was finally achieved once 
 
99 Supra n. 96, Guérin. 
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102 Jeffery, B. and Palmer, K.A., (2017), ‘The Need for a Multivocal Approach to Researching and 
Managing Guam's World War II Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 46(1) International Journal of Nautical 
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103 Ibid. 
104 Supra n. 94, Harvey and Shefi, at p. 197. 
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the local community was brought in and more effectively educated about the wreck’s 
importance and, from there, utilised in its long-term stewardship.105   
 
Another common means of effectively achieving such community buy-in has been the 
conversion of marine and coastal communities into amateur archaeologists.  By utilising 
archaeological approaches and methods of thinking, communities are therefore not only 
capable of unlocking many of UCH’s dormant recreational, social, historical, educational, 
excitement, and empathy values, but they are also more likely to prefer to protect and 
preserve it as an archaeological resource, rather than merely an economic or aesthetic 
resource.  As Manders said in interview, you should offer a chance to ‘stakeholders to 
become part of it, because then you will know for sure that you won’t do an excavation 
on that site, so let the amateur archaeologists do some stuff there.  So, opening up for 
others – participation – that should be a big important part of it.’106  Examples of such 
approaches being used effectively can be found, including successes of the South Carolina 
Sport Diver Archaeology Management Program,107 the Submerged Sites Education and 
Archaeological Stewardship program in Florida,108 and the strategy by Historic England 
to encourage archaeological training of divers through the Nautical Archaeology Society 
(NAS).109   
 
Bernier also provides an illustrative example with the case of the Elizabeth and Mary 
wreck in Baie-Trinité, Canada, where local sports divers who regularly visited the 
threatened site were given archaeological training through the NAS.  As a result, the 
divers, ‘whose activities have in the past occasionally had a negative impact on 
shipwrecks due to a lack of awareness of the importance of protecting shipwrecks, have 
now become major players and advocates in the quest to protect underwater heritage.’110  
Bernier adds, ‘[h]aving a group of trained local divers paid off in a number of ways.  
 
105 Ibid, at pp. 198-201. 
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110 Bernier, M-A., (2006), ‘To Dig or not to Dig? The Example of the Shipwreck of the Elizabeth and 
Mary’, in Underwater Cultural Heritage at Risk: Managing Natural and Human Impacts, Heritage at Risk 
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Without these divers, visits to the site would have been much fewer and farther 
between.’111  The core benefit of all such archaeological training programmes, as Scott-
Ireton puts it, is that they enable ‘divers to produce information, rather than just consume 
information’.112  Finally, it is also worth acknowledging that other coastal and marine 
communities, outside of the diving community, can be equally converted and utilised.  
For example, in England, the CITiZAN programme provides tools, resources and 
educational programmes to encourage coastal communities to take an interest in 
archaeological heritage found at low-tide.113  Similarly, the SCAPE programme in 
Scotland has utilised partnerships between communities and archaeologists, in order to 
improve the surveys of coastal heritage.114   
 
In addition to community education about UCH value and the provision of archaeological 
cooperation and training, one of the key pathways to achieving effective community buy-
in has been by rousing or leveraging a stronger sense of ownership over UCH which falls 
under the community’s protection or stewardship.  For example, Gribble writes how 
improvement in the protection of precolonial fish traps on the South Western Cape Coast 
of Africa is likely to be achieved ‘by increasing public awareness of the traps, and by 
encouraging local coastal communities to understand their significance and importance 
and to take ownership of “their” traps.’115  Similarly, a few years later, Gribble writes that 
giving communities ‘a stake in the sites, can ensure their long-term preservation, 
investigation, and understanding’.116  Interestingly, Burgin goes one further and says that 
many efforts to protect UCH in the Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary have 
attempted to reach out to the 100,000 certified divers in the Great Lakes region ‘and turn 
them from stakeholders to shareholders.’117  Scott-Ireton also describes how the attitude 
of the nearby coastal and marine communities towards the Urca de Lima wreck changed 
once the site was formally designated as a preserve and was placed ‘in the public’s 
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trust’.118  She adds that, ‘Shipwreck Preserves throughout Florida have enabled local 
communities to develop a sense of stewardship and pride in their submerged historic sites 
as pieces of their own history and heritage.  By establishing a Preserve, residents and 
visitors have the opportunity to become better informed about their past and to become 
more aware of the long-term value of preserving a historic shipwreck in its natural 
setting.’119  Similarly, Drew points out that because local World War II shipwrecks are 
regarded as ‘national treasures’ in the Solomon Islands, it means that local residents 
provide the protection ‘as de facto custodians of the wreck sites’, even without a formal 
shipwreck management programme.120   
 
Indeed, many national communities utilise this same sense of national community 
ownership over UCH within coastal waters, such as France, Italy and Greece.  
Furthermore, considerable effort to include local community buy-in through building a 
sense of ownership has also been taken and further vindicated across Europe.  For 
example, following on from the early efforts of the NAS’s ‘Adopt-a-Wreck’ scheme, 
there have been recent efforts through the Maritime Archaeology Trust, working with 
Historic England, to develop a new scheme for ‘Heritage Partnership Agreements’ 
between local communities and heritage agencies working in collaboration to protect 
specific sites.121  As their Final Report states, ‘it appears fundamental to the success of 
any HPA programme that people want to conduct work on the sites concerned because 
they have a personal, shared or community interest in them.  This to an extent revolves 
around the creation of a sense of ownership of such heritage assets’.122  Yet further, and 
clearly taking into account its increasingly limited budget, Historic England have also 
recently begun collaborating more closely with the National Coastwatch Institution and 
Project Kraken, to improve a sense of stewardship over UCH and thus drive up 
monitoring by coastal and maritime communities.123  For many, therefore, community 
buy-in and engagement with the values to be obtained by UCH and its protection is a vital 
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pathway to addressing many of the inadequacies of using top-down regulation and the 
difficulties of relying exclusively on poorly-resourced public agencies to produce public 
goods.  It also resolves fragmentation and enforcement weaknesses at the heart of the 
international system, as identified in Chapters 3 to 5, by ensuring that the stakeholder 
level represents strong compliance and integration with the public objects of the wider 
system. 
 
As Leshikar-Denton said when discussing UCH protection in the Cayman Islands, 
‘knowledge inspires appreciation among the public for cultural heritage sites, and results 
in enlistment of allies in the guardianship of these irreplaceable resources.’124  Similarly, 
Breen and O’Sullivan once discussed the expansion of policing and heritage enforcement 
agencies protecting UCH across Ireland, but conceded that, however, ‘it is only through 
local community education and vigilance that coastal policing can be effective.’125  Even 
more appositely, Gribble discusses the unfortunate case of SS Maori, which was subject 
to considerable looting and souvenir hunting, saying: 
 
‘But legislation cannot stand alone.  Of equal importance to the protection 
of underwater cultural heritage is an understanding by those using the 
resource and the wider South African public of what underwater cultural 
heritage is, and why it is worth preserving.  Without winning over hearts 
and minds, legislation can never truly succeed.’126 
 
However, it should be obvious that community buy-in, while necessary and perhaps the 
most effective example of achieving global protection by community-level governance, 
is not on its own a panacea.  The first great challenge is that, realistically speaking, not 
all in the community will share the same passion for the archaeological, educational, 
historical, social, excitement and empathy values produced by their local UCH.  Some 
members of the community – no matter the amount of education or training they receive 
– will continue to enjoy UCH for its economic value and, worse, may receive greater 
 
124 Leshikar-Denton, M.E., (2006), ‘Foundations in Management of Maritime Cultural Heritage in the 
Cayman Islands’, in Underwater Cultural Heritage at Risk: Managing Natural and Human Impacts, 
Heritage at Risk Special Edition, R. Grenier, D. Nutley and I. Cochran (Eds.), 23-25, ICOMOS (Paris), at 
p. 24. 
125 Breen, C. and O’Sullivan, A., (2002), ‘Underwater Archaeology in the Republic of Ireland’, in 
International Handbook of Underwater Archaeology, C. Ruppe and J. Barstad (Eds.), 401-418, Springer 
(New York), at p. 415. 
126 Gribble, J., (2006), ‘The Sad Case of the SS Maori’, in Underwater Cultural Heritage at Risk: Managing 
Natural and Human Impacts, Heritage at Risk Special Edition, R. Grenier, D. Nutley and I. Cochran (Eds.), 
41-43, ICOMOS (Paris), at p. 42. 
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excitement or economic value from its illicit recovery.  In other words, individuals cannot 
escape the same combined rationalist and constructivist decision-making motives 
explored in the context of nation states in Chapter 3.  In combination with this, therefore, 
as was with the example of the Clarence schooner above,127 there is a risk that by 
increasing a community’s engagement by educating them about the value of local heritage 
may actually increase the risk of looting or free riding.  As Maes responded, ‘[p]ublic 
disclosure of certain UCH sites may be problematic for attracting looting, as such [it] may 
be difficult to provide the exact location of certain sites.’128   
 
Some might argue that the risk of looting can be addressed by education.  For example, 
Erreguerena writes how ‘minor looting’ still takes place at the Sound of Campeche, but 
she believes that this is caused by ‘the lack of consciousness of some sport divers and 
fishermen who are not aware of the importance and cultural value of this legacy.’129  The 
reality, however, is probably more that these members of the community do not share the 
same interest in the intangible qualities of UCH heritage and, perhaps understandably 
given their socioeconomic situation, are more interested in its more tangible or economic 
value.  Similarly, in contrast to the Clarence case, Nutley does provide a persuasive 
argument that community engagement played a vital role in protecting the Lady Darling 
wreck in New South Wales, despite its value and location becoming widely 
disseminated.130  Nevertheless, there are perhaps other distinguishing factors which are 
likely to have played an important role in the case of Lady Darling, beyond the mere 
‘buy-in’ of the community (covered in subsection (b) below). 
 
Relying on an approach which provides the community with a sense of ownership is 
perhaps also at risk of going too far in that, eventually, communities may ascribe their 
own values and preferences on the future management of that heritage, disregarding the 
views of the international or external community.  For example, a coastal community may 
develop a sense of ownership over a vessel in its waters and decide to utilise it as a site 
for sport diving and tourism; while an external ‘origin’ state linked to the site may feel a 
powerful spiritual or historical connection and, especially if it contained human remains, 
 
127 Supra n. 94, Harvey and Shefi.  
128 Maes, F., (2018), Written Response of Frank Maes, 16 March 2018, Filed with Author. 
129 Supra n. 101, Erreguerena, at p. 19. 
130 ‘Most importantly, the system could not work so effectively without local interest in historical values 
and long-term recreational viability of this site.’ (Nutley, D., (2006), ‘Protected Zones and Partnerships: 
Their Application and Importance to the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, in Underwater 
Cultural Heritage at Risk: Managing Natural and Human Impacts, Heritage at Risk Special Edition, R. 
Grenier, D. Nutley and I. Cochran (Eds.), 32-34, ICOMOS (Paris), at p. 34). 
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may wish to see it respected in a manner which leaves it undisturbed.  Contrasting with 
this, however, is the need for sensitivity around local cultural heritage and to ensure that 
local values are understood, empowered and included within designation and 
management processes.  For example, Jeffery has pointed out how failures to engage the 
community in the protection of the Chuuk Lagoon were largely ‘attributed to the use of a 
single dominant non-indigenous perspective [of] the value and management of the 
sites’.131  He has also highlighted how the adoption of a multivocal approach has been 
more effective across Micronesia and Sri Lanka.132 
 
The other great difficulty, once more, relates to the multiple-value nature of UCH.  While 
educating the community or enhancing its sense of buy-in with local heritage could 
increase the ‘share’ of value they enjoy over the heritage, it might be difficult in many 
cases for the total value enjoyed by coastal or maritime communities to eclipse that of 
external communities and future generations.  As with national governments, explored in 
Chapter 4, any significant difference in cost-benefit allocation may cause the local 
community to prioritise short-term gain for the community, above the long-term interests 
of those outside the community.  As Maarleveld replied, the difficulty with local or 
subnational-led governance is that coastal communities are equally, if not more, 
disengaged with the distant valuations of local heritage.133  He responds, ‘even in a 
municipality at the sea coast, it’s not the sea beyond the horizon that is important, but it’s 
the traffic lights in the centre of the city.’134  At the UCH policy workshop in Ghent in 
2015, attendees were also discussing the same challenges which arise by protecting UCH 
through federalised and decentralised polities, wherein the lower levels have the freedom 
to choose whether or not to protect heritage of importance to others.135  Nevertheless, 
education and buy-in of the local community will still only improve upon this issue, by 




131 Supra n. 102, Jeffery and Palmer, at p. 172. 
132 Parthesius, R. and Jeffery, B., (2012), ‘Building Country-Relevant Programmes to Support the 
Implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001’, in 
European Archaeology Abroad: Global Settings, Comparative Perspectives, S.J. van der Linde, M.H. van 
den Dries, N. Schlanger and C.G. Slappendel (Eds.), 267-286, Sidestone Press (Leiden). 
133 Maarleveld, T.J., (2018), Interview with Thijs J. Maarleveld, 22 March 2018, Transcript on File. 
134 Ibid. 
135 DeRudder, T. and Maes, F. (Eds.), (2015), Workshop: The Legal Protection of Underwater Cultural 
Heritage 23 April 2015 – Final Report, Maritime Institute, University of Ghent (Ghent), (at: http://www.
vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/ocrd/274121.pdf; accessed 8 January 2019), at p. 16. 
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Overall, therefore, the community approach simply cannot be used in isolation, but must 
be thoroughly integrated with more effective co-regulation from the ‘higher’ levels.  Such 
co-regulation can not only be crafted to more effectively and efficiently facilitate such 
programmes and to achieve collaboration among all partners, but can more forcefully 
regulate issues where the community level cannot cope.  For example, a strong and 
respected legal system and infrastructure is needed to properly enforce against those 
looters and free riders that do not ‘buy in’ to the abstract values of UCH.  Co-regulation 
is also needed to steer the community to protect sites which continue to be of less value 
to them than they are to external communities; in other words, to protect UCH as an 
externally socio-psychologically valued asset when faced off against the community’s 
internal desire for economic development. 
 
(b) Community Incentivisation 
As has been demonstrated, the community buy-in approach, which emphasises education 
of a community to expand its ability to enjoy the abstract values from UCH sites, can only 
go so far.  Recognising the importance of sites is necessary; but, in several cases, will not 
alone be sufficient.  As suggested, if too much ‘value’ of UCH protection is delivered to 
external communities then there is a routine risk of a shortfall in cost-benefit calculation 
for local communities when considering whether to invest in its stewardship.  Not all in 
the community will be as receptive to archaeological, social, aesthetic or educational 
values of UCH.  For many, it could remain an object of potential (and usually nominal) 
economic value and little else.  Furthermore, when competing with other socioeconomic 
priorities of the local community, the intangible values of the heritage will have a limited 
impact.  As Ooms put it in interview, with regard to land-based pollution from agriculture, 
even though ‘you have to solve it’ with local communities, ‘if they are getting all their 
money from the agriculture, then it is difficult of course’.136   
 
Similar issues are experienced, therefore, with the shortfall in motivation for protecting 
UCH.  As Jeffery and Palmer say, ‘effective management of a large number of shipwrecks 
is a daunting and expensive task for any country and in particular for the developing 
countries of the Pacific.  In this context it is of prime importance to [make such 
management] beneficial to local people.’137  Similarly, an empirical study by Vander 
Stoep, Kenneth and Tolson found that avocational divers ‘with their passion, skills, and 
 
136 Ooms, E., (2018), Interview with Erik Ooms, 27 February 2018, Transcript on File. 
137 Supra n. 102, Jeffery and Palmer, at p. 176. 
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sometimes access to equipment – can be invaluable partners’ in discovering and studying 
UCH.138  However: 
 
‘[T]hey have other responsibilities, paying jobs, and limited time.  And 
they are more likely to choose, during their valuable leisure time, the most 
exciting activities (e.g., diving vs. tedious data entry) and the most exciting 
wrecks.  They cannot be “dumped on” or simply “used”.  Government 
partners must also bring something to the partnership table, even if in non-
traditional forms.’139 
 
The study demonstrated that, while content to engage in public objectives surrounding 
UCH, recreational divers expected some form of incentivisation for discovering, 
assessing, or protecting UCH, with proposals from interviewees including tax breaks, 
provision of support facilities, formal recognition (including attribution or publicity), 
preservation of intellectual property rights, or other financial incentives such as launch 
and dockage fee waivers.140   
 
The study by the Maritime Archaeology Trust into Heritage Partnership Agreements in 
2015, highlighted above, also came to similar conclusions, saying that the ‘main reason 
for the lack of sign-ups, based on the feedback from groups involved, was twofold and 
revolved around the selection of sites, and the incentivisation of work’.141  Many therefore 
drew comparisons with the Environmental Stewardship scheme by Natural England 
which offers financial rewards for participants.142  Indeed, such meaningful incentives are 
perhaps more commonplace in the environmental context.  For example, a core aspect of 
the Common Fisheries Policy has been the development of a large European Maritime 
and Fisheries Fund to help finance ‘transition to sustainable fishing’ and to incentivise 
‘coastal communities in diversifying their economies’ away from unsustainable 
 
138 Vander Stoep, G., Kenneth V. and Tolson, H., (2002), ‘Shipwreck Management: Developing Strategies 
for Assessment and Monitoring of Newly Discovered Shipwrecks in a Limited Resource Environment’, in 
Proceedings of the 1999 International Symposium on Coastal and Marine Tourism: Balancing Tourism 
and Conservation: April 26-29, 1999 Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, J. Auyong, N.P. Hadley and 
M.L. Miller, 125-136, Washington Sea Grant (Seattle), at p. 134. 
139 Ibid, at p. 134. 
140 Ibid, at pp. 134-135. 
141 Supra n. 121, at p. 19. 
142 Ibid, at p. 21; Franks, J.R. and Emery, S.B., (2013), ‘Incentivising Collaborative Conservation: Lessons 
from Existing Environmental Stewardship Scheme Options’, 30(1) Land Use Policy 847-862. 
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practices.143  Altvater also discussed a scheme in the Baltic for compensating coastal 
farmers by setting them up with a more sustainable mussel farming business.144 
 
Such community incentivisation schemes would therefore perhaps take the form of 
‘cultural services’: being the cultural heritage equivalent of ‘environmental services’, 
discussed in Section 3 above.145  By the creative design of co-regulatory solutions, 
regulators are – whether operating at the local, national or regional scale – capable of 
addressing this shortfall by providing more meaningful value or compensation to the 
community.  This is a subject which clearly needs future research in the area of UCH 
protection, particularly addressing the creative types of sustainable business or systems 
of incentivisation for marine and coastal communities which may be available.  
Nevertheless, there are some existing examples.  Perhaps the most prevalent among these 
is the widespread use of reporting incentives in most national legal systems, which 
provide an element of incentive for communities (or even reprimand for failing) to report 
new UCH discoveries.146  In many senses, this could be likened to a form of meta-
governance designed to encourage coastal and maritime communities to act in the public 
interest in recording and protecting discovered sites, in exchange for some compensation.  
Such incentivisation also need not be limited to “local” communities either: although 
there might be initial challenges in design and implementation, a more detailed system 
which strongly incentivises fishing communities or certain maritime sectors, such as 
shipping, salvage, construction, mining, renewables, and shipbroker industries to take a 
proactive approach to site reporting, monitoring and enforcement, or to reporting 
suspicious activities or engage in whistleblowing, would probably also be very 
effective.147   
 
 
143 European Parliament, (2014), Regutlation No. 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15 May 2014 on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), 20 May 2015, 149 Official Journal 
of the European Union 1-66. 
144 Supra n. 69, Altvater. 
145 Supra n. 92.  Not to be confused with the ecocentric view of ‘cultural services’ which merely refers to 
the cultural benefit of ecosystems but, rather, shifting this to mean the socio-ecological benefits of cultural 
systems. 
146 See generally, Dromgoole, S. (Ed.), (2006), The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National 
Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden). 
147 Flemming, N.C., Çağatay, M.N., Chiocci, F.L., Galanidou, N., Jöns, H., Lericolais, G., Missiaen, T., 
Moore, F., Rosentau, A., Sakellariou, D., Skar, B., Stevenson, A., Weerts, H., (2014), Land Beneath the 
Waves: Submerged Landscapes and Sea Level Change – A Joint Geoscience-Humanities Strategy for 
European Continental Shelf Prehistoric Research, N.C. Chu and N. McDonough (Eds.), Position Paper 21, 
European Marine Board (Ostend), at p. 61. 
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Instead of cultural services, perhaps the most dominant form of community 
incentivisation which has been achieved in the protection of UCH so far is through the 
medium of ownership.  Contrasting with the sense of community ownership, highlighted 
in subsection (a) above, this relates to the use of formal and legal rules to provide some 
element of actual ownership over in situ UCH: whether that be ownership of the UCH 
site itself, the part of the sea where it is found, or over the means of accessing it.  As was 
highlighted above, private property ownership is an inherently unattractive and unsuitable 
model of management for UCH which is, in effect, a public good and which would be 
systematically prone to undervaluation and underproduction.  However, not all forms of 
legal ownership necessitate private dominion and the exclusion of the public interest; and 
property laws are entirely capable of being crafted or moderated to prevent externalities 
where private owners hold goods effectively in the public domain.  A good example is 
the world-famous collection of Titanic artefacts raised by RMST Inc. throughout several 
expeditions in the late 20th Century.  While the nature and motives of the original recovery 
projects have been subject to critique, at least the US District Court of the Eastern District 
of East Virginia, particularly through the guided input of NOAA, were able to secure the 
entire collection within a detailed and strictly provisioned system of conditions and 
covenants which have effectively ensured that the collection has remained in the public 
domain and protected for external beneficiaries and future generations.148   
 
If local, coastal or maritime communities can more effectively control and monitor the 
access to UCH and protect it thereby, then carefully designed co-regulation can enable 
them to monetise the chokepoint in a manner that financially incentivises them to ensure 
long-term protection of the site for the public benefit.149  There is no reason that these 
ownership rights cannot be even privately held by individuals, as opposed to 
communities, provided that the same are properly regulated to ensure that the UCH is 
maintained and monetised exclusively for public enjoyment.  Perhaps the best example 
of this has been by the licensing of local dive clubs and giving them exclusive legal rights 
over access to UCH sites on the condition that they protect them and maintain them for 
 
148 Aznar, M.J. and Varmer, O., (2013), ‘The Titanic as Underwater Cultural Heritage: Challenges to its 
Legal International Protection’, 44(1) Ocean Development & International Law 96-112, at pp. 99-100. 
149 Cornes, R. and Sandler, T., (1996), The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, 2nd 
Edn, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at pp. 277-279; Supra n. 3, Ostrom (1990), at p. 38; Cafaggi, 
F., (2012), ‘Transnational Private Regulation and the Production of Global Public Goods and Private 
‘Bads’’, 23(3) European Journal of International Law 695-718, at pp. 703-710; Supra n. 82, Kaul, 
Grunberg and Stern, at p. 491. 
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public access.  A recent UNESCO Report stresses the benefits of a system like this, where 
it was recently trialled in Croatia.150  The report adds that dive clubs would:  
 
‘guarantee, by contract, the control of the integrity of the site and monitor 
it regularly with a certified underwater archaeologist.  This system does 
not only help to finance underwater archaeology.  It also permits more 
fragile sites to be opened up to the public without compromising their 
protection.  Moreover, it engages the dive community more closely, 
encouraging divers to take care of ‘their own’ sites.’ 
 
The disadvantages to such a solution, provided that meta-regulation is properly designed, 
seem difficult to find.  The success of protecting the Lady Darling wreck, as was noted 
earlier, was partly by giving the local fishing community a greater sense of ownership, 
by laying a plaque in thanks to their discovery and report of the site; but was likely 
significantly driven by a system of exclusive permits which local dive companies would 
purchase from the government.151  Viduka also provides the example of a highly 
successful ‘user pays’ system at the popular Yongala wreck dive site in Australia, where 
diving companies apply for permits which contain conditions and rules enabling them to 
maintain the ongoing business.152  This has even led to dive companies duly reporting all 
criminal activities or interference, even by their own customers.153  However, such a 
system would clearly be bolstered by expanding the sense of community engagement and 
value, as explored in subsection (a).  As Altvater said in interview, while community 
incentivisation is important, ‘good ideas are failing, and some regulations are not 
effective, because there’s no real interest to implement them.’154   
 
This can be witnessed clearly in the case of the Chuuk Lagoon.  Here, although a 
significant income is delivered for the local community by imposing an ‘innovative’ dive 
 
150 UNESCO UCH Secretariat, (2013), ‘The Benefit of the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage for 
Sustainable Growth, Tourism and Urban Development’, UNESCO (Paris), (at: http://www.unesco.org/
new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/UCH_development_study_2013.pdf; accessed 1 May 2019). 
151 Supra n. 130, Nutley. 
152 Viduka, A., (2006), ‘Managing Threats to Underwater Cultural Heritage Sites: The Yongala as a Case 
Study’, in Underwater Cultural Heritage at Risk: Managing Natural and Human Impacts, Heritage at Risk 
Special Edition, R. Grenier, D. Nutley and I. Cochran (Eds.), 61-63, ICOMOS (Paris). 
153 Ibid, at p. 63. 
154 Supra n. 69, Altvater. 
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fee through a system of permits and local guides,155 most of the Chuukese still ‘lack a 
personal connection or an emotional attachment to the sunken military vessels.  This is 
problematic for law enforcement as locals are reluctant to be proactive in the protection 
of Chuuk’s ‘Ghost Fleet’.’156  Similarly, Barbash-Riley notes the difficulties of protecting 
a ‘resource that involves a multitude of local, national, and global stakeholders with 
limited human and financial resources and technical expertise.’157  She adds that, ‘in this 
era of austerity, we can expect all governments – both of developed and developing 
countries – to increase the horizontal outsourcing of their responsibilities to nonstate 
actors’.158  As such, she recommends that the Dominican government responds to these 
‘administrative and financial challenges by authorizing a management framework that 
allocates responsibilities among domestic and foreign state and nonstate actors’.159  This 
includes the ‘larger, more equitable, and longer-lasting economic benefits’ of converting 
UCH into a ‘Living Museum of the Sea’,160 as well as empowering communities ‘in a bi-
directional way’, which might be referring to a co-management approach as highlighted 
in Section 3.161  However, she does not satisfactorily or clearly justify why communities 
are needed to protect UCH, merely implying that it is because national governments are 
prone to corruption and treasure hunting: despite the fact that local communities are just 
as prone to treasure hunting, if not more so.   
 
In other words, there is a serious lack of detailed and empirical research examining the 
true capacities, benefits and weaknesses of relying on community-led management or 
protection of UCH sites, whether by incentivisation through cultural services 
arrangements or by legal forms of ownership.162  By pinpointing examples from existing 
case studies on UCH management, the benefits and advantages have been demonstrated 
with great clarity above.  However, it appears that in all cases, effective co-regulation is 
needed to set the boundaries and rules of such community governance and to properly 
engage the community with the long-term benefits of such approaches.  As with the 
 
155 Dromgoole, S., (2006), ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: 
National Perspectives in Light of the UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), xxvii-xxxviii, 
Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. xxxvii. 
156 Browne, K.V., (2014), ‘Trafficking in Pacific World War II Sunken Vessels: The ‘Ghost Fleet’ of Chuuk 
Lagoon, Micronesia’, 3(2) GSTF International Journal of Law and Social Sciences 67-74, at p. 72. 
157 Barbash-Riley, L., (2015), ‘Using a Community-Based Strategy to Address the Impacts of Globalization 
on Underwater Cultural Heritage Management in the Dominican Republic’, 22(1) Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 201-240, at pp. 207-208. 
158 Ibid, at p. 240. 
159 Ibid, at p. 204. 
160 Ibid, at p. 204. 




demands for regime-building at the global and regional level, in Chapters 6 and 7, the 
need for further regimes at the community level would therefore also be a suitable area 
for future research. 
 
(c) Collaborative Governance 
i. Multi-stakeholder approaches 
It is finally worth briefly acknowledging another critical pathway towards community 
protection of UCH undertaken by communities through reflexive processes such as 
collaborative governance.  As explored above, although there is considerable overlap and 
contradiction between the growing bodies of research on community governance, it 
appears clear that ‘collaborative’ or ‘new’ environmental governance would be witnessed 
by facilitating true dialogue between all the key stakeholder groups and allowing them to 
negotiate collective preferences and to ‘set the rules’ for future management.163 
 
As Manders also put it in interview: 
 
‘The management of cultural heritage . . . is what the Convention is about, 
or should be all about […].  It’s about managing.  It’s about balancing 
values.  So, it means that in situ preservation is one part of the management 
strategies and methods, but excavation is another one.  What do we do or 
what don’t we do?  Just ask the people!’164 
 
Such inclusive negotiations have the capacity to more accurately reach the Pareto frontier, 
allowing for the wider set of collective preferences to more accurately determine 
allocation of rights and wrongs, as well as align the overall governance framework.  As 
Flatman appealed in 2012, with regard to competing sectors in the offshore environment, 
what is needed is ‘a holistic view, global in scope, comprehensive in consideration.  The 
provision of and continuance of energy supplies and other essential resources, and the 
control and reduction of climate change are intimately interlinked, not least of all in their 
impact upon cultural heritage.’165 
 
 
163 See Section 2. 
164 Supra n. 100, Manders. 
165 Flatman, J., (2012), ‘What the Walrus and the Carpenter Did Not Talk About: Maritime Archaeology 
and the Near Future of Energy’, in Archaeology in Society: Its Relevance in the Modern World, M. 
Rockman and J. Flatman (Eds.), 167-192, Springer (New York), at p. 187. 
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There are numerous challenges to taking such an inclusive approach, as highlighted in 
Section 2 above,166 but there are significant advantages.  In particular, by developing 
normative frameworks and new systems from the bottom up, with the central role of 
stakeholders, it is possible to achieve a more efficient use of resources, a better common 
consciousness among the group, and enhance the legitimacy and efficacy of agreed 
norms.  For example, Ringer has discussed how the Chippewa tribe in Quebec felt a strong 
spiritual connection and sense of stewardship over the prehistoric Mnjikaning fish weirs 
at Atherley Narrows.  However, it was through collaboration between the Chippewas and 
other interested stakeholders that the Mnjikaning Fish Fence Circle was created, 
‘composed of representatives of the Chippewas, local municipal governments and 
historical associations, residents of the area and Parks Canada’.167  A similar story can be 
found in the successful outcome of the Lady Darling wreck, noted above, where Nutley 
has stressed the critical role of a collaborative partnership between the ‘local dive 
industry, local council, other key interest groups as well as the State Government through 
the NSW Heritage Office and the Australian Government through the Historic 
Shipwrecks Program’.168  In both these examples, therefore, the communities themselves 
were shown to be effective at creating their own rules and systems of protection from the 
bottom-up, without the need for intensive external rule-making or scrutiny. 
 
ii. Collaborative governance through transboundary marine spatial planning 
A highly illustrative way to demonstrate the many potential benefits of community 
governance over UCH, which is initiated and driven by stakeholder collaboration, is by 
examining the potential value of marine spatial planning (MSP).  MSP is an increasingly 
central aspect of integrated ocean governance, with a good definition provided by the 
MSPP Consortium, which referred to it as an ‘integrated, policy-based approach to the 
regulation, management and protection of the marine environment, including the 
allocation of space, that addresses the multiple, cumulative and potentially conflicting 
uses of the sea and thereby facilitates sustainable development.’169  Its overarching aim 
is thus overcoming the harmful and fragmentary effects of siloed decision-making across 
marine sectors, by ‘facilitating the balancing of sectoral interests with the aim of 
 
166 See supra nn. 46-53. 
167 Ringer, R.J., (2006), ‘Atherley Narrows Fish Weirs’, in Underwater Cultural Heritage at Risk: 
Managing Natural and Human Impacts, Heritage at Risk Special Edition, R. Grenier, D. Nutley and I. 
Cochran (Eds.), 44-45, ICOMOS (Paris), at p. 44.  
168 Supra n. 130, Nutley, at p. 34. 
169 MSPP Consortium, (2006), Marine Spatial Planning Pilot – Final Report, DEFRA (London), (at http://
www.abpmer.net/mspp/docs/finals/MSPFinal_report.pdf; accessed 1 May 2019), (emphasis added). 
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achieving sustainable use of marine resources and optimizing the use of marine space.’170  
In effect, therefore – whether conducted at local, national, subregional, or regional scales 
– MSP is about bringing together the various stakeholders and sectors with an interest in 
the maritime space and encouraging them to resolve conflicting plans over the spatial 
allocation of activities and to solve common problems. 
 
While there is a general lack of research detailing the motivations and benefits of MSP – 
with the exception of a report by Firth in 2013, focusing predominantly on national-level 
and top-down MSP,171 and a current pilot project in the Baltic, focused on improving 
communication between heritage conservationists and other ocean stakeholders172 – there 
is a strong argument in favour of UCH being effectively included within such MSP 
projects, particularly at the transboundary level.  As Aznar responded in interview, ‘MSP 
is a multilayered tool which may assist . . . the protection of UCH in regional seas.  
Including cultural, fishing, environmental, energy, tourism and coastal development 
issues in the same web is necessary to offer holistic approaches to that protection.’173  
Each Ooms, Altvater and De Vrees also confirmed that UCH would be much more likely 
to receive better protection as a result of its inclusion within MSP processes.  Similarly, 
Firth responded that transboundary MSP ‘would be a good way forward and I think 
there’s a lot of scope there.’174  Indeed, in 2008, Gilliland and Laffoley had already 
identified the ‘need for more recognition of cultural heritage’ in MSP processes, saying 
that ‘whilst it is very challenging, objectives should be identified for the full suite of 
economic, environmental, and social interests’.175 
 
The interesting question, however, is why it would assist UCH protection by including it 
within MSP: a question which experts in this area have yet to really get to the bottom of.  
 
170 Platjouw, F.M., (2018), ‘Marine Spatial Planning in the North Sea – Are National Policies and Legal 
Structures Compatible Enough? The Case of Norway and the Netherlands’, 33(1) International Journal of 
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The first and most obvious motivation, for example, would be to enable maritime sectors 
to have a greater knowledge of where their activities might directly threaten or 
incidentally harm known UCH sites.  As Maes said in his written response, 
‘transboundary or national MSP is important for the protection of UCH by introducing 
an exclusion zone around an UCH spot for other activities beyond those mentioned in the 
UNESCO Convention (related to in situ protection), such as prohibiting beam trawling 
and regulating diving activities’.176  Similarly, Varmer has said MSP would help address 
threats which could inadvertently harm UCH, as well as designate traffic lanes and no-
anchorage areas.177   
 
Seen from this initial minimalist perspective, however, the need to include communities 
in negotiations over the protection of UCH in shared ocean spaces seems modest.  Indeed, 
if such sites are mapped out by public authorities and any protected areas are effectively 
communicated through top-down law, there should be little need for stakeholders to get 
together.  Ooms appears to take such a view in his response when he urged caution 
towards the concept of including UCH comprehensively at the transboundary planning 
level.  He proposed, instead, that one has ‘to look at transnational issues which are most 
relevant’, such as energy infrastructure, shipping, fishing, and marine protected areas, 
given that these have a clear need for coordinating spatial activities.178  Unfortunately, 
this first motivation does not deal with the fact that – as was explored in Chapter 4 – the 
major threat to UCH is from the very lack of prioritisation from governments and the lack 
of legal rules in the first place, as well as the clear lack of knowledge and understanding 
about much of UCH’s precise locations and values among the key stakeholders.  As 
Peeters responded, ‘I am not convinced that . . . in situ preservation is feasible.  There are 
far too many gaps in our knowledge.  In order to (partially) fill the gaps, research is 
necessary, but a systematic survey of an area like the North Sea is impossible.’179 
 
A second motivation for including UCH in MSPs, therefore, could be by the development 
of a stronger sense of empathy towards UCH and its plight, through a common 
consciousness of the cumulative impacts within a shared social-ecological system.  
Indeed, it was noted in Chapters 2 to 5 how UCH has often suffered from an ‘out of sight, 
out of mind’ mentality, where the lack of awareness of its true in situ values, its threatened 
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status, or even of its very existence, can lead to systemic deficiencies in terms of the legal 
and social norms protecting it.  Under this heading of motivation, the inclusion of UCH 
within transboundary MSP processes would provide a much-needed opportunity to 
influence the actual decision-making and adjust the future negotiating positions of 
maritime and industry sectors, or public agencies, having an impact on UCH.  Regular 
updates could be communicated to wider sectors about the values and threats to nearby 
UCH; where its protection has reaped rewards; the mutual or compassionate gains to be 
obtained by its protection; and where a lack of protection has diminished the multiple 
values now available for present and future generations.  As demonstrated when 
discussing pathways to more effective regional regimes, in Chapter 7, those regions with 
a stronger sense of ‘shared heritage’ will have a stronger incentive to cooperate, because 
they feel a stronger collective consciousness and more readily see the mutual benefits to 
cooperation.180   
 
Similarly, it was accepted by a number of respondents in this study that a difficulty for 
UCH was the lack of awareness among competing marine sectors with the true concerns 
or values of UCH protection, which can be better addressed by bringing these sectors 
together.181  This weakness of inter-sectoral fragmentation in terms of UCH protection is 
therefore witnessed beyond the MSP context.  For example, in interview Guérin pointed 
out the challenges of engaging sectors with UCH protection at international conferences 
on the marine environment.  She adds, ‘we have to do much more to promote 
collaboration when we talk about ocean space preservation: that we speak not only about 
pollution and sea level rising. […] It’s certainly an issue and we have to scream the word 
“heritage” much more loudly into the ocean space.’182  Maes responds, for example, that 
collaboration through MSP was vital for engaging politicians in Belgium with the 
importance of improving UCH protection.183  Similarly, Altvater relays how regional 
MSP builds knowledge and a ‘community feeling’ among stakeholders and notes the 
importance of communicating to competing activities – such as shipping, fishing, and 
tourism – about the impact they have on heritage.184   
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However, this motivation for including UCH within MSP – the ability to communicate 
its importance to other stakeholder groups – does not tell the full story or address the 
potential of using MSP as a means to protect MSP.  Instead, its true potential becomes 
clearer once it is recognised that MSP is, in effect, merely a system for facilitating highly 
inclusive multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral collaborative governance across sectors 
and regional communities.  This third and all-important motivation recognises that highly 
inclusive collaboration stimulates not just effective problem-solving, coordinated effort, 
co-benefit development, resource integration, cross-fertilisation of ideas, innovation, and 
the efficient co-location of activities between sectors, but can also unearth and resolve 
latent conflicts and misunderstandings between competing sectors through full and 
ongoing dialogue, enabling better alignment of objectives and the establishment of 
enduring systems for collaboration and communication.   
 
Thus, MSP is widely heralded as an integrative process between conflicting maritime 
sectors through its capacity to properly explore, understand, and address conflicts, 
misunderstandings, and underlying interests between conflicting interest groups.185  
Ritchie and Ellis go so far as to say that MSP is ‘the main fora for mediating conflicts of 
understanding and emphasis’ in marine governance.186  Similarly, for Jentoft and Knol, 
this propensity to resolve conflict is precisely what deems MSP as necessary at the local 
community level.187  Many commentators commend this aspect of its processes, which 
create a vital foundation for future ongoing inter-stakeholder communication and 
collaboration.  As the EU Commission reported, ‘without any MSP in place, the increased 
risk of spatial conflicts between expanding maritime uses . . . may result in a suboptimal 
combination of growth and sustainability.’188  Adding that an ‘open debate must take 
place between the different sectors in order to identify conflicts and a means of 
coexistence between them.’189  As Jay says, MSP ‘directs attention beyond borders, in 
order to avoid conflicts with neighbours [and] make best use of shared or adjoining 
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resources’.190  This goes right to the heart of the new marine governance movement, the 
‘essential quality’ of which, as Jentoft and Chuenpagdee have suggested, is its capacity 
to mediate conflicts.191 
 
As Altvater made clear in interview, stakeholders and their interests are the most 
fundamental aspect of the MSP process.192  In other words, MSP is viewed ultimately as 
an ‘interactive’193 process of collaborative facilitation, wherein active stakeholder 
involvement ‘is essential when looking for synergies and innovation and for making the 
goals and benefits of the process clear.’194  This proclivity for reflexive interaction and 
collaboration towards resolving conflicting goals creates a space for crafting mutually 
beneficial solutions, as well as the strategic and efficient integration of effort and 
resources towards productively and positively solving problems and resolving competing 
interests.195  As Pomeroy and Douvere have said, ‘stakeholder involvement provides an 
opportunity to deepen mutual understanding about the issues at hand, explore and 
integrate ideas together, generate new options and solutions that may not have been 
considered individually and ensure the long-term availability of resources to achieve 
mutual goals.’196  Such innovation and solution-searching also produces better planning 
by effective integration of local and special knowledge.197  Moreover, collaborative 
facilitation as a part of MSP carries greater economic potential for all actors, by 
optimising resource allocation and the coordination of effort.198   
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Within a fluctuating and variable environment, with constantly interacting and shifting 
ecological reference points and stakeholder preferences, there is also a need for reflexive 
or adaptive forms of governance.199  This can of course only be achieved by flexible, 
heterarchical, collaboration-driven models, as opposed to formal, hierarchised and top-
down models.200  As Jay et al have said, ‘[e]ngaging stakeholders and sea-users is 
regarded as a critical element of MSP both in guidance and practice, yielding benefits in 
terms of transparency, broadening the information and knowledge-base, setting mutually 
agreed goals to advance sustainable use of marine resources and improving decision 
making’.201  Such approaches have thus allowed ‘productive engagement with 
stakeholders and facilitated their cooperation in the identification of issues, pressures and 
opportunities, data provision, knowledge sharing, objective-setting and evaluation.  They 
also set the tone for wider working between institutions and underscore the importance 
of developing strong relations between individual participants.’202  Importantly, by 
enabling stakeholders to develop their own norms and processes of cooperation, it is 
imminently possible for collaborative governance networks to be created and to 
eventually witness the bottom-up migration of stakeholder-derived norms across regional 
or sub-regional contexts, instead of an exclusive reliance on top-down rules which may 
be less adaptable, responsive, efficient, effective, or socially legitimate.203 
 
These very same benefits of transboundary MSP would be highly beneficial in the context 
of UCH protection, where more effective inter-sectoral collaboration might address the 
fact that UCH is viewed as an “obstacle” to national economic progression, in a far more 
time-efficient, cost-effective and co-beneficial manner.  In their responses, both 
Maarleveld and Peeters recounted the numerous benefits available from development-led 
archaeology, which is continuing to expand in the marine context.204  In particular, they 
explained how industry is open to contributing important finance and resources towards 
UCH research and protection, provided they have a clearer idea of what is needed from 
them and are therefore able to invest more effectively and prevent risk.205  Industry 
therefore appears to yearn for more information on how heritage impact assessments are 
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going to be carried out and what obligations are likely to arise.206  As Bickett et al have 
said, this would be ‘economically sensible from the perspective of developers who often 
seek to find added value through public relations and community engagement.’207  In 
many senses, therefore, through proper integration and inclusion of all competing 
interests, one would be naturally driven towards the establishment of ‘heritage offset’ 
payment systems, much like the polluter pays principle for environmental degradation.208 
 
Yet, it is conceivable that cooperation between industry and UCH conservationists can 
and will go further. For example, offshore construction, mining, dredging, fishery and 
shipping companies are all better-placed to design the most effective and efficient rules 
and systems for minimising impacts to UCH from their offshore operations; just as UCH 
conservationists are better-placed to propose mutually beneficial activities in response, 
such as the sharing of data or the minimising of cost and disruption to offshore projects.  
It is well known that collaboration between the dredging community and the UCH 
community has improved the systems for reporting finds and locating spots for UCH.209  
Bailey has also written of how collaboration between epistemic actors, government 
agencies and offshore sectors would lead to much better awareness, protection, and 
research on prehistoric sites in the North Sea.210  This accords with what Ooms said in 
interview, that perhaps one of the greatest advantages that could be derived by taking a 
transboundary MSP approach to UCH protection is the sharing of ideas and best practices 
between usually competing sectors.211  Dromgoole has taken a similar view, having noted 
that inter-sectoral cooperation ‘can lead not only to improvements with respect to the day-
to-day practicalities of management of UCH within the region, but also – through the 
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sharing of ideas, experiences and best practice – with respect to the general management 
techniques employed.’212 
 
This could be equated with creating a space in which multiple stakeholders can develop 
new solutions and collectively raise standards through communication and collaboration.  
As Firth rightly points out, in terms of the potential for enhanced legitimacy from self-
crafted rules among UCH stakeholder communities, while national legislation ‘might 
appear to be stronger in terms of enforcement[; ] policy that has been established 
consensually through engagement with the different parties might have a legitimacy that 
fosters implementation more readily in day-to-day decisions.’213  The European Marine 
Board are in harmony with this view, suggesting that only when archaeology is integrated 
into the planning process from the beginning can ‘effective cooperation between industry 
and science be achieved.’214  Whereas, by comparison, ‘[o]verly restrictive regulations 
are perceived as burdensome by industry and are difficult to enforce.’215  Pertinently, they 
add that, if through cooperation between industry and the heritage sector, further 
‘voluntary codes of practice can be developed, those engaged in offshore activities will 
report their finds more willingly, and costs of enforcement and restrictions will be 
reduced.’216 
 
Resource and time efficiency can also be gained by such public-private partnering, 
including by collective problem-solving the most effective processes, as well as through 
the ability to merge existing systems and thereby avoid duplication.  As Firth responds, 
given the lack of public funding available for heritage protection, there is perhaps a far 
greater opportunity to protect UCH through existing systems or processes which are 
presently focused on other public goods, such as through OSPAR (the international 
organisation for environmental impact coordination in the North-East Atlantic), through 
the present exploration of renewable energy farms on the Dogger Bank, or through likely 
imminent reforms of the UK and EU’s fisheries policies following the outcome of the 
Brexit vote.217  Naturally, of course, while such interweaving of UCH protection into 
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existing systems could deliver many efficiency gains, enhance political currency towards 
UCH protection, and minimise economic costs; such integration of different themes could 
only work by ground-level multi-sector collaboration.  This also sets the groundwork for 
increased trust between sectors and establishes ongoing patterns of communication and 
cooperation.218 
 
Such collaboration also creates a space for innovation and developing new win-win 
solutions or, at the very least, helping parties to recognise the mutual gains and losses 
from adopting the best course of action available to all.219  As Maes said in interview, 
MSP creates a space for ‘stakeholders and public participation’, where they can discuss 
‘measures to be taken’.220  Aznar responded that MSP assists policymakers in tailoring 
‘the best normative and institutional approach’ for the protection of UCH.221  Similarly, 
Peeters adds, ‘economic stakeholders are willing to think about solutions with 
archaeologists, both in terms of planning and technological innovations to permit research 
when protection is impossible.’222  He further indicates that a regional solution would 
mean working ‘towards a common research approach and dedicated mutual involvement 
through input of expertise (and equipment).’223  For Altvater also, there is a need to 
include UCH within blue growth strategies which is, in effect, a call to search for new 
‘integrated ways’ of managing and protecting UCH which interoperates with other 
sectoral objectives.224   
 
Importantly, as noted earlier, such MSP can also operate on local to regional scales, such 
that it could provide an important pathway to transnational regime-building and multi-
stakeholder collaboration across subregional seas without sole reliance on the limited 
international-national system.   This creates an opportunity for harmonised standards and 
rules, as well as better compliance with norms with stronger social legitimacy.  As 
Maarleveld and Altvater both respond, one of the key challenges with achieving effective 
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standards of protection in a regional context is that each state has its own view and 
approach on how UCH should be treated.225  Similarly, Ooms notes the challenges of 
dealing with different approaches and priorities between national agencies; some are 
more focused on ecosystem-based approaches, others on blue growth strategies; some are 
more top-down, whereas others are stakeholder-led; and so on.226  Regional inter-sectoral 
collaboration therefore overcomes the weaknesses inherent from each sector or agency 
using their own types of data or having their own forms of dialogue and values, eventually 
leading to common standards and, eventually, to common rules. 
 
Ooms noted how it is visibly apparent that large organisations in marine activities, who 
are inherently transnational themselves, also act as a harmonising process by gently 
pushing all operators towards common standards and approaches.227  As Salter, Murphy 
and Peters add, therefore, cross-border collaboration between industry and archaeology 
can ‘ensure consistent approaches to research and management [which] is essential.’228  
This thus significantly improves upon the fragmentation inherent in the marine 
governance system highlighted in Chapters 3 to 5, while going considerable distances to 
providing proper multi-level integration across the marine environment.  Altvater 
emphasises this issue quite strongly, saying how different sectors ‘have different data, 
different kinds of meeting, different people’, but that regional MSP ‘brings them all 
together.’229  She adds that we ‘already have a lot of rules in place, but the thing is that 
we’re not really [complying,] many are contradictory, and many are not really effective.  
So, this is the issue we have to solve in our next step [and] think about how to break it 
down to . . . sea basin needs.’230  The ultimate objective, as she sees it, is to go beyond 
broader marine plans which can be very general and ‘overall’, and to really ‘integrate 
detail’ into the specific rules for protection.231   
 
In 2017, van Tatenhove therefore very aptly referred to transboundary MSP as a ‘way of 
overcoming the “inefficiencies” that arise from fragmented governance regimes’, by 
providing ‘sectoral integration and incorporat[ing] hierarchical policies from different 
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layers of government, offering opportunities for a more strategic and forward-looking 
framework for all uses at sea’.232  Unsurprisingly, therefore, it is increasingly common to 
find statements or declarations highlighting the value of multi-stakeholder and multi-
agency collaboration – whether locally, nationally, or regionally – if we are to effectively 
protect UCH.  As Secci and Spanu say, ‘measures should foster, define, and regulate 
collaboration among institutions (e.g., ministries, universities, research centers, policing 
authorities, etc.), between these institutions and the private sector (e.g., cooperative 
companies and consulting firms), and between institutions and the local communities.’233  
Leshikar-Denton also reminds us that cooperation is at the heart of the UNESCO 
Convention and that, by this, a ‘policy of cooperation among all stakeholders is the key 
for success.’234 As has been shown, however, such “cooperation” should not be 
understood – as it has been from a legal perspective – as a requirement for inter-national 
co-existence, but as a need for greater reflexive multi-stakeholder and multi-level 
collaboration. 
 
5. Conclusion: A Community Governance Approach to Protecting Underwater 
Cultural Heritage 
This chapter has brought forward a lot of research detailing the advantages and 
opportunities presented by the use of ‘community-level’ governance, i.e., the 
development by communities themselves of rules, systems, networks and organisations, 
whether operating locally, nationally, regionally, or transnationally.  The chapter has also 
introduced interview feedback with UCH policy experts, as well as located examples from 
across the world of literature on UCH management, which all provide evidence that such 
community governance is likely to carry a number of important benefits in the future 
protection of UCH.  While the chapter highlighted some of the inherent challenges which 
accompany such decentralised approaches to environmental governance, it also provided 
a lot of clear evidence to support the view that such difficulties are to be viewed as a 
necessary part of achieving fully integrated and effective transnational solutions to 
complex global public good challenges, rather than an argument against community 
empowerment and further decentralisation of governance.   
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Indeed, it has been evidenced that the pooling of capacities and interests, the utilisation 
of private resources, and the considerably improved compliance and reflexivity, all serve 
to address many of the compliance, fragmentation and public good production 
weaknesses explored in Chapters 3 to 5.  It is also interesting to note the various examples, 
in both environmental and cultural heritage contexts, where a strengthened sense of 
community buy-in or ownership, as well as hardened forms of property rights, have all 
been instrumental in integrating effective private community protection into wider public 
objectives.  Most significantly, it appears likely that communities can themselves design 
the ‘rules of the game’ by collaborating together across numerous scales, such that they 
develop new forms of group consciousness, new incentives and new systems for ongoing 
synergy and collaboration.  One such process in the UCH context which can help to 
achieve such collaborative governance is through transboundary MSP, wherein numerous 
marine sectors and interests are brought together to craft win-win solutions and discuss 
common concerns and values. 
 
It is clear, as noted above, that public policy can assist in facilitating and harnessing the 
power of the community, such as by constructing meta-regulation or co-regulation which 
brings together or empowers such stakeholder communities. It will be for future research 
to explore the design and achievement of such co-regulatory solutions in the protection 
of UCH.  Instead, this thesis now turns to the concluding chapter to draw together the 
findings from across Chapters 1 to 9, suggesting that future research and policy 
development in the field of UCH protection must seek to promote the expansion of 
governance upwards, downwards and outwards from the nation state, towards greater 
transnational and multi-level solutions, whenever and wherever such integrated modes of 















A Transnational Governance Approach to the Global Protection of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage 
 
Chapter Abstract:  
This chapter concludes the study by confirming its initial hypothesis that various aspects 
of transnational governance, as were explored in Chapters 6 to 9, have the potential to 
offer solutions to the weak levels of state compliance in the protection of underwater 
cultural heritage (UCH), as were explored in Chapters 3 to 5.  It argues that international 
law and transnational law are capable of having a positive inter-relationship, where each 
can be utilised to strengthen the quality of the other.  This suggests that one should pursue 
a dual international-transnational approach which promotes both the widespread 
ratification and implementation of intergovernmental framework rule systems, such as 
the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 
in parallel to significantly expanding and strengthening the role of NGOs, institutions, 
epistemic actors, corporations, individuals, and communities, all operating within 
multiple, overlapping and multi-layered transboundary governance networks.  It also 
argues that, given how developments at the inter-state level have become increasingly 
lethargic, the expansion of local, regional and global institutions, agencies and regimes, 
as well as the empowerment of private and public-private communities by co-
management and collaborative governance, should all now be pursued in earnest.  The 
thesis then finishes by arguing that none of the challenges facing the achievement of 
transnational governance are insurmountable and that resolving them is a small price to 
pay in order to achieve more effective governance of global UCH protection. 
 
1. Future Advantages of Underwater Cultural Heritage Protection by Multi-Level 
Governance 
Given the vast breadth and depth of literature and theoretical assertions raised throughout 
this study, it would be impossible to tie up all loose ends and to provide a detailed 
evaluation of all the hypotheses and proposals which have been discussed.  The principal 
focus of this concluding chapter will therefore be upon the study’s main research 
questions, which sought to evaluate whether and how transnational governance could 
improve the global protection and management of underwater cultural heritage (UCH).  
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This first section spends a brief moment reflecting back on some of the key findings from 
across Chapters 1 to 9, highlighting how the traditional and horizontal model of 
international law – particularly enforced for UCH protection through the UNESCO 2001 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 
Convention)235 and the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)236 
– has displayed various weaknesses which can be addressed or ameliorated by the 
addition of actors, norms and networks beyond inter-state relations, operating at multiple 
levels of governance.  The second section that follows then examines these findings in 
context, by exploring some of the important issues to consider when asking how such 
new transnational and multi-dimensional systems of governance can be achieved.  
Finally, the last section will briefly highlight some of the uncertainties and complexities 
which might arise if the findings from this thesis are to be adopted into policy, providing 
further inspiration and direction for future research. 
 
The first two chapters of this thesis set the scene by examining and highlighting some of 
the features of the international legal system protecting UCH.  There it was demonstrated 
that the UNESCO Convention has been effective at driving forward a culture shift and in 
addressing the primary threat to UCH, as of that time, which was commercially-
exploitative treasure hunters and salvors.237  By reappraising UCH through the lens of a 
multiple-value understanding of heritage, it was apparent that the UNESCO Convention’s 
drafters were also correct to adopt a model which valued archaeological (preservationist) 
values above those of treasure salvors (opportunistic) values.238  The early chapters also 
supported the widespread ratification of the Convention, by pointing to research which 
defends its value and utility to both coastal and flag states alike.239  However, it was also 
clear from the research findings, and confirmed by expert interviews, that while the 
UNESCO Convention has helped to address threats to UCH from salvage laws, it did not 
 
235 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, (adopted 2 November 
2001, in force 2 January 2009), 2562 UNTS 1. 
236 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 397. 
237 See Chapter 2.  Manders, M., (2018), Interview with Martijn Manders, 15 February 2018, Transcript on 
File; Williams, M., (2018), Interview with Mike Williams, 18 June 2018, Transcript on File; Firth, A., 
(2018), Interview with Antony Firth, 15 March 2018, Transcript on File; Dromgoole, S., (2006), ‘United 
Kingdom’, in The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage: National Perspectives in Light of the 
UNESCO Convention 2001, S. Dromgoole (Ed.), 313-350, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 340; O’Keefe, 
P.J., (2014), Shipwrecked Heritage: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on Underwater Cultural 
Heritage, 2nd Edn, Institute of Art and Law (Builth Wells), at pp. 124-125. 
238 E.g., Maarleveld, T.J., Guérin U. and Egger, B. (Eds.), (2013), Manual for Activities Directed at 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: Guidelines to the Annex of the UNESCO 2001 Convention, UNESCO 
(Paris), at pp. 20-41. 
239 See Chapter 1, Section 4. 
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have sufficient opportunity to address the arguably greater and still growing damage 
caused by other threats, such as looting, trophy hunting, offshore development, fishing 
and economic activity.240 
 
However, Chapters 3 to 5 promulgated a considerable amount of scepticism and concern 
about the capacity of international law – as a legal system predicated on absolute equality 
between wholly independent “sovereigns” – to address such threats to UCH.  By 
confirming that UCH protection fits within the definition of a ‘global public good’,241 it 
argued that it will be difficult for nation states to agree to curtail their own economic 
advancement for the betterment of external communities when there is little in the 
enforcement architecture to overcome the consent-based nature of international law.242  
This capacity of states to freely consent to being bound by international norms therefore 
undermines collective action and leaves too much space for free riders and for low 
compliance.243  These chapters also expressed concern about the overt reliance upon 
hortatory commitments between states to ‘cooperate’ in the protection of UCH, when 
such commitments are often reduced to a negative sum game of reactive cooperation, as 
opposed to a positive sum game of proactive collaboration and regime-thickening.244   
 
These weaknesses were then explored in the broader context of the law of the sea, which 
confirmed that various features of the ‘Westphalian’ system of law, i.e., its horizontal 
 
240 Supra n. 237, Manders; Maarleveld, T.J., (2018), Interview with Thijs J. Maarleveld, 22 March 2018, 
Transcript on File; Aznar, M.J., (2018), Interview with Mariano J. Aznar, 12 February 2018, Transcript on 
File; Supra n. 237, Dromgoole, at p. 346; Flatman, J., (2012), ‘What the Walrus and the Carpenter Did Not 
Talk About: Maritime Archaeology and the Near Future of Energy’, in Archaeology in Society: Its 
Relevance in the Modern World, M. Rockman and J. Flatman (Eds.), 167-192, Springer (New York), at p. 
174; Flatman, J., (2009), ‘Conserving Marine Cultural Heritage: Threats, Risks and Future Priorities’, 11(1) 
Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 5-8, at p. 7. 
241 See generally, Kaul, I., Grunberg, I. and Stern, M. (Eds.), (1999), Global Public Goods: International 
Cooperation in the 21st Century, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Kaul, I., Conceição, P., Le Goulven, 
K. and Mendoza, R.U. (Eds.), (2003), Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford); Kaul, I. and Conceição, P. (Eds.), (2006), The New Public Finance: Responding 
to Global Challenges, Oxford University Press (Oxford); Reflexive Governance for Global Public Goods, 
E. Brousseau, T. Dedeurwaerdere and B. Siebenhüner (Eds.), 1-18, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA). 
242 Bodansky, D., (2012), ‘What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and Legitimacy’ 
23(3) European Journal of International Law 651-668; Heal, G., (1999), ‘New Strategies for the Provision 
of Global Public Goods: Learning from International Environmental Challenges’, in Global Public Goods: 
International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 220-240, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford); Krisch, N., (2014), ‘The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of 
Global Public Goods’, 108(1) American Journal of International Law 1-40. 
243 Crawford, J., (2012), Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th Edn, Oxford University 
Press (Oxford), at p. 16; Guzman, A.T., (2011), ‘Against Consent’, 52(4) Virginia Journal of International 
Law 747-790; Besson, S., (2016), ‘State Consent and Disagreement in International Law-Making: 
Dissolving the Paradox’, 29(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 289-316; Pergantis, V., (Ed.), (2017), 
The Paradigm of State Consent in the Law of Treaties: Challenges and Perspectives, Edward Elgar 
(Cheltenham). 
244 See Chapter 3. 
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arrangement between absolutist, equal and zonal political units – have served to drive 
forward weak compliance and poor management in the marine environment.245  This was 
clearly evidenced in the case of UCH protection and management, where large numbers 
of secondary sources and interview responses pointed to worldwide issues with 
compliance by states with their international commitments towards UCH.246  It was not 
just the problem of poor implementation, but particularly the difficulty with providing 
states with sufficient incentive to curtail political or economic gains available elsewhere, 
in preference to the socio-cultural interests of an ‘external’ international community.247  
This has all too frequently led to treaties which are poorly adopted and which are drafted 
with considerable latitudinal ambiguity to prevent future constraint on national 
sovereignty.248   
 
As Risvas once commented on the Convention’s likely weakness in achieving 
cooperation and implementation by states, despite the fact that ‘one of the primary 
objectives of the UNESCO Convention was to create a legal framework of cooperation 
by fleshing out UNCLOS Article 303(1), this effort has not been crowned with 
success.’249  Similar responses were received by most of the UCH and marine policy 
experts interviewed during this study, who confirmed that commitment and compliance 
by states with the international protection of UCH will be challenging.  This is particularly 
a result of states being able to agree with and implement – or disagree with and not 
implement – international laws according to their own motives or conscience.  This is the 
nature of our inter-national law, where the focus of law is not on maximising law’s diverse 
subjects and contexts; but on reducing law’s influence solely to those marginal aspects of 
governance which national governments are willing to resign, often for some rational (or 
constructed) political or economic gain.   
 
245 See Chapter 5. 
246 Supra n. 237, Williams; Supra n. 237, Firth; Supra n. 237, Manders; Sarid, E., (2017), ‘International 
Underwater Cultural Heritage Governance: Past Doubts and Current Challenges’, 35(2) Berkeley Journal 
of International Law 219-261, at p. 256; MacKintosh, R.F., (2018), The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Implementation and Effectiveness, University of 
Southampton, Doctoral Thesis. 
247 See Chapter 4. 
248 As the pre-eminent professor of international UCH law, Sarah Dromgoole, once put it, ‘unless it is 
widely adopted by both flag states and coastal states – treasure hunters will be able to evade its control 
mechanisms by using “flags of convenience” and “ports of convenience”.  [It seems] that the Convention 
may be quite widely adopted by coastal states, but it seems unlikely that significant flag states, including 
the USA and UK, will sign.  The holes that this will create in the protective system, together with the 
inevitable difficulties of enforcement . . .  mean that the effectiveness of the Convention will probably be 
patchy at best.’ (Dromgoole, S., (2003), ‘2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage’, 18(1) International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 59-108, at p. 90). 
249 Risvas, M., (2013), ‘The Duty to Cooperate and the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage’, 2(3) 




This is where Chapters 6, 7 and 9 examined whether the addition of rules, actors and 
systems outside of the inter-state legal bargaining process would assist in enhancing the 
protection of UCH.  These chapters explored the potential merit of a more transnational 
approach to the international governance of UCH protection, by exploring the capacity 
for non-state actors and regimes to influence matters at the global, regional, and 
community levels.  The conclusions to be drawn from these chapters are many and 
diverse, with several intriguing and beneficial questions and proposals left to be explored 
by future research.250  Nevertheless, it was apparent that in each case – whether looking 
at the global, regional or local level – the addition of well-crafted transnational law should 
improve overall protection of UCH and drive up compliance with rules demanding its 
better preservation.  In particular, both Chapters 6 and 9 explored the advantages obtained 
by further increasing the role of private and hybrid actors – such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), epistemic communities, standards bodies, multinational 
corporations, subnational entities, communities, and stakeholders – in governance at the 
transnational level.  In both cases, it was possible to find evidence and various examples 
of where such non-state actors have positively improved the protection of UCH, by side-
stepping, influencing or complementing state-level protection.   
 
For example, at the global level, numerous organisations and bodies – such as the 
International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), International Law 
Association, International Maritime Organization, and various NGOs and epistemic 
actors – have improved the protection of UCH more than would otherwise have been 
possible through enforcement by state-based treaty making and customary law alone.251  
At the broader transnational levels, it was also demonstrated that private communities of 
stakeholders – such as local communities, economic sectors, and ocean users sharing the 
same geographical space – can be highly effective at driving forward protection of the 
historic and natural environment on behalf of humankind, if they are given sufficient buy-
in or incentivisation, or by creating the right conditions for collaboration, communication 
and innovation.252  By comparison with the command-and-control system of international 
and domestic law, such transnational communities and multi-level networks can carry 
 
250 See Section 3 below. 
251 See Chapter 6. 
252 See Chapter 9. 
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advantages in securing compliance,253 routing free riders,254 increasing efficiency,255 
lobbying governments,256 and reflexively dealing with the ‘wicked problems’ and 
relational complexity of aggregate-effort global public goods.257  All of this also serves 
to strengthen and reinforce state-based laws and systems protecting UCH, operating in a 
positive symbiosis between transnational and international regime-thickening.258 
 
It should also be recalled that an essential characteristic of multi-level governance is its 
capacity to constrain or complement national-level regulation and thus to overcome 
collective action weaknesses within intergovernmental legal processes.259  As Chapter 4 
 
253 E.g., Brousseau, E. and Dedeurwaerdere, T., (2012), ‘Global Public Goods: The Participatory 
Governance Challenges’, in Reflexive Governance for Global Public Goods, E. Brousseau, T. 
Dedeurwaerdere and B. Siebenhüner (Eds.), 21-36, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA), at p. 31; Masten, S.E. and 
Prüfer, J., (2014), ‘On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts’, 43(2) 
Journal of Legal Studies 359-400; Mitchell, R.B., (1994), Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental 
Policy and Treaty Compliance, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA), at pp. 299–300; Papanicolopulu, I., (2012), 
‘The Law of the Sea Convention: No Place for Persons?’, 27(4) International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 867-874, at p. 872; Bodansky, D., Brunnée J. and Hey, E., (2008), ‘International 
Environmental Law: Mapping the Field’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, D. 
Bodansky J. Brunnée and E. Hey (Eds.), 1-28, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 20. 
254 E.g., Johnson, N., Alessa, L., Behe, C., Danielsen, F., Gearheard, S., Gofman-Wallingford, V., Kliskey, 
A., Krümmel, E.M., Lynch, A., Mustonen, T. and Pulsifer, P., (2015), ‘The Contributions of Community-
Based Monitoring and Traditional Knowledge to Arctic Observing Networks: Reflections on the State of 
the Field’, 1 Arctic 28-40; Abbot, J. and Guijt, I., (1998), Changing Views on Change: Participatory 
Approaches to Monitoring the Environment, International Institute for Environment and Development 
(London). 
255 E.g., Wälti, S., (2010), ‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance’, in Handbook on Multi-Level 
Governance, H. Enderlein, S. Wälti and M. Zürn (Eds.), 411-422, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham), at p. 413; 
Calado, H., Bentz, J., Ng, K., Zivian, A., Schaefer, N., Pringle, C., Johnson, D. and Phillips, M., (2012), 
‘NGO Involvement in Marine Spatial Planning: A Way Forward?’, 36(2) Marine Policy 382-388, at p. 385; 
European Commission, (2010), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Maritime 
Spatial Planning in the EU—Achievements and Future Development, COM(2010) 771 Final, at p. 5. 
256 Keck, M.F. and Sikkink, K., (1998), Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics, Cornell University Press (Ithaca); Moghadam, V.M., (2005), Globalizing Women: Transnational 
Feminist Networks, 2nd Edn, Johns Hopkins University Press (Baltimore); van Tuijl, P. and Jordan, L., 
(2000), ‘Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advocacy’, 28(12) World Development 2051-2065; 
Sikkink, K., (2002), ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Social Construction of Legal Rules’, in 
Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy, Y. 
Dezalay and B.G. Garth (Eds.), 37-64, University of Michigan Press (Ann Arbor). 
257 E.g., Chaffin, B.C., Gosnell, H. and Cosens, B.A., (2014), ‘A Decade of Adaptive Governance 
Scholarship: Synthesis and Future Directions’, 19(3) Ecology and Society 56-68; Englender, D., Kirschey, 
J., Stöfen, A. and Zink, A., (2014), ‘Cooperation and Compliance Control in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction’, 49 Marine Policy 186-194, at p. 187; Armstrong, J. H. and Kamieniecki, S., (2017), ‘Strategic 
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Sustainability 1244-1262; Perrings, C. and Gadgil, M., (2003), ‘Conserving Biodiversity: Reconciling 
Local and Global Benefits’, in Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, I. Kaul, P. 
Conceição, K. Le Goulven and R.U. Mendoza (Eds.), 532-555, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 
535-536. 
258 See Sections 2 and 3 below. 
259 Van den Bergh, R., (2010), ‘Private Law in a Globalising World: Economic Criteria for Choosing the 
Optimal Regulatory Level in a Multi-Level Government System’, in Globalization and Private Law: The 
Way Forward, M. Faure and A. van der Walt (Eds.), 57-96, Edward Elgar (Cheltenham); Wälti, S., (2010), 
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detailed, the global public good nature of UCH protection makes it prone to externalities 
and, thus, to underproduction and deficient inter-state cooperation.  Furthermore, its 
placement within the transnational ocean context, with its characteristically fluid borders 
and intensive interdependence between nations, further compounds these collective 
action difficulties.  Multi-level governance is therefore a necessary model to manage these 
overspills (externalities) and underspills (internalities), so as to prevent regulatory races 
to the bottom and to provide states with sufficient incentive to drive forward their 
compliance with international norms.260  One particular area where this has proven 
effective, as exemplified by the impressive level of subscription to environmental, 
consumer, employment, social and human rights systems across Europe, is by increasing 
the role, function, power and complexity of regional and continental networks and 
regimes.  As evidenced in Chapter 7 – whether by multilateralism, supranationalism or 
transnationalism – the cultural and geographical proximity, lower collective action 
threshold, greater trust and goodwill, and lower common denominator effects, all make 
increased collaboration and cooperation across regional and sub-regional networks far 
more effectively than reliance on global inter-state treaties alone. 
 
Thus, most of the respondents to this study, with the exception of two, expressed a 
positive response to the potential of regional regimes and agreements to significantly 
improve the protection of UCH.  An analysis of existing literature also supported this 
view.  As Maarleveld responded in interview, ‘I am optimistic [because] I think that 
regional treaties will start to work.’261  Research across Chapters 6, 7 and 9 therefore 
highlighted multiple advantages to exploring new means of governing UCH protection 
beyond the exclusive role of inter-state treaties and customary international law.  In all 
cases, the ability of private and hybrid actors to drive up standards, pick up the slack in 
deficient public good provision and put pressure on states to comply or delegate in the 
governance of transboundary concerns, would all argue in favour of some further 
diminution and diffusion of exclusive state power outwards, downwards and upwards to 
wider multi-level governance regimes and networks.  As Firth aptly responded to this 
study, ‘the idea of having a multiple-layered approach is a good one.’262 
 
on the Environment: Exploring the Dynamics of a Complex Relationship’, 7(1) Transnational 
Environmental Law 89-113; at pp. 106-108; c.f., Scharpf, F.W., (1997), ‘Introduction: The Problem-
Solving Capacity of Multi-Level Governance’, 4(4) Journal of European Public Policy 520-538, at pp. 
521-523. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Supra n. 240, Maarleveld. 




2. Future Achievement of Underwater Cultural Heritage Protection by Multi-Level 
Governance  
(a) Overcoming the Limits of International Law Alone 
As evidenced in Chapter 8, national-level systems of law, i.e., public international law, 
private international law and domestic law, will remain the most powerful and influential 
systems of governance for some time.263  However, seeking a multiple-level and 
transnational approach does not equate to the demotion or devaluation of national 
governments; but instead recognises the future role of national governments as being 
more functional within the multi-level governance framework, providing valuable 
systems of democratic accountability, as well as an ability to exercise certain monopolies 
over citizens, including over domestic public services, fiscal rules and taxation, and 
municipal laws.264  Rather, what becomes necessary is the softening or reconfiguring of 
exclusive national sovereignty – with its values of absolutism, equality and hard political 
borders – whenever dealing with matters of a cross-border and transboundary nature. 
When one considers, therefore, that the production of certain global public goods radiates 
many ecological and psycho-social externalities which unavoidably concern external and 
future communities, such as the protection of the natural and historic environment, one 
could conclude that the production of such goods cannot fall to the exclusive remit of the 
nation state, even within its own territory. 
 
 
263 Marauhn, T., (2008), ‘Changing Role of the State’, in The Oxford Handbook of International 
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(Oxford), at pp. 728-729; Eckerberg, K. and Joas, M., (2004), ‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance: A 
Concept Under Stress?’, 9(5) Local Environment 405-412, at p. 411; MacCormick, N., (1993), ‘Beyond the 
Sovereign State’, 56(1) Modern Law Review 1-18; Walker, N., (2016), ‘Constitutional Pluralism Revisited’, 
22(3) European Law Journal 333-355; Supra n. 253, Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, at p. 22; Kaul, I., 
Grunberg, I. and Stern, M., (1999), ‘Global Public Goods: Concepts, Policies and Strategies’, in Global 
Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 
450-507, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 466; Harrison, J., (2011), Making the Law of the Sea: A 
Study in the Development of International Law, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), at p. 283; Boyle, 
A. and Chinkin, C., (2007), The Making of International Law, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at pp. 41-
46. 
264 Zürn, M., (2012), ‘Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance, D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), 730-774, Oxford University Press (Oxford), at p. 735; Franck, T.M., 
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International Cooperation and the Global Environment’, in Global Public Goods: International 
Cooperation in the 21st Century, I. Kaul, I. Grunberg and M. Stern (Eds.), 192-219, Oxford University 
Press (Oxford), at p. 194. 
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Nevertheless, and quite unsurprisingly, the decision to soften the hard edges of 
sovereignty and to weaken state autonomy will be controversial, complex and difficult.  
The recent rise in populist pro-nationalist sentiments in many parts of the world is well-
known,265 as are the concerns of many developing, emerging or postcolonial economies 
who now, quite reasonably, want their own opportunity to prosper independently as 
market nations and to assert their new sovereign right to self-governance.266  This point 
came across clearly from almost all of the interviewees in this study who, while accepting 
that strict defences of national sovereignty could be one of the principal difficulties facing 
the protection of the marine environment, were also clear that many communities and 
present-day citizens are increasingly looking in the very opposite direction.267  Indeed, 
there are several legitimate concerns with the weakening of state power, as broadly 
explored in Chapter 8.  For example, there remains a widely and strongly held belief that 
the nation state is the only legitimate source of political authority, with systems of 
constitutional accountability and recognised and respected democratic processes, such as 
elections and political parties.268  Unfortunately, there are also many who still regard the 
nation state as the rightful mechanism for dividing global civil society into discrete ethnic 
or cultural groupings. 
 
However, as has been argued in this thesis and has been given thorough scrutiny through 
an abundance of literature and research across different research fields, there is a great 
risk to future generations if we continue to place too much emphasis on traditional 
national divides.  Instead, the nation state will eventually be forced to adapt to its new 
modern, globalised, pluralised, multi-level, multi-cultural and increasingly cosmopolitan 
surroundings.269  Fortunately, the choice between greater transnational governance and 
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the preservation of international order need not be binary and, in fact, both forms of 
governance can interact within a productive, positively-reinforcing and synergetic 
relationship.  Three means by which this could happen, for example, might be by the 
forces of global constitutionalism, global administrative law, and global legal pluralism.  
In each case, as argued below, joining a national-level treaty framework such as the 
UNESCO Convention will actually assist in facilitating and hastening such 
transnationalisation. 
 
(b) Encouraging International Law by Transnational Law – and Facilitating 
Transnational Law by International Law 
One of the potential pathways, discussed in Chapter 6, is by global constitutional law.  
This recognises the gradual internationalisation of constitutional norms and values, such 
as rules imposing an obligation to protect concerns of humankind, which over time 
become increasingly vivid and harder to derogate from.270  States and international 
adjudicators will feel increasingly compelled to comply with such norms, such as by 
entering into and enforcing treaties which promote such values or by customarily 
observing such principles along with an opinio juris sive necessitatis.271  The liberal and 
increasingly decentralised administration of modern states also provides an environment 
where internal actors and courts may also be compelled to adopt and apply such external 
values, despite existing discrepancies in their own national law.272  Quite simply, the more 
that global civil society promotes the value of UCH protection, expanding and forcing the 
case for its necessary import on behalf of all humankind, the more that such erga omnes 
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norms will influence national societies, policies and judiciaries.273  Therefore, joining and 
supporting the UNESCO Convention will further assist the development of such 
peremptory norms; while the development of peremptory norms will incentivise joining 
the Convention. 
 
The second pathway by which inevitable processes of transnationalisation in a globalised 
world will positively interact with international law is by global administrative law.  This 
recognises that another force driving forward transnational law is the inevitable and 
increasing delegation from states to external administrative agencies and actors, who 
undertake many of the administrative legal functions on behalf of states.  Such agencies 
are often public-private hybrids or even privately instituted networks, in which non-state 
actors and other global governors operating in networks across different levels can 
actively participate and influence law.274  Such transgovernmental or administrative 
networks will continue to significantly influence compliance and interact positively with 
state policy, particularly in areas of complexity or requiring technical expertise beyond 
the shrinking remit of state budgets.275   
 
The likely difficulty of the United Kingdom to leave the supranational institution of the 
European Union, despite committed efforts to do so by its own government, is in some 
ways another example of this.  A particular difficulty has been the infeasibility of 
assuming administration of a complex matrix of transboundary governance issues which 
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have been absorbed by the EU over the years.276  Combining this with the findings in 
Chapter 7, which argued that the lower collective action threshold of regional-level 
systems and regimes will also entice states towards the collective gains, also makes it 
likely that transnational law will continue to drive up national standards in pursuance of 
global public goods.  In entering international treaties, therefore, states can be encouraged 
to sacrifice certain technical functions to agencies with a better handle on transboundary 
concerns, including the common concerns of humankind.  This same absorption of 
administrative law to external agencies and actors can therefore be found in the UNESCO 
Convention and the LOSC, where a growing role for public-private institutions – such as 
the UCH Scientific and Technical Advisory Board (STAB), International Maritime 
Organisation and International Seabed Authority – could see them increasingly influence 
transnational norms without complete intergovernmental oversight; instead relying on 
more intricate and nuanced systems of accountability to global civil society. 
 
Another key driving force of transnational law, as explored in Chapter 5, is by global 
legal pluralism.  This more broadly speaks of all actors engaging with laws which arise 
outside of traditional national law, operating through their own systems of accountability, 
legitimacy, scrutiny, behavioural modification, lawmaking and enforcement.277  It can 
include various networks and communities of non-state and subnational actors, who each 
have the capacity to create powerful social or legal norms, without the need for all of the 
traditional state legislative and judicial functions.  In some cases, these internally or co-
regulated systems – such as the Forest Stewardship Council certification,278 Marine 
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Stewardship Council certification279 and International Council of Museums Code of 
Ethics,280 just as examples – have the capacity to impact behaviours of citizens without 
the need for state intervention.281  In other cases, such as following the necessary 
expansion of international commercial arbitration or online dispute resolution, it is 
possible that actors self- or co-regulating in the transboundary space will force sovereign 
states to resign their usual juridical functions, decrease their public scrutiny role, or even 
facilitate such developments so as to better control such unavoidable transnational 
regimes and networks.282  Similarly, regional networks between subnational actors and 
local councils will enhance the quality of national law by applying pressure on their 
national governments from the bottom-up.283 
 
However, again, it is not only the inevitable development of issue networks and 
transnational communities outside of states that will lead to the eventual influence of 
international law towards transnational values; but also the development of international 
law which can help hasten, improve or facilitate the development of transnational and 
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regional systems of governance.  For example, intergovernmental and supranational 
treaties can institute collaborative spaces through which stakeholders can be given the 
space to interact, communicate and eventually collaborate.284  A good example will be 
the growing future role for transboundary spatial planning tools, such as marine spatial 
planning and the creation of transboundary marine protected areas.  Such processes will 
ensure that transnational communities can form networks, establish new rules and grow 
their influence, but these processes can be facilitated and significantly hastened by 
national law and international treaty.  For instance, Lisa Martin has extolled the 
facilitative benefits of international regimes for achieving more effective cooperation and 
communication among all stakeholders, where transnational organisations can facilitate 
the pursuit of ‘global cooperative goals’.285  Similarly, Bodansky has listed numerous 
advantages that international law can provide in the attainment of aggregate-effort global 
public goods, predominantly revolving around the provision of information, the 
legitimisation and standardisation of norms, and the empowerment of non-state actors in 
the global framework.286  In other words, national-level law can facilitate effective 
transnational law and governance; and transnational law can be highly influential in 
changing national-level law. 
 
(c) Enhancing the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage by both Transnational 
Law and International Law 
Given this positive interplay and complementarity between international and 
transnational law, there should be many transnational gains through widening 
participation in international treaties, such as the UNESCO Convention.  For example, 
the resulting increased international subscription to values recognising the importance of 
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protecting UCH will subsequently accelerate the coagulation of such universal values 
among all transnational actors and governors, thus influencing the policies and levels of 
compliance among other states.287  The UNESCO Convention provides this shift in mind-
frame.  For example, each Guérin,288 Manders,289 Williams,290 Firth291 and Aznar292 made 
statements in interview highlighting the clear shift in language which the UNESCO 
Convention instils, thus further embedding the norm of UCH protection among regulators 
and society generally.  The Convention also sets the framework for future communication 
and cooperation between all actors operating in networks with or without state scrutiny, 
in the pursuit of more effective means of governance and enforcement, as highlighted 
above.  In addition to all of this, the Convention also opens states themselves to 
collaborative dialogue over the protection of UCH, in a growing cognisance of its status 
as a common concern of humankind.293   
 
The grand irony being that, despite all criticism of national-level governance in this thesis, 
this system of governance is likely to remain important in hastening the quality and 
strength of transnational actors and regimes for some time.  As Kaul et al once wrote, the 
‘paradox of global public goods . . . is that their provision has to start nationally […].  
International efforts can complement, coordinate and monitor national endeavours but 
cannot substitute for them.’294  Treaties such as the UNESCO Convention and LOSC 
should therefore be understood for what they are: ‘framework treaties’, which are wholly 
intended to set the initial framework for future regime-thickening, proactive international 
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cooperation and transnational network facilitation.  As Barrett once put it, it is better to 
consider the ‘evolution of the treaty process’, given that ‘it simply will not be possible to 
construct a treaty that gets it all right from the start’.295  This accords with the influence 
and importance that Abbott and Snidal placed on international soft law, given its ability 
to influence the subsequent development of more complex processes of global 
governance.296  On this basis, they say, the use of broader equivocal targets in an 
international treaty should not automatically be regarded as a failure.297  As Firth rightly 
says, therefore, the constructive ambiguities throughout the UNESCO Convention ‘are 
there intentionally’ and, while ‘they will cause problems in the future . . . they are still 
outweighed [by] the positives.’298   
 
However, neither can we remain obsessed or excessively focused on international law 
and the UNESCO Convention alone.  Wherever state action is stalling, or compliance has 
become weak, such as relating to reflexive, complex or low-political issues, we must then 
dedicate greater resources and research to the facilitation and stimulation of 
communication, coordination and collaboration among all other actors and governors 
across all levels of governance.  Indeed, as demonstrated again above and throughout this 
thesis, such global, regional and community-level actors, regimes and norms have the 
capacity to side-step, mediate or coerce national policy or state behaviour.  Therefore, 
despite Flatman’s and Dromgoole’s concerns that powerful flag states will be slow to join 
the Convention, for fear of creeping coastal state jurisdiction,299 the growth of 
transnational regimes, systems and norms – operating above and below the state – may 
eventually force such states into submission or help coordinate their future policies 
towards transnational norms anyway.  Furthermore, in future epochs – by forces which 
include global constitutionalisation, transboundary administrative delegation, legal 
pluralism, and supranationalism – inter-state treaties such as the UNESCO Convention 
are susceptible to becoming fully superseded, enhanced or replaced in the areas where 
intergovernmental collective action can advance the common interest no further.300 
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Ultimately, global, regional and community solutions can and should be pursued at the 
same time as promoting the ratification of the UNESCO Convention: both options should 
be seen as complementary and neither should be exclusive of the other.  This includes 
allocating greater resources and shifting attention towards effective regional and sub-
regional schemes; as well as developing more effective systems and sharing best practices 
for integrating all local, dedicated, epistemic and professional communities into taking 
on a more powerful governance role.  Their symbiotic interrelationship not only means 
that future policy efforts should be concentrated on both transnational legal pluralisation 
and national-level law; but also that, when one of these systems stalls or slows down, then 
subsequently putting more fuel into the other system can kickstart all the other actors, 
including national actors, back into collective action and so helping to leap over any 
impasses which have become entrenched in the former system.  As has been evidenced, 
compliance has been most effective when it is driven by a combination of hard (inter-
state) rules and more managerial or reflexive systems of compliance management.301  In 
other words, in a period where ratifications and compliance with the UNESCO 
Convention has been weak to moderate, then all other transnational approaches – such as 
supranationalism, transnationalism, regionalism, and community empowerment – should 
be laid down more forcefully upon the table.   
 
3. Future Challenges of Underwater Cultural Heritage Protection by Multi-Level 
Governance 
The findings and arguments raised in this thesis have provided evidence that 
transnationalisation and multi-level stratification have various advantages which make 
them particularly desirable when addressing a complex, transboundary, low-political and 
universal public good, such as the protection of the marine historic environment.  In the 
case of UCH protection, stronger efforts should be dedicated to the real empowerment 
and strengthening of transnational and public-private actors, such as NGOs, research 
institutions, the STAB, and ICOMOS’s International Committee on the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage.  UNESCO’s recent initiative to twin various underwater archaeology 
research institutions in a global network and the recent conference bringing together 
various UCH-related NGOs from around the world are examples of positive 
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developments in this regard.302  Campaigners, conservationists and stakeholder groups 
should also keep working on the establishment of constitutionalised and baseline norms 
which place erga omnes obligations on humankind to protect UCH as a common concern 
of humankind.303  
 
Policymakers also need to start recognising that the LOSC and UNESCO Convention are 
not alone sufficient to protect UCH, but should be understood as ‘framework 
conventions’, from which future regional and sub-regional agreements – such as within 
the North-East Atlantic, Baltic Sea, Mediterranean and Caribbean, and across South and 
Latin America, Africa, Pacific Islands, and South East Asia – place tougher and more 
detailed instructions and obligations on the various stakeholders and communities 
implicated in UCH protection, including nation states themselves.  The need to 
proactively design further and more detailed rules is what should be understood by past 
state-to-state commitments to ‘cooperate’ in the protection of UCH on behalf of all 
humankind, as detailed in Chapter 3; as well as with agreements to continue processes of 
regime-thickening (or future sovereignty-sacrificing commitments) in LOSC Art. 303(4) 
and UNESCO Convention Art. 6.304  Policymakers also need to properly value what can 
be achieved by giving communities and stakeholders much greater opportunity and 
autonomy to achieve UCH protection themselves, including the careful provision of meta-
regulation and drafting new systems of public-oriented property and trust laws which can 
provide incentive and buy-in for communities to protect cultural heritage on behalf of 
humankind and future generations.  This also means recognising the importance and value 
of stakeholder involvement in the reflexive governance of complex social challenges, by 
providing facilitation or mediation of collaborative spaces and the provision of rights, 
tools and powers to enable communities to self- or co-govern effectively and sustainably. 
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Through forces such as externalisation, privatisation and innovation, such 
transnationalisation is arguably an inevitable development in our future globalised 
world.305  As a result, traditional regulatory actors and systems, as well as civil society 
more broadly, should be focusing energy and resources on being prepared for this gradual 
turn towards more complex, network-like and holistic modes of governance 
interconnecting with, within and without the conventional grandeur of the nation state.306  
They should also be moving more quickly towards such developments in the production 
of transboundary goods, such as the protection of the marine environment, given the clear 
failures and disadvantages which are inherent in the present horizontal model of exclusive 
inter-state government.  Naturally, there will be many challenges which are likely to arise 
in the future implementation of transnational governance approaches to UCH protection, 
of which some pertinent examples can be highlighted as this study closes. 
 
One of the key challenges, noted several times throughout this thesis, is the general 
resistance in much of society to the further resignation of national sovereignty.  A well-
known example is the European Union which, despite its impressive achievements when 
reviewed objectively, is likely to have its activities significantly stymied for some time 
by recent anti-establishment and nativist rhetoric in the European political space.  
Certainly, some of these concerns relating to globalism and regulation beyond the state 
are legitimate, especially in terms of democratic accountability, transparency and 
excessive centralisation.  As such, work should be done to increase the legitimacy, 
accountability, transparency, reflexivity and inclusivity of such external networks and 
actors.307  This also includes better communication of the equal democratic legitimacy of 
 
305 Mol, A.P., (2016), ‘The Environmental Nation State in Decline’, 25(1) Environmental Politics 48-68; 
Supra n. 242, Heal, at pp. 221-222; Gillespie, A., (2012), ‘Science, Values and People: The Three Factors 
that Will Define the Next Generation of International Conservation Agreements’, 1(1) Transnational 
Environmental Law 169-182, at pp. 179-182; Supra n. 263, Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, at p. 41-42; Tuerk, 
H., (2012), Reflections on the Contemporary Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoff (Leiden), at p. 186. 
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233, at p. 218). 
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supranational institutions, such as the European Union.  As Maarleveld responded, while 
governance approaches beyond international law are likely to improve the protection of 
UCH, ‘that is easily said, but not easily done of course.  And, let’s be honest, international 
developments . . . are not very promising at present.’308  Similarly, Firth and Maarleveld 
each expressed concerns with the powerful role that nationality still plays when engaging 
communities with the significance of UCH sites and the need for their protection.309  
However, there are potential advantages to this.  As Williams responded, Brexit presents 
an opportunity to engage national communities with strengthened regional systems of 
protection, by highlighting the national interests at stake.310  Similarly, Manders and 
Maarleveld pointed to the broader powers that will be available by better storytelling, 
rather than fact-telling, when engaging communities with the need to accept stronger rules 
of protection.311   
 
There is also the intriguing, but complex, question of how traditional inter-national law 
will interact and respond to transnational law arranged over multiple levels, with the 
resulting duality which is increasingly present in integrated models of ocean 
management.312  For example, even though multiple-layered networks and transnational 
communities will be able to improve upon the protection of UCH, the present system of 
ocean management is still entirely undergirded by a rigid constitution allocating exclusive 
state rights and powers.313  According to the LOSC, flag states remain exclusive owners 
of their UCH or legislators for UCH flagged to them beyond other states’ coastal waters; 
whereas coastal states remain exclusive legislators for UCH in their coastal waters or over 
natural resources in their wider economic zones.  The exclusivity which is essential to 
both juridical situations makes it difficult to see states freely agreeing to resign such rights 
for the benefit of external interests, as argued in Chapters 3 to 5.  As Maarleveld 
 
Networks 331-352; Kingsbury, B. and Casini, L., (2009), ‘Global Administrative Law Dimensions of 
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308 Supra n. 240, Maarleveld. 
309 ‘It is indeed the national narratives that still do the best job.  And, whereas at the other end, those are 
not the strongest narratives for protection, so.  So that’s a problematic paradox and it will be resolved at 
some point, but it will take time.’ (Supra n. 240, Maarleveld); Supra n. 237, Firth; Firth, A., (2002), 
Managing Archaeology Underwater: A Theoretical, Historical and Comparative Perspective on Society 
and its Submerged Past, BAR Publishing (Oxford), at pp. 79-100. 
310 Supra n. 237, Williams. 
311 Supra n. 237, Manders; Supra n. 240, Maarleveld. 
312 See Section 2 above; Tanaka, Y., (2008), A Dual Approach to Ocean Governance: The Cases of Zonal 
and Integrated Management of the Laws of the Sea, Routledge (Abingdon).   
313 For example, Kraska writes how the LOSC is the ‘centrepiece for oceans governance’, because it 
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responded, the LOSC ‘will not be changed soon. […] It had an enormously long trajectory 
to get it negotiated and it has to do with power politics, well with everything, and it will 
not change.’314  However, as argued above, many transnational forces – such as by global 
constitutionalism, administrative law and legal pluralism – will eventually constrain, 
influence or pressure states into further sovereignty-restraining regimes.  However, the 
problem appears instead to be with the pace of adoption, which usually comes ex post 
destruction, rather than states refusing to consent to further constraints on their 
sovereignty in the fullness of time. 
 
In this sense, the LOSC and UNESCO Convention should not be seen as set in stone.  
From a logical standpoint, no constitution which specifically allocates rights and 
obligations to different sectors of a society should be free from future modification as 
social circumstances and contexts evolve.315  Indeed, the LOSC was negotiated in a 
context when the threats, values and challenges of UCH protection were not yet known 
or understood.316  For example, and perhaps with an allusion to the growth of global 
governance and transnational law over the past few decades, Freestone says the exegesis 
of the LOSC is very different to many decades ago, given that an entirely different 
generation of law of the sea specialists are using it today.317  He adds, however, that ‘by 
the same token no-one . . . suggests that we need to start again.’318  In many ways, this 
suggests that such products of intense inter-state bargaining should be understood as 
establishing the ‘starting point’ for nation states allocating their desired rights and 
obligations inter partes; after which they should adopt a more functional role, by 
subsequently diversifying and stratifying governance into more complex, nuanced and 
multi-faceted networks which increasingly utilise, coerce or limit their national 
sovereignty.  This transition of the state from a territorial to a functional role, wherein it 
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helps to facilitate and improve the quality of future transnational governance networks, is 
widely understood.319  The state could thus continue to enjoy a powerful and central 
mediatory role between the supranational (global) orders and subnational (local) orders 
and, wherever a problem is of an international nature, higher ‘global’ or ‘regional’ norms 
should one day be able to outrank the individual state’s autonomy on the issue.320  The 
nation state’s interests should remain relevant so as to eventually be ‘enmeshed’ with 
humankind’s collective interests, but not ruling as ultimate and supreme.321   
 
Undoubtedly, many provisions within the LOSC and UNESCO Convention have – 
consciously or unconsciously – left leeway for the creation of future symbiosis between 
the international and transnational systems of governance.  For example, not only do 
Articles 6 of the UNESCO Convention and Article 303(4) of the LOSC invite future 
regional and multi-level treaties which provide ‘better’ and stronger constraints on states, 
but Article 311(5) of the LOSC states that the treaty’s limitation on the negotiation of 
future agreements which run counter to its constitutional decree would not include 
‘international agreements expressly permitted or preserved by other Articles of this 
Convention’.322  In other words, given that UCH was expressly recognised as an object 
meriting protection and that it requires future regimes of preservation, under Article 303, 
it is safe to conclude that Article 311(5) leaves harbour for powerful sovereignty-
constraining agreements which run counter to the original spirit and ethos of the LOSC.323  
Similarly, by not dealing with ownership and by prohibiting coastal states from assuming 
an exclusive legislative function over UCH, the UNESCO Convention has also left plenty 
of room for states to engage in negotiations over better and more effective systems of 
protection.  This can be supported by the system of coordinating states, as explored in 
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Chapter 3, as well as the requirement to include all states with a ‘verifiable link, especially 
a cultural, historical or archaeological link’ to UCH sites in such future negotiations.324  
 
There are also a whole host of future challenges in the actual administration of such 
transnational modes of governance, as highlighted in Chapter 8.  For example, the inter-
national system of world government remains attractive to many because it provides clear 
and predictable systems of accountability, in which it is easier for society to understand 
and scrutinise political developments.  By contrast, embracing overlapping and multiple 
levels of public-private norms, actors and regimes is only likely to bemuse or even 
harmfully disaffect society.  As above, therefore, more energy should be dedicated to 
understanding the role and placement of diverse governance regimes, as well as how and 
where civil society can be assured of democracy, fairness, accountability, opportunity, 
legitimacy and predictability.  This could be assisted by the institution of a coordinating 
agent at the global or regional levels, who is responsible for overseeing regimes and 
driving up these same values.325  As Aznar replied in interview, policy networks and 
forums would certainly help in protecting UCH, but such ‘forums must be stable and 
transnational, permitting the presence of all stakeholders but avoiding the biased lobby of 
the most powerful among them.’326 
 
There is also complexity and difficulty which is bred by taking stakeholder-inclusive 
approaches more generally, after bringing together diverse communities with conflicting 
or shifting public and private interests, values and perceptions.  Most of the interview 
respondents in this study noted such understandable concerns with stakeholder inclusivity 
and with the difficulty of even identifying – let alone effectively engaging and 
empowering – the correct groups of stakeholders and at the correct stages in the 
governance process.  Nevertheless, as was explored in Chapter 9, it is feasible that 
productive and collaborative conditions could be created by meta-regulation and by 
facilitative mediation, as well as by empowering and incentivising collaborative 
governance and problem-solving leadership.  As Altvater responded, for example, 
community inclusivity in ocean governance is most effective when you have one or two 
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people really leading the process.  ‘If you don’t have these persons in the region or in the 
community,’ she responds, then ‘there is a dearth in interest’.327   
 
Perhaps future integrated ocean management will adopt a more holistic and community-
oriented approach, even looking to an emerging idea of more feminist conceptions of 
ocean governance that depart from our traditional system built upon territoriality and 
displays of military power.328  Policymakers might also take notice of a growing 
development of holistic legal practice and dispute management, built around inclusivity, 
acceptance, mindfulness and open-mindedness.329  As Weston and Bollier have said of 
the future model for ecological governance of the commons, ‘given the cooperative nature 
of commons, conflicts and disputes within commons and rights-based ecological 
governance systems are not best settled by adversarial litigation or other such decision-
making processes.  They should be settled, instead, to the maximum extent feasible, 
through self-organized dispute resolution systems, using techniques and procedures that 
favor dialogue, mutual respect, and restorative outcomes among the disagreeing 
parties.’330     
 
Finally, there is the inevitable challenge of shifting values and ethics surrounding the 
management of UCH more generally.  Many of the starting points of UCH protection 
raised in Chapters 1 and 2 – such as in situ preservation, commercial exploitation, the 
powers of linked communities, the value of UCH, the definition of “underwater cultural 
heritage”, ownership of UCH, sovereign immunity, jurisdiction, and the proper treatment 
of historic sites and of human remains – all also remain susceptible to future contestation 
and fluctuation.331  Overall, however, all of the challenges emerging in the future 
transnational governance of UCH protection raised throughout this thesis and in this 
concluding chapter should be preferably viewed as matters which need to be addressed 
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by better and stronger regulation, rather than arguments in favour of safeguarding the 
traditional, consent-based and horizontal system of inter-national law.  The only certainty, 
therefore, is that research into effective ways to promote and coordinate transnational 
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